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Building Reasons Without Authority 
by 
Stan Husi 
My dissertation defends a comprehensive version of meta-normative 
skepticism which holds that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority 
or normative force. The view does not deny either that there are norms, standards 
of correctness, and principles of various kinds or that it is possible both to succeed 
or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. What it does deny is that any norm has 
the status of commanding with objective authority, the status of giving rise to 
objective normative reasons to take seriously and follow its demands. Many believe 
objective authority is required if we are to make sense of and explain the 
significance of our normative practices. Without authority, they fear, any critical 
standpoint vis-a.-vis our practices would evaporate, even when we have reached a 
consensus regarding critical matters, which, without correctness, appears to reflect 
nothing but an ultimately arbitrary choice. I disagree, and argue that while authority 
cannot be accommodated within the world as we know it, we don't need it either. A 
chief goal of my dissertation is to propose a positive interpretation of our normative 
practices that dispenses with authoritative facts directing us what to do. The 
practical question of what to make of our practices and our involvement with them, 
I counter, retains significance only when pursued from an engaged rather than a 
iii 
detached perspective - one that we adopt when, driven by our concerns and 
commitments, we actively participate in the resolution of practical problems, 
including the selection and development of norms to live by, searching for common 
ground for how to coordinate our individual and joint endeavors. Even though there 
are no definitive answers, this deliberative enterprise is not unconstrained; it is 
carried out within a tight web of norms that we do already accept, a web we 
continuously spin and expand. 
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Preface 
In this preface I would like to provide an overview of the dissertation. The 
first chapter Two Concepts of Normativity introduces the problematic of normative 
authority by inSisting on the important distinction between norms and their status, 
between the formal feature of being directive in character and the substantive 
feature of directing with authority. The first distinguishes norms as norms, 
including their implicit standards of correctness, but it is the second that prompts 
the entire meta-normative problematic in the first place. There is a common 
tendency to under-appreciate the meta-normative problematic, and this is partly 
explained by our lack of an established vocabulary in which to express that 
problematic. The term normative itself is ambiguously used, at times denoting the 
directive element in norms, setting them apart from historical treatises and medical 
records, at other times denoting their authoritative standing, setting them apart 
from illegitimate norms. Presumably we are all realists about norms. The public 
arena in which we debate how to manage our individual and joint affairs is evidently 
characterized by a great plurality and diversity of norms and standards directing us 
what to do. Undoubtedly there are plenty of oughts and shoulds according-to-norm-
such-and-such, plenty of opportunities to commit mistakes according-to-norm-such-
and-such, and so forth. Language and the law exemplify that indisputable fact best. 
Whenever we open our mouths to form a sentence we engage in a norm-guided 
activity. And grammaticality is but one instance of for our thoroughgoing 
involvement with norms. Another is the law. It is unlawful in the United States to 
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hoist any flag higher than the Stars and Stripes. Yet whether authoritative reasons, 
not just officials, decree that I must comply in my own enclosed yard is unclear and 
represents a matter wholly distinct from the recognition that I would act contrary to 
the law if I do not. The normative problematic as I envision it cannot be appreciated 
solely in terms of standards of correctness, but only in terms of the authority of 
standard of correctness. Norms are not the solution, but the problem. 
The second chapter, "Against Non-reductive Realism," challenges the idea 
that some norms just are authoritative practice-independently, even though there is 
no explanation why. This form of non-reductive normative realism has recently 
gained considerable support, and holds, in David Enoch's succinct summary, that 
there are response-independent, non-natural, irreducibly normative truths, perfectly 
objective and universal ones, that when successful in our normative inquires we 
discover rather than create or construct. Yet to postulate an independent normative 
realm, I argue, presupposes a metaphysics that systematically undermines all 
epistemic access to normative truths and renders it mysterious why once detached 
from our concerns they should practically matter to us in the first place. If certain 
norms were authorized in practice-independent Platonic heaven, how should we 
ever find out which, and why should we obsequiously follow them rather than those 
that reflect our own concerns? Moreover, the strategy most prominently cited in 
support of non-reductive normative realism, namely transcendental argumentation, 
is unsuccessful, even if rhetorically quite impressive. The argument begins by 
pointing out that settling what to accept, and in particular whether to accept a 
skeptical position such as my own, appears to be a norm-driven enterprise. Yet, it 
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continues, skeptics cannot coherently view as authoritative the norms they need to 
rely upon in advancing their case without also relinquishing their very skeptical 
denial. How, then, can they coherently recommend their view? In response, I admit 
that making the case for and against any hypothesis does essentially involve norms: 
we need criteria of argumentative correctness and success. Yet what we do not need 
is to presume that the norms underwriting philosophical argumentation are 
equipped with practice-external authority. We only need norms that in fact facilitate 
our epistemic and dialectical ends, and their employment is not bound up with or 
contingent upon the metaphysics of Platonic realism. 
The third chapter, "Against Reductive Realism," rejects the proposal that 
normative authority can be explained on the basis of our desires and endorsements. 
Initially, desire-based accounts have a lot going for them. The issue of a norm's 
authority arises in connection with agents, the unique consumers of standards and 
reasons. They are the ones to whom norms must be addressed, and it is they who 
must determine whether to take seriously what is so addressed. This naturally leads 
to the thought that a norm's authority consists in its voluntary endorsement and 
endorsement, the proposal must say, is a complex form of desire, a disposition to do 
something, instead of a judgment on the norm's authority (if it were such a 
judgment, the proposal would move in a circle). Yet desire-based accounts face a 
fatal dilemma. If the relationship between agents, their desires, and their choices is 
understood purely descriptively, as a complex natural-psychological phenomenon, it 
is clear nothing normative can fall out of it. If, however, we appeal to additional 
normative principles, which asserts that agents ought or have reasons to further 
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their desired ends to explain the normative significance of desire, then we have 
essentially introduced a principle whose authority cannot itself be accounted for in 
terms of desire. And this, I argue, involves costs for desire-based accounts that far 
exceed the mere admission of a gap in explanation. It amounts to no less than the 
rejection of the very rationale that motivates desire-based accounts in the first 
place. 
The fourth chapter, "Against Agency-Based Accounts," introduces and rejects 
agency-based accounts of authority. The basic idea is this: For a norm to be 
authoritative is for it to be constitutive of our own agency and capacity to make 
practical choices. A norm that enables you to be who you are and that empowers 
you to ponder what to do must represent a standard you cannot escape. This 
quintessential Kantian strategy concurs with my own approach in its emphasis on 
the vantage point of the deliberating agent. The problem, however, is that 
constitution and authority represent rather distinct phenomena, and to equate them 
is to equate apples and oranges. At the very least, constitution cannot be the whole 
story on authority even if it is part of it. This becomes apparent once we realize that 
many norms that are held to be authoritative are not constitutive of anything. More 
importantly, though, the kind of necessity that underwrites constitution is not the 
same as that underwriting normative authority. Constitution concerns what we 
can't help doing more than what we should be doing. It belongs more to the purview 
of the engineer who designs complex norm-consuming systems than to that of the 
ethicist and practical philosopher. Suppose acceptance of norm N turns out to be 
constitutive for doing X. In that case you cannot do X while disrespecting N. Should 
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you also care about doing X, then you would only achieve what you care about so 
long as you implement N. You Botta do what you Botta do. Yet nothing more seems to 
follow. In particular, it does not follow that you normatively must comply with N or 
that you have any reasons to do so. The impossibility of doing-X-while-disregarding-
N could reflect some basic constraints in design-space akin to that one cannot build 
stable bridges while disrespecting the laws of gravity. Moreover, the inescapability 
of doing X itself would not change the normative situation either, but solely place 
yet another constraint on your practical options. Thus, even if you absolutely had to 
do X - a choice you simply could not evade - and further that doing X was required 
for complying with N, this hardly would entail any reasons to comply with N on your 
part. One constraint would lead to another, but the fact remains that being 
constrained is not the same as having reasons. You merely would find yourself 
trapped in a tight corner. Might does not make right, as normative force evidently 
differs from brute force. 
The fifth chapter, "Reasoning without Authority," develops my 
counterproposal explaining how norms and social practices can have significance 
for us without appealing to practice-independent authority> I call the resulting view 
"revisionary subjectivism" and present deliberation as a very sophisticated form of 
norm-guided motivation with the aim of accommodating core features of practical 
deliberation. The chapter starts out with a discussion of the fictionalist response to 
skepticism, the view that we may manage to retain the benefits of knowingly 
discredited practices by downgrading our epistemic attitudes towards them from 
believing to making-believe. Against this I show the fictionalist response to be 
xii 
inferior to the revisionist alternative, for once fully worked out, fictionalism is going 
to lead us right to the very doorsteps of revisionism. The benefit the fictional 
attitude is capable of affording is due to the retainable elements of the 
corresponding practice. If so, there always is an available revisionary alternative 
which "shrinks" the original practice to precisely those retainable elements, and 
which has the advantage of clear-headedly dispensing with the barely-stable 
fictionalist attitude. Because of this we should stop making-believe in what does not 
work and start believing in what does work. 
The chapter then addresses the fundamental challenge that without a 
normative account there cannot be an adequate account of deliberation, the 
challenge, in particular, that revisionary subjectivism cannot accommodate the 
notion of correct deliberation. To this I respond by aiming to show how the 
subjectivist can accommodate correctness-permitting deliberation from within by 
helping himself to norms underwriting the deliberative process. These are norms 
void of normative authority, yet they nonetheless generate formal correctness 
conditions which, in conjunction with motivational force acquired through our 
commitments, enable a form of practical deliberation incorporating internal 
correctness and incorrectness conditions. After this, the chapter turns to a close 
discussion of concerns, the core component engendering deliberation according to 
revisionary subjectivism. Attending to concerns more closely reveals an astonishing 
degree of complexity and richness, which, despite the long noticed importance of 
desires and concerns for practical deliberation, has not always received adequate 
treatment in the literature. Concerns are unruly fellows, displaying an intriguing set 
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of properties including diversity, specificity, particularity, and synchronic and 
diachronic stability. Moreover, concerns appear to contain an element of appraisal, 
where there often seems, in the relevant object, an element of invitation drawing in 
the concern: concerns do not present themselves as a mere blind reaction aroused 
by certain aspects of their objects, but as a receptivity to their attractiveness. This 
sometimes enables us to construe a concern as called-for by the attractiveness of the 
relevant feature, as something that can be appropriate or inappropriate depending 
on whether the feature is in fact attractive. In light of this, one of my objectives in 
the chapter is accommodate the element of appraisal in a manner consistent with 
skepticism. 
This final and positive part of the project supports the first and negative one 
by neutralizing the general worry that our practices would naturally falter without 
an external authority supporting them. The case for practice-independent authority 
rests on painting a grim picture of the alternative. Yet if a brighter picture of that 
alternative can be painted, the case for such authority loses one major column of 
support. This is exactly what I set out to do in the final chapter. The idea of 
normative practices without authority is intriguing because it liberates practical 
thought from all doubts about an authority transcending our practices. It allows us 
to grow content with thinking of practical thought and its object as fundamentally of 
our own making - the only way that makes sense to me. What I share with most of 
my opponents is the core belief that our practices and their internal standards are 
indispensable. The lesson I draw from this is different, however. What I wonder is 
how such a central piece of our lives could be held hostage to uncertain 
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metaphysical truths. Rather than joining into the defense of our practices by 
defending authority, I maintain no such defense is needed to begin with. My 
opponents serve our practices poorly by rendering the very point of them 
contingent on normative metaphysics. By revising the interpretation I seek to 
conserve the practices. 
Chapter 1 
Making Sense of the Meta-Normative 
Debate 
1.1. Setting the Stage 
This is an essay in normative metaphysics. It investigates the nature, reality and 
practical significance of normativity. The thesis I defend combines a skeptical stance on 
the existence of normativity with an equally skeptical stance on its practical significance. 
Normativity, I argue, cannot be accommodated within the natural world as we know it; I 
consider my naturalistic commitments to exclude normativity from my ontological 
repertoire. It is the combination of ontological and practical skepticism about 
normativity, however, that promises to present the skeptical position in a novel and 
favorable light overall. My denial of the normative not only is attenuated by my 
corresponding denial of its practical significance, or at any rate by my suggestion that its 
practical significance may be renegotiated; it also receives support by neutralizing the 
1 
2 
perhaps most powerful counterargument. Many have forcefully argued that "normative" 
discourse would naturally falter without normativity supporting it; their case for 
normative realism partially rests on painting rather grim a picture of the alternative. Yet if 
a brighter picture of that alternative can be painted, the case for normative realism loses 
one major column of support; the case I wish to make, then, is that far from being 
inevitable, the realists' portrayal of irrealism actually constitutes a rather dubious sort of 
fear-mongering. 
Moreover, we hardly know what that alternative would look like to begin with; 
there are several systematic treatises defending normative realism, but very few, if any, 
opposing it; the sketchy portrayals of normative irrealism offered by realists are all we 
really have - teeming with confusions and misunderstandings. We certainly find plenty 
refutations of particular normative domains - most prominently the moral one - but as we 
shall see that's a different story. So without having a systematic investigation of 
normative irrealism at our disposal, the basis for favoring realism over irrealism must 
appear somewhat imbalanced. Even those who disagree with irrealism may welcome to 
learn more about what exactly they are disagreeing with. With this appeal to their 
curiosity, I'd like to invite them to imagine normative discourse without normativity, and 
possibly to be surprised. If my case is sound, not only is normativity the kind of 
suspicious property many have suspected, but also rather dispensable. Normativity, put 
bluntly, is something we neither have nor need. 
Normative discourse without normativity - such an idea promises an intriguing 
vista on practical thought and discourse, I believe; not only would it immunize practical 
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thought against an increasing number of nagging doubts about the normative; it would 
also allow us to grow content with thinking of practical thought and its object as 
fundamentally of our own making - the only way that makes sense to me; content 
because practical thought would emerge not any longer as wanting or deficient solely 
because it was of our own making. Putting my cards on the table, then, this project is in 
part motivated by the intention to bolster a broadly constructivist agenda in political 
philosophy by neutralizing one of its greatest worries: that constructivism is deficient for 
its inability to account for normativity; I agree that it is unable to do that, but I disagree 
that it needs to do that. If accounting for normativity presents an unrealistic demand, we 
may rather want to reconsider that demand; unrealistic, because it would be a funny 
demand indeed to account for that which does not exist. And we already know a few of 
such unrealistic demands that have at times been made of practical thought or parts 
thereof - that there must be a God, mostly, without whom many feared there would be no 
right and wrong; and yet, some of us got over that. In fact, I believe asking for 
normativity is not completely unlike asking for a God; both seem like asking for the 
ultimate backup, for that which with unquestionable authority would license the way we 
conduct our lives alone and in company; but we need no backup and no license; we can 
learn to live without that which we cannot have: normativity. 
But how can the union of normative discourse and normativity be even so much 
as optional? Normativity appears to be part and parcel of normative thought; moreover, 
the request for normativity is profoundly motivated by elements inherent in normative 
thought, as I will show shortly. Yet however firm their current union may be, it can still 
come apart. To show how, I want to introduce an important distinction, namely between 
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practices and interpretation of practices; we engage in normative thought, and we 
interpret that engagement; we think about what to do, and we have a conception of what 
we are then thinking about. The normative interpretation - the one I wish to dispense 
with - has it that in thinking what to do we are responding to what we are called upon to 
do; practical questions supposedly receive answers in authoritative facts of what is to be 
done - facts, I claim, that do not exist. Once interpretation is distinguished from that 
which is interpreted, it becomes possible to replace one interpretation for another; a chief 
goal of this essay, then, is to devise such an alternative interpretation of practical thought 
that is not in need of normative facts. What I share with most normative realists is the 
core belief that practical thought is indispensable; the lesson I draw from this is different, 
however; what I wonder is how such a central piece of our lives could be held hostage to 
uncertain metaphysical truths. Rather than joining into the defense of practical discourse 
by defending normativity, I plea no such defense is needed to begin with. Realists serve 
our practices poorly by rendering the very point of them contingent on normative 
metaphysics. By revising the interpretation I seek to conserve the practice. 
Similar interpretative shifts have occurred before; picking up on my analogy from 
religion again, morality was long perceived to depend on divine authority, but is not 
anymore. Still, how profound the conviction at times was is witnessed by the allegiance it 
found even in thinkers who allegedly challenged it. Grotius - who contended that 
morality could conceivably have a certain degree of validity without God (Schneewind 
1998:67-68) - thought that strictly speaking "duty and obligation ... necessarily supposes 
a superior power, a supreme master of mankind." (Schneewind 1998:73) Kant seemed to 
concur. In his critique of rational theology, Kant argues that God's existence is to be 
postulated as a condition of what ought to be. Having God's existence in mind, Kant 
writes: "Since there are practical laws that are absolutely necessary (the moral laws), then 
if these necessarily presuppose any existence as the condition of the possibility of their 
binding force, this existence has to be postulated." (Guyer 2006:152, A 633-4) 
Dostoevsky, of course, put the doctrine best when he ventured that God's death would 
result in unlimited moral permissibility. Moral thought, then, was long thought to target 
at God's demands; no such demands, no target and no point, or so many must have 
thought. Yet our conception of moral thought certainly has changed and evolved, without 
even altering much of moral thought itself; we still believe murder is wrong, even if we 
aren't told so by God. The normative interpretation of normative thought, I thus propose, 
may turn out just as optional as the theological interpretation of morality. 
But what is normativity anyway? To answer this question, I will propose a norm-
based approach; to a first approximation, I take normativity to be a property that 
distinguishes norms with authority from those without. I believe this approach is 
particularly fruitful, for three reasons; first, it allows us to tackle the notion of normativity 
step by step; thereby we can expect to gain greater illumination than if we took on the 
notion as a single piece; secondly, I think the approach is intuitively appealing. There are 
a great number of norms that have been or could have been issued on us; yet at best we 
only take a small number of them to be authoritative; there is an intuitive distinction 
between norms that merely issue claims on us versus those that do have claims on us. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, the approach actually offers a motivation and not 
just an analysis of the idea of normativity. It opens up a perspective on normativity that 
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would explain why the idea may have been introduced in the first place; it presents the 
idea of normativity as a response to a problem and not merely as a product of our creative 
minds. The norm-based approach, then, does not emerge as a mere exercise in conceptual 
analysis, which is a most welcome result; unmotivated conceptual analysis of normativity 
makes for a questionable enterprise, I believe, as it immediately grapples us with thorny 
questions such as whose concept we are analyzing anyway and what significance the 
concepts we'd end up with could possibly have (normativity - schormativity). Motivation 
as opposed to analysis would render it simply unnecessary to settle which of the many 
definitions of normativity got it "right." And so while I do believe that I can show my 
conceptual choice to correspond to important parts of the philosophical literature, what 
I'm ultimately interested in is the philosophical problem to which I take the idea of 
normativity to be a response, and not the mere idea itself. That's why I believe the norm-
based approach is so attractive, for it nicely explains why anyone could have been 
interested in normativity in the first place. 
1.2. Normativity and Norms 
I take it to be a minimal yet distinctive feature of normative domains or categories 
that they open up space for success and failure; it must be possible for something to go 
wrong. A normative category must not only give rise to some distinction between what 
does and does not satisfy or belong to that category; any old category does that. Rather, it 
must formally encapsulate an unfavorable stance towards instances that do not satisfy that 
category. Such instances must count as nonconforming as opposed to merely falling 
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outside the category's application or extension. In fact, it is only because a normative 
category does apply to nonconforming instances that those instances can be classified as 
nonconforming in the first place. So whereas the relationship between non-normative 
categories and their instances is exhaustively captured in terms of formal satisfaction, the 
relationship between normative categories and their instances is importantly different and 
more complex. 
The difference is most apparent when we consider negative cases of 
dissatisfaction or nonconformity; take ELEPHANT, a non-normative category, and 
HEAL THY, a potentially normative one. Things that aren't elephants are in no way 
wanting; they just aren't elephants. It would be an odd way of speaking to say that a 
mouse fails to live up to the category ELEPHANT. Unhealthy things, in contrast, can 
sensibly the thought of as failing to live up to being HEALTHY. HEALTHY, I said, is 
potentially normative, as it is not necessarily used that way in every context; one may 
always abstract from the normative aspect of a normative category and focus exclusively 
on its descriptive aspect; HEALTHY used this way would just be another distinction in 
how things could be. The normative aspect of categories by no means preempts them 
from being used merely descriptively; still, it is once we can sensibly think of negative 
instances as not merely dissatisfying, but as failing to conform or live up to some 
category that this category becomes normative. 
This brings us to norms, then; norms by their very nature encapsulate conditions 
of success and failure, and thus provide an excellent entry for thinking about normativity. 
Norms, I suggest, are models for a range of objects. The full specification of a norm 
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would encapsulate at least two elements. First, each norm would specify a range of 
objects it applies to; norms always are norms for something, and cannot be empty or lack 
'subjects' to be governed. In turn, only that which is within a norm's range can sensibly 
be judged in terms of that norm; norms for elementary school students do not apply to 
high school students; not because high school students are perfect can they never violate 
elementary school norms; they cannot do so simply because they are outside the range of 
elementary school norms; I will call a norm's range of application its application or 
jurisdiction. Notice that no principal limits have been placed on what could count as a 
norm's application; norms often apply to people and their behavior, but might just as well 
apply to artifacts, hypothetical scenarios, or the world as a whole. 
Secondly, norms specify models for how the objects within their applications 
shall be. Norms encapsulate a directive element. Figuratively speaking, norms are maps 
with a particular spin or direction of fit, as they do not map what is but what should be. 
Anscombe's (1967) frequently used example of two "identical" shopping lists used for 
different purposes comes in handily; the list that directs the father what to buy is a norm; 
the list of what he did buy compiled by the detective afterwards is not. Or take another 
example; architectural blueprints are norms, while architectural digests are not; blueprints 
specify how a list of materials is to be arranged, digests how they were arranged. Models 
are complex units encoding information, and one cannot tell whether they are used as 
norms or representations solely by considering the information encoded; whether or not 
some model functions as a directive or representation also depends on how a misfit 
between model and world would have to be construed. If in such a misfitting case "the 
fault would be placed on the world," the model would be used as a directive; otherwise as 
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a representation. Norms call upon their application to be as specified by the model, 
representations are called upon to specify things as they are. This characterization 
suggests that the distinction may not be as straightforward as it initially appeared; 
representations as such may also be norm-governed, possibly on a higher level: what 
makes a representation a representation is that it is to accord with how things are, which 
clearly has the form of a directive. It is not easy to make all this more precise and to 
replace the figurative with the non-figurative; still, it is quite familiar; it may be hard to 
come up with a better characterization of norms; but most would probably agree that 
norms as such, including their existence and epistemological status, are not terribly 
problematic. In any case, we better ensure that what may be said about norms in the 
abstract comports with the fact that norms are both prevalent and familiar. 
Thus, instead of further embarking upon a detailed treatment of norms, I wish to 
plea to the familiar. We can readily identify an abundance of norms operating in virtually 
any comer of our lives. Norms are as common as what they govern - which is basically 
everything; even talking about norms is recognizably norm governed - if only because 
language is; hence no later than when we start learning our language - figuring out how 
to distinguish correct from incorrect usages of that language - are we immersed in norm-
governed behavior. We certainly cannot always articulate the norms we are guided by; 
making norms explicit requires some effort. Still, that there are norms for most of our 
doing is as plain as it could be. Just think about the familiar academic cocktail party. 
There are norms concerning what to wear; when to arrive; how to eat, and what to eat; 
what to talk about and what to only hint at; what jokes to make, and how to react to 
others' jokes that one may not make; how long to stay, and when to leave; who to say 
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goodbye to and whom to thank; what to recall about the party later on and what to leave 
as that which is not to be talked about; whether and when to return the favor; and then, 
how and when to host the next party, for which there will be norms again concerning 
such matters as what to wear, and when to arrive ... 
I also believe my focus on norms is compatible with a wide array of philosophical 
traditions; more controversial material will emerge soon when I tum from norms as such 
to questions concerning their status; for now, I would like to set up the point of departure 
so as to welcome most everyone to join the trip. Norms are marvelously versatile and can 
come in all shapes and sizes; norms can be principled or unprincipled, general or 
particular, atomistic or holistic, categorical or hypothetical; norms can specify conditions 
tight or loose for their application, address affairs large and general or tiny and concrete; 
norms can be implicit or explicit, encoded or non-encoded - perhaps even unencodable. 
Furthermore, norms can be structured in all sorts of ways; most norms are not isolated, 
but rather come organized in form of entire webs of norms; norms are often nested in 
each other and are governed by higher order norms; there are plenty of norms governing 
how to devise or set up norms, how to debate norms, how to incorporate norms, even 
how to follow norms, etc. There are norms for when to make exceptions, norms for when 
to suspend norms, and so forth. In light of such flexibility, we should be able to find 
norms suiting every kind of philosophical predilection and background. 
Let me show this for a prominent few. Principles are norms, and consequently . 
principle-based traditions such as consequentialism and deontology should have little 
troubles countenancing the importance of norms. What about traditions that reject the 
primacy of principles? No problem there, I think; while principles are norms, norms need 
not be principles; virtue-oriented traditions employ notions such as what kind of person 
to be or whom to be angry at in the right manner at the right time and so on and so forth -
and it's not hard to detect a norm in all of that. 
1.3. Norms and Evaluation 
Let me expand my norm-based approach to the domain of evaluation and value. I 
believe evaluation or evaluative statements will fall into place smoothly and easily once 
we identify their norm-based character. Evaluative statements, I suggest, are statements 
about particular instances judged in light of some background norm. If such an instance is 
within that norm's application, the evaluative statement will be true or false depending on 
whether that instance complies with the model specified by the norm; if it does, that 
instance would be valuable along some dimension of value - evaluations, after all, are 
statements concerning value. The full explication of the content of an evaluative 
statement would involve the specification of a norm; every norm would in turn give rise 
to a potential infinity of true evaluative statements, relative to that norm. 
Consider the norm "one must not wear green socks to dinner parties;" let's use the 
term socky for behavior that violates this norm; an evaluative statement such as "Peter 
behaved sockily again" would be a true (negative) evaluation of Peter's behavior if he 
indeed was wearing green socks to a dinner party. The norm-based account of evaluation 
admittedly is somewhat deflationary; the truth of evaluative statements is easily secured; 
all that is required is a norm operative in the background with which we can hook up the 
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relevant evaluative statement, and a sample of plain descriptive facts. Evaluative facts 
piggy bag on facts about norms and descriptive facts; as a consequence, whatever can be 
said about norms will have implications for evaluative statements as well. 
The norm-based account of evaluation or value has various attractive features. 
First, it explains why value is inherently dynamic; value does not sit still, but engages our 
active capacities; value is not merely another aspect of the world to be taken notice of - it 
engages more than our representational capacities; it bears a direct and dynamic 
relationship to what is to be done. Since norms are directive in nature, the norm-based 
approach of value can do justice to this dynamic element of value. Secondly, the 
approach squares well with a wide variety of prominent accounts of value; take, for 
instance, Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. On Scanlon's account, something is 
valuable roughly if it calls for a certain response; a piece of art is beautiful, say, if there 
are reasons to admire it. Now, as will become clear later on, I cannot go with Scanlon all 
the way, but here's how far I can go. Calling for a certain response is a norm-governed 
affair. The statement that a piece of art is beautiful can be understood (in part) as 
involving a norm; a norm calling for admiration with regard to that piece. Or take 
response-dependent accounts of value; the responses taken to be constitutive of value 
must all have a directive direction of fit; they thus could qualify as mini-norms of sorts; 
my desire to be a good philosopher is a norm calling on me to be a good philosopher, a 
norm I endorse. Or take perfectionist accounts; again, what does or does not qualify as 
the suitably perfectionist state can well be stated in terms of norms; if one is to exercise 
regularly in order to reach perfection, the corresponding norm calling for regular exercise 
could be taken to (partly) specify the content of that perfection. 
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Thirdly, the norm-based account of evaluation would nicely explain how and why 
evaluation and directives so intimately hang together. An example from the moral 
domain will make this plain: What we want to say are things such as that it is because 
some action would produce bad effects that one must not do it. Now, the question is what 
explains that, as most would think, the badness of those effects and the prohibition 
against doing it are not just accidentally, but inherently related? Few would believe that it 
was just an accident that one must do what has value rather than disvalue. The norm-
based account of evaluation, I think, has a ready answer here. According to that account, 
evaluation and directives are really just two sides of the same coin. For something to be 
good, as the norm-based account has it, is for it to be as it is supposed to be; and how it is 
supposed to be is specified by some norm; the norm says be so-and-so, and it is so-and-so 
- and hence it is good. We consequently do not need an extra principle connecting 
something is valuable to be like this! Being valuable already couples Be like this! with 
being like this. 
1.4. Norms and Favoring 
The norm-based approach, I think, can also be employed for getting a firmer 
handle on the notion of favoring, an important one in contemporary meta-ethics; many 
believe, for instance, that favoring is what reasons characteristically do. What I want to 
suggest now is that favoring is a norm-supported relationship as well; the full 
specification of a particular favoring relationship would make reference to some norm or 
other. Let's take an example. The fact that walnuts are healthy due to their richness in 
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Omega 3 fatty acids favors eating them. Why? The simple answer is that one should eat 
healthy things (a norm) and walnuts are healthy; a more complex answer would perhaps 
specify a variety of norms interacting with each other in this context; if I'm correct, the 
evaluation healthy already contains a norm - a norm for how food is supposed to be; 
thus, the norm for what to eat and that which underlies healthy would already be related; 
eat that which is fitting for eating, where fitting for eating is that which supplies the body 
with what it needs so that it can function as it is supposed to function (another norm), and 
so forth. 
The norm-based approach to favoring suggests the following picture, then; the 
favoring-relationship holds between some states of affairs and a response in virtue of a 
supporting norm. Whether or not we want to think of the relevant norm as participating in 
that relationship or merely sustaining or enabling it I do not care; a lot discussion has 
been spilled lately on the distinction between favorers and enablers - a distinctions I'm 
not sure carries much substantial weight; for the record, I'm fully content with the weaker 
construal where norms need not be part of the favoring relationship itself; as long as 
norms playa crucial job in explaining that relationship, I'm fine, whatever the exact job 
description may turn out to be. 
The important point is that it is always a fair question why some state of affairs 
favors a particular response; by answering that question we bring out what norm is 
operative for sustaining that favoring relationship; why does the fact that walnuts are 
healthy favors eating them? The simple answer, that this is so because one should eat 
healthy things, immediately brings us to a norm. Thatfavoring is norm-supported is often 
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disguised. For one thing, as I argued above, many favoring-statements do already cover 
norms; this generates the appearance that no norm needs to be mentioned in order to 
explain some favoring, overlooking that a norm has been in play all along. But also, 
many norms that support some favoring or other simply are taken for granted, even 
trivial. Paying them any extra attention seems superfluous; still, trivial norms are norms 
nonetheless. 
My thesis, then, is that states of affairs cannot be favorers just by themselves; 
favoring is like calling for something, and states of affairs don't call for anything; they 
are fully satisfied with how they are; there is a gap between the mere existence of some 
state of affairs and having favoring powers; that gap needs to be closed and norms do just 
that. Some disagree, however, and argue that nothing additional is needed to close that 
gap; the specification of certain states of affairs, they think, can be explanatorily 
complete as the favoring powers of those states of affairs are concerned; they hold the 
relationship between the existence and favoring powers of some state of affairs to be 
seamless. 
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Three reasons speak against that view. First, as I already explained, the 
appearance that in many cases favoring needs no norms is faulty for it disguises the fact 
that norms are already contained in the relevant evaluations. Many descriptions of states 
of affairs are anything but innocent as they contain plenty of norm-laden terms; if 
beautiful involves a norm calling for admiration, then mentioning Venice' beauty is 
indeed sufficient to settle whether it favors admiration. This and other value-laden 
descriptions of states of affairs thus do not provide counterexamples to the claim that 
every favoring involves a norm. 
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Secondly, on a broader semantic level, the view strikes me as utterly implausible 
in itself. Applying Moore's open question argument to the case at hand, I believe it 
always remains an open issue whether or not some state of affairs favors even after one 
has come to full comprehension of that states of affairs. One could wonder about this 
matter without being factually confused or partially ignorant. The coldhearted dissector 
of reality who is at a loss of finding any favoring need not be charged with having done 
incomplete work; he merely failed to look at things through the classes of norms. This 
suggests - if only defeasibly - that the existence and the favoring of some state of affairs 
can be dissociated. 
Thirdly, if favoring was fully inherent in states of affairs, it would be hard to 
explain certain sorts of variability; whether or not, what, and how strongly certain states 
of affairs favor often depends systematically on external factors; but how can matters 
concerning favoring both be sufficiently accounted for by internal factors of certain states 
of affairs and yet be explanatorily dependent on external factors as well? Consider again 
Venice's beauty. Under certain circumstances, this fact favors visiting Venice - a 
response that let's suppose is not already contained in describing Venice as beautiful. The 
emphasis, however, is on 'certain circumstances.' Suppose Venice' very existence is at 
stake; the city will fall if any more visitors enter it. In that case, what Venice' beauty 
favors is not visiting it. Yet the fact that Venice is beautiful has not been changed in the 
least; all that has been altered are external circumstances, producing the result that the 
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identical states of affairs now give rise to opposite favoring powers. Moreover, it is 
important to stress that in both cases of favoring the relevant factor remains the same -
Venice's beauty; if Venice was as ugly as adjacent Maestro, I'd say go for it -
considering only aesthetic reasons, of course. Yet if favoring was inherent to states of 
affairs, wouldn't that suggest that Venice's beauty contains two favorings with 
contradictory aims - to visit it and not to visit it? However this may be, the norm-based 
approach offers a solution that would silence all these worries in one stroke; it explains 
why those and only those states of affairs that favor do favor; it also explains how such 
changes in polarity can occur due to the fact that different norms are operative in 
different circumstances. If Venice is safe, the relevant norm is to visit beauty. If in 
danger, the relevant norm is to protect beauty; without including those norms in the 
explanatory basis for why and what Venice favors, such sudden shifts in favoring powers 
would remain rather mysterious. 
1.5. Norms and Normativity 
Let's turn now to the status of norms; I believe that's where all the action is. If 
norms govern all comers of life, the question is with what right; their status must become 
a rather intriguing issue. Norms, I suggest, provide an excellent entry for thinking about 
normativity because they introduce normativity as a response to a problem created by 
norms. Norms are the starting point, but not the end point, for thinking about normativity. 
Many seem to think otherwise; speaking of the moral ought, the quintessential 
normative province, James Griffin, writes: "To say that something 'out to be' is to say 
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that it is what conforms to some standard, norm, or regularity .... 'Moral oughts' are no 
different. They claim merely that there is a norm in the background to which a certain 
action would conform." (Griffin 1996:81) Yet having a norm in the background is easily 
secured; so easily, in fact, that one can readily understand the discomfort this would 
create for those who feel that having a norm in place cannot be all there is to normativity. 
There is a great number of social systems sustaining an even greater number of moral and 
non-moral norms in the background; yet we do not think that just any of those norms is 
worth heeding; anthropologists have identified and studied a huge variety of norms in the 
cultural record, many of them abhorrent. They found norms prescribing murdering and 
sacrificing of outsiders, systematically discriminating women and minorities, permitting 
slavery and intolerance, etc. In many societies men are still called upon to dictate 
women's fates without residue. For sure, the questionable status of norms is felt strongest 
when it comes to norms far afield; but even when we tum to norms operative in our own 
society, most of us find some norms we see little point in complying with, if we don't 
outright reject them. My favorite example are norms I believe erected to perpetrate a state 
of massive inequality; norms, for instance, that effectively inhibit any redistribution of 
goods, even if without fault of their own some have everything and others nothing. Yet in 
such opposition we need not and usually do not deny the existence of what we are 
opposing; in fact, only if the existence of such norms is taken for granted does the 
opposition have a real target and some bite. Griffin's conception which takes as the only 
requirement for the truth of some ought statement that some norm exists in the 
background is surprisingly weak; it must fall short of capturing even in principle the 
intuitive difference of norms we ought to comply with and those we do not, since plainly 
enough norms of both kinds do exist in the background. 
Indeed, if the problem of normativity was to find 'norms in the background,' we 
could happily report "problem solved;" we may further inquire into semantic or 
sociological aspects of norms. But it can hardly be the existence of norms that 
philosophers have worried about for so long. If there is a problem stemming from such 
existential matters, it is because there is too much rather than too little of it. There are so 
many norms, many of them in mutual conflict; we cannot consequently take all of them 
seriously - but how to select those we should? And what would it be that recommends 
some norms over others? It is not for their shortage, then, but rather for their abundance 
that one starts to wonder what status particular norms or even norms in general may have. 
If one thinks that norms in the background is all there is to normativity, I'd like to ask 
with respect to some more controversial norm whether in skeptical moments the 
assurance of the existence of that norm is all one wishes to be assured about. If indeed the 
existence of that norm is what causes one to worry, one may just make it up and have it. 
Moreover, the existence of norms cannot be thought of as a requisite for 
normativity either; the norms that are truly worth heeding might not have been installed 
or thought of yet; those norms may not yet fill the background. And if so, this altogether 
contingent matter by itself is unlikely to disqualify any of these 'non-existing' norms. I 
conclude, then, that the existence of norms is not what constitutes normativity; simply 
having norms in the background is not enough. The idea of normativity is the response to 
the fundamental problem of which of all those norms that fill or could fill the background 
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are in fact authoritative; normativity is that generic feature that distinguishes authoritative 
norms from mere pretenders. 
1.6. Norms, Morality and Rationality 
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If the notion of normativity is a response to a generic problem created by norms, 
the notion will be as general as the problem. Let me stress that generality. What I seek to 
understand is not how this norm can be normative if that norm is; rather, the problem is 
what could make any norm normative. Many believe the normativity of certain norms is 
less problematic than that of others; there is a huge literature trying to explain the 
normativity of morality in terms of the normativity of rationality; or that of other-
regarding demands on the basis of self-regarding demands. If there is any such 
asymmetry, it would be good advice to focus on the least problematic case and explain 
what makes that norm normative. Presumably, that case would be some norm of self-
interested or instrumental rationality. I doubt, however, that there is any such asymmetry. 
Once one appreciates the general nature of the problem, the notion that the normativity of 
certain norms can be taken for granted while that of others requires explanation seems 
rather silly. If there is a problem with normativity, as most would grant, then it is a 
problem across the board. It is just as big a conundrum to explain what could make 
egoistic norms normative as what could do the same for altruistic norms; the normativity 
of moral norms per se seems no more troubling than those of purely self-centered 
rationality; norms of the first sort demand to heed the interests of others; those of the 
second sort demand to never heed the interests of others unless there's something in for 
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me; these are just two different norms; that they differ in content by itself does not 
explain why one is authoritative while the other isn't. Explaining the normativity of 
morality on the basis of the normativity of rationality has thus two, not only one, success 
condition; that the relevant normative transfer works; but also, and that often goes 
unnoticed, that the normativity of rationality is accounted for. Nothing comes from 
nothing. 
For sure, there are related projects for which it makes sense to assume such 
asymmetry. If there are systems running on some norms but not others, it may be nice to 
show how the norms of the second kind can be incorporated within those of the first. If 
we are all egoists, then showing that taking morality seriously delivers many personal 
benefits makes for a neat exercise. But whatever the problem of normativity is, it is not 
that of somehow bringing people to run by certain norms; it is to show that people should 
run by certain norms. 
My discussion could thus center on any norm; if the normativity of that norm 
could be successfully explained, the task as I understand it would have been completed. 
However, because morality and rationality present the two most prominent domains of 
norms, and because those norms are taken very seriously, they will take center stage in 
the discussion to come. 
1.7. Normativity and Authority 
What is authority, then? The functional analysis that took it to be a property of 
norms helps to roughly locate it. It provides a task analysis. Still, it would be nice to say 
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more. Calling some norm authoritative is to recommend that norm in some sense; it is to 
say something on behalf of it; there are, however, many things one can say on behalf of 
norms; they may be called elegant, to make sense, or to be useful, among other things. 
We need to distinguish the recommendation of authority in particular from these and 
others. How to specify the difference? 
Te task really is to spin an ever wider web of interrelated concepts. In the end we 
may still not know exactly what we are talking about or that there is something we are 
talking about in the first place; still, the wider the web, the more connections we can 
establish, the better. The notion of normativity is in this regard no different than other 
philosophically tough ones. Consider metaphysical necessity. Most seek to capture that 
notion by relating it to two other forms of necessity; metaphysical necessity is said to be 
stronger (more restrictive) than logical necessity but weaker (less restrictive) than 
nomological necessity; metaphysical necessity allows more than nomological, but less 
than logical necessity. Analogously, I will try to connect the notion ofnormativity to with 
respect to others, some of them similar and some of them interestingly different. I believe 
that ultimately, though, we have to move away from isolated conceptual webs and tum to 
substantive theories. We may reach a stage where further concept juggling just doesn't 
get us anywhere; we then have to think about what normativity could be rather than what 
normativity might mean. We are not there yet, but almost. 
1.8. True Norms 
Let's tum to truth. Are those norms authoritative that are true or correct in some 
sense? Perhaps there is a difference I have not fully appreciated yet between norms 
merely existing in the background and norms being true. It's not clear, however, what 
that difference would be. The very idea of true or correct norms edges on confusion; 
norms do not represent; norms do not have truth-conditions since they do not map what is 
but what should be. Yet if norms do not even qualify as truth candidates in the first place, 
it is hard to see how they can be true. The idea must be, then, that true or correct norms 
are those that exist in special ways, perhaps in ways not dependent on us. Many norms 
exist because we made them to exist; they may, for instance, be the ones that have 
currency in our society - to use a phrase of David Copp's (1995); they may be the ones 
that are widely accepted or encoded or enforced or put into law or taken to underlie and 
guide our practices, or something similar. Yet some norms, perhaps, exist is ways other 
than that; they - the true ones - may be the ones with authority. 
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I don't think so; existence, of whatever kind, simply is insufficient for authority. 
If the idea sounds plausible, it is so only because it has things backwards; the most 
charitable interpretation is that true norms are those that are authoritative; which, of 
course, would turn the notion of true norms into a non-starter for coming to grips with 
authority. 
Let's consider a thought experiment to illustrate that even "true existence" and 
normativity can be dissociated in surprising ways; if, at any rate, true existence does not 
stand short for existence with authority. Suppose there is a single truly existing moral 
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norm. It is part of the universe in ways that have nothing to do with us. Is that norm 
thereby authoritative? Not necessarily. Suppose we can find out what the true moral 
theory is by consulting an imprint in certain stones. For some funny reason or other, the 
truth about morality is infallibly represented in that particular configuration; just as we 
are about to finish our decoding, however, we find to our great surprise that the true 
morality is somewhat different than we thought. While it has a recognizable perfectionist 
character, it is not quite of the familiar sort; the one and only aim prescribed by the true 
morality, we find, is to perfect our bodies; athletic considerations alone turn out to be 
morally relevant - and truly so. Schwarzenegger is a saint, while Gandhi is morally 
corrupt. Yet after a short period of shock, we feel rather unimpressed by this truth; we do 
not feel the least bit inclined to comply; we see little reason, for instance, to give up 
philosophy and head straight to the gym. Now, what are we to think of that indifference 
on our part towards that truth? Do we need to think of ourselves as behaving as we 
shouldn't - that we really ought to heed the norm because is truly exists? And if we 
don't, are we committed to some sort of conceptual/logical mistake? Now, it is obviously 
true that in displaying such indifference and refusal to comply we violate the precepts of 
the single true morality; we do not behave as that norm tells us we should; but this 
constitutes a truism of a rather trivial sort; it is true for any norm that if we fail to comply 
we do not behave as we should according to that norm; yet in rejecting some norm or 
other we are usually not bothered much that in doing so we self-consciously violating 
those norms - after all, the authority of those norm is exactly what we reject. Now the 
difference here is that the norm truly exists; it is not merely of our making. Does that 
make the difference? I can't think of any good answer why it should. Why not rather 
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think the universe is messed up? At any rate, it seems perfectly coherent to have this 
thought; to think, that is, that a norm has no authority and yet that it does truly exist; if 
that is correct, if truth and normativity can be conceived separate, this would strongly 
suggest that they are not the same sort of property. 
Truth, I conclude, offers little insight into matters normative; at best, true norms 
are those that have authority; at worst, the idea of true norms is flat-out confused. I 
believe this also suggests a refreshing vista on traditional ethical debates. The debate 
between consequentialist and deontologist, for instance, must be about authority or 
something near enough; it cannot merely be about which sort of norms truly exists -
which one really is "out there;" if that was all that was at stake, I believe the point of that 
debate would be utterly lost; short of some curiosity for funny features of the universe, it 
is hard to see what practical interest to take in such matters. 
1.9. Normativity and Reasons 
What about reasons? Normativity can properly be characterized as that which 
supplies normative or justifying reasons; norms are authoritative if we have adequate 
reasons to heed them. Reasons talk is now very fashionable and I'm most happy to join 
in; it is the most convenient normative idiom, and I will use it extensively. I'm not sure, 
however, how much illumination can be gleaned from such talk. To begin with, we need 
the very notion of normativity to distinguish normative reasons from other kinds; 
normative reasons are not considerations we are motivated by, but those we should be 
motivated by, in the normative sense of should. But even on a more general level, 
normative reasons and normativity appear to be interchangeable labels; something is 
normative if it provides normative reasons, and it provides normative reasons if it is 
normative. What we want to understand is what it is for a norm to be authoritative, and 
reasons might offer a clue; yet at the same time, normative reasons seem themselves to 
emerge from the application to an instance of norms for which the question of authority 
has been answered; one has reason to do what an authoritative norm tells one to do. 
Neither notion, then, appears to be primary or to bring much elucidation onto the other. 
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Still, reasons-talk is most convenient. First, it is pleasantly fine grained; it is more 
apt to capture all the subtleties pertaining to normativity than other notions such as ought. 
Normativity, they say, is fraught with ought, but ought is rather clumsy a notion. Ought 
incorporates an all things considered element which disguises much of what is going on 
"before" ought-judgments are reached. The normativity of norms need not be reflected in 
such final ought-judgments. One may regard some norm authoritative even though in 
certain circumstances one believes one ought not do what it says; one need not thereby 
deny the norm to carry genuine force. The norm may recommend telling the truth, but 
now one must not because otherwise people die. Moreover, one need not regard 
authoritative norms to necessarily bear on what one ought to do either; the norm not to 
kill may trump the norm to tell the truth in ways that cancel out any possible contribution 
of the latter to the case; the presence of the truth-telling norm may make no difference 
whatsoever. It is also consistent to regard norms as authoritative even though one thinks 
these norms ought not be considered or taken seriously. Consequentialists have 
demonstrated how norms may be authoritative yet best not be taken notice of in 
deliberation. Thus, the notion of norms one ought to comply with matches poorly that of 
authoritative norms. The notion of reasons, in contrast, is better situated to articulate 
subtleties such as these and others. It presents little trouble appreciating how what one 
has most reasons to do one may also have some reasons not to do; or that one has reasons 
not to take seriously certain reasons one has; we may, for instance, have reasons to reach 
happiness, but best achieve that goal by not considering these reasons. 1 The expressive 
power of reasons-talk, then, far exceeds that of ought-talk, and thus is preferable. 
Secondly, reasons-talk turns the focus on the practically engaged agent, thereby 
highlighting the arena where authority truly becomes an issue. We can find norms for 
anything, including artifacts such as toasters (Thompson 2007); non-defective toasters 
supposedly toast as specified by toaster-norms; but toasters have no reasons; authority is 
not an issue for them. Artifacts do not face questions of what norms to take seriously as 
they never have to make choices between complying and not complying with norms. 
Agents are different; they have to make choices, and they have to take responsibility for 
them; the authority of norms matters to agents, both in a forward and a backward looking 
manner. Agents not only have to decide what norms to take seriously, but also what to 
think of norms that have been violated in the past, either by themselves or others. 
Normativity not only supplies guidance, but also critical force; it concerns grounds for 
criticism as well as grounds for choice. We regularly hold each other accountable for 
failing to conform to certain norms. Yet an agent's non-compliance with some norm can 
only constitute grounds for substantive criticism if it was incumbent on that agent to 
1 Dancy is thus mistaken when he writes "A reason is a consideration one ought not to ignore, even if 
things would go better ifone did ignore it." (Dancy 2000:29) 
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comply with that norm in the first place. Thus, a norm's critical force and its authority go 
hand in hand. 
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Reasons with their unwavering gaze on the practically engaged agent also warn us 
of overly global perspectives on normativity. Some have argued, for instance, that the 
normativity of norms consists in their social usefulness. Global approaches, however, 
tend to miss the focal point of authority. Norms are authoritative, because it is incumbent 
upon particular agents in particular situations to take them seriously. This is not to deny 
that global facts can be relevant; still, they need to be connected to individual agents. 
This is most apparent when societal and individual appraisal of what is to be done 
conflict. Game theory offers an abundance of examples where the maximizing choice 
from the collective viewpoint is diametrically opposed to the maximizing choice from 
each individual viewpoint. But even more generally, an agent may wonder whether he 
has reasons to comply with some norm even though fully acknowledging the social 
benefits if he did; "it would certainly serve the collective," he may think, "but now here I 
am and not the collective making the choice; and certainly I am no mere servant of the 
collective." He may well conclude without confusion that he has no reasons to comply. If 
the case is an especially drastic one - if he is asked to make substantial sacrifices on 
behalf of society - he may rather wish to dissociate himself from society altogether; the 
request to justify to him why he needs to make that sacrifice cannot be answered by sheer 
force; if that is all that pushes him in directions he is not willing to follow, the project of 
authority has been abandoned. The practically engaged agent, then, is where the buck 
stops. Consequently, we may just as well focus on reasons for agents; talk of reasons 
offers a straight route to that which is of interest in normativity. 
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Let me close this section with a cautionary note, however. As convenient the 
reasons-idiom may be, its usefulness can also be overstated. Some appear to think that by 
merely mentioning reasons we can answer most questions about normativity. This is 
puzzling. What we observe, I believe, is a regrettable tendency for how all too swiftly 
undue confidence in reasons can turn into philosophical complacency. Words have the 
amazing power of conjuring up magical realities; religion testifies to that. We need to 
resist the slippery slope from the prevalence of some talk to the impression that we fully 
understand that talk to finally the conviction that what we are talking about is entirely 
unproblematic. It strikes me that some hope if we just talk enough about reasons, the 
question of their existence may go away. 
1.10. Naturalism and Normativity 
It is time now to turn from conceptual cartography to my substantive enterprise. I 
claim that normativity does not exist in the world as we know it. The argumentative 
strategy I pursue will be this. Calling a norm authoritative, I said, was to recommend that 
norm in some way or another. I consider various ways of recommending norms 
consistent with naturalism, and conclude that none of them is sufficient for normativity. 
Naturalism provides insufficient material for reasons. After noticing this shortcoming, I 
will then go back and see whether any of the recommendations in tune with naturalism 
may be practically sufficient even though normatively insufficient; a question, I believe, 
that can be answered in the affirmative. 
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But what is naturalism anyway? Naturalism, I believe, is poorly characterized in 
tenns of a defining condition or property - that of being natural as opposed to 
supernatural. Naturalism approaches ontological questions in a strictly a posteriori 
manner; what the universe is like and what it contains is not an assumption we start with 
but one we constantly revise in light of our best knowledge. Naturalism presents an open-
ended and inherently incomplete doctrine that incorporates a rationale for why it is open-
ended and incomplete. Previous generations of materialists would probably not have felt 
comfortable with countenancing electromagnetical fields; yet we discovered them 
anyway. The lesson we learn from this is that we are likely in for more than one surprise. 
As Haldane famously said, "my own suspicion is that the universe is not only queerer 
than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose." (Haldane 1927:286) Naturalism 
construed as an inflexible and principled doctrine would rapidly unnaturalize itself. 
Still, I believe it comprises two broad ideas; both have been SUbjected to 
innumerable tests, and survived. First, that we live in one unified world where everything 
is connected; there are no isolated phenomena that are outside the reach of everything 
else. Secondly, that the world is structured; complex phenomena are systematically 
related to less complex phenomena. As the physicist Murray Gell-Mann has put it, "you 
don't need more to get more." (2007) The second idea implies a weak fonn of 
reductionism; nothing that exists comes from nowhere. This articulates a belief in the 
fundamental intelligibility of the universe, even if it may be beyond our grasp; complex 
phenomena could in principle be explained by the complex interaction of less complex 
phenomena. This fonn of reductionism is weak, and is a far cry from various stronger 
straw man versions that have been successfully refuted, such as the notion that higher 
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order laws can semantically be captured by lower-order laws in conjunction with bridge 
laws. It is surprising that many philosophers still hold on an outdated paradigm of 
reductionism, without taking seriously the idea that the common conviction that nothing 
comes from nothing requires some sort of account. (Kim 1998) 
Naturalism constrains the search for the normative in the following manner. First, 
to repeat, the constraints it suggests are non-final and subject to revision. When I claim 
that naturalism provides insufficient material for reasons, what I am claiming is that this 
is so only in light of our currently best knowledge of what there is. Secondly, naturalism 
rejects primitive normativity as an unstructured phenomenon unconnected to everything 
else. If normativity exists, we must be able in principle to situate it in the interactive 
complex we call our universe; call this the principle of accommodation. We must also be 
able in principle to explain normativity in virtue of some aspects or other of that world; 
that is what it means that we cannot take it as a given or ontologically primitive; call this 
the principle of explanation. I think that those two ideas broadly capture what most would 
take away from naturalism. They are particularly well suited for phenomena we have no 
immediate acquaintance with, and certainly normativity is such a phenomenon - we 
cannot simply point towards it. If someone proclaimed to just have seen or felt or smelled 
normativity we would likely take him to misunderstand what normativity is. Normativity, 
thus, behaves somewhat like a theoretical term; it purports to pick out a phenomenon the 
existence of which needs to be established indirectly. To explain it and to show it existent 
are intimately related projects. 
Non-naturalistic accounts of normativity have seen an astonishing comeback 
recently. Non-naturalists believe normativity is an ineliminable and primitive part of our 
universe; if we cannot explain it, we have to accept our inability to situate normativity 
within the world as we know it. In Moral Realism - A Defense Schafer-Landau writes 
(2003:205): 
Those who affirm [that there are no intrinsic reason-giving facts] 
will say that all reasons derive from an agent's perspective. For consider 
the alternative: if reasons exist regardless of ones beliefs, desires and 
interests, then where do they come from? ... To insist that a set of facts 
could contain within themselves normative authority for agents, regardless 
of their outlook on life, seems obscurantist, and gives the appearance of 
prematurely cutting off any helpful explanation of normativity. If this is 
obscurantist, I think we have no choice but to embrace the mysteries. I 
think that intrinsic normativity is ineliminable. 
My argument is channeled to those who like me do not want to embrace the 
mysteries. Still, I consider non-naturalists my greatest ally, and here is why. I concur that 
important parts of normative discourse are indeed currently committed to normativity; 
that's why I am an error theorist and not an expressivist, say. But most importantly, I 
share the same skepticism that normativity cannot be accommodated in the natural world. 




Against Non-Reductive Normative 
Realism 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter wrestles with non-naturalistic or non-reductive normative realism, a 
position that continues to gather widespread and prominent support. The view holds, in 
David Enoch's succinct summary (2007:21), that there are response-independent, non-
natural, irreducibly normative truths, perfectly objective and universal ones, that when 
successful in our normative inquires we discover rather than create or construct. This 
view - conveniently named realism within the chapter's confines - represents not only 
the sharpest adversary to my own position, but also levels the perhaps most fundamental 
challenge to it. It is proper, then, to address realism and its challenge first before I tum to 
naturalistic or reductive normative realism in the following chapter. 
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Realism confronts anti-realism in stark transcendental fashion by questioning 
whether the latter's global denial of normativity represents a position that can be 
coherently adopted and defended. There are no reasons in the fundamental normative 
sense, I claim, reasons that would provide authority for norms, standards or rules. Yet 
settling on what to do and accept appear reason-guided enterprises, and settling on 
whether to accept global normative anti-realism is one such enterprise. Surely enough, 
then, the anti-realist cannot coherently support his view by citing reasons in its favor after 
he just rejected them throughout. In recommending his view, what is he doing, then? Will 
he not have to become silent, ushering himself off the philosophical scene? Worse, a 
defense of his position may even testify to its refutation, since it exemplifies what it 
supposes impossible: providing reasons for accepting a hypothesis. In response, I show 
how to support anti-realism without deserting its tenets. I begin with the admission that 
making the case for and against philosophical hypotheses essentially are norm-driven 
enterprise. We need norms supplying criteria of argumentative correctness and success. 
Yet we need not presume the relevant norms underwriting philosophical argumentation 
equipped with practice-external authority; our employment of them is not bound up with 
and contingent upon the metaphysics of realism. 
Despite their sharp contrast, realism and anti-realism have actually a great deal in 
common as well. They share a similar conception of what is at stake; they fundamentally 
agree on what normativity is. This by itself turns them into allies in a remarkable number 
of ways. For instance, realists and anti-realists look eye to eye when it comes to the 
plentiful intermediate attempts to explain or reduce normativity. They converge in their 
assessment that such attempts are unviable for they either fail to explain normativity or 
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simply lapse back into realism; that there cannot be normative engines that successfully 
explain authority without already presupposing it. The principle both accept is no 
normativity in, no normativity out, or conversely, that by denying the irreducible 
normativity of some phenomena we deprive it from any recognizable form of normativity 
altogether. "Moral and other evaluative facts have a feature that no natural fact could 
have," writes Jonathan Dancy "namely, normativity. If we try to identify moral facts, or 
facts about what we have most reason to do, with natural facts, their normativity is lost." 
(2006: 132) This shared belief places realism and anti-realism in a dialectical situation 
similar to that between libertarians and hard determinists in the context of the free will 
debate. Libertarians and hard determinists too share a common mistrust concerning the 
various "softies" in between - suspecting that the compatibilist majority merely seeks a 
way out by conveniently changing the subject. Thus, however profoundly realists and 
anti-realists disagree on a variety of issues, they must at least grant each other to have 
gotten the subject matter right. All the more reasons, then, to start with realism. It 
encompasses an understanding of normativity that proves most helpful for clarifying 
what the debate is all about, and provides the perfect platform for formulating and 
defending my global denial of authority. 
Here, then, is what I shall to do in the chapter. I will first provide a systematic and 
sympathetic reconstruction of realism that incorporates a variety of recent and prominent 
articulations of the view. Realism, I believe, is what most philosophers in ethics are in 
fact committed to - even though the commitment is not always explicitly acknowledged 
and on occasion even ridiculed. This is a mistake the nature of which will hopefully 
emerge from the analysis I offer. Realism is an internally sound and well thought through 
position that has proven resistant in the face of considerable counterattacks. In the end, 
though, I do reject realism, and so I'd like to say why and why not. After that, I tum to 
the heart of chapter, the refutation of the transcendental argument. 
2.2. Normative Non-Naturalism 
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What does normative realism assert, and what in response does global anti-
realism deny? Realists obviously affirm the existence of some normative reality. What is 
distinctive of their view is of what kind they take that reality to be. The label non-
naturalism is intended to denote a certain way in which the normative is presumed 
independent of the natural. A recent statement of the view has it that "there are ethical 
facts that obtain independently of our actual ethical beliefs or attitudes or practices, both 
on an individual and a societal level, at least in the sense that such facts about what is 
right, or what is good for us, or what reasons exist are not simply a direct function of 
these things as they stand." (FitzPatrick 2008:162) Realists on occasion prefer using the 
label primitive instead of non-natural, but what does primitive amount to if not an 
ontological addition to what we already get in terms of and in virtue of the plain natural? 
Sorting out in what ways the normative is primitive or independent from the natural 
presents a subtle matter. It is especially easy to misunderstand what is and is not 
supposed non-natural. What will be required is a careful and systematic exposition of 
how the normative relates to the non-normative according to realism. 
Let me first, however, comment very briefly on the contrast between the natural 
and non-natural itself. This is not an essay in general metaphysics, and I'd rather not get 
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entangled too deeply with the difficult question of how to precisify this distinction. I am 
unaware of any straightforward and uncontroversial approach to use as a basis for what 
follows. Still, I believe the situation is actually not as conceptually dire as it may initially 
appear. However we may ultimately choose to fill out the exact metaphysical details of 
the natural/non-natural distinction, a corresponding position of normative non-naturalism 
should readily emerge. In the context of the present debate, then, we shall be content with 
having the terms natural and non-natural figure as placeholders, and regard my 
occasional substantive remarks as primarily serving expository purposes. 
Let me start out with some recent statements by three prominent realists, first by 
Derek Parfit, then Schafer-Landau, and finally Thomas Scanlon, all of whom I propose to 
quote at considerable length. In the section two of his excellent essay Normativity, Parfit 
offers a most clear-headed characterization of realism that contains all the important 
labels, a position he then proceeds to defend in depth. "Irreducible normative truths" he 
writes "are most unusual" for "it is not obvious how such truths fit into a scientific world-
view. They are not empirically testable, or explicable by natural laws." He then raises the 
question "If such truths are not empirical, or about features of the natural world, how do 
we ever come to understand them?" In response, he concedes "non-reductive realists ... 
do not give helpful answers to these questions. ... we can explain some normative 
concepts, but only by appealing to others." In sum, "normative concepts cannot be 
explained in non-normative terms. Nor can we say much to explain how we understand 
these concepts, or how we recognize normative truths." However, we need to keep in 
mind that "if there are normative truths, these are of a distinctive kind, which we should 
not expect to be like ordinary, natural truths." We can find, he believes, some helpful 
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analogies in modal concepts such as possible and necessary, which also "cannot be 
explained in empirical terms ... and are not made true by natural laws." Parfit then briefly 
turns to "some writers who try to explain what normativity is," an undertaking ''that 
cannot be helpfully done." Taking the via negativa, he goes on "though we cannot 
explain what normativity is, or what normative concepts mean, we can say what 
normativity is not, and what these concepts do not mean. It could not be true that, as 
naturalists claim, normative statements mean the same as, or report the same facts as, 
statements about natural facts. Naturalists ... mistakenly conflate these [normative] truths 
with the natural facts which, according to these truths, have normative importance." As 
we shall see momentarily, especially this last statement proves most essential. 
In Moral Realism - A Defense Schafer-Landau provides a remarkably well-
written and very systematic defense of realism, in particular of non-natural moral realism. 
He considers the essential feature of realism to be "its endorsement of stance-
independence." "Realists believe," Shafter-Landau writes, "that there are moral truths 
that obtain independently of any preferred perspective, in the sense that the moral 
standards that fix the moral facts are not made true by virtue of their ratification from 
within any given actual or hypothetical perspective." Shafer-Landau considers realism "a 
view about the status of ... normative theories [that] insists that the truth of any first-
order normative standard is not a function of what anyone happens to think of it. Such 
standards, if true, are not made true, and, in particular, are not correct in virtue of being 
vindicated by some process of (inter)personal election or approbation." (15-16) And later 
on he confronts a challenge to the very aspect of anti-reductivism in an intriguing way, 
starting with a paraphrase of the charge: "Those who affirm [that there are no intrinsic 
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reason-giving facts] will say that all reasons derive from an agent's perspective. For 
consider the alternative: if reasons exist regardless of ones beliefs, desires and interests, 
then where do they come from? ... To insist that a set of facts could contain within 
themselves normative authority for agents, regardless of their outlook on life, seems 
obscurantist, and gives the appearance of prematurely cutting off any helpful explanation 
of normativity. If this is obscurantist, I think we have no choice but to embrace the 
mysteries. I think that intrinsic normativity is ine1iminable. (p. 205) 
In his 2009 John Locke Lecture on normativity, Scanlon says (8.27) "I also 
maintain that truths about reasons are irreducible normative truths. Not reducible to, or 
identifiable with, truths of other kinds, such as truth about the natural world of physical 
objects, causes and effects. So I am what might be called a reasons-fundamentalist." He 
then asks about the grounds of normative truths (10.36): "In virtue of what are claims 
about reasons true when they are true? In particular, does the idea that claims about 
reasons can the true or false independent of our options about them and that truths about 
reasons are irreducibly normative have unacceptable metaphysical implications? ... How 
are facts about reasons if there are such facts related to natural facts? They are not 
entailed by natural facts all agree, but they tend not vary unless natural facts vary, and 
this strange relation of non-entailment that some kind of rigid binding may seem puzzling 
and in need of explanation." 
With these statements in hand we can now tum to a systematic reconstruction of 
realism. What is most important to get clear on what is and is not supposed non-natural 
according to realism. The normative obviously engages the natural world as it is; all that 
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is relevant must be built up entirely from natural bits and pieces - what else is there to 
work with? Realism does not contest that. The role it assigns to the non-natural has 
another source altogether. As I understand the view, what is supposed non-natural is the 
determination of what is relevant rather than that which is relevant. This is what I take 
Parfit to mean when, in the above quotation, he urges us not to "conflate these 
[normative] truths with the natural facts which, according to these truths, have normative 
importance." Realism starts from the recognition that there are multiple logical 
alternatives for what has normative relevance all of which equally consistent with a 
thoroughgoing conception of the natural world. None will be simply ruled out on natural 
or conceptual grounds alone. Realism is the hypothesis, then, that there are normative 
truths concerning what is relevant, even though those truths are not determined by the 
natural or conceptual. There are, first, all the natural facts that constitute the world as it 
is; normative truths then simply concern which of those natural facts are normatively 
relevant, according to realism. 
The crucial distinction to notice, in Jonathan Dancy's words, is "the difference ... 
between facts that might be mentioned in answers to the question what to do, and the 
facts that those facts are relevant to the question what to do. To give a very contentious 
example of this difference: the fact that this action would make many more comfortable 
and none less comfortable could well be mentioned in an answer to the question whether 
it is the thing to do, but is not the same fact as the fact that it is relevant to what to do." 
(2006:137). Normative facts, in this picture, figure as meta-facts; facts regarding which 
regular natural facts have normative significance. As Dancy continues "It is these 
metafacts that I think of as the central normative facts, by reference to which the 
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normativity of all others is to be understood. Each such fact is the fact that some other 
fact stands in a certain normative relation to an action (or a belief or a feeling or a desire 
... )." It is easy and common to mislocate the central normative facts Dancy is alluding to 
at the wrong level. This is exemplified, for instance, by Jackson's caricature of realism, a 
position he takes to imply that "someone who says, 'I see this action will kill many and 
save no one, but that is not enough to justify my not doing it; what really matters is that 
the action has an extra property that only ethical terms are suited to pick out'." (Jackson, 
1998, 127-8). Yet normative facts, as the realist envisions them, do not posit any extra 
properties to be adjoined to the plain natural; rather, they take the natural as it is and 
dignify it with normative significance. To return to Jackson's example, the fact that an 
action will kill many and save no one is indeed all we need. The relevant normative truth 
is simply that this is normatively relevant (that it takes the action off the table of 
permissible options, or that it provides reasons not to do it, or something else). It is 
potentially misleading, then, to read realism as postulating extra normative properties of 
any kind. All it does is to identify which natural configurations are relevant. 
The underlying idea can be best brought out in terms of the notion of normative 
functions or alternate mappings from the natural onto normative status. 1 will illustrate 
my own systematic reconstruction of realism by going through three prominent 
normative notions, namely good and bad, right and wrong, and normative reasons. It is 
my belief that these present three distinct normative domains, where the content of each 
cannot be adequately characterized in terms of the others - a claim 1 shall defend in later 
chapters. For now, and in light of that conviction, I'd like to separately specify for each 
domain what in my understanding realism amounts to. 1 need to stress right away, 
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however, that I am presently concerned only with providing a working characterization of 
non-naturalistic realism, and thus my focus will be schematic and rest only with a few 
relevant details; the following is certainly not intended as a comprehensive analysis of the 
respective normative notions. 
Start with good and bad or value, then. Different theories of value identify 
different features as valuable: pleasure, knowledge, autonomous choice, perfection, 
harmony, unity in multiplicity, preference-satisfaction, etc. Most if not all of the features 
singled out as valuable by some theory or other are clearly part of the natural world. 
What proponents of rivaling views of value contest is usually not that the features their 
opponents advance as valuable do exist. Few adversaries of hedonism, for instance, deny 
the existence of pleasure. They take issue only with the normative status hedonists assign 
to it, namely that of being singularly valuable. Each position on value, then, could be 
summed up in terms of a complex function that assigns to each value-candidate one of 
three numbers: one for valuable, negative one for disvaluable, and zero for value-neutral. 
Returning to the list from above in the same order, hedonism would correspond to the 
function (1,0,0,0, ... ) assigning the negative -1 to pain only. Intellectualism would be the 
alternative view that corresponds to (0,1,0,0,0, ... ), Nozick's late rendition of some 
Leibnizian ideas in terms of organic unities or of unity in multiplicity would perhaps 
correspond to (0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0, ... ), optimism to (1,1,1, ... ) and pessimism to (0,0,0, ... ). 
Given some basic mathematical combinatorial facts, there will be lots of alternatives for 
sure. With respect to each alternative it will be the case, then, that what it postulates as 
valuable are just plain natural features. Value will readily supervene on the natural; the 
particularly valuable will perhaps be fully constituted by the natural: According to 
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hedonism, there is nothing more to value than plain natural pleasure, according to 
intellectualism there is nothing more to value than plain knowledge, and so on. Virtually 
all theories of value are naturalistic in the sense that what they identify as valuable are 
features entirely natural. However, it is also true that virtually all theories of value are 
non-naturalistic in the sense that the determination of what is valuable is not supposed 
naturalistic. Even a comprehensive conception of the natural would leave it open which 
function gets it right. What realism asserts is that there is a truth of the matter of which 
theory of value is correct, and that this truth is not of the natural sort. 
The same goes for right and wrong. It is entirely compatible with realism that all 
candidate ethical theories can be taken to share the presupposition that what is morally 
relevant must be natural. No moral theory, according to realism, needs to make the 
implausible assumption that what matters morally is something other than plain natural 
configurations. Again, the issue is not whether morally relevant features are or are not 
natural. Realism is not forced to accept, and is even free to reject, this second disjunct. 
Rather, the question is whether the fact that this rather than that feature or configuration 
is morally relevant is a natural fact; whether we could adjudicate between alternative 
mappings of natural configurations onto moral status solely in virtue of natural 
observations. Realists grant we cannot, and yet assert that there are moral truths; that 
some mappings but not others are in fact correct. 
Focus, for convenience, on the narrow set of the traditional ethical candidates 
utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue-ethics. Each of the three theories advocates 
alternative mappings between natural features and moral status. Utilitarianism maps 
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moral status onto behavioral options in terms of their agglomerative effects on overall 
pleasure and pain; deontology does the same in terms of what maxims can be 
universalized, and virtue-ethics in terms of whether beneficial character-traits are 
exemplified. For short, utilitarianism (U) maps moral status onto u-features, deontology 
(D) onto d-features, and virtue-based ethics (V) onto v-features. The important point is 
that neither U nor D nor V need to think of the respective features they identify as 
morally significant - u and d and v - as non-natural. Moreover, all sides may grant the 
same for their competitors, namely that no theory needs to postulate any funny non-
natural creatures to carry moral status. For the sake of the present argument we can 
simply accept that effects on pleasure and pain (u-features), maxims (d-features), as well 
as character-traits (v-features) are all part of the natural order. Dissenters of 
utilitarianism, for instance, do not usually deny that actions affect future distributions of 
pleasure and pain. What utilitarianism's adversaries contest is an altogether different 
matter: namely that this kind of differential impact is the sole carrier of moral relevance. 
It would be entirely futile and wrong-headed if in response to their opposition utilitarians 
simply reaffirmed that behavior does have causal effects. For utilitarianism to emerge 
victorious, more is required that this plain truth; in particular, what is required is that their 
preferred mapping, rather than that of their challengers, turns out correct, even though 
none appears to be ruled out on natural grounds alone. 
It presents no major obstacle, then, to see how each moral theory, if correct, could 
make good on the idea that the moral status of particular actions is comprehensibly 
constituted by their natural features; the concrete moral status of an action would not only 
weakly supervene on, but even be determined and fixed by natural facts. For utilitarians, 
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being morally superior just is resulting in better effects; for deontologists it just is being 
chosen in accordance with (or as a result of the recognition of) the relevantly 
universalizable maxims; for virtue-ethicists is just is exemplifying beneficial character 
traits. There is no need for any additional, potentially non-natural components to 
complete the picture. Indeed, the ease with which each theory can proclaim constitutive 
relationships between the natural and the moral has tempted some to prematurely 
conclude that theirs is a naturalistic moral theory. Not so fast says the realist, and rightly 
so. The important qualification, of course, is if correct. Each U and D and V offer 
rivaling identifications of moral correctness; the question is whether any of them is 
correct in that identification. Suppose one does get it right. Is that a fact that is fixed and 
determined by the natural order of things, and could we in principle ascertain and settle 
its presence solely in virtue of some natural method of investigation? According to 
realism, we presently have no good evidence to believe so, and a commitment to moral 
truth thus translates into an ontological commitment to certain truths of the non-natural 
sort. Since all sides may very well be in agreement over all natural facts while remain in 
disagreement over moral relevance, their disagreement consequently does not concern the 
natural but the non-natural. 
Finally, tum to normative reasons. It is now customary to consider normative 
reason the quintessential normative notion, perhaps even the mortar that infuses all others 
with their normativity as well. "All normative phenomena," Joseph Raz opens a recent 
address, "are normative in as much as, and because, they provide reasons or are partly 
constituted by reasons." (2010:5) This is a mistake I must wait to examine later. For now, 
and going with the flow, the idea of a normative reason, as I argued in the first chapter, 
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incorporates norms presumed authoritative. Norms themselves, to continue the working 
suggestion of the previous paragraphs, can be seen as complex functions, mapping as 
appropriate certain initial conditions onto certain responses. Traffic norms, to pick an 
instance, specify which types of automotive behavior constitute appropriate responses to 
traffic-related situations. Reasons then come into play once certain norms and their 
corresponding mappings have become imbued with authority; or, conversely, norms 
acquire authority once they issue an appropriate provision of reasons. To the extent to 
which traffic norms prove authoritative for us - possibly through the interaction of more 
general norms - we will have reasons to act accordingly. 
What is important is not to presume one of the notions reason and authority prior 
and capable of explaining the other, but to learn something by noticing their 
interrelatedness. Reasons are considered favorers, period, not just favorers-according-to-
some-norm-XYZ. This initial dependency of the favoring-relationship upon some 
specific norm is supposed dissolved once the relevant norm itself becomes authoritative, 
period. Normative reasons, then, incorporate "correct" and "authoritative" mappings 
between situations, agents, and responses. Saying that someone has a reason to help the 
child in need while passing by amounts to saying that given the situation in which he 
finds himself helping is the thing to do or is the appropriate response to take; not just 
according-to-some-convention-or-norm, but simpliciter. Having this reason supposes, 
then, that the mapping child-in-need onto helping is correct whereas that of mapping 
child-in-need onto passing-by-without-helping is incorrect. The relevant question is what 
renders one mapping correct whereas the other incorrect? For each combination of 
situations, agents, and responses there is a virtually infinite number of such alternative 
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mappings. Realists believe that there are correct mappings and that which are is neither 
entailed by, fixed or determined by natural facts, nor can be established solely by natural 
methods. What realism assumes is that there is a truth of the matter of what norms are 
authoritative or of what authoritatively favors what, and that this truth is again not of the 
natural sort; which is not to deny that that which favors and that which is favored are 
entirely natural configurations. 
We must then again be clear about what is and is not presumed non-natural here. 
The particular states of affairs that carry normative significance according to the relevant 
authoritative norms are usually just plain natural configurations. What was the reason to 
help?, we ask, to which we answer that the child was in need - a response that points at 
nothing more than a plain natural configuration. Yet this response remains somewhat 
elliptical. For sure, that which is reason-related to our helping response is not itself a non-
natural phenomenon. It solely consists in the child's occupying a certain spatial-temporal 
location being quickly filled by water. What we identify as reasons will quite generally 
be plain natural phenomena - what else could it be? Yet what is non-natural, according to 
realism, are not the reasons-relata, but the normative relation of favoring-with-authority 
itself. "A person who accepts [that X is a reason for doing A] takes a certain belief to be 
warranted," Scanlon correctly notices, "namely the belief that the relation 'counting in 
favor of' holds between X and doing A. That this relation holds will then be a 'non-
natural' fact, that is to say, a fact that is neither merely a fact about our psychology nor an 
ordinary empirical fact about the world outside us." (1998:58) The underlying idea is 
again that a complete specification in natural terms of the child's situation would not 
entail which response to take, or to which particular response it is reasons-related. That 
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this is not imminently obvious has mostly to do with the fact that our descriptions of 
situations usually proceed in already value-laden and reason-apt terms. In need of help 
obviously suggests helping as the course to take. Yet the callously indifferent person need 
not miss a natural detail in that situation. What renders correct the mapping child-in-need 
onto helping whereas incorrect the mapping child-in-need onto passing-by-without-
helping is not a natural fact, even though it is a fact, or so the realist believes. 
My characterization of realism thus far did proceed in somewhat abstract and 
structural terms. I emphasized solely that realists take normative truths to have some sort 
of independence from the natural, without specifying what sorts of things in particular 
realists take the normative to be independent of. Yet since their naturalistic opponents 
usually identify the normative with a confined set of prominent candidates, I shall 
explicitly name what realists think normativity is not. First, realists take normative facts 
to be evidence transcendent in the sense that they obtain independently from what we 
taken them to be. They are not projected, or constructed, or emerge as the shadows of our 
attitudes and beliefs in any other way. Realism believes in a profound difference between 
being correct and being found correct, or any other function from what we agree upon or 
endorse as correct. When we truly and responsibly believe what is valuable, right, or 
favored, we do so in virtue of normative facts, and not vice versa. The exact nature of 
evidence-transcendence is a complicated matter. For our purposes, it shall suffice to think 
of it in similar ways as realists do in other domains. The correctness of our conception of 
the normative world depends on the normative world, not the other way around, just as 
the correctness of our conception of the external world depends on the external world, 
and not the other way around. 
Secondly, realists take normative truths to be independent from motivational and 
other dispositional psychological facts, be it of an individual or societal nature. Realists 
reject all constructivist approaches, who, despite all their variations, always offer 
essentially the same answer in response to the question of the Sphinx: it is man, or it is us 
and our consent, or it is society who sets up which normative mappings are correct and 
operative. Not so says the realist. That suffering provides reasons for relief is not to be 
explained in terms of what we are motivated to do in the face of suffering, even after 
reflection, or what reactions we are disposed to cherish as a group, etc. The common 
equation of normativity and motivation is what non-reductive realists in fact scorn most. 
They correctly urge us to keep distinct normative force from motivational force. This 
goes in both directions. As mentioned, having a reason to ~ does not consist in being 
motivated to ~ under some non-trivial and non-normatively specified conditions C. In 
turn, having a reason to ~ does not require being motivated to ~ under conditions C. For 
sure, tinkering with C might very well generate a true bi-conditional between the 
normative and the motivational. This may be most easily achieved by having C to include 
normative qualifications such as recognition of what reasons pertain and flawless 
execution of practical rationality; which, obviously, would not get us anywhere. Upon 
close inspection most biconditionals that have been suggested to bridge the normative 
and motivational contain normative vocabulary in the definiens part of, if only in the 
suggestive and intolerably vague phrase "in the right way. "Motivation need not be 
normative and normativity not motivational, even if both can be linked bi-conditionally 
under some trivial conditions C. 
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2.3. What to Make of Realism - Impotent Metaphysical Arguments 
Realism raises a variety of metaphysical, epistemological and practical issues. Let 
me briefly outline my own assessment. Ultimately, the case for or against realism must 
prove inconclusive, for, I suppose, structural rather than purely evidential reasons. It is 
the very manner realism is set up, I believe, that preempts arguments that would depart 
solely from premises judged acceptable or even tolerable by proponents and opponents 
alike and that would conclude in a judgment about the truth of realism. This is not 
universally recognized. A good number of arguments advanced in the literature portray 
little but an unfortunate misunderstanding of what is at stake. In recognizing why they 
fail, indeed must fail, we may actually learn something about what position realism is. 
For the sake of intellectual honesty it is important, then, to acknowledge the limitations of 
what we can argumentatively achieve. But this has a flipside as well. Once this 
recognition has been explicitly stated, it becomes rather boring and repetitive to point out 
time and again why certain challenges are inconclusive. The task at hand will be to 
distinguish the more promising candidates among the pool of all inconclusive arguments, 
in the expectation of getting a dialogue going beyond the observation that nothing will 
ever be decisively disproven. 
Let me begin with the metaphysics of realism. Realism is first and foremost an 
ontological thesis; it would be desirable if its truth could be assessed accordingly in direct 
ontological fashion. It remains unclear, however, whether this can be done, and whether 
the best we can do in the end may not be to resort to highly indirect ways of assessment. 
For now, consider the most prominent direct argument against realism, which proceeds 
from the purported tension between realism's ontology and a thoroughgoing natural 
conception of the world we live it. The nature of the tension is uncertain, however. 
Realists stress time and again the compatibility of their view with any such 
thoroughgoing natural conception of our world. There is nothing paradoxical about this. 
Realism simply does not issue any empirical implications which in turn could stand in 
competition with a natural conception in the first place. As the slogan goes, realism is not 
in the business of explanation but of justification. In this respect it is quite unlike any 
strand of supernaturalism which does aspire to make explanatory contributions for natural 
events; when, for instance, the sickness of a child is accounted for by some evil stroke of 
a witch. Realism, in contrast, does not cite non-natural facts for the sake of the 
explanation of natural facts. The non-natural reality it postulates does not interfere with 
the natural reality in ways that could put it at odds with any comprehensible natural 
conception. Realism in this sense corresponds to deism in theology, a view that became 
increasingly popular with the triumphal procession of natural science. Realism and deism 
alike have a design that immediately immunizes them from any conceivable empirical 
criticism. Since realism is empirically unfalsifiable, the question of whether to accept its 
non-natural ontological addition to the natural cannot be directly adjudicated on the basis 
of our best knowledge of the natural world. 
This bears considerable dialectical significance. Some have rejected realism 
solely on grounds of its non-natural metaphysics. But notice that the truth of naturalism 
of the sort required for such a refutation is itself what is at issue and moreover cannot be 
determined by appeal to science or natural method alone. The acceptance and the denial 
of naturalism alike lack any empirical footing. As a matter of sheer logic, the hypothesis 
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that there is nothing beyond the empirically accessible is not empirically accessible. 
Empirical science deals only with the empirical; whether there is an extra-empirical 
reality is beyond the scope of the empirical. To use a neat picture of Wittgenstein's, one 
cannot determine what, if anything, is outside the circle by staying within. Neither 
realism nor anti-realism can hence fully escape a certain residue of dogmatism. 
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What this makes readily apparent, though, is why various arguments against 
realism must fail for their misconception of what realism involves. Consider, for instance, 
versions of the argument from explanation. Its core idea is to make a certain kind of 
explanatory indispensability a criterion for ontological inclusion. Since n~rmative facts 
plainly are explanatory dispensable (hallo!), their ontological standing must become so as 
well, or so the argument claims. Yet this argument flat-out ignores that realism was never 
purporting to have any explanatory impact in the first place; it merely claims that in 
addition to explanatory facts that it has no business with there are justificatory facts as 
well. To insist that all facts must be of the explanatory rather than the justificatory sort is 
simply to beg all relevant questions. 
This has an interesting flipside. Some philosophers have sought to substantiate the 
presence of a normative or moral reality by allegedly spotting an explanatory contribution 
that reality makes. The wrongness of slavery is supposed to explain why it ultimately 
became abolished. Call this the positive argument from explanation. Now this argument 
gives rise to a funny set of issues I cannot even begin to tackle in full here - I will come 
back to some of those issues in the next chapter. But notice for the moment that there are 
different ways in which the normative could become ingrained in some explanatory 
enterprise, not all of which bear dialectical potency. In a first manner, one may hold that 
the natural configurations singled out as normatively significant play some explanatory 
role. This, however, turns out such an uncontroversial contention that it cannot 
argumentatively differentiate between the competing players in the meta-normative 
debate, since everyone in principle may accept it, including realists, anti-realists, 
constructivists, relativists, etc. It was antecedently agreed upon, I presumed in my 
analysis, that whatever is morally relevant must be plain natural configurations of the 
world we live in, and hence will have causal ramifications. Pleasure is causally 
interconnected with other natural phenomena, and if hedonism is correct, then that which 
is valuable obviously plays some causal or explanatory role. No problem. Moreover, all 
participants can even accept, in principle, that normative or moral categories render 
particularly salient certain natural phenomena and their interrelations; that they afford 
certain sorts of insight not to come by in alternative terms. Why did John and Paul both 
end up in prison? Well, they both must have done something wrong - and this may be the 
only commonality between John's and Paul's behavior. The availability of such 
explanations is actually most easily accounted for by constructivists; for them, moral 
categories reflect our collective attitudes in some way or other. No big surprise, then, that 
moral terminology can illuminate various phenomena, including our moral reactions! Yet 
realists worth the label must surely reject constructivism. An argument that does not 
favor realism over constructivism is no good as an argument for realism. 
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So if the positive argument from explanation is to get some dialectical millage, it 
must identify another way in which the normative supposedly impacts the natural. And 
that is not easy. The most popular proposal ties explanatory contribution to the truth of 
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certain counterfactuals. That, for example, had slavery not been wrong, it would not have 
been abolished. Yet that does not help, even if the latter statement proved correct. The 
truth of counterfactuals is too easily secured, and does not require any causal or 
explanatory connection between its components. This is immediately apparent from 
phenomena that give rise to stable epiphenomenal characteristics, such as the shades of 
the parts of a moving carriage. It appears as though the shade of the horses pulls the 
shade of the wagon; but this is obviously not so, despite the truth of this counterfactual: 
Had the shades of the horses not pulled in this direction, the shade of the wagon would 
not have moved accordingly either. This is true, because in the nearest possible world 
where the horse-shades are arranged differently the real horses occupy different positions 
as well, which then affects the position of the wagon, which in tum alters the wagon's 
shade. The only causal and explanatory connection is that between the real horses and the 
real wagon, and it only so happens that their shades reliably trace that connection. The 
same is true in the normative and moral domain. Whichever ethical theory emerges 
victorious, it will be true that if slavery had not been wrong, that could have been so only 
because slavery would have had alternate natural properties in that scenario (such as 
causing fun instead of misery), and that obviously changes the entire game. Since it is 
agreed by all sides that the natural features of a particular event fix its moral status, 
difference in moral status implies difference in natural status, which in turn is all the 
difference explanatorily required. Even Descartes, the textbook dualist, holds that there is 
a relationship between the mental and the physical that supports counterfactual 
statements - due to stable correlations between the mental and the physical, potentially 
established and secured by God. But the mental obviously does not explain anything 
physical in that picture. So the truth of certain normative-factual counterfactuals won't 
secure a positive explanatory contribution of the normative either. 
The only way I can see the normative impacting the non-normative in a 
meaningful manner is this: Suppose, at time tl, hedonism is correct. Value-status is 
attached to pleasure. Now change the relevant normative switches while leaving 
everything else equal. Now, at time t2, value-status is attached to preference-satisfaction. 
Would that switch have any causal impact? This is a funny scenario, for sure, potentially 
metaphysically impossible, even if logically possible. The answer to that question is not 
entirely clear - to the extent to which the question is sensible in the first place. I'd say the 
answer is no, and so does the realist. In any case, since neither of us takes the normative 
to be in the business of explanation but rather in that of justification, we find the positive 
argument from explanation off target from the very start. 
Realism, I thus conclude, is neither empirically assailable nor supportable. Is this 
good news or bad news for the view? Neither, I'd say. It presents no step forward because 
it does not suffice to merely prove ones opponents' charges ineffective, and yet that is 
often all realists do, even by their own admission. Parfit, for instance, writes: "If we 
believe in irreducibly normative truths, we are what Korsgaard calls dogmatic 
rationalists. As Korsgaard notes, since these rationalists have little positive to say, they 
are 'primarily polemitcal writers', who explain and defend their views by attacking other 
views. That is what, in this essay, I shall mostly do." (2006:332) Refuted criticism does 
not increase probative force. It presents no step backward either, despite the verdict of 
some traditional empiricists who consider unfalsifiability the ultimate sin, worse even 
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than being false. Sentiments have tempered down since logical positivism and Popper. 
Opposition to empiricism is again a reputable option, let alone intelligible and worth 
consideration. And even the brands of empiricism currently fashionable are more 
moderate. The empiricism I favor would certainly recommend abstaining from positively 
accepting any hypothesis that lacks empirical support, but not necessarily going as far as 
recommending flat-out denial instead of agnosticism. Of course, if there is a presumption 
in favor of a positive case being made before the need arises for demanding sound 
refutations - a presumption that is certainly part of scientific practices - realism 
potentially is in trouble; in trouble, that is, as long as it cannot identify other sources that 
lend positive evidence in its favor. And to those other sources we must ultimately tum, in 
both the positive as well as the negative case. The best we can do, in my assessment, is to 
discuss more indirect motivations for and against realism. In the absence of opportunities 
for face-to-face combat, we must resolve to focus on the supply lines instead. In the end 
one may simply believe realism, or one may not. 
One indirect argument we can put aside quickly. This is the familiar partners-in-
crime move realists on occasion advance. Realism is supposedly alike other hypotheses 
postulating non-natural realities, most prominently ones advanced in the philosophy of 
mathematics. And that, it is hoped, takes away some of the pressure resting on realism. 
Yet either the argument clumsily demonstrates what we already know - that an insistence 
on the truth of naturalism in order to refute realism amounts to mere question-begging -
or it is simply no good. An initial suspicion already arises from the very labeling 
"partners in crime." I always thought crime is a bad thing, and how exactly the mere 
presence of accessories could offer any legitimate excuse or justification is beyond me. 
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But more to the point, the argument has two serious shortcomings. First, normative-truths 
have almost nothing in common with the usual accessory, mathematical truths, apart from 
the hypothesis that both obtain non-naturally. Normative truths and mathematical truths 
supposedly have the same modal status, obtaining necessarily. But even that is not so. At 
best, normative truths are only metaphysically necessary, while mathematical truths are 
logically necessary - a huge difference. Moreover, whether normative truths are or must 
be metaphysically necessary is also unclear. This is certainly often dogmatically 
affirmed, but rarely defended. That it could not be the case that consequentialism is true 
in one world while deontology in another requires some argument. Certain strands of 
constructivism and relativism would clearly deny it - without apparent conceptual 
confusions - and suppose it possible, perhaps even likely, that alternative moral codes 
will be operative in different worlds. Notice these modal scenarios are consistent with 
world-by-world, even though not with across-world, supervenience. But only the former 
appears supported by actual moral practices and observations, and has potential 
significance for us, as when the injunction 'treat like cases alike' provides the basis for 
principled criticism. Yet in any case, mathematics and normativity are utterly unlike in a 
number of important ways that undermines any probative transfer. Most pertinently, 
mathematics, unlike normativity, is non-normative (sic.), part of a well-developed formal 
discipline, successfully and essentially employed by science, departing from uncontested 
axioms according to formal procedures, etc. On reflection, the alleged analogy between 
mathematics and the normative actually turns out quite a major disanalogy. 
As a second point, if we take the partners-in-crime move seriously, there simply 
will be too many to swallow. One partner is theology, an endeavor few philosophers 
would be fully comfortable with aligning themselves with. But there are infinitely many 
others as well. Alternative non-natural hypotheses can easily be constructed in structural 
assimilation to realism. On pain of consistency, wouldn't this move then have to cut a 
break for all partners, however insane, if it is to do the same for one? Consider realism 
about witchcraft: the hypothesis that there really are witches who acquire that status in 
virtue of their natural features; that witchcraft does not imbue their members with any 
supernatural powers; that it simply consists in having a particular status - being a witch -
a status certain persons have by reference to some non-natural standards for witchcraft. 
No empirical discovery could in principle disprove the hypothesis of witchcraft 
appropriately refined. Yet I presume witchcraft is a partner realism is better off without. 
2.4. The Epistemological Argument 
Epistemological worries enable the second most successful way of indirectly 
assaulting realism by undercutting potential motivations for the view. Since 
epistemological worries constitute a prelude for what I consider the most successful 
indirect attack - this one stemming from practical concerns - I start with the former. 
Epistemological as well as practical worries take their aim at the very heart of realism, 
namely its independence thesis. By disconnecting normative truths from natural truths, 
realism inevitably also bums all epistemological and practical bridges required to 
reconnect the normative to our ways of life. The normative cannot be independent and 
yet epistemically accessible, or independent and yet practically relevant, or so I wish to 
argue. Start first, then, with the epistemological concern I hope to substantiate: If there 
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are normative truths of the sort realism espouses, we are in no position to non-
accidentally find out what they are. Left thus clueless, then, we cannot respond to them in 
ways commonly thought significant to our rationality, morality, or responsibility. I 
readily admit: it is entirely possible that we may correctly believe, even know, what those 
truths are. But the chances of that are cosmically minute. The epistemic inaccessibility of 
normative reality would certainly not disprove that reality; that's why the charge, even if 
successful, is at best indirect and inconclusive. Still, it most likely would create enough 
of an aura of discomfort to motivate an interest in my ultimate counterproposal. 
The charge itself is quite familiar, occasionally put in terms of the absence of an 
epistemological story to accompany realism. I am not sure this is necessarily the case; 
realism, in a sense, does have a story, and therein lies the very problem: the story of blind 
guessing. The epistemology of realism is akin to playing the lottery. We may hit the 
jackpot, and there is no principled argument to rule out the occurrence of such a lucky 
coincidence; yet the odds are rather slim. In fact, the problem does not lie in mere 
absence of a story at all. There were and still are countless phenomena for which we lack 
a story. The Greeks had no idea of what drives cognition - they apparently considered the 
brain's purpose to cool the blood - but that didn't entice them to doubt there is such a 
thing. The problem, then, is not the lack of a story, but the apparent inevitability of a 
terrible one. 
For the sort of epistemological concern I wish to press against realism to succeed, 
I need to get the focus exactly right. I must block what I deem are avenues of evasion and 
questionable retreat. In response to epistemological worries, realists have usually 
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attempted to explain how normative beliefs can be justified. But the focus on 
justification, I believe, side steps the deeper and potentially irresolvable issue. The 
problem is accessibility, not justification. Shafer-Landau at first aptly describes the 
problem in terms of accessibility, only to immediately tum the lens on justification 
afterwards: "A classic case against moral realism begins from the assumption that any 
moral truths there are must be accessible to us, and maintains that realists have no 
plausible account of such accessibility. To be accessible, in the present sense, is to be 
capable of being known or justifiably believed." (2003:231) Not so. To appreciate the 
true force of the worry, we need to redirect our attention away from matters of 
justification onto our chances of getting it right. Justification is commonly understood in 
broadly coherentist terms, as when we reach a state of reflective equilibrium or one that 
exemplifies our best epistemic efforts. And there are no principal obstacles for normative 
beliefs to acquire justification in that sense. Yet such a concession does not even begin to 
address the deeper worry; which is not that we may fail to be justified in our normative 
beliefs, but rather that the chances of even our best epistemic efforts to get it right 
approximate zero. 
Here, then, is the argument. How could we acquire some non-accidentally correct 
representation of normative truths? There are three broad ways to cover. We may hit 
upon the normative in a priori fashion, through empirical investigation, or based on our 
intuitions. Yet none will suffice to explain how the sort of normative reality espoused by 
realism could become epistemically accessible. First, forget about the a priori. Realism 
has already granted that normative truths are not of the logical or conceptual sort; neither 
are they constructed in virtue of our best attempts to organize our pre-theoretical 
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normative convictions in coherentist fashion; what is normatively true is not so due to 
some state of reflective equilibrium we can reach under actual or idealized circumstances. 
Yet the logical, conceptual and coherent are the prime, if not only, candidates for the a 
priori. If we do not have a priori access to the normative in virtue of some logical, 
conceptual or coherentist capacities, how else would that work? Assuming, of course, 
that we are unwilling to reintroduce some primitive non-natural epistemic capacities 
widely thought discredited: a primitive moral sense or some non-natural moral intuition 
that has a mysterious direct line to matters normative. 
For sure, this entire problematic would not arise if we could suppose with 
reasonable confidence that (some) normative truths are self-evident - a path indeed taken 
by several writers. Unfortunately, we cannot do that. Who would be fully comfortable 
presuming the truth of utilitarianism, deontology, or virtue ethics, or of hedonism, 
intellectualism, perfectionism, preference-satisfaction, and so on solely the deliverance of 
some self-evident a priori reflection? Here's a self-evident proposition: 'If show is white, 
then snow is white.' Yet normative contentions, such as that pleasure is (or is not) the one 
and only thing worth striving for are nothing like that. It is one thing to advocate on 
behalf of the truth of a thesis and quite another to declare it self-evident. Philosophers 
like to emphasize that reasonable people can disagree about normative matters; which 
would hardly be so if they turned out self-evident. The persistence of reasonable 
disagreement supplies prima facie compelling evidence against self-evidence, and there is 
plenty of that in normative discourse. Insisting nonetheless on self-evident proposition 
would, hence, amount to the flat-out declaration of intellectual incompetency of many 
hard-thinking people. It would be accompanied by a presumption reaching barely 
tolerable levels of dogmatism that, I'm afraid, also comes dangerously close to reminding 
us of previous practices of declaring the expositions of opposing viewpoints worth 
nothing but the fire. I, for one, have certainly spent a considerable amount of time in 
serious reflection, and yet cannot help finding less and less self-evident all matters 
normative. Teaching students why matters are harder than they initially appear is in fact 
an important part of the ethics curriculum. Appeal to self-evidence is thus not only 
entirely unsubstantiated but also intellectually disreputable. 
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Next, tum to empirical methods. Natural observation cannot non-accidentally 
deliver correct representations of normative reality either. If normative correctness is 
indeed what realists suppose it to be we inevitably are in no position to non-accidentally 
identify what is correct based on empirical information. This is due to the supposed 
independence of the normative from the natural - realism's core thesis that a 
thoroughgoing conception of the natural world does not determine the shape of the 
normative world. Yet if that is so, we cannot determine what form that shape has based 
on what we empirically know. Consider, as an analogy, that we have two closed off class 
rooms; each has written a number on its blackboard. Suppose we previously asked two 
students to write down whatever number came to their mind; being careful, of course, to 
ensure that there was no correspondence between the two. Given such mutual 
independence, there simply is no way to determine what the number is in the other room 
based on what the number is in this room, apart from just blind guessing. And yet that is 
exactly the situation in which realism finds itself. We are confronted by a myriad of 
serious contenders of normative theories all of which equally compatible with the natural. 
Since every well-worked out ethical theory is equally compatible with what we can 
observe scientifically, they are in this regard equally likely with respect to our best 
natural evidence. To put an artificially low number on it, suppose we have a thousand 
equally coherent theories of value all of which fully compatible with a thoroughgoing 
conception of the natural world. What, then, is the basis for assigning even a greater 
probability to one of them rather than another on grounds of natural observation? Being 
epistemically locked off in the natural world, how are we to determine what number is 
engraved in some independent normative world? For all we know, the relevant value-
switch could have fallen on each of those thousand theories, and the independence of that 
result from the natural preempts any natural access to that result. 
Turn, finally, to intuitions. It was not my intention to mention intuitions as a third 
and necessarily distinct epistemic category from the previous two - the a priori and the 
empirical. Depending on one's account of what intuitions are, they incorporate different 
mixes of the two. But intuitions now serve as a basis for normative argument so 
prominent that the extra treatment is warranted; even though what follows will mostly be 
an application of the previous remarks to the particular case of moral cognition, sentiment 
and public opinion - to slightly broaden the traditional scope of moral and normative 
intuitions. Our moral and normative sentiments and intuitions are most sensibly seen as 
part of the natural order and amenable to natural investigation. There is an increasing 
number of empirical data shedding light on these phenomena. It is hard to predict what 
future empirical investigation will reveal; however, in light of what we already know I 
find it hard to share the confidence of many philosophers that the empirical data will bear 
out a conception where our moral sense and intuition happens to reliably indicate a 
causally independent non-natural normative order. While empirical evidence cannot 
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directly refute such realities - this was the conclusion from above - it can put substantial 
pressure on the idea that our moral sensibilities could inform us about them by recovering 
a genesis of those sensibilities that is ill-suited for the task. If those sensibilities turn out 
to be the product of factors that are not causally controlled by any alleged non-natural 
moral realities - as must be granted given the way non-natural realism is set up - it would 
be a cosmic coincidence if the relevant sensibilities were to correctly represent the nature 
of those realities. In light of the independence of the normative from the natural, the 
reliability of moral intuitions could only be secured due to some amazing preestablished 
harmony between the development of our moral sensibilities and normative reality. 
Yet what we learn about the genies of our moral sense and intuition in detail does 
not inspire confidence in such preestablished harmony. That they are shaped by the 
contingencies of our biological and cultural makeup becomes increasingly hard to deny. 
It is particularly interesting to note how certain emotional features that are idiosyncratic 
to our species and culture drive our moral sense (Cf. Jesse Prinz, The Emotional 
Construction of Morals). Requirements that have high emotional resonance - by eliciting 
disgust reactions, for instance - are more likely to culturally spread and persevere than 
those with lower resonance (Cf. Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules). How funny it would 
be if the contingent agglomerate of causal factors that explains the importance we place 
on the symbolic, for instance - our tendency to accord more weight and attention to the 
famous kidnapped baby than to the merely starving baby, or saving private Ryan in the 
course of which many other soldiers die - just happens to coincide with what is true in a 
causally closed off normative domain. Or, to take another example, that our predilection 
towards the near and dear, nicely explained in evolutionary terms by Hamilton's famous 
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kinship formula, just happens to match what we are normatively required in terms of an 
independent realm of "special" obligations. Recall the two class-room example from 
above. The reliability of my intuitive call of what number is written on the other room's 
board would be akin to that of rolling a dice. If moreover my intuition was shaped by my 
idiosyncratic fondness of prime numbers, suspicion would be even more in order. The 
situation is similar for non-natural moral realism. How to combine a belief in non-natural 
moral realities with one in the reliability of our moral sensibilities is unclear to me. 
With no a priori, empirical or intuitive access to normative reality, we simply 
must lack such access altogether. Notice, though, that these epistemological worries do 
not merely reiterate a skeptical point. To treat them as such would be misleading and 
understating the problem. This can be easily seen from the contrast of normative with 
traditional external-world skepticism. There we learn that we cannot systematically rule 
out that all our perceptions of the natural world may be deceptive. The traditional skeptic 
reminds us of our perceptual limitations - that they are not self-certifying - and that we 
are consequently anything but epistemically perfect. This we can learn to live with, 
because what the traditional skeptic cannot take away is our appreciation of how we 
could in principle form more or less reliable representations of the external world. We 
have an excellent account, well supported and worked out, of how we may indeed have 
access to the external world. If there is nothing funny about our situation in the world, we 
know how we can come to be informed about it. But the epistemic difficulties realism 
faces are of an entirely different sort. Here we are not merely embarrassed by being 
unable to come up with a systematic way of proving and substantiating what we already 
firmly believe: that there is an external world rather than an evil demon deceiving us. It is 
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not that we merely cannot rule out with certainty some artificial skeptical scenarios. It is 
that we have a structural argument that threatens all realistic chances of acquiring non-
accidental access to normative reality in the first place. This presents an epistemological 
problematic of an altogether different magnitude. 
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Now, if that was not already bad enough, things are worse still. My previous 
argument focused mainly on our inability to adjudicate between sensible normative 
competitors if realism is true. Yet we are actually in no position to even rule out utterly 
insensible ones. Why suppose that only suitably coherent theories are to be considered? 
Who is to know whether normative reality is coherent? We have absolutely no systematic 
basis for presuming the ultimately correct normative theories to correspond to what we 
now consider theoretical virtues. Those virtues have evolved through our theoretical 
encounters with the natural world. Systematicity is a virtue in a causally closed world, 
simplicity has proven to help predictability, etc. Normative reality may resemble natural 
reality in that respect, but again, it may not. Perhaps our true ethical requirements are as 
abstruse as that on Monday's we must eat peanuts and on Tuesday we must climb the 
tallest buildings. What motivates our confidence that the correct theories would even 
make sense to us, that we could process them given our contingent provision of 
computational power, or that we could even fancy them? Moreover, why suppose they 
will respect our contingent sensibilities? Why suppose what is valuable must be found 
agreeable by some particular species with its contingent cognitive and conative design 
features? Ethicists usually look for guidance to a shared and uncontroversial set of 
principles, such as that every person has equal moral worth, and then proceed on that 
basis to make their case for more controversial principles. Yet the truth of the former 
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principles is no more certain than the truth of the latter. Realism is plagued by an 
epistemology unable to rule out the absurd, to determine as less likely the most 
outlandish proposal than what has been developed by entire hard-working philosophical 
communities. If my argument is correct, the epistemology of realism is a disaster of 
unanticipated magnitude. It threatens the very viability of any serious truth-seeking 
ethical theorizing. 
Assuming, of course, that my argument is correct, and there is no shortage of 
those who would challenge its soundness. Here I have space to consider only one, namely 
the concern that the argument over-generalizes, that if correct, it would spell disaster not 
just for normative epistemology, but philosophical epistemology quite generally. The 
reply is in a sense an adoption of the partners-in-crime move sketched above; tying up the 
success of normative epistemology with that of other philosophical enterprises. Shafer-
Landau again best articulates the argument. I thus wish to quote him at some length, 
starting first with his nice summary ofthe problem to be followed by his rejoinder. 
This first argument claims, against the possibility of moral knowledge, 
that there is no adequate evidence to support our moral views. All the empirical 
evidence there is is compatible with a wide variety of ethical diagnoses of it. And 
our only other sources of evidence - our considered judgments about principles 
and cases - are too dependent on historical, cultural, and personal contingencies 
to serve as a secure and reliable basis for justifying our moral beliefs. 
Yet this criticism, if successful, is sufficient to eliminate the justification 
we might have for any of our philosophical beliefs. In philosophy, as in ethics, the 
best empirical evidence underdetermines the correct theoretical understanding of 
it. In philosophy, as in ethics, we rely very heavily on intuitions and considered 
judgments to adjudicate between conflicting claims. Try doing modal metaphysics 
or analytic epistemology without the use of such convictions. It just doesn't seem 
possible. 
If that is so, then we have good reason to suppose that the following 
principle is true: 
(P) If there is no adequate evidence to support our moral beliefs, then there 
is no adequate evidence to support our philosophical beliefs. I think that this 
principle is true, and that we must reject its consequent, rather than accept the 
antecedent. For the latter course forces a wholesale philosophical skepticism. 
Given the truth of (P), the price of moral skepticism is global philosophical 
skepticism. Yet this is surely too high a price for moral skeptics to pay, since they 
are affirming the warrant of at least one philosophical claim (namely, moral 
skepticism). 
I have two responses. First, the global philosophical implications Shafer-Landau 
takes moral skepticism to have need further argument. His move is currently subjected to 
considerable scrutiny, and many have put pressure on its inescapability (Cf. Matt Bedke 
forthcoming). Not all philosophical enterprises are necessarily in the same boat. Consider 
philosophy of mind, for instance, which is certainly empirically informed and 
constrained. In fact, to the extent to which that sub-discipline oversteps empirical bounds 
philosophers have indeed questioned its reliability. Similar things could be said for 
philosophy of language, science, physics and biology, etc. More abstract branches, too, 
such as logic and philosophy of mathematics can again appeal to formalistic procedures 
unavailable to ethics. Though they as well may rely on intuitions, the intuition that if both 
A and B are true then A is true is somewhat less troubling than that one must or must not 
turn a switch in some particular trolley scenario. And when it comes to modal 
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philosophy, I do find skepticism highly attractive m its own right. Shafer-Landau's 
verdict may consequently be premature. 
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But secondly, and more importantly, Shafer-Landau's move is dialectically 
awkward. The question at issue is not whether normative skepticism is true, or whether 
we can non-accidentally represent what is morally or normatively the case. Rather, it is 
whether this would be entailed by realism and what in response to make of realism. The 
question is whether there is an implication from realism to normative skepticism, and it is 
unclear how the alleged further implication from normative to global philosophical 
skepticism bears on the truth of that former logical relationship. Alternatively put, even if 
realism entailed normative skepticism, and even if normative skepticism entailed global 
philosophical skepticism, this undesirable result would only materialize if realism is true. 
And that is precisely the target of our present inquiry, however indirect the approach. We 
cannot here dialectically ignore realism's many rivals, many of which take full credit for 
their apparently superior epistemology. Naturalists, constructivist, subjectivists, 
expressivists all believe they can explain moral knowledge with ease, since they don't 
assume that ethics or normative discourse is aimed at the discovery of an independent 
normative reality. Especially the practice-based constructivism I favor handily emerges 
free of the realist's embarrassments of being accompanied by an epistemology of voodoo. 
Shafer-Landau's acknowledges the very same point: "Constructivists will tie moral 
knowledge to knowledge of the deliverances of the relevant agents whose attitudes form 
the basis of moral truth. Obtaining such knowledge will be more or less difficult 
depending on the particular characterizations of the agents and attitudes that go into 
constructing moral truth. Nevertheless, the difficulties can in principle be overcome, so 
long as we have hope of gaining access to the relevant attitudes." (231) Why, then, did 
this opportunity of liberating us from the threat of global philosophical skepticism go 
unmentioned in the first of the above passages? Constructivism - by the admission of its 
opponent - does not share the predicament of realism who in virtue of its particular 
realistic interpretation of what ethicists are trying to achieve potentially lacks any viable 
corresponding epistemology. Thus, if anything, Shafer-Landau's allegation that moral 
skepticism entails global philosophical skepticism would seem to aggravate the burden 
on realism; realism would now appear even more costly, unless the implication from 
realism to moral skepticism can be cut, which would bring us back to exactly where we 
started. 
To sum up. Realism, I argued, implies principled epistemological inaccessibility 
to all matters normative. The point is not of a skeptical, but structural nature. It is the very 
independence of the normative from the natural that figures as the cornerstone of realism 
that inevitably involves such dire epistemological side effects. This does not disprove 
realism, but does burden it with considerable costs. The normative domain - what is 
valuable, right, or reason-giving - was originally hoped to assist us in making our 
choices. The normative was commonly supposed to be essentially action-guiding. Yet if 
we are in no position to acquire non-accidentally correct representations of what is 
normatively the case, its practical impact vanishes. It must resemble an invisible map, 
specifying where to go without disclosing what route to take. If realism is true, it would 
still be the case that some configurations are objectively better than others, that some 
options are to be disregarded, or that certain responses are favored. Still, we will be in no 
position to tell and to adjust our choices accordingly. This has most drastic effects in the 
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case of our inability to detect what authoritatively favors what, that is in the domain of 
reasons. Our capacity to respond to reasons, many now believe, lies at the very heart of 
our rationality, responsibility, and even agency. We can still respond, of course, to that 
which is reason-giving, even with the correct responses, but only without any sensibility 
to what in fact are the appropriate responses to take. It will be a crap-shoot. Our decision-
making could not reflect or express more than a blind guess on our part that this rather 
than that way was how we were supposed to respond. An invisible map cannot guide our 
choices. It consequently is not a particularly attractive map to buy. 
2.5. The Practical Argument 
This section challenges the practical relevance of normative reality as envisioned 
by realism. I join a rising chorus of writers who have articulated similar worries, 
including Bernard Williams, Christine Korsgaard, Alan Gibbard, Simon Blackburn, as 
well as others. Parallel to the epistemological worries presented above, the practical 
concern takes aim at the very independence thesis of realism. By dissociating the nature 
of normative reality from what we are actually concerned about, realism also relinquishes 
all avenues connecting the normative back to our practical concerns. Yet without a 
foothold on those concerns normative reality becomes incapable of making genuine 
contributions to our autonomous choices of how to lead our lives. The source of its 
resonance for our actual choices becomes unclear without a bond to our concerns. 
Independence purges normative reality of the one job it was supposed to take care of: to 
guide us in our choices. Thus unemployed it must sink to the bottom of irrelevance; or so 
I shall argue. 
This would be a most surprising result. Realism, after all, is the view that there are 
true and authoritative answers to questions of what to do. What distinguishes realism 
from anti-realism is exactly that it postulates objective resolutions to practical issues. 
Since normative facts authoritatively settle what is to be done, how can there be any 
remaining issue of what is to be done? In light of this thought various realists have 
declared all familiar charges from practical significance against realism confused. The 
challenger appears to be asking what reasons we have to do what we have reasons to do, 
thereby portraying nothing but unwillingness on his part to appreciate what reasons are in 
the first place. 
Yet no one is guilty of confusion here. The corresponding question will obviously 
not be one about reasons. The impression that it must be only reflects a common realistic 
bias. What undergirds the present concern is an alternative picture of the nature of 
practical questions and how they are to be answered. We have seen how realists read 
practical questions: as targeting at an external realm of special facts. By doing so, 
however, realists profoundly misinterpret the practical in terms of the theoretical, and 
thereby offer the wrong kind of solution to what is at stake. What supposedly explains 
what constitutes correct solutions to mathematical problems and to practical problems has 
the same structure in the image of realism: representing things as they are. The alternative 
picture expressed by the present worry radically departs from this representational model 
of practical thought. Correctness in representation is a paradigm ill tailored to practical 
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thought and choice. By living out our agency we do not participate in some knowledge 
quiz. What we need is a clear exposition of the alternatives in approach to practical 
significance - a goal that defines much of what follows later. For now, I shall be content 
if I can begin to substantiate that there is indeed an alternative to realism's 
representational model, and that despite all the realists' puzzlement this delivers an 
intelligible way of asking the question: why care about what we are supposed to care 
about? 
What precisely, then, is the nature of the gap I claim opens up between the 
normative and the practical as a structural consequence of realism? It is common to 
understand it in motivational terms - when, for instance, we wonder whether the 
recognition of what one ought to do is by itself sufficient to provide some motive to 
comply. And how, in case it does not, we want to understand the extra component 
necessary to bridge normative cognition with motivation and what role it plays in rational 
deliberation. Now, understanding the practical in motivational terms is correct in one 
sense and yet highly misleading in another. In light of a long philosophical tradition that 
has contrasted motivation with reason we must be careful not to underappreciate 
motivation. Motivation is a highly complex phenomenon. Anyone who harbors 
suspicions about reason must ultimately tum the focus of attention back to motivational 
matters, and think that's where the action is, not in the fantasyland of reason. Employing 
rationality and reflection is just one particularly interesting way of becoming motivated. I 
thus need to stress most emphatically: The practical problem is motivational only in the 
sense in which everything related to choice and deciding what to do is motivational. It is 
motivational in the sense in which Nagel used the term in his The Possibility of Altruism, 
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mistaken perhaps about the contrast of motivation and reason, but not mistaken in his 
emphasis that all practical problems ultimately come down to what to do. 
This is not how motivation is commonly introduced in meta-normative debates. 
There motivation is frequently regarded the villain for its potentially inimical relationship 
to reason. The problem set forth is how to bring in line the recalcitrant motivational parts 
of the soul with their more rational counterparts. Sidwick writes: "Now we cannot help 
believing what we see to be true, but we can help doing what we know to be wrong or 
unwise: thus we are forced to notice the existence in us of irrational springs of action, 
conflicting with our knowledge and preventing its practical realization: and the very 
imperfectness of the connexion between our practical judgment and our will impels us to 
seek for more precise knowledge as to the nature of that connexion." (Methods, chap.1 
third paragraph).This is most apparent when we approach the practical problem from a 
third-personal rather than first-personal vantage point - thereby grossly misrepresenting 
the entire problematic that only reveals its true force from a first-personal perspective. 
When philosophers worry about motivation, they often first confront us with a 
particularly mean bunch of folk, and then invite us join the exploration of new 
motivational avenues of getting them to be nicer. If we just could get all the sensible 
knaves, fools, Lydian Shepherds, Gorgias and Thrasymachus, as well as others to be 
more respectful of our common ethical codes; how wonderful it would be if we could 
somehow rationally argue each and everyone to behave. The practical problem thus 
understood turns into a battle against diverging motivational temperaments of especially 
obnoxious people. It presents and extension of some imaginary war of us against them 
now fought out on philosophical territory. All this is rather silly, and does certainly not 
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represent the worry I have in mind. We thus better put to a side the third-personal 
problematic and its accompanying motivational caricature once and forever. 
Turn, then, to the first-personal deliberative perspective each of us occupies. It is 
here where the practical problem becomes a real issue - the issue. Let me first present the 
problematic in its grandest terms and then fine-tune it step by step. We all have to figure 
out what we want from life, what we want all this to be about. We only have one life to 
lead, our own, and - as far as we are able to keep in check life's many vicissitudes - it is 
ultimately up to our own choices. This is what I want, we say: being a philosopher, a 
family-man, a traveler, or what not. This is what makes life worth living for me, which 
explains why I stick around. From the perspective of realism, however, the question of 
how to lead one's own life receives its true answers not in your own concerns but in an 
altogether different source: in an independent reality that potentially transcends radically 
what we subjectively deem important. They come from the outside, as it were, and fully 
coming to grips with what that amounts to is what the practical problematic is all about. 
Now, I am fully aware that the question why care about what we are supposed to 
care about must initially appear puzzling and decidedly unimpressive. This is easily 
explained. The radical nature inherent in realism of the externality of normative reality 
together with its practical consequences is easy to overlook. We are accustomed to think 
that what we are supposed to care about cannot stray thus far away from what we actually 
do care about. For anti-realists especially, this is an entirely predictable attitude. 
Normative reality, we believe, is an illusion generated by our disposition to objectify our 
present concerns. It consequently comes as no big surprise that what we are concerned 
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about and what we believe we must be concerned about neatly match up, since the latter 
is a projection of the former. Had triangles been able to form thoughts about reasons -
paraphrasing Spinoza - they probably would have construed their nature as being 
concerned with perfect angles and straight lines. The case in point is marvelously well 
narrated by a chicken-and-egg story dear to evolutionary psychologists: For chickens, 
eggs must have magical powers; in particular, they must appear equipped with the 
peculiar property of to-be-sit-uponness. Chickens must find it unimaginable how one 
could fail to feel that call. How better to make sense thereof if not by supposing norms 
authoritative that relate eggs to the one and only appropriate response, namely to hatch 
them? For chickens, the question why care about (hatching eggs) what they are supposed 
to care about (hatching eggs) is a real no brainer. 
Yet the supposition that our actual concerns must neatly correspond to the 
concerns mandated by an independent normative reality turns out surprisingly naive - if 
normative reality is indeed what realism takes it to be. Especially in light of the above 
epistemological worries we have no systematic grounds for supposing as more likely than 
not that normative reality is sensitive to our concerns in the first place; that it is 
hospitable rather than hostile to what we find agreeable, or, what appears an even more 
intriguing possibility, that the normative is just plain indifferent to our concerns - as the 
natural world seems to be. Such a possibility is indeed reflected in various conceptions of 
value, mostly of an aesthetic nature, such as Nozick's and Leibniz's, where what matters 
is organic unity, or unity in multiplicity, leaving little space for our all-to-human 
anxieties. It is unclear, then, why to believe in any agreement between our own parochial 
human perspective and concerns on the one side and normative reality on the other side. 
76 
Belief in harmony, here as elsewhere, amounts to little but an entirely unsubstantiated 
hope. For all we know, life could objectively be all about jumping up and down as many 
times as one can, or some other outlandish thing. 
In addition, realism's epistemological calamities also undermine the only sensible 
way I am aware of that would explain why our actual and required concerns 
systematically converge: namely that we adjust our actual concerns in light of what we 
recognize are the correct concerns to have according to some authoritative normative 
standards. However, in the absence of an account for how those standards could reveal 
themselves to our very natural minds, we simply cannot rule out that the imperatives they 
issue would have to be judged utterly crazy by the light of our present concerns. Perhaps 
what we must do is to be as miserable as we can be; perhaps reverse utilitarianism is true, 
that morally we must maximize pain and suffering. Just think about the odds here. 
Normative truths are supposedly eternal ones. Think of them as the goal. Now add to this 
a contingent evolutionary process starting from a contingent set of circumstances, 
resulting, at one stage, in a complex and intelligent design called Homo sapiens. Billions 
over billions of contingent happenings, neither related to nor influenced by normative 
reality, added up to the presence of some funny thinking creatures. How probable is it 
that what they happen to like exactly hits that normative goal? The odds here resemble 
two people executing independently devised travel plans, one starting from Houston and 
one from Johannesburg, meeting up in a cafe of some town in Indonesia - very low 
indeed. With the real possibility of an unimaginably drastic clash between actual and 
required concerns, we potentially face a fundamental choice in its starkest terms: to side 
with our own concerns or to side with those required by an external reality. 
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Now, what does all this mean if viewed from a first-personal practical vantage 
point? Here you are, taking great pleasure in spending time thinking about interesting 
issues and sharing experiences with family and friends and exploring other regions of the 
world, and yet: for all you know, what makes life objectively valuable might have 
nothing to do with that at all. It is hard to know how to speculate about normative 
probabilities, but we have gone through various ways of entertaining the thought that the 
odds are rather unfavorable that it just so happens that your concerns correspond to your 
normative reasons. Let's thus consider both cases where they either do or do not so 
correspond, starting with the latter. Suppose, then, that the good life, as specified by the 
relevant independently authoritative standards, consists solely in perfecting athletic 
fitness. I introduced this example in the first chapter, and now shall stick to it. It is not 
entirely unrelated to prominent Aristotelian ideas that each creature has an inherent 
purpose or telos, that this telos has a semi semi-biological form as it springs from the 
nature of things, and that being a good exemplar of its kind consists in perfecting ones 
nature-given telos. And it is conceivable that athletic fitness could fit that bill. The 
example is also suitable crazy yet without completely being over the top. And it can be 
extended: suppose further that normative reasons aim at opportunities for perfecting 
athletic fitness, and that the theory of athletic consequentialism represents our de facto 
moral duties and/or underwrites the valid scalar evaluations: the obligation to maximize 
agglomerate athletic fitness or the comparative superiority of options in terms of their 
greater realization of athletic fitness. 
Now postulate you know all this with certainty. The Holy Grail told you. This 
forces a choice upon you: to continue to indulge your philosophical, familiar and 
exploratory predilections, or to correct your concerns, as far as you can, and strive for 
bodily perfection. It is no secret where my sympathies lie. And I readily admit: My 
decision to stay cold in the face of objective duties to radically reform my way of life so 
as to become a second Arnold Schwarzenegger, the ultimate saint, is clearly and 
objectively incorrect. It exemplifies a profound deficiency on my part. It represents an 
unwillingness to act as I should. It renders me a bad and potentially blameworthy person. 
Yet why would I care about any of these verdicts, all of them coming from the outside, 
after I so boldly refused to heed the initial requirements? All these additional verdicts do 
is to restate that which I already decided not to empower with practical significance: the 
dictates of an external provision of authoritative standards telling me to work out. 
Now, everyone concurs we must disregard various ways of how I could come to 
be recaptured by my objective requirements. Society may get angry at me for my 
nonchalant noncompliance; I may end up in athletic hell (though perhaps I'd prefer that 
to athletic heaven). Athletic priests may find ways of guilt tripping me. The point is: this 
is not how the normative is to engage the practical. I objectively have to become a better 
athlete, not because of something else I do care about, but simply because that's what I 
have to do according to authoritative standards. To explicitly eliminate potential sources 
of distraction, let us grant, then, that no instrumentally undesired effects will fall upon me 
if I decide to disregard my reasons. So I wonder, and wonder how anyone could fail to 
wonder, why to follow their prescriptions rather than my own? 
I have no clue as how to answer that question. Realism, it seems to me, must 
simply say that's what you objectively have to do, period. This I already took full notice 
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of, however, and then continued to ask: why care about what I objectively have to care 
about? What does that have to do with me and my life? It is not that I will pay a 
considerable price if I don't, that I will become unable to realize my long standing plans 
and projects. In fact, as the scenario was set up, quite the opposite is the case. If I was 
codeliberating with some advisor of mine who took my real concerns at heart, I could see 
how he could help me in my practical questions; he could make me appreciate concern-
related aspects of the options I face that I did not previously notice. Yet in the absence of 
such concern-related avenues, realism's above insistence strikes me as amounting to little 
but a heavy and unexplained dose of bullshit, to use Williams' technical term. On 
realisms' own account, there is a further, at the very least logical, step to be taken from 
the recognition of what one is supposed to do to actually doing it - otherwise all the 
problems concerning motivation could not even arise - and if one wonders why to take 
this further step, realism turns utterly silent. Even in the face of objective values, it is still 
you who has to choose. One may be told all day long what one must do; but it is 
ultimately your life, and your choice, as how to lead it. The practical perspective is 
radically yours and simply is not identical with that of any alleged independent normative 
reality. Realism's incapability to even appreciate that there is a further practical issue is 
symptomatic of the fact that the answer it offered was of the wrong kind to begin with. 
Now suppose that my reasons and concerns do coincide. Authoritative standards 
call upon me to study philosophy, spend time with family and friends, and to explore the 
globe. And, since we are still in realism's territory, those reasons are not mere reflections 
of my concerns, but have a standing logically, conceptually, and nomologically 
independent of them. Reasons and concerns are distinct entities yet happen to align. Can 
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the normative thereby come to meaningfully engage the practical? I doubt it. The answer, 
I think, is brought out by a hypothetical: change your reasons and test whether your 
concerns follow, thereby turning this scenario into one of the previous kind. And if your 
concerns do not readjust, as I would reiterate the point from above, then even in the case 
of perfect reasons-concerns matchup, the most plausible explanation of your ultimate 
practical choices would not mention your reasons. They would still drop out of the 
practical picture. 
Now, there is a profound worry about this argument, powerfully put forth by 
Professor Norcross on the occasion of a review of the previous chapter. Here it is. That I 
have the aforementioned reasons may be metaphysically necessary, and the envisioned 
hypothetical hence impossible. We cannot test whether my concerns would differ under 
the alternative reasons-scenario, because there simply is no such alternative reasons-
scenario. This is an argument with considerable potency, and I am not sure I have an 
effective reply. Still, I shall try. First, the question of whether our reasons are, or must be 
according to realism, metaphysically necessary is unclear. This question raises certain 
meta-modal issues about which I prefer to stay agnostic. I only want to notice, though, 
that the potential metaphysical necessity of the normative, as far as we know, could turn 
out either side. I don't know what we would want to say if, for instance, it turned out that 
our only reasons are to jump up and down and that this is so necessarily. The 
metaphysical necessity of the normative appears to raise the stakes of the game. 
Consequentialism, for instance, would now not only be true or false, but be necessarily 
true or false. I hope I have occasion to ask Professor Norcross whether he is especially 
troubled about this latter option. Granted, all this is shadowboxing, and so let's just 
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postulate for the sake of the argument that first our reasons do align with our concerns in 
the above manner and secondly that they hold metaphysically necessarily. 
In response I shall make two suggestions. A first one introduces various partners 
in crime - not without noticing the irony of my own usage of the realists' favorite 
argument. Whatever its worth, then, let me mention that there seem to be many 
interesting and non-trivial thought experiments that involve metaphysically impossible 
scenarios. Some of them are doing considerable argumentative work: if water had been 
different in chemical composition, we would have discovered that as well. Or, dear to all 
atheists, if there was a god, the world would be better and involve less suffering, or there 
would be some evidence of him/her/it, etc. Or, had I been born in prehistoric times I 
wouldn't have acquired a philosophy degree from Rice University. All these conditionals 
seem non-trivially true. We may thus stillieam something from considering that which is 
impossible. 
This brings us to my second suggestion. It may suffice that I have epistemological 
or logical modalities to work with. If the normative is not logically fixed - if alternatives 
are at least logically possible - I may be able to direct my questions at that kind of 
possibilities. Moreover, since what I am testing is not normative reality directly, but 
rather indirectly our responses and attitudes towards it, even epistemological modalities 
may suffice. The questions I raise all have the structure of what we would do or feel if 
such and such turned out the case. As long as it remains epistemologically open whether 
consequentialism or deontology is true, for example, we can meaningfully speculate 
about our reactions if we found out. It seems correct to say, for instance, that if 
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consequentialism turned out true, Professor Norcross would acquire more hedons than if 
it turned out false. Before water's chemical structure was decisively determined, the H30 
camp might have reasoned correctly that in the eventual case of falsification their funding 
would be cut off. In any case, since our attitudes exhibit a well documented fineness of 
grain, they may also be capable of sensitivities not limited to what can and cannot be 
metaphysically the case. I'd be very happy if I could live a thousand years, or fly, or 
travel back to Kant and beg him to write better. It may simply be a fact about our 
attitudes that they exemplify sensitivities that can only be revealed by imagining how 
they would behave even in metaphysical impossible scenarios. Since the practical 
argument is all about what to make of normative reality, our attitudes and responses, not 
of normative reality directly, I hope I can draw on a long Fregean tradition allowing for 
exploring options in thought not corresponding to options de reo 
The normative, I suggest by way of concluding, leaves practically open what to 
do, and thereby becomes deliberatively dispensable. Perhaps this only prompts the 
suspicion that I do not fully understand authority and reason, despite all my functional 
and structural analyses presented before. I admit guilty as charged, but only under the 
proviso that there is nothing to be understood in the first place. Conceptually, however, I 
must insist that I am as clear on reasons as realists are - after all, we both converge in our 
conception. If my argument was contributing to the dissolution of our grasp of reasons 
and resulted in a profound puzzlement I would consider it a huge and unlikely success. 
The dialectical situation, again, resembles what hard-determinists conclude in the context 
of the free-will debate: they believe once you really understand what the notion of 
freedom of the will involves, you will see there cannot be such a thing - a verdict they 
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reach in their opinion not as a result of lack of conceptual clarity but for the presence of 
it. Some authors from the camp of realism, Parfit especially, love to level the charge of 
confusion against philosophers who have articulated the practical puzzlement about 
realism; at what point, however, did I slip and committed conceptual blunders? I was 
explicit that the practical argument does not directly challenge the existence of normative 
reality. On the contrary, I'd say it leaves intact whatever probabilities there were for such 
a thing. The argument as I introduced it only attempts to moderate our contingent interest 
in such a reality. I fully admitted we cannot ask, without confusion, what possible reasons 
we have to care about what we are supposed to care about, since it was stipulated that 
there are overwhelming reasons to do precisely that. What we can ask, however, and 
without the slightest hint of confusion, is this: after clear and careful reflection, after 
vividly reminding ourselves of everything involved, do we want to choose to act in 
accord to objective demands, or do we rather want to choose to act in accord to what we 
actually care about? This is the practical question. Adequately formulating it without 
lapsing back into representational vocabulary requires quite some effort. The practical 
question as I envision it is not what I should do or have reasons to do. That issue was 
settled, and on that basis I went on to ask whether to do what we have reasons to do. The 
answer to that question, I suggest, simply is not a further proposition but a choice. It 
essentially involves parking my body in the armchair, with an engaging book and a fine 
cup of espresso in hand, or to move it into the gym, sweating profusely while being 
caught in the treadmill. The answer to a practical question is something practical, not 
theoretical, such as an action, a commitment, a plan, a way of life; it is not a thought that 
takes the world to be one way rather than another. It does not involve some further belief 
regarding the alethic status of a normative proposition. Realists may insist that the nature 
of the notion of reason is such that once you have recognized a reason you must have 
closed off all further practical questions. This, however, is simply to reiterate the magic 
without explaining the trick. 
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Many realists have distanced themselves from normative naturalism precisely 
because they find it unintelligible how plain natural facts alone could have the kind of 
significance we are after. We may fully recognize what is the case yet still wonder what 
to do in the face of it. The worry I have pressed against realism is structurally similar. 
The mere provision of additional facts, now of a normative sort, cannot achieve what 
previously plain natural facts couldn't achieve either: determining what to do in light of 
what is the case. What else can, then? In one sense, I want to say: nothing, that's the 
point! Yet in another sense, the answer is surprisingly simple: You can! That choice is 
possible and how is exemplified by or actual daily choices. Realism is a distraction 
precisely because it turns into a mystery that which is as clear as water. 
With respect to all my funny examples, it could be pointed out that I didn't really 
believe in reasons to e.g. solely strive for athletic perfection in the first place, and that's 
why I was able to pump the desired intuitions. This is true. But notice, for the record, that 
to the extent to which I believe in reasons they are nothing but reflections of our 
considered concerns. I side with the chickens, though without falling for the temptation 
of objectification. I also suspect that many people, to the extent to which they find it 
awkward to entertain the thought that reasons and concerns may pull in different 
directions, are in fact already attracted to an anti-realist and concern-based portrayal of 
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reasons. They may think that reasons and concerns necessarily align, but only because the 
former are some function or other of the latter. To this we will tum when I show how to 
build reasons, if only of a distinctively non-normative but practical kind. Without 
realism's independence thesis, there cannot be a gap looming between the two, because, 
after all, they aren't really two but just one. With the independence thesis, however, we 
have all the conceptual resources needed to entertain the possibility that concerns and 
reasons drastically diverge. And with that, the relevant questions can be asked and the 
desired intuitions be pumped. 
2.6. The Transcendental Argument 
What is the transcendental argument against robust meta-normative anti-realism? 
It is easily stated: If there are no reasons in the fundamental normative sense, we cannot 
have such reasons to believe in their absence either. If no norm has authority, then neither 
does the norm to believe what is supported by the best available evidence. This would be 
so also in the case where that evidence supported anti-realism. How, then, are anti-realists 
able to make their case, if they cannot rely on any norms, even of the most basic 
epistemic sort? How, to put the point more generally, is anyone able to argue for 
anything, if global meta-normative anti-realism was to prevail? A view that appears to 
entail such dire consequences is better well supported, and exactly therein lies the crux. 
Global meta-normative anti-realism appears to be cutting off the very justificatory branch 
it sits upon. Anti-realism seeks to engage a dialectical enterprise while denying its 
currency; at the same time trying to play a game and yet advancing a move that violates 
its constitutive ground rules. No wonder many philosophers have been quick to dismiss 
the position out of hand! 
Let me quote a few recent representative statements that exactly level this 
intuitive charge. The authors I have chosen already have some affinities for anti-realist 
positions, or at least take them seriously enough to honor them with detailed responses. 
The blow of their verdict must consequently exceed that of those already firmly placed on 
the side of realism. The three authors cited articulate the position they attack in slightly 
different terms; still, the common thread in quite recognizable. In The Normative Web, 
Terence Cuneo claims that normative nihilists - the slightly charged label he uses for 
anti-realists - face the following dilemma: 
Either epistemic nihilists hold that we have reasons to believe epistemic nihilism 
or they do not. If epistemic nihilists hold that we do have reasons to believe their 
position, then their position is self-defeating in the sense that it presupposes the 
existence of the very sorts of entity that it claims not to exist. ... But there are no 
rational oughts according to epistemic nihilism; there are no facts that imply that 
certain propositions are belief-worthy or that failing to believe something on good 
available evidence renders one (all other things being equal) irrational. If, by 
contrast, epistemic nihilists hold that we do not have epistemic reasons to believe 
their position, then their position is polemically toothless in the following sense: 
No one would make a rational mistake in rejecting it and no one would be 
epistemically praiseworthy in accepting it. 
Cuneo thus concludes that this "undesirable result is sufficiently unattractive that 
any minimally adequate philosophical position will be at pains to avoid being committed 
to it." (2007: 117-118) 
David Copp writes in Morality, Normativity and Society (1995:46-47): 
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No argument can consistently be viewed as justifying normative skepticism, if the 
argument is also believed to be sound. Normative skepticism is untenable. It 
would be incoherent to hold that the belief in normative skepticism is justified on 
the basis of any argument... For if the belief that no standard is justified is 
justified, then, since all justification is relative to some justified standard, it 
follows that the belief that no belief is justified is justified. Hence, the belief is 
justified that it is not the case that the belief in normative skepticism is justified. 
. .. This is a logically consistent position, but it is hardly coherent. ... Worse, it 
would be inconsistent for a normative skeptic - one who believes normative 
skepticism to be true - to hold that this belief is justified, for her skepticism 
entails that nothing is justified .... This means as well that no one can consistently 
hold that the belief in normative skepticism is justified unless he avoids being 
committed to normative skepticism .... Paradoxically, if one thinks that an 
argument proves normative skepticism to be true, he cannot consistently hold that 
the argument justifies belief in normative skepticism. 
Richard Joyce writes in The Myth ofMorality(2001:49-50): 
Can we imagine someone questioning practical rationality: "Yes, I recognize that 
there is a practical reason for me to ~, but what is that to me? - Why should I 
adopt that set of rules?"? This, it seems to me, is incoherent (perhaps uniquely 
among these sorts of questions). Even to ask the question "Why should I be 
interested in practical rationality?" is to ask for a reason. Thus even to question 
practical rationality is to evince allegiance to it. After all, what kind of answer 
could be provided? If the questioner is already expressing doubts about whether 
things he acknowledges as "his reasons" should move him, then there would be 
no point in providing further reasons. Therefore to question practical rationality is 
unintelligible - it is to ask for a reason while implying that no reason will be 
adequate. 
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Later on, Joyce summarizes the point succinctly: "practical rationality is not 
something that we may legitimately question, for to question it is to acknowledge it." 
(2001 :83) 
The common denominator in the cited sections is that his position is none the anti-
realist can coherently defend philosophically. By attempting to do precisely that the anti-
realist is committed to the game he questions. By arguing against the existence of reasons 
in the fundamental normative sense he in fact evinces allegiance to their very existence. 
Cuneo, Copp and Joyce are careful to target their arguments only at the 
philosophical defensibility of anti-realism and not directly at its truth. Their charge is 
indirect. Transcendental arguments, as Barry Stroud has convincingly argued (1968), 
cannot establish the falsehood of a position straightforwardly, but at best only that the 
position cannot coherently be adopted and defended. All three authors acknowledge anti-
realism is not logically inconsistent or self-defeating. The statement which denies 
normative facts does not entail a contradiction as does the statement which predicates its 
own falsity. Neither does it undermine its own intelligibility and coherence by specifying 
criteria it itself then proceeds to violate, such as the dictum of verificationism which 
states that every meaningful sentence is either empirical or analytical, without itself being 
either. Hence, even a successful transcendental argument cannot rule out its target 
theory's correctness. What the transcendental argument seeks to establish has more the 
form of a conditional: If there are no normative facts, then this truth cannot be supported 
by normative facts either. More generally, if there are no normative facts, then any 
philosophical debate that aspired to proceed in normative terms would be unsuccessful. 
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All reason-statements would be false (Cf. Joyce qualifications, though), including that we 
have reasons to believe so. This result might be regrettable and awkward. We would be 
caught up in a futile discourse, trying to get at the bottom of things that do not exist. This 
is how many would regard theological discourse. It would not, however, prove realism 
true or anti-realism false. 
Insisting upon that point, however, would not be an effective way of countering 
the transcendental argument. For starters, by now we do not need to be reminded that 
most meta-normative arguments are highly indirect. This reflects the complicated nature 
of the present discourse where indirect arguments may be all we have. Hence indirectness 
alone will not discredit transcendental arguments. Secondly, given the greater confidence 
we take in the sensibility of the philosophical enterprise than we take in particular meta-
normative assumptions, the response will be unmoving. Thirdly, what to make of 
philosophical arguments depends on the larger picture. An affirmative account that does 
justice to most of what we believe about reasons potentially reinforces the transcendental 
argument. Since non-debunking accounts are preferable, the anti-realist better does not 
rest content with his in principle irrefutability. Luckily, he has a more effective response, 
and to this I now turn. 
2.7. The Refutation of the Transcendental Argument 
What is the response? I will start with a concession, show why it does not support 
what the realist wants, and close with a counterproposal that effectively takes anti-realism 
off the realist's fire line. My goal is not just to score a logical point. The transcendental 
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argument fails for more profound reasons, and that failure is instructive for it reveals true 
alternatives in approach. What I contest is not the validity of the transcendental 
arguments so much as one of its presuppositions. I admit: Justification in the realist sense 
is indeed not something the anti-realist can draw on, as he rejects it outright. I grant we 
have indeed no reasons in the fundamental normative sense to believe in their absence 
and to accept any norms, including norms underwriting rational argumentation. If 
philosophical argumentation is to be carried out in terms of normative reasons - if the 
realist gets his way in setting the success conditions for that enterprise - the anti-realist 
will indeed stand little chance. From the realist's perspective, my above concession must 
be read tantamount to rejecting all norms that now lay reason-unsupported - including 
norms all parties need to rely upon to make their case. For he introduced authority as that 
feature which settles what norms to accept and thus he must consider the non-existence of 
authority to reveal all norms unacceptable. This reasoning is impeccable, but not 
inevitable. What it presupposes is an intimate connection between the acceptability of 
norms and their authority. And this presupposition is exactly what I wish to challenge in 
my defense of anti-realism. 
Rejecting a norm's authority, in short, does not amount to rejecting the norm 
itselfl This sounds paradoxical only under the realist' presupposition just unmasked. The 
assumption, namely, that the practical issue of what norms to accept must be settled in 
terms of what meta-normative status norms possess. Disagreement over this assumption 
leads the realist and anti-realist to see the question of what norm to accept very 
differently. For the realist, the issue is primarily a theoretical one: finding out what norms 
bear a certain meta-normative feature. Once that feature is identified in certain norms, 
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those norms are to be accepted. For the anti-realist, this approach is misguided. He does 
not believe that the question of what norm to accept is answered for us in virtue of some 
non-natural property norms possess. He does not believe acceptable norms come attached 
with some metaphysical seal of quality that would settle the practical issue of whether to 
accept them. Whether to accept a norm is one thing and what meta-normative properties 
norms possess quite another. Only the realist, but not the anti-realist, finds the second 
question to necessarily bear on the first. For sure, anti-realists admit that such a decision 
has to be made partly in terms of what characteristics norms have; whether or not they 
serve our purposes, for instance. He at some point owes an alternative story for 
acceptance. For now, we need to notice that his rejection is twofold. The anti-realist 
rejects the feature of authority warranting acceptance. He also denies authority to carry 
the practical significance that realists assign to it. For the anti-realist, the non-existence of 
authority is in fact no big deal. 
To see the difference in approach, consider this thought-experiment. It nicely 
illustrates the structure of the disagreement as well as the anti-realists' response. I hope 
the reader will not take offense in its details. Suppose realists thought the acceptability of 
norms consisted in their approval by the gods, and anti-realists were to deny gods. 
Structurally speaking, normative authority and divine approval are not entirely dissimilar 
features as they both purport to provide ultimate backup for norms that with 
unquestionable authority licenses their dictates. Neither gods nor authority is supposed to 
be constructed or projected. Now, based on the presumed link between divine approval 
and acceptance, realists must interpret the realist's denial of gods as a denial of norms. 
But not so must anti-realists. For they reject precisely that link, and consider the 
questions of what norms are approved by the gods (none) and what norms to accept 
(some) distinct. Anti-realists, in this hypothetical scenario as well as in the real world, 
have no quarrels with norms, but only question whether they possess certain meta-
normative properties. Instead, they picture norms more as tools or strategies for the 
attainment of our goals, in consequence reversing the master-slave relationship inherently 
suggested by realism. Norms do not subject us, in virtue of some feature of authority, but 
are servants for our purposes. We use them, for instance when we are conducting 
theoretical inquires or when we are coordinating joint endeavors. We employ norms 
based on what purposes we have and on how effectively they advance them. If what we 
seek is truth, we best rely on norms that have proven successful before. 
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Let me fill in some further details for how I envision theoretical inquiry in anti-
realist fashion. Call the theoretical and philosophical enterprise of figuring out what is 
true dialectical engagement, and call the norms guiding the successful execution of 
dialectical engagement basic norms for rational argument, or basic norms. All this is 
admittedly abstract and idealized. Specifying with greater precision what basic norms are 
would quickly lead into controversies I wish to avoid. My point is a general one and 
some abstraction shall be unavoidable. I need to be clear, however, on what exactly I 
assume about basic norms. First, I do not intend to have the locution "norms for rational 
argument" to distinguish basic norms as authoritative, but only to characterize their 
subject matter as dealing with issues related to how to reason and argue (as opposed to 
how to garden, say). Basic norms concern cognitive and dialectical landscaping while 
gardening norms concern backyard landscaping. The term rational exhibits an ambiguity 
familiar from the term normative. It can either be used to merely denote canons of 
rationality, prescriptive standards or protocols that could be summarized in some 
compendiums of Logic and Reason. In this case rationality denotes just another norm. In 
contrast, the term can also be used to denote an authoritative standard, perhaps even the 
authoritative standard. Many philosophers have in fact interpreted the normative question 
explicitly in terms of rationality. They understand the question of whether e.g. morality is 
normative - whether we have reasons to be moral - in terms of whether it is rational to be 
moral. In doing so they are effectively taking it for granted that rationality has normative 
authority. In my usage, however, rationality extends no further than to denote just 
another norm. And since I have no worries with norms, I am equally happy to 
acknowledge a realm of norm-related facts of rationality. 
Notice that one Cunoe's above cited contentions is true only under the more 
ambitious authority-laden reading and false under the less ambitious authority-free 
reading of rationality. There he says the anti-realist is committed to the view that "there 
are no facts that imply ... that failing to believe something on good available evidence 
renders one (all other things being equal) irrational. ... No one would make a rational 
mistake in rejecting [anti-realism]." As I propose to understand rationality, this would be 
plainly false. Making a rational mistake is failing to do what basic norms call for. This is 
not a possibility anti-realists deny or even find problematic. Consider etiquette, the 
philosopher's favorite example for suspicious norms. Still, even in light of that suspicion, 
few would think "no one would make a mistake of etiquette in rejecting to wear a certain 
outfit on a certain occasion." Of course there are mistakes according to etiquette - we can 
recognize them quite easily. In the case of uncertainty, one may always consult the most 
recent Emily Post. What philosophers who regard etiquette with suspicion question is not 
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whether there is a fact of the matter of what conforms to etiquette - there clearly is. 
Rather, what they contest is whether such mistakes offend anything authoritative (for 
realists) or whether the thing to do is to stay committed to etiquette (for anti-realists). In 
similar fashion, certain ways of organizing attitudes are plainly irrational. The inference I 
wish that p hence p is clearly irrational. I reject only that norms of rationality and basic 
norms are authoritative. 
Now, returning to my anti-realist vision of dialectical engagement, I suggested we 
use basic norms based on how successfully they facilitate the discovery of truths. For our 
purposes, we probably want to adopt a more subjective criterion for success. Norms are 
successful if for all we know they facilitate the discovery of truths. This again is rather 
abstract and quick. For now I need to restrict myself to a few comments on the notion that 
we chose to use norms. I certainly don't believe we consciously chose on any particular 
occasion to implement basic norms based on their perceived success. I envision the 
process by which we become attracted to basic norms as rather slow and gradual, where 
through a constant process of adjustment basic norms are passed on and refined. I would 
also suspect that our cognitive architecture is to some degree biologically channeled or 
predisposed to implementing basic norms - despite all popular reports of our allegedly 
wide-spread irrationality. Whatever the ultimate story, I intended to use the term 
successful as shorthand for whatever characteristics norms have that attract us to them 
(individually, collectively, and evolutionarily). What I need to emphasize, however, is 
that I do not claim we have reasons in the fundamental normative sense to comply with 
successful basic norms, or even that we have such reasons in case we are seeking to 
uncover truths. 
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My construal of basic norms resembles John Broome's account of normative 
requirements or norm of rationality. For Broome, norms of rationality are prescribing 
certain patterns of inference. They require adopting certain cognitive responses given one 
has adopted others. They require believing A if one already believes A & B. The 
important point for Broome is that normative requirements are wide-scope. They don't 
call for particular attitudes given ones other attitudes. They call for certain packages of 
attitudes. Broome does not, however, consider those norms normative in that they do not 
necessarily issue corresponding reasons or oughts to comply (Broome usage of the 
attribute 'normative,' I fathom, is meant to denote the directive element in norms of 
rationality). Broome does not think one has a reason in the fundamental normative sense 
to believe A given one already believes A & B; one is just rationally required to do so. 
This makes his approach congenial to mine. Norms require (or direct or recommend), and 
rational norms require to be rational, to conduct reasoning in a certain way, just as 
gardening norms require to garden in a certain way. Basic norms are norms to organize 
reasoning about what's the case (that's their subject matter). 
Now let me add to my picture the acknowledgment that basic norms not only 
facilitate, but also enable dialectical engagement. Their relationship is one of constitution 
and not just one of promotion. In addition to facilitating certain endeavors, norms are 
commonly known to make some of them possible in the first place. Linguistic exchange 
can carry on only in virtue of constitutive norms, and so can games and lots of other 
activities. Some would even include the very possibility of having propositional attitudes 
or being a cognitive system. Constitutive norms are certainly in play when it comes to the 
theoretical and philosophical enterprise of figuring out what is true. 
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However, that a norm is needed for enabling this or that enterprise is not a 
normative fact, nor does it require one. If in chess one starts moving towers diagonally 
one has effectively ceased to play chess. If one stops regulating ones assumptions in light 
of what the evidence supports one has effectively ceased to engage in truth-seeking. The 
underlying point can be expressed by the following entirely non-normative conditional: 
one is playing chess only if one abides by chess rules; one is engaging in truth-seeking 
Qnly if one accords with basic norms for dialectical engagement. There's nothing in this 
constitutive relationship that would explain or require the presence of any meta-
normative non-natural facts. Only the mistaken addicts-understanding of normativity -
where something is normative if we can't help using it - could mislead us into thinking 
that being constitutive for and being authoritative are the same feature when in fact they 
are very distinct. 
As a consequence, there is nothing paradoxical or even incoherent in the notion 
that the anti-realist may use norms for dialectical engagement in order to advance his 
position. There's nothing to prevent his participation in the truth-seeking enterprise, just 
as there is nothing to prevent someone to play chess (and even win!) who happens to 
question that chess rules are sanctioned by certain non-natural facts (a position, I 
presume, with few advocates even among chess fans). In case the anti-realist was able to 
bolster this position successfully - a tall order by anyone's admission - we could say that 
as far as we can tell his position appears more probably true than not. We would have 
arrived at this judgment by employing basic norms for truth-seeking to the best of our 
abilities. We could even agree on calling the position justified-according-to-norms-
guiding-dialectical-engagement, so long as what we mean by this is no more than that the 
98 
faithful employment of norms for dialectical engagement has lead us to this result. 
Whether in such a case we also would be justified in the more robust sense mayor may 
not be of any concern to us. That it need not be without involving any funny incoherence 
on our part is what I have argued for. Have I shown that we can have reasons to believe 
anti-realism? No. I don't believe we have such reasons. Have I shown that the anti-realist 
can in principle defend his position coherently as the one most likely to be true? I wish. 
All the transcendental argument shows is that certain endeavors require norms, not that 
norms have any meta-normative property. Since the anti-realist has no quarrels with 
norms, the argument seems misdirected. 
Perhaps this verdict is premature, though. Perhaps the transcendental argument is 
best applied to norms directly without the detour over authority. It would then proceed as 
follows. Rejecting a norm based on arguments requires the employment of basic norms. 
Such rejection presents no difficulties when it comes to norms other than basic norms, 
since what we employ and what we reject are distinct entities in such cases. Not so with 
regards to basic norms. Here we would need the very same norms which we aspire to 
reject for the argument-based rejection itself1 An argument-based rejection of basic 
norms is possible only in virtue of the employment of basic norms. Here we can recall 
Joyce' apt way of putting this thought: "practical rationality is not something that we may 
legitimately question, for to question it is to acknowledge it" and "even to question 
practical rationality is to evince allegiance to it." The transcendental argument, applied to 
norms directly, would then conclude that we cannot coherently reject all norms based on 
arguments, for there is (at least) one set of norms - basic norms - that will always be with 
us. If successful, the argument would show global norm-rejection untenable. 
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I have no principal worries with the argument as it stands. The argument seems to 
be doing little more than to spell out a necessary but uncontested condition for the 
successful execution of a particular enterprise, which happens to be that of dialectical 
engagement. The condition is the employment of basic norms. Since for the sake of 
argument I have already granted that this enterprise is enabled only in virtue of 
constitutive norms, the conclusion of this redirected argument comes as little news. 
Whatever feature the argument establishes basic norms have, however, it is not the non-
natural property of authority outlined above. The argument thus does not address the anti-
realist denial. We again must be careful not to confuse the anti-realist with someone who 
is questioning his allegiance to basic norms. Far from it. The anti-realist holds on to basic 
norms just as firmly as the realist does. Showing that he can't help it does not contradict 
his thesis that no norm has authority. He might have suspected anyway that as a matter of 
design he comes hardwired with certain cognitive dispositions for specific inference-
patterns which leave him little choice of cognitive defection. The anti-realist contests 
only that there really is that feature of authority introduced by realists. Arguing requires 
breathing too, but that does not reveal the demand breath! to have any non-natural meta-
normative property. It is just something we must do in order to do something else. 
Still, the realist might take the argument one step further. Acceptance and 
rejection of norms, he might suggest, reveal certain commitments. Thus reformulated, the 
conclusion of the argument would state that one cannot coherently and rationally abandon 
ones commitment to basic norms without at the same time retaining the very same 
commitment to basic norms. Now, setting aside the possibility that one didn't have any 
commitments either way to begin with, suppose the argument does show that our 
commitment to basic norms is indeed non-optional in that it cannot be rationally 
discontinued. From this the realist might reason further: What is it to be committed to a 
norm, if not to regard it as authoritative? How to make sense of commitments if not in 
terms of the belief that certain norms are justified? A commitment to norms without 
authority seems arbitrary, and worse, if the norm is not even believed authoritative, it 
seems like a fetish. Yet that is exactly the position the reflective anti-realist wants to take: 
to sign up to norms he himself does not consider authoritative. 
This, I believe, may be the strongest way of putting the transcendental argument. 
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It introduces a new notion - commitment - which potentially bridges the gap between 
accepting a norm and regarding the norm as authoritative. For recall the anti-realist's 
response to the transcendental argument crucially depended upon emphasizing the gap 
between the purportedly practical question of what norms to accept and the purportedly 
theoretical question of what properties norms have. Being committed to a norm is now 
introduced as the idea of accepting norms in virtue of considering them authoritative. 
Not surprisingly, then, the anti-realist will challenge the idea that we can wed 
acceptance and authority via commitments. And this he can do. Commitments need not 
be accompanied by any theoretical conviction of the realistic kind in order to qualify as 
genuine commitments without fetish. What a norm-commitment requires is a stable 
practical disposition to follow the norm's dictates, a readiness and willingness to be 
guided by it without regret. Perhaps it also requires a disposition to find certain features 
salient, or to exclude certain options from consideration. Nor need a commitment be 
arbitrary if unaccompanied by meta-normative convictions. For sure, we may think of 
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non-arbitrariness in terms of what is sanctioned by some meta-normative feature of 
authority. But then the charge of arbitrariness simply begs all questions and retains no 
independent argumentative force. If non-arbitrary means something else, however, then it 
is at least possible that norm commitment can be non-arbitrary without being authority-
laden. Perhaps this possibility is ruled out more indirectly. But in that case, the notion of 
arbitrariness needs to be made precise before we can reevaluate the charge. With no clear 
target in sight, the best I can do is to shoot in the dark. There are many ways for our 
commitment to basic norms to come out as non-arbitrary: because basic norms do indeed 
serve truth-seeking best; or because we find the commitment tied up with our identity that 
involves a substantial amount of curiosity; or because it facilitates other aims of ours; or 
because it is something we are simply endowed with and that makes us who we are, etc. 
Suppose we just happen to run by norms for dialectical engagement, perhaps something 
that is to be explained in terms of biological and cultural co-evolution. This capacity 
certainly has enabled us to do some amazing things. In order to seriously challenge or in 
any sense criticize that cognitive capacity of ours as arbitrary in the absence of certain 
meta-normative facts requires certainly more than the transcendental argument does 
provide. All this does lead us to larger issues concerning commitment that goes beyond 
the scope of an already stretched chapter. Notice, though, that in this version the 
transcendental argument depends upon on a particular way of understanding 
commitment, one that can legitimately be questioned. Its force now hinges on a 
controversial and contested understanding of the complex philosophical notion of 
commitment. This does not show that a further development of the argument will prove 
unsuccessful. But it reveals further presuppositions that limit the clean slate and 
minimalist appeal transcendental arguments are usually supposed to have. 
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Realism cannot be directly refuted; it is set up that way. This I am fully aware of, 
and as a consequence I did not aspire to achieve the impossible resulting in only one 
effect: to provide further ammunition for realists to disprove inconclusive suggested 
counterarguments - a game I truly wish they would stop playing. What I tried is to make 
realism unattractive and to reveal it as optional; that there are no principal obstacles for 
systematically developing and defending a thoroughgoing anti-realist alternative. 
Whether that alternative is superior to realism cannot yet be determined. For this we first 
need to see the alternative. If after finishing this long chapter the reader went away with 
some interest in that alternative, the chapter would have achieved its purpose. 
Chapter 3 
Against Reductive Normative Realism 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter surveys naturalistic or reductive normative realism. The view -
conveniently named naturalism within the chapter's confines - holds normativity to be a 
natural phenomenon. I shall discuss various natural constellations - normative engines -
that have been proposed to explain normativity, and show why they must fall short in that 
aspiration. Desire and its relation to reason will be the most important element in this 
discussion, since it fuels the most powerful normative engine and provides the blueprint 
for most others as well. My disagreement with naturalism is vital though subtle: I too 
shall introduce a naturalistic-constructivist apparatus of my own explaining what reasons 
and values are all about in due course. What, then, sets apart my approach from 
naturalism? What does is our diverging assessment of what can and cannot be accounted 
for in terms of the natural. To motivate the difference, we must recognize first what core 
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convictions define our conception of the normative and, second, that they cannot be 
accommodated in the world as we know it. I prefer bold rejection to craven redefinition 
and consider it a mistake to antecedently constrain our conceptual diagnosis of what 
reasons are by what we believe exists. For the sake of conceptual honesty and clarity -
the core trademarks of philosophy - we better acknowledge what components feature in 
our conception of normativity and remain frank about whether we can supply a natural 
foundation for them. What essentially differentiates my own approach from naturalism is 
that my approach issues a call for reform naturalism finds unnecessary. Naturalism 
cannot find anything in our conception of the normative to prevent its full naturalization, 
and it's at this juncture where we part company. 
The quibbles I have with naturalism resemble the internal disputes of how best to 
combat libertarians in the context of the free will-debate. In fact, here as before, the 
analogy with the free-will debate is helpful, since it provides a strict dialectical analogue 
to how I envision the present debate. Here and there we find three players naturally 
paired up into realism and libertarianism, naturalism and compatibilism, and global 
normative anti-realism and revisionism. Instead of choosing the compatibilist escape-
route in response to libertarians - incredibly pretending free-will never was concerned 
with agents originating choice in truly unconstrained fashion - I want to grant libertarians 
to have identified core components in our conception of free will, but then deny their 
existence and ultimate practical significance. This leaves the newly rediscovered strategy 
of revisionism, which on one side acknowledges core libertarian commitments in our 
conception of free will yet which on the other side substantially rejects their ontology, in 
this regard siding with compatibilism. The pair of libertarians and realists are 
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conceptually on target even though there is no target, while the pair of compatibilists and 
naturalists have successfully identified something that could serve as a target if only it 
had been our target; leaving only the pair of revisionists and normative anti-realists who 
realize we must change the target if we wish to hit anything. David Chalmers (2009:22-
23) has recently provided a neat structural analysis where this dialectical 
... triangle between heavyweight realism, lightweight realism, and anti-
realism is found in all sorts of areas of philosophy .... In each case, the 
heavyweight realist gives inflationary truth-conditions and holds that they 
are satisfied, the lightweight realist gives deflationary truth-conditions and 
holds that they are satisfied, and the anti-realist gives inflationary truth-
conditions and holds that they are not satisfied. The first and the second 
agree on the truth-value of certain sentences, while the first and the third 
agree on the truth-conditions of these sentences. The second and the third 
disagree on both of these linguistic matters, but consequently agree on the 
underlying character of the world: it is such that some parts satisfy the 
deflationary analysis, but no parts of it satisfy the inflationary analysis. In 
these cases, one can argue that the difference between lightweight realism 
and anti-realism is largely semantic. 
Naturalism presents a thorny subject to cover. In contrast to non-reductive 
realism, a position defined mostly in negative terms via its opposition to naturalism and 
anti-realism, naturalism comprises a variegated set of positive attempts to explain 
normativity that only share some family resemblance. In my discussion of realism, I 
afforded the luxury of treating the natural as a placeholder without precise specification, 
since whatever its nature realism held normativity to be independent to that. But now 
details matter. Success and failure in the diverse forms of naturalism will hinge on the 
particular ways in which they seek to explain normativity. My argument that no form of 
naturalism can succeed must raise the concern that it aspires to achieve the impossible. 
No need to throw the towel just yet, however. If we can identify serious shortcomings in 
a number of prominent naturalistic accounts that share certain commonalities, at the 
minimum we acquire some inductive basis for doubting naturalism to succeed in general. 
In this regard my skepticism that naturalism is able to accommodate normativity is no 
different from others, e.g. that naturalism is unable to accommodate real magic, even 
though magic comes in myriad forms. Moreover, my argument and its corresponding 
diagnosis will be surprisingly transparent with the pleasant result that, if working at all, it 
can be extended with ease. Ultimately, though, we need to remain realistic about what we 
can argumentatively achieve in the meta-normative context. While the challenge I am 
about to present has buttressed my worries about normative naturalism, I admit its verdict 
is anything but decisive; those more sanguine about naturalism may read what follows as 
an invitation to point out where I went wrong - e.g. what options I missed - or why 
further developments may achieve what previous ones did not. 
In a nutshell, my worry recasts the familiar one: that there is a conceptual gap no 
substantive form of naturalism can bridge: from what is to what ought to be, from what is 
the response we are inclined to take to the one we should take, from what we cherish to 
what is appropriate to cherish, from what we praise and condemn to what is praiseworthy 
and worthy of condemnation, from what standards and norms we endorse and accept to 
which standards and norms we should endorse and accept, and so forth. There's no 
natural route to get us from here to the Promised Land of shoulds and oughts; no 
normative engine is capable of delivering the final product of reasons. All we get are 
communities who find certain ways of living more agreeable than others, who, through a 
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long process of trial and error, have mostly come to agree to abide by certain norms in 
order to get along. We may have internalized a considerable number of norms, we may 
get upset at each other for violating them, we may communicate and debate our shared 
attitudes, we may decide to apply sanctions to the callous and indifferent, and we may 
resolve to strive for further reform. But where, then, is that fact, that natural 
configuration, which explains what ways of live are appropriately chosen as better than 
others, what norms we should agree to abide by, which norms we must internalize, when 
we are right and justified in getting upset at others, when it is truly called for to apply 
sanctions, and what further reform constitutes progress rather than just change? 
The problem is not finding standards of correctness; that's easy, so easy, in fact, 
that we can immediately understand why many want more. Standards of correctness are 
provided by norms, viz. principles, policies, and prescriptive rules all of which 
encapsulate a directive element. The issue concerns the status of norms: that there are any 
privileged norms which possess objective authority. To fully appreciate the issue, we 
must keep distinct the formal aspect of being directive in character from the substantive 
one of directing with authority. The first distinguishes norms as norm, but it is the second 
we need to focus on. Philosophers harboring doubts about the normativity of morality, 
law, rationality, instrumental reason don't contest the presence of norms in these areas 
but their authority. Norms of etiquette still serve to illustrate the distinction best. The rule 
that one must answer in the third person to third person invitations clearly states a 
demand, but what is its normative force? (Foot 1972:308) Norms are easy to come by; 
their authority, their status as objective guidelines, however, must appear an altogether 
more consequential matter. Compare Korsgaard who writes "We live under the pressure 
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of vast assortments of laws, duties, obligations, expectations, demands, and rules, all 
telling us what to do. Some of these demands are no doubt illicit ... just social pressure, 
as we say .... I call the normativity of a law or a demand ... the grounds of its authority 
... the way it binds you." (2009: 2) The fundamental question, then, is whether out of the 
great plurality and diversity of norms any stand out as objectively authoritative. 
Naturalists say yes and then aspire to explain why. 
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3.2. Normative Naturalism 
What is natural normative realism? Naturalism, like non-reductive realism, 
obviously affirms the existence of some normative reality. And again, what renders the 
view distinctive is of what kind naturalism pronounces that reality to be. The answer, of 
course, is of the natural kind: since naturalism holds everything to be natural and 
normativity to be, normativity must be natural. Yet we need to know more precisely what 
that means. For this we can substantially draw on the previous chapter. There, in 
reconstructing non-reductive realism, we saw that for naturalism to emerge as a distinct 
position it does not suffice to acknowledge that all that is normatively relevant must be 
built up from natural bits and pieces in entirety. What we are after is normative status 
rather than that which bears normative status: what it is to have this or that status rather 
than what does have this or that status. Neither does it suffice for naturalism to emerge as 
a distinct position that normative status supervenes on the natural. Naturalism, in a 
nutshell, offers a view distinct from non-reductive realism only if it postulates that, in 
addition to that whatever is normatively significant to be natural configurations, that it is 
normatively significant also figures as a thoroughgoing natural phenomenon. Let's briefly 
recall why. 
Remember, first, the important distinction between normative status and that 
which has such and such normative status. The previous chapter put great emphasis on 
the fact that non-naturalists need not deny that everything that has some particular 
normative status is itself a natural configuration. Naturalists consequently cannot 
distinguish themselves in virtue of holding solely that the normatively significant fully 
consists in certain segments of the natural unless they also hold that normative 
significance itself fully consists in certain segments of the natural. If the good life 
consists in happiness and health, profitable pursuits and engagement, close relationships 
and beneficial sociability, insight and understanding, then nothing in that list need give 
pause to any firm naturalistic metaphysician. The suggestion that there are close 
relationships, for instance, hardly raises any special ontological concerns. What 
potentially may give pause to such a metaphysician, though - even with the 
aforementioned admission - is the idea that there is such a thing as the good life - a life 
particularly worthy of choice, a life we have reasons to strive for, admire, or envy: A 
proposition entirely distinct from one recognizing that there are lives we do happen to 
choose, strive for, admire, or envy. In other words, it is consistent to grant that there are 
e.g. close relationships without also granting that they bear the particular normative status 
of exemplifying value. The distinction between normative status and that which has it 
could be taken to separate classical normative ethics from meta-ethics; the former 
primarily being concerned with what has what normative status, the latter primarily being 
concerned with what it is to have normative status in the first place. 
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Now keeping status and bearer distinct is not to deny that they are related. To 
begin with, if there is no status then nothing can bear that status either. Hence, if 
normative ethics aims at figuring out what has what status, then success of that enterprise 
so conceived depends on the viability of a certain meta-ethics. In addition, there are many 
other ways in which bearer and status could relate. In whatever ways status "attaches" to 
bearer - a metaphor better used with great caution - this certainly need not be so 
irrespective of what potential bearers are like. Moreover, insisting on the distinction 
between status and bearers does not imply that they could ever come apart de reo Either 
because, as in the case of attribute and substance, one never comes without the other; or 
because, as in the case of essence and origin, they are forged together by metaphysically 
necessary ties. Pain could be truly bad and never be anything but, and yet, in conception 
at least, there clearly is a difference between the state and its status. To deny this is to 
deny meta-ethics and meta-normativity, and to suppose each second-order question to 
collapse into first-order questions. (Cf. Dworkin 1996) 
Consider supervenience next, the thesis that, necessarily, two situations differ in 
their normative status only if they differ in their natural configuration as well. Though 
widely considered the hallmark of naturalism, this thesis clearly cannot set apart 
naturalism from non-naturalism. This is readily apparent once we recall that even dualists 
such as Descartes were able to firmly and consistently pronounce the supervenience of 
the mental on the natural without thereby retracting their commitment to non-naturalism. 
Likewise, there is nothing incoherent in supposing the normative to be firmly non-natural 
and to supervene on the natural. This could be achieved in virtue of God's maintenance 
of a pre-established harmony between the normative and the natural; or it could just be 
like that, without explanation, but why suppose everything must necessarily receive an 
explanation? Perhaps our universe contains normative laws as primitive components just 
it contains basic physical laws as primitive components. Normative laws in that context 
would be laws that systematically correlate natural configurations with normative status 
and which would thereby, by fiat, secure the latter to supervene on the former. Leibniz 
raised the puzzling question of why there is something rather than nothing - why there 
are laws to govern our universe - which is puzzling precisely because we are at a loss as 
how to answer it. Rather, it appears there simply is no answer as to why fundamental 
laws of nature obtain. Likewise, it could simply be the case that there are systematic 
normative-natural laws where again there simply is no illuminating answer as to why 
they obtain. That this would spell systematic frustration of our ambition to come to grips 
with the normative delivers no proof that there is no non-natural normative reality 
supervening on the natural. 
For sure, the thesis that the normative supervenes on the natural could be turned 
into a distinctive characterization of naturalism, but only if accompanied by other 
substantial assumptions: namely that the supervenience of the normative on the natural is 
itself explainable in natural terms. But this would inevitably strengthen the relationship 
between the normative and the natural and to render it more demanding than mere 
systematic co-variation; in particular, it would render the normative in some way or other 
to be a resultant feature of the natural. In fact, normativity as such must emerge as a 
natural phenomenon. Nothing short of this will suffice to render naturalism a distinctive 
position. 
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One way in which the normative could be more strongly related to the natural is 
via reduction, and at the end of the day it is hard to see how naturalism can consistently 
refuse to affirm some sort of reductionism. Yet we need to be careful since reduction can 
mean many different things. There is conceptual reduction, explanatory reduction, 
property reduction - often called type-type reduction, and there is reduction of tokens to 
tokens. In addition, there is another inherent and telling ambiguity in reduction. It can 
either be read as denoting explanation or alternatively as denoting elimination. It depends 
on whether the final product is quite what we initially set out to reduce. The term 
reductionism is dreaded in our culture precisely because people often are unable to 
recognize the real McCoy in rubble to which it was reduced. You want candy and instead 
get celery. You know it's not the same when you see it. Likewise, reductive explanations 
often change our sense of the relevant phenomena beyond recognition. Naturalists must 
credibly withstand the suspicion that what they deliver is not normativity but something 
else. Which, of course, is precisely the kind of suspicion I seek to substantiate in this 
chapter; that naturalists unconvincingly praise their view as reductive in the first sense 
while really offer a reduction in the second sense. Normativity cannot be part of the 
natural world. With no other world to have we must lack normativity too. 
There is widespread consensus that normativity as a natural phenomenon is not a 
view committed to the successful reduction of normative concepts to natural concepts; 
there even is decent consensus that it is not committed to the successful reduction of 
normative properties to natural properties. Sorting this out could quickly lead us into 
general metaphysics and semantic theories. I shall not do that here. Rather, let me 
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consider in brief why the kind of naturalism I am after does not require conceptual or 
type-type reduction. 
Start with concepts first. Here I am basically relying on a long Fregean tradition 
distinguishing between Sinn and Bedeutung, or between primary and secondary 
intentions. Often we are in no position to determine whether or not differing concepts 
share the same referent on the sole basis of their conceptual content. Moreover, 
normative concepts are likely semantically embedded in peculiar frameworks containing 
gross-conceptual connections that cannot be fully captured by natural concepts. Thus, 
normative concepts may very well pick out the exact same phenomena that natural 
concepts pick out yet do so "in a special way." For instance, they may instantaneously 
render salient the importance certain features have for us that natural concepts may not. 
Normative concepts as such may contain appraisals of significance not contained in 
natural concepts, even if ultimately the former and the latter describe the same thing. 
Consider sweetness: things that are sweet, that is, not necessarily the experience itself. 
Presumably, being sweet is a plain natural phenomenon, consisting in certain chemical 
structures interacting with our gustatory sensibilities in a certain way. Now suppose 
characterization C fully describes this phenomenon in purely chemical terms. The term 
sweet and the term C may be said to differ conceptually without differing in their 
denotation. All this could be reflected by the fact that one could have mastery of both 
concepts yet without knowing that they refer to the very same thing. That being sweet 
and being C are identical would constitute an empirical discovery and not merely a 
conceptual clarification. 
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That normativity is a natural phenomenon thus need not be conceptually obvious. 
Whether some normative situation consists in nothing over and above some natural 
configuration can be conceptually open even if substantially closed. Under some 
interpretations of Moore's famous open question argument it must fail because it does not 
recognize the aforementioned conceptual subtleties - which emphatically is not an 
admission that the argument is best understood that way or that it necessarily fails. Also, 
what has been said does not rule out that on occasion we know that concepts of a first sort 
cannot denote the same phenomena as concepts of a second sort on conceptual grounds 
alone. Here's a quick proof: Take the concept non-natural. This one clearly cannot have 
the same referent as the concept natural. And beyond such obvious cases involving 
logical operators there are many others as well. A miracle cannot have a natural 
explanation; God cannot be identical to love; transubstantiation cannot be a chemical 
process. These observations are entirely vindicated on conceptual grounds alone. One 
cannot explain a miracle without dissolving it, identifying God with love without 
becoming an atheist, and provide a chemical analysis of transubstantiation without 
eliminating it. Likewise, even if we grant that we are in no position to rule out many 
convergences in reference on conceptual grounds this does not mean that we are in no 
position to rule out some. Which is good news for the larger argument to come which 
substantially relies on some conceptual observations. 
Next consider type-type or property reduction. Suppose we think of properties or 
kinds as suitably stable features that are countenanced by some explanatory theory. A 
property is what a set of things have in common, and that form of unification is typically 
achieved and sustained by some explanatory enterprise. Very rarely, however, do 
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different explanatory enterprises match in what features they pronounce relevant and 
salient for purposes of unification. Consider money. Being money is a stable feature that 
figures as a core element in advanced economic practices facilitating exchange. It is hard 
to specify precisely what money is. But a good guess is that anything can figure as money 
so long as it performs a certain complex economical function, and is recognized and 
accepted as such by all relevant participants. Economic theory offers many useful 
generalizations that proceed in terms of money yet which could not be captured without 
alluding to money: We know in advance what kinds of pieces this seller will accept in 
exchange for his furniture and which not, but only if we grasp the concept of money. And 
then there are reliable higher level economic laws, such that of two kinds of pieces 
qualifying as money the one considered less valuable will come to dominate as medium 
of exchange: Bad money drives out good under legal tender laws. This law, formulated 
by Thomas Gresham in the 16th century and named Gresham's law after him, still holds, 
as we now witness electronic mediums of exchange replacing formerly physical mediums 
of exchange. 
Suppose, then, we agglomerate all things money in a big conceptual pot: gold, 
silver, certain forms of paper, peculiarly shaped forms of metals and plastic, certain forms 
of electronic patterns, see shells, and what not. The important point is that only from the 
perspective of economic theory will we be able to find those things, and only those 
things, to share anything significant in common. From the perspectives of relativity 
theory, chemistry, biology, etc., our class must appear an entirely arbitrary motley bunch. 
Here you have a piece of paper issued by the federal reserve that is money, just like this 
coin from Sweden, but there you have another piece of paper, the perfect counterfeit, that 
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shares all identifiable physical and chemical features with the first but which is not 
money. How come that this paper and this coin belong to the same category, but not this 
counterfeit, even though in physical and chemical terms, the two pieces of paper share 
everything while the federal reserve note and the coin virtually nothing? 
This generalizes. In particular, normative kinds could qualify as suitably stable 
features that figure in certain practices and explanations yet have nothing interesting in 
common from the perspective of other explanatory enterprises. It is as futile as it is 
unnecessary an attempt to capture normative kinds in terms of non-normative kinds 
which are recognized as profitable forms of unifications by other enterprises. 
3.3. A Preliminary Case 
To warm up, let's look at one prominent naturalistic account of normativity-
infused phenomena: reliabilism about epistemic justification. The sketch will be 
illuminating, I believe. 
Take reliablism in epistemology: the view that belief is justified when reliably 
produced. This gives us a first prototype of naturalism, and also gives us a first hint as to 
why it must fail. According to reliabilism, the normatively commendable state that 
certain beliefs occupy - being justified - just consists in a particular complex natural 
configuration; it includes historical facts regarding how the beliefs were generated; it 
includes statistical/probabilistic facts of how frequently the relevant generative 
procedures result in truths; it perhaps also includes some cognitive sensitivity of the 
reliability of the relevant belief-forming procedures. The upshot is this: everything 
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mentioned so far are but plain natural facts. According to this instance of naturalism, 
being a justified belief is nothing over and above having a particular natural pedigree. 
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That's all justification is says reliabilism - only to inevitably render justification 
normative in name only. What we get is a characterization of a state beliefs can be in, 
admittedly one we happen to be particularly interested in. Yet if one were to proceed and 
ask whether we should have beliefs that occupy that state - whether it is appropriate to 
form beliefs fitting that description - reliabilism evidently turns silent. Nothing in the 
above characterization indicates anything anyone ought to do, has reasons to do, or to 
become subjected to appropriate criticism if he fails to do, etc. Certainly the mere 
employment of the term justification cannot carry anything with normative significance, 
even if the term has traditionally been used to with normative pretensions. Call the state 
resulting from certain process whatever pleases. There are many other states as well one 
could define for beliefs: being shmustified, for instance, the state of being formed on 
Mondays, where some beliefs will be shumstified and some will not. For sure, we don't 
care about shmustified beliefs but do care about justified beliefs, since, among other 
things, the latter prove particularly useful for building bridges. Similarly, we don't care 
for bitter fruits but sweet ones, yet sweetness no more denotes anything with mysterious 
normative strings attached than bitterness does; it simply identifies something we happen 
to like. To anticipate the larger argument to come, then, what we do care about is distinct 
from what we should care about. Nothing in the reliabilist story appears to provide an 
explanation of why we normatively must care about justified beliefs. 
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3.4. Desire, Pure and Simple 
Desire fuels the most powerful normative engine. Since it provides the schema 
and blueprint for many others to come - e.g. the endorsement of norms and the 
agreement to install and abide by norms - we shall begin with desire. Understand desire 
to be that pro-attitude which maximizes the plausibility of the relevant response-
dependent theory of normativity. Desire, for instance, need not have any 
phenomenological imprint and usually is not tied up with sexuality. Later I shall argue 
that the kinds of pro-attitudes that stand the best chance of carrying reasons are concerns 
embedded within our larger identities and projects. For now, the basic idea is that with 
the appropriate provision of desire comes reason and value; that practical reasons enter 
the stage with agents who harbor concerns and adopt ends. The universe is cold and 
indifferent, but we are not, and in light of our ends and what we care about some practical 
pathways emerge as more attractive than others. In the final analysis, it is supposed, 
reasons and values rest in desire, not the other way around. Spinoza wrote "It is clear ... 
that we do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we judge a thing to be good. 
On the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we endeavor, will, seek after and 
desire it." (Spinoza, Ethics III.9 Scholium) And Simon Blackburn adds "Nature itself 
may be heartless and free of desire, but among the creatures it has thrown up are some 
which are not heartless, and not free of desires. We understand our values by 
understanding ourselves as valuing, and this we can do." (1998:50). I share a great deal of 
sympathy with what Spinoza and Blackburn have to say. In fact, reading their statements 
carefully, I fully agree. Spinoza talks about judging a thing to be good and not a thing 
being good; and Blackburn talks about understanding our values and not about just 
values. I too believe desire fuels under perception of and response to things as good, 
worthwhile, and reasonable. It is what anchors and sustains our practices. If that was all 
we seek to understand, I am on board. 
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But it is not. Usually desire is called upon to explain reason and value in their 
distinctive normative sense; not just our perception and thought about reason and value, 
but reason and value, period. And here I must depart. I find the desire-based account of 
normativity a view astonishingly close for being entirely off target. Normativity cannot 
be explained on the basis of desire. Desire-based accounts deliver something, and we 
may choose to call it reason and value. Given their wide employment to denote most 
everything, we may choose to allow those terms yet another usage. But labeling should 
not deceive us that the thing named entirely lacks anything distinctively normative. What 
we need is to look inside the engine and to see what it actually does. We shall see then 
what it explains is why we choose what we choose and why we prize what we prize. 
What we shall miss, however, is why we have reasons to choose what we choose and 
why we have reason to prize what we prize, or why doing anything of that sort can ever 
be appropriate or inappropriate. 
In my criticism I partially converge with non-reductive realists who too doubt that 
reasons can be explained on the basis of desire. This may seem puzzling, since I have 
already rejected what they offer, namely to take reason and value as primitive and simply 
as a given without further explanation. With this option ruled out, then, what else is there 
to rest reason and value upon if not our concerns and ends? Nothing, I say, and that's 
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precisely my point. I understand, however, why this move is dialectically unusual. The 
context of the debate has largely been defined in terms of the contrast between desire-
based and more robustly realist accounts of normativity, e.g. value-based accounts. The 
implicit suggestion, then, was that it must either be the one or the other: Either we accept 
reasons with no further explanation or we do provide an explanation for them. Since 
many share a profound skepticism about robust realist accounts of reason and value - to 
simply take reasons as a given - desire-based accounts have found an important spring of 
motivation in the perceived absence of viable alternatives. They came to appear attractive 
for their comparative advantage over realism with its insatiable hunger for mystery. The 
problem, unfortunately, is that desire-fueled normative engines do not work either, which 
is a matter entirely distinct from what we happen to think of robust realism. One cannot 
just rest content with showing stronger proposals deficient; one needs to show that the 
weaker ones are not deficient as well, and that task often fell off the sideways. 
There are desire-based accounts of reasons and there are desire-based accounts of 
value. Since both proceed in different manner they need be treated separately. I shall 
mostly focus on reasons and then briefly turn to values. For now, recall what we are after. 
What we seek is an explanation of how states of affairs can stand in the reasons-
relationship to choices agents face in particular circumstances; how certain states of 
affairs can favor certain responses. The relationship itself needs explaining and not just 
what happens to stand in that relationship: which is just plain situations, agents, and 
choices. What favors what hardly gives rise to any profound puzzlement. That something 
favors what it favors, in contrast, is what it is hard to understand yet what desire-based 
accounts need to explain. Sporadically one finds authors wondering what the fuzz about 
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reasons is all about. Reasons are just plain state of affairs and situations, they say, and 
what's problematic with that? Nothing, of course. Yet situations are just situations and 
are reasons for anything only in virtue of standing in the favoring relationship to 
whatever they favor. How, then, do desire-based accounts go about explaining reasons 
and the corresponding favoring-relationship? 
Jonathan Dancy proposes an excellent precis of desire-based accounts of reason, 
where p is some state of affairs, A some agent, tjJ some practical option or choice, and e 
some end or concern (2000:28): 
If its being the case that p is a good reason for A to <1>, this is because there 
is some e such that A actually desires e and, given that p, <I>-ing sub serves 
the prospect of e's being realized (or continues to be realized). 
Dancy is no fan of desire-based accounts, but his characterization is remarkably 
close to Mark Schroeder's, who is a fan. Suppose r stands for some proposition (or state 
of affairs), x for some agent, a for some action (or option or choice), and p for some 
desire, end, or concern. Schroeder writes (2007:29): 
For all propositions r, agents x, and action a, if r is a reason for x to do a, 
that is because there is some p such that x has a desire whose object is p, 
and the truth of r is part of what explains why x' s doing a promotes p. 
That Dancy talks about state of affairs (or what is being the case) and Schroeder 
about propositions need not distract us here. These are variations in detail we can safely 
ignore for present purposes. The important upshot is that according to both accounts, 
reasons are complex quadruple relationships between (1) state of affairs, propositions or 
situations, (2) agents, (3) actions, options, or choices and (4) desired ends or concerns. 
Or, to put it differently, for something to be a reason is for it to stand in this complex 
quadruple relationship. Schroeder provides a neat example (2007: 1): 
Tonight there is going to be a party, and everyone is invited. There will be 
good food, drinks, friends, chat, music - and dancing. Ronnie and Bradley 
... have been invited to the party. But while Ronnie loves to dance, 
Bradley can't stand it. ... So while the fact that there will be dancing at the 
party is a reason for Ronnie to go, it is not a reason for Bradley to go .... 
Ronnie's and Bradley's reasons therefore differ .... Moreover, it's not 
hard to see why Ronnie's and Bradley's reasons differ ... It is because of 
what they like, care about, or want. 
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Ronnie's having a reason thus consists in the quadruple relationship between a 
situation (the party), an agent (Ronnie), an end (love of dancing), and a action or choice 
(going to the party) such that the situation causes a particular choice to be the (best) 
option for an agent to bring about what he cares about. 
Now besides Dancy's and Schroeder's version of desire-based accounts of 
reasons there are others as well. There is in fact little consensus on how precisely desire 
is supposedly implicated in reason where one can find multiple and conflicting accounts 
in the literature. Yet in my assessment Dancy's and Schroeder's version fares 
comparatively well and avoids multiple problems overshadowing many of its 
competitors. I shall henceforth stick to it. Since the account is able to claim support of 
prominent proponents and opponents alike, this choice shall not prejudice the discussion 
to come. Let's start by drawing attention to a few of the account's key features. It is vital 
to get the picture right. Philosophers tend to be somewhat impatient with desire-based 
accounts and as a consequence identify flaws that aren't really there, or at any rate 
needn't be there. When suitably worked out desire-based accounts have in fact a lot going 
for them. Their strength shall not go unmentioned here. In particular, I shall make five 
comments on behalf of the present version: (1) It can adequately capture the deliberative 
perspective of agents and (2) it can motivate many concerns we have even in the absence 
of a basis of assessing fundamental ends and (3) it can do justice to the epistemological 
complexity of practical reasons and (4) it can withstand most attacks by counterexample 
and (5) it is motivated by a requirement on practical reasons many accept. With a 
representation of desire-based accounts in their strongest suit we shall finally tum to why 
they nonetheless remain incapable of explaining what they set out to explain, namely 
normative authority. 
(1) Notice, first, that in the present version it is not desires themselves that are 
reasons. Instead, desires figure as components and constitutive parts of the relevant 
reasons-relationship, though certainly important components and parts. Reasons surely 
are complex. Where there are reasons, according to the present account, there are 
situations and agents and ends and choices appropriately interrelated. If we wish to single 
out one of the above components as the reason, that should be states of affairs and 
situations. This choice would comport with common usage where we often call the 
relevant situation itself the reason: as when we say the dancing at the party was the 
reason for Ronnie to go. This way of speaking is perfectly fine as long as we do 
remember that for reasons to be reasons - for state of affairs to be reasons - they need to 
stand in that particular favoring relationship. And to favor, according to the account in 




Similarly, we best avoid speaking of desires as "generating" or "providing" 
reasons. This locution only suggests a rather misleading temporal picture involving two 
stages, where first there are desires and then thereafter, in some mysterious manner, they 
"generate" or "provide" reasons. Desire-based accounts essentially are accounts of what 
reasons and the relevant reasons-relationship are: take them apart, and this is what you 
find: a quadruple relationship connecting situations, agents, ends and choices, and 
certainly not a process of dubious creation. Schroeder, in his general analytical approach 
to understanding reasons, compares his account to the analysis of water as H20. There as 
well it would be rather awkward an expression to say that the chemical complex H20 
generates or provides water instead of just being water. If again we wish to single out one 
component as the provider of reasons, it would be as before state of affairs and situations. 
It is the dance-party which provides the reason for Ronnie to go. (Likewise, it is hoses 
and faucets which provides water and not H20). 
These are not merely terminological reminders but have larger ramifications. 
Reasons are world-wise and practical deliberation consequently is outward-directed 
rather than inward-directed. Deliberation engages the world and rarely amounts to a mere 
exercise in navel-gazing. Desire-based accounts do not face principal obstacles in 
acknowledging these fundamental facts so long as they stay clear on how precisely desire 
interacts with the other components and, most importantly, the world. What recommends 
certain choices instead of others first and foremost has to do with how things are. It's the 
dancing at the party that makes all the difference for why Ronnie should go. This is not to 
diminish the important role of desire, for without it no situation by itself does ever 
recommend anything. Yet as important the role desire plays, the role is better seen as that 
of a background enabler, which is that of a spotlight operator rather than that of a frontal 
stage actor. We look at our options through our desires instead of paying them direct 
attention. It is in light of one's desires that certain practical options become more 
attractive than others, where importantly the light springs from desires instead of shining 
on desires, and where what is illuminated in particularly favorable colors are choices 
rather than desires. 
Only so conceived do desire-based accounts stand any chance of successfully 
capturing the deliberative perspective of agents. Agents are the unique consumers of 
reasons. To them reasons must be addressed and they must determine whether to take 
seriously what is so addressed. That's why it is such an important test case for accounts 
of reasons that they not misconstrue the perspective of us qua deliberators, the chief 
arbiters of reasons. Desire-based accounts would fail in this regard if they placed the 
primary focal point of reasons on desire. Fortunately, they do not. To desire is to take a 
stake in things, but what we take a stake in are things and not desires. Deliberation very 
rarely concerns what to desire rather than what to do given how things are. Here's an 
example. Desiring to have a piece of chocolate-cake is to look at that piece in a certain 
manner: finding it attractive, taking pleasure in the thought of eating it, and then figuring 
out how to get it. It is not that one has a neutral perception of the cake, and also notices a 
desire somewhere to eat it, on the basis of which one then draws the practical inference 
that one shall eat it. If this was the way desires came upon us, it would leave it rather 
obscure why we should care about them at all. Suppose I was to discover my desire for 
chocolate-cake, say by locating it on the computer-screen of some MRI device I am 
presently plugged into or by some process of psychoanalysis. That result may strike me 
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as quite interesting; as yet another curiosity about myself. But that fact certainly is not 
what drives me to get that cake; what does is my fondness of it - rather than my notice of 
that fondness - with the characteristic accompanying outward way of looking at the cake. 
Indeed, to think of desires as the direct object of deliberation immediately leads to 
a number of awkward results. At one extreme we find desires being presented as if they 
were a nuisance to be quieted, where one primarily deliberates in order to seek out ways 
of shutting up the constant grumble. From this perspective it appears as though to desire 
is to suffer from some mild sort of itch one has not yet figured out how to scratch. This 
view is bizarre but not uncommon. Jonathan Dancy, for instance, credits Brad Hooker 
with the suggestion that "on the Humean showing we have as much reason to abandon a 
desire which there is no reason to have, as to do what will sub serve it." (Dancy 2000:39) 
Yet only the caricature of the sort outlined above could impose this absurd result on 
desire-based accounts. 
In fact, desire is anything but a self-obsessed creature demanding substantial 
attention and which above all else aims at its own satisfaction. Here, then, we find a first 
hint as to why the picture likening desires to conditions we need to be cured of is so 
common: it is concealed in thinking of desires as something to be satisfied, and hence the 
usual label desire-satisfaction is hardly as innocent as often supposed. It potentially steers 
us in the wrong direction from the very start, advancing desires as something to make go 
away; as if desires were entries in a list of errands to take care off; as if Ronnie, returning 
from his dance-party, now had one thing less to worry about. Yet the satisfaction of 
desires as such is never what we have reasons to do, unless we are very careful here and 
understand the notion of satisfaction entirely de re; that is to say what we have reasons to 
do is what satisfies desires, de re, not to satisfy desires per se. Even this may be too much 
of a concession, since the concept of desire need not even figure in the description of the 
reason-supported choice at all. Griffin offers the best case in point: "... if a father wants 
his children to be happy, what he wants, what is valuable to him, is a state of the world, 
not a state of his mind; merely deluding him into thinking that his children flourish, 
therefore, does not give him what he values." (1986:13) Again, desire-based accounts are 
most plausible when desires are merely taken to constitute the explanatory background of 
reasons and are not considered part of what we have reasons to do. In this regard, the 
reason-desire relationship is analogous to the money-attitude relationship. Our attitudes 
towards money explain that it is money, but no piece of money contains any attitudes as 
proper part. Likewise, desires are taken to explain what we have reasons to do, but 
reason-supported choice needs not contain desire as proper part. (Cf. Korsgaard 1996; 
Smith & Pettit 1990) 
Perhaps there is another reason why the misleading picture of desires qua mild 
irritations appears so common. And this may have to do with the term desire itself. In our 
culture especially, desire has not been looked upon favorably, in part for its connotation 
of sexuality and our culture's uneasy relationship with that. In this context being "free of 
desire" was considered a desirable condition. For these and other reasons philosophers 
have been looking for other labels, such as the boring technical term pro-attitude. I 
believe concern-based accounts would be the best terminological choice, and I shall later 
say more why. For now, let's just remind ourselves that the sense of desire that is capable 
of sustaining sensible versions of desire-based accounts of reasons must involve true 
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concerns for how things go and for how people fare; desiring essentially is a way of 
getting involved, of becoming less indifferent about the state of the world. To the extent 
to which felt satisfaction in ends achieved reflects something essential in those ends -
which it usually does not - the satisfaction again is world-wise: gratification that one's 
institution prospers; that one's children flourish; that one's dreams became true. 
Decidedly not that one finally has put to rest an irritating inner voice calling to serve 
one's institution, take care of one's children, or to strive towards the realization of one's 
dreams. 
Now it is true that deliberation on occasion does pay direct attention to desires 
instead of how things appear in light of them. But even then the deliberative result is 
surprising and quite revealing. A few examples should make this plain. That one desires 
to get drunk more often than not is a reason to stay away from the bar rather than to 
gravitate towards it; that one desires to be loved by everyone more often than not is a 
reason to seek moderation and retreat rather than company; that one desires to take risks 
more often than not is a reason to stay clear of risks rather than seeking them, and, for 
instance, not to become a pilot. 
When we attend to desires directly, this often is an indication that something is 
amISS. When, for instance we deal with obsessions and addictions. There is a long 
tradition in philosophy that presumes the main focus of the deliberative lens to rest on 
desire; as when we decide what desires to have, to endorse or identify with, etc. The 
problem that motivates this shift in focus often has to do with attempts of dealing with 
alienating urges that are characteristic of drug addiction. Ironically, by doing so they tend 
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to render desiring into a phenomenon too much resembling addiction altogether. For now 
we need to bear in mind why this purportedly self-obsession of desire is not forced upon 
us by desire-based accounts. Our desires are part of who we are, and usually figure as a 
given on the basis of which deliberation can take off. Very rarely is desire itself 
scrutinized in terms of reasons, and even more rarely can we affect what to desire in a 
manner comparable to which we can affect what to do in response. I have always been 
very fond of small company and have despised large company. Perhaps it might have 
served me better to be more of a party-animal or to at least to be more tolerant of huge 
crowds it, but the disposition of mine to stay away from large crowds has never been the 
target of any serious thought. How could I possibly change it, and why would I even want 
to if I could? It's simply how I am. The only question that usually plagues me is how to 
get home as quickly as possible. 
(2) A very important aspect of the account, then, is precisely that there is no basis 
for assessing fundamental ends, but only options as facilitating those ends in better and 
worse ways ones those ends are in place. Still, there is a deeper worry this generates. 
Even if according to desire-based accounts only means but not ends figure as appropriate 
targets of assessment, the concern is that means cannot obtain a commendatory status that 
the ends towards which they are tailored entirely lack. It is frequently objected that 
without reason to support desire, desire cannot support ways of realizing desire. "If I had 
no reason to want to catch this train" Derek Parfit writes, "I would have no reason to 
leave now." (2011 Chapter 1, 29). And Warren Quinn adds "If my basic love of music 
doesn't give me a reason to listen, then it doesn't ... give me a reason to take the record 
down." (Putting Rationality in its Place, quoted from Dancy 2000:32). And Christine 
Korsgaard must have a similar point in mind when she writes (1997:223; 2008:35): 
The instrumental principle, because it tells us only to take the means to our 
ends, cannot by itself give us a reason to do anything. It can operate only 
in conjunction with some view about how our ends are determined ... It is 
routinely assumed ... that ... our ends will be determined by what we 
desire. But if you hold that the instrumental principle is the only principle 
of practical rationality, you cannot also hold that desiring something is a 
reason for pursuing it. The principle, "take as your end that which you 
desire," is neither the instrumental principle itself nor an application of it. 
If the instrumental principle is the only principle of practical reason, then 
to say that something is your end is not to say that you have a reason to 
pursue it, but at most to say that you are going to pursue it. ... If we allow 
reason a role in determining ends, then the instrumental principle will be 
formulated this way: "if you have a reason to pursue an end then you have 
a reason to take the means to that end." But if we do not allow reason a 
role in determining ends, then the instrumental principle has to go like 
this: "if you are going to pursue an end, then you have a reason to take the 
means to that end." 
And it is this second formulation Korsgaard is very suspicious of, for it all too 
conveniently attempts to derive an ought from an is. In sum, whatever normative force 
desire is capable of passing on must supposedly be borrowed from reason supporting it, 
and hence the worry is desire cannot be the complete story. 
Consider this case in point. Suppose I desire to ~, and suppose ~-ing avails itself 
as a direct way of realizing what I desire, namely that I ~. The pathways towards 
realizing desires are usually not that direct and involve more sophisticated navigations 
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with mUltiple steps. But sometimes it is that simple and means and ends do coincide: I 
want to listen to Beethoven, and this is I best achieve by listening to Beethoven. Consider 
this a limiting case. Now, for the sake of the argument, let us grant I have no reason to 
desire to <1>. Yet because <I>-ing presents itself as the unique opportunity of realizing what I 
desire, I now have a reason to <1>, according to the above model of desire-based accounts. 
Solely in virtue of desiring to <I> and the fact that I can achieve this directly I have a reason 
to <1>. To spice Up the case even further, consider intention. Acting involves intentions, and 
intentions are often understood as states involving desire or resulting from desire. Thus, 
since doing <I> involves forming the intention to <1>, and since this intention includes or 
results from the desire to <1>, I automatically acquire a reason to <I> solely in virtue of 
intending to <1>. This sort of bootstrapping appears suspect. Derek Parfit considers one 
concrete case, the desire to be happy. "The fact that we had this desire could not be truly 
claimed to give us a reason to have it. Desires cannot be self-supporting. Our wanting 
happiness as an end could not give us a reason to want happiness as an end." (2011 
Chapter 1, 38) 
And yet, it remains unclear just how damaging this problem really is. Recall, first, 
that desire-based accounts have no aspiration of explaining reasons in a vacuum, but 
always only relative to particular ends. Given that this is what you want, we hear the 
advisor saying, here is a good way of getting it. Never is the corresponding 
recommendation just to do such-and-such, period, but rather to do such-and-such given 
this is what one wants. It would be mysterious indeed if one could start with some 
reason-unsupported desire to <I> and then end up with some reason to <1>, period, completely 
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detached from the former desire and standing on its own. But nothing of this sort is 
suggested. According to desire-based accounts, reasons are always reasons vis-a-vis ends. 
And bearing this in mind, the supposition that one has reason to <p given that one desires 
to <p does not sound as counterintuitive after all: given that I want to listen to Beethoven, I 
better listen to Beethoven, rather than, say, Brittney Spears. For sure, the advice to <p if 
one wants to <p does not provide helpful advice, as good advice never is that obvious, but 
that's an entirely distinct matter. And with regards to Parfit's example, desire indeed 
cannot support itself. But even when one can <p in order to bring about what one desires, 
<p, our present account does not imply that one then has a reason to desire to ¢. That 
would indeed be an amazing sort of self-certification. All we have, in such a case, is a 
practical reason to do something, namely to <p, which is a different thing entirely from 
reasons for the respective attitude itself. 
Desire-based accounts, then, have no aspiration of providing a basis for assessing 
fundamental ends. They do, however, provide a basis for assessing non-fundamental 
ends, which is to say most all of the ends we adopt. Desires and concerns permeate 
agency in the form of integrated organic structures. In most cases our concerns are 
systematically interconnected, as when we care about something because it possesses 
features that attract us; as when what we care about is embedded within our larger 
identities and projects, not necessarily in relation of means and ends, but in one of many 
other ways. Reading good philosophy is not primarily a means to becoming a philosopher 
rather than a way of being a philosopher. If one came to regard it a necessary chore to 
advance this particular career its prospects would be rather dim. And so when we love 
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reading good philosophy, we do so partly because we enjoy it; because it contributes to 
our understanding; because it is part of larger research projects; because we need 
something to argue with. This could obviously go on forever. Indeed, hardly ever are we 
short of answers why we care about what we care about. Not primarily because we can 
locate the relevant concerns within some sort of chain with some ultimate regress-
stopper. Instead, what we find has more the form of an organic clutter of variously 
interrelated concerns. The fundamental/non-fundaments dichotomy is thus best seen as a 
technical devise to make a technical point; not to suggest our concerns need be layered, 
but to insist that almost never do they just stand in isolation. Sometimes, though, we will 
say we just don't like it and that's the end of it: perhaps we just don't like feeling pain or 
getting sick. What is it about pain we don't like? Well, it's just like that, we don't like it. 
Hence, desire-based accounts have no difficulties acknowledging that our desires are 
usually motivated by some of the valuable properties of their objects; the value of these 
properties, of course, must in tum be explained by some other of our responses towards 
those properties. Saying that X is desired may thus not be the end to the story. Thus, even 
if, in principle, the story needs to end somewhere, and, according to desire-based 
accounts, has to end with some desire rather than some unexplained value, most desires 
simply do not stand as isolated givens. 
(3) What our reasons are is usually not an epistemologically straightforward 
matter. It involves lots of intelligence. Desire-based accounts need not implausibly 
endorse the transparency of all practical reasons. Not merely because what we desire 
often is anything but translucent to ourselves. Even if our desires were an open book to 
ourselves, desires still engage a complex world. And what we have reasons to do just as 
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much depend on the state of the world as on the state of our mind. The complexity of the 
situations in which agents find themselves, together with the inscrutability of large parts 
of the future and the exact effects of our choices directly translates into the complexity of 
practical reasons. And with that comes ample opportunity to discover what our reasons 
are, to disagree about what they are, and to be mistaken about them. What best sub-serves 
our ends more often than not is a highly complex matter. How best to negotiate through 
academia, for instance, so as to realize the end of attaining a doctoral degree is something 
lots of thought and discussion can be spilled upon. 
Notice, however, that the mere fact that we can be mistaken about desire-based 
reasons does not render them normative. The possibility of mistake about some 
phenomenon does not render the phenomenon itself normative in character. At best it 
renders cognition about the phenomenon normative, but that's an entirely different 
matter. We often are mistaken about what time it is, but time, whatever else it may be, is 
certainly not a normative phenomenon. 
(4) The most common strategy to combat desire-based accounts is by 
counterexample. This can quickly generate quite extensive discussions. Here I shall stick 
to a few comments. Overall I remain unimpressed. More often than not the proposed 
counterexamples fail to fully appreciate the difference between what we have some 
reason to do and what we have most reason to do; between pro-tanto reasons and all-
things-considered reasons. This distinction, in some form or another, is accepted by 
virtually all parties, and so it is only fair that proponents of desire-based accounts rely on 
it as well. If someone, to take an example, were to stand on a cliff and harbor the wish of 
finding out how it feels to freefall, desire-based accounts may indeed imply some reason 
to jump. May, I say by way of qualification, because for subtle reasons addressed shortly 
it may also be the case that it does not imply that. For the moment, however, and for the 
sake of the argument let's just grant that there is some reason to jump. This anyway is a 
concession entirely safe and sound, given that there must be overwhelming reasons not to 
jump as well - supposing our agent cares about life and limb at all. His reason to jump 
need not cause worries concerning his safety as long as it is kept in check by 
overwhelming reasons to stay put. That we may want to accord him with a reason to 
jump that only is rendered all but invisible by the opposition - as opposed to according 
none at all - is supported by this consideration. Cancel the opposition and see what 
happens. To that end we shall add a bungee-cord. Thereby we may tum into a winning 
reason what before was squarely on the losing side; and yet the reason, it is plausible to 
suppose, was there all the same. The bungee-cord hardly added a new reason that was 
absent before but rather just cancelled out the competition, leaving the field entirely to 
the jumping reason. This appears the most natural and non ad-hoc diagnosis of what 
changed the overall normative situation. 
And yet, the above concession is not forced upon desire-based accounts, 
addressing now why our agent need not have a reason to jump after all. We need not 
presume each and every desire to have the capacity of empowering the relevant reasons-
relationships. This is so even if we restrict the focus on desires people actually have, an 
assumption that has guided the discussion up till now. Desire-based accounts are entitled 
to add further conditions on which actual desires count. I already have voiced my 
conviction that only desires that are embedded within our larger projects and identities 
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have reason-related capacities. Other plausible restrictions could include that the objects 
of desire must have received at least some consideration; that the desires must not rest 
upon our attraction to features that are not really there but which we deceptively only 
take to be there; and so on. None of these qualifications need be ad hoc or threaten our 
preoccupation with desires people actually have. Hence, more often than not it is 
dialectically an impotent move to advance just any desire and then to insist that desire-
based accounts must acknowledge a reason accompanying it which is of an allegedly 
counterintuitive sort. It's simply not that simple. 
All in all, I share a great deal of sympathy with desire-based accounts. For 
convenience, we may call them Schroeder-reasons or just S-reasons. They comport with 
a substantial proportion of the term's common usage, as is nicely illustrated by 
Schroeder's example of Ronnie and Bradley. Furthermore, they capture situations of 
agents in a manner that reflects their own appraisal of these situations; what they find 
salient and significant about them and what choices will consequently appeal to them. By 
keeping close to agents' own deliberative vantage points S-reasons afford vast predictive 
powers. They are tied up with the intentional stance that unlike others is actually able to 
issue reliable long-term forecasts of what people are going to do. In this regard S-
reasons' predictive utility may presently be unsurpassed. This is a pleasant benefit when 
we occupy a third-person perspective on other people. But desire-based accounts are in 
fact most attractive when we occupy a first-person perspective on our own deliberative 
situations. S-reasons capture what we wish our advisors to be concerned about, since we, 
the advisees, shall be able to recognize the recommendations they issue as truly helpful 
and non-presumptuous. This is not to reiterate the important point from above that 
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capturing the first person deliberative perspective is paramount for any account of 
reasons. Rather, it brings us to the perhaps most important source of motivation for 
desire-based accounts: that they, unlike most competitors, refrain from imposing reason-
demands on agents that incorporate aims they have not chosen as their own; that they 
refrain from hoodwinking agents into compliance with alien agendas in virtue of utilizing 
what could be seen as nothing but a particularly sophisticated form of bluff. 
The motivation in question springs from the famous internalism requirement. The 
requirement places a necessary condition on practical reasons: whether some 
consideration qualifies as a reason for an agent depends upon its capacity to engage what 
that agent cares about. Bernard Williams, utilizing semantic ascent, offers this definition 
in terms of statements about reasons: The statement that "there is a reason for A to tP ... 
implies ... that A has some motive which will be served or furthered by his ~-ing, and if 
this turns out not to be so the sentence is false." (1981:101) Williams calls reasons that 
meet the requirement internal and those that do not external, but since he does not 
believe in external reasons, what his definition effectively does is to place a constraint on 
practical reasons as such. His dichotomy between internal and external reasons does not 
offer a classification of two kinds of reasons so much as in effect to rule out categorical 
or external reasons, reasons agents allegedly have irrespective of what they happen to 
care about. What Williams should have said is that practical reasons are internal or cease 
to be reasons. The requirement proposes a litmus test each reason-candidate must pass. 
The requirement has received extensive treatment in the literature. Here I shall be rather 
brief and not defend a stance for or against; all I shall provide is a rough rationale for the 
requirement. The employment of the requirement within my larger argument does not 
rest on its validity so much as on the assumption that it figures as a vital element for 
desire-based accounts. 
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The core intuition behind the internalism requirement is that agents must be 
capable of seeing a point in taking seriously the demands that are applied to them. The 
internalism requirement incorporates a profound skepticism with regards to all forms of 
substantive demands and standards that are forced upon agents without their approval: 
dictates that they must do something even though they cannot quite see why. James 
Dreier captures the spirit nicely (2001 :41): 
When we give a justification, we are either explicitly citing or adverting to 
some norms. But we can't just cite any old bunch of norms. Which norms 
count toward justification? The problem is that if we simply cite a bunch 
of rules, the agent may well ask, what are those rules to me? She may ask 
for a reason to follow them. And we can't just shrug this off. Suppose that 
someone cited the laws of India in support of moral principles. We 
ourselves recognize that this sort of justification is useless. ... If we cite 
the laws of India and our subject asks what reasons she has to follow 
them, we understand what she's asking. She's again asking for reasons. 
She doesn't see any force in the rules we've cited. 
It comes all down to reasons, then. And reasons, the requirement pronounces, 
cannot be imposed on agents from the outside as it were lest they lose all force and point. 
If someone, after careful reflection, were to remain entirely unmoved by some 
consideration, its capacity to figure as a reason is seen as systematically undermined. The 
question of why accept a consideration as a practical reason is always a fair one to ask. 
And the buck stops with agents on whom it is to answer this question. Their indifference 
towards a consideration, says the requirement, must mean the denunciation of it as a 
reason by the only arbiters and judges there are. Considerations that have aspirations to 
reasonhood must thus find a foothold in the concern-structure of the relevant agents to 
whom they are proposed, for either they will connect to what they care about or they 
simply will get disconnected. If considerations fail to engage agents - by incorporating 
aims that are considered alien by those agents - the requirement strikes out these 
considerations as mere reason-pretenders falling short of qualifying as true practical 
reasons. Richard Joyce writes (2001:80-81): 
Normative reasons claims - claims concerning what it is rational for an 
agent to do - must be something that potentially engage the agent to 
whom they are applied. This doesn't mean that the presentation of a true 
normative reason claim immediately results in the agent being motivated; 
rather, it means that the agent cannot sensibly both acknowledge that 
something is a normative reason for him to act and ask "But so what?" 
Any adequate theory of normative reasons must make out reasons to be 
precisely those things that forestall a "So what?" response. 
How does the internal ism requirement lend support to desire-based accounts? The 
requirement certainly does not imply the truth of desire-based accounts. Various authors, 
in fact, consistently endorse the requirement and yet reject desire-based accounts. The 
former places a necessary condition on practical reasons, whereas the latter provides a 
sufficient condition for reasons. The former constrains what qualifies as reasons, without 
necessarily saying what reasons are or to offer an account. The latter, in contrast, does 
say what reasons are and does offer an account. Still, how the requirement is able to lend 
crucial support to desire-based accounts is not hard to see. According to the requirement, 
principles retain normative force only if its subjects, the relevant agents, are prepared to 
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accept them. And accepting a principle is to exhibit some willingness to comply, which 
requires a motive, a desire to do something. David Velleman offers a similar 
reconstruction (2000:170-171): 
Suppose that reasons for someone to do something must be considerations 
that would sway him toward doing it if he entertained them rationally. 
And suppose that the only considerations capable of swaying someone 
toward an action are those which represent it as a way of attaining 
something he wants ... These assumptions, taken together, seem to imply 
that the only considerations that can qualify as reasons for someone to act 
are considerations appealing to his antecedent inclinations - that is his 
desires or dispositions to desire. 
The internal ism requirement demands reason must have the capacity of engaging 
the concerns agents have, and desire-based accounts take care of this by precisely making 
reasons a function of those concerns. Desire-based accounts, hence, explain reasons in a 
manner that fits exactly the job description placed by the requirement. Desire-based 
accounts find support in the requirement because they offer the best explanation of the 
requirement itself. The relevant logic here is abduction, not deduction, that is to say 
inference to the best explanation. It is unclear whether those who accept the requirement 
and yet reject desire-based accounts can do equally well. Their alternative way of 
accommodating the requirement smacks of being ad hoc. Suppose that alternatively, 
reasons were grounded in concern-independent considerations, such as objective values. 
Dancy, among others, has argued for this, while also holding on to the requirement. The 
question he and his compatriots face is why, given that we are now supposing reasons 
spring from value rather than concerns, some value here is capable of empowering 
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reasons while the exact same value there is not, solely in virtue of extrinsic and unrelated 
facts concerning what certain agents happen to care about and what they happen to be 
motivated by. The question, in other words, is how to explain the relevance of such 
concern/motivation-related contingencies for reasons given that what reasons are, 
according to this alternative picture, has nothing to do with those concern/motivation-
related contingencies. It does not suffice to insist that reasons must be capable of 
motivating agents. The question is precisely why this should be so if the source of 
reasons had nothing to do with motivation altogether. To date I am not aware of any 
satisfactory answer to this question. 
The requirement, then, lends vital support to desire-based accounts. Yet the role it 
plays for desire-based accounts actually goes further. The requirement does not just 
figure as one witness among others to speak on their behalf. Without the requirement 
desire-based accounts are exposed defenseless with regards to the myriad of competitors 
who seek to empower features other than desire with reasons-related capacities. This can 
most dramatically be illustrated with regards to desire itself, only desires of others. 
According to desire-based accounts, it is not just desires as such that figure as crucial 
components for the reasons agents have; it is only agents' own desires. This is 
structurally somewhat puzzling. Why should only desires agents have themselves be 
capable of figuring in the relevant reasons-relationship and not also desires held by their 
agential neighbors? After all, desires are desires, and if two desires had in common 
everything but their location, it is not immediately obvious why their geography should 
make all the difference. It sounds rather awkward to say that this desire on your right can 
undergird someone's reasons while its identical twin desire on your left cannot. Consider 
an example. Suppose Bert and Berta share a room that Berta wants to be warmer but Bert 
does not; Bert is in fact indifferent. Berta and Bert sit side by side with the thermometer 
in equal reach. Now what desire-based accounts imply is that Berta has a reason to get up 
from her seat and tum up the heat and that Bert has no such reason; disregarding, for 
them moment, any concerns Bert may have for Berta and that he also lacks any other 
social/moral sensitivities; imagine Bert and Berta suffer from systematic mind-blindness, 
a particularly heavy form of autism. How come, then, that whether the exact same desire 
can figure in Bert's reasons depends on its location? The answer must be that this is so 
because only if the desire is Bert's own do we have any guarantee that Bert will be 
moved by it and see a point in doing something that furthers it. In other words, because 
out of two otherwise identical desires the internalism requirement preempts the 
motivationally disconnected one to count at all. 
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This completes my reconstruction of desire-based accounts and of what they have 
going for them. Unfortunately desire-based accounts render reasons entirely void of 
distinctive normativity. Once we attend carefully to the details of desire-based accounts, I 
believe this becomes next to obvious. We must not fall prey to an awkward reverse 
consciousness suspecting what is readily apparent really must be deceptive instead. The 
crucial point is the relevant relationship between situations, agents, ends and options is 
blatantly non-normative or rendered thus only in virtue of externally normative principles 
that transcend the compass of desire-based accounts. Let me explain. 
Take situation S, agent A, end E as well as options X and Y. Now suppose that as 
a matter of empirical fact, A will more likely realize E if he were to X rather than Y, and 
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everything else is truly equal. Given how A's overall cognitive-motivational system is set 
up, and given that he really cares about E and is not stupid, we would expect A to prefer 
X over Y. We would certainly expect A to gravitate towards X rather than Y and be 
puzzled if otherwise. The one-million-dollar question, however, is this: can we detect 
anything distinctively normative in that complex relation that explains why A ought to do 
X, should do X, must choose X over Y, would become subject to warranted criticism if 
he did not in fact choose X over Y, and so on? Can we detect anything that explains, 
based on that relationship, why preferring X over Y is genuinely the appropriate choice 
and why preferring Y over X is genuinely the inappropriate choice? 
We cannot. What we can detect is this: if A chooses X over Y, he will more likely 
realize his end E. If A chooses Y over X, he will less likely realize his end E. This 
appears to be a simple empirical observation of the kind that psychologists, sociologists, 
or anthropologists might advance with regards to some study subject. If fits the 
perspective of some neutral observant of the strategic situation of two combatant parties: 
If Napoleon moves there, he will risk his right flank. If he retreats, he will compromise 
the benefit of the victory the day before. Granted, we may employ reasons-language to 
capture this and other empirical observation. This may be especially illuminating since it 
reveals how the relevant agents appraise the situation. It would be perfectly fine to use 
the vocabulary of S-reasons to do all this. Calling S-reasons reasons, however, does not 
render them reasons in any distinct normative sense, just as saying the reason why the 
volcano erupted was that magna was building up involves nothing normative either. 
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It is worthwhile to stress, then, that my present contention is not with what are 
often called motivating reasons. I am not trying here to come to grips with what could be 
classified first and foremost a psychological phenomenon. It is true that people usually 
exemplify systematic patterns in their reasoning and behavior where goals and means 
become suitably interconnected; and further that those cognitive/conative patters will be 
subject to and evolve in response to various ecological pressures. Effective practical 
reasoning certainly enhances our capacity to successfully deal with our environment; it 
contribute to self-preservation and flourishing in a hostile world. And it is also true that 
with systematicity in patterns comes understanding and prediction. Given that people 
tend to connect means and ends, we usually are able to cite the relevant sets of beliefs and 
desires that illuminate why they acted as they did; beliefs and desires that effectively 
present their choices in a favorable light and promise to make sense of them. The issue of 
motivating reasons, and of what sets them apart from both purely normative and purely 
explanatory reasons, is tricky. But to the extent to which we can distinguish between 
motivating and normative reasons - or at least between two roles reasons can play, a 
motivational and a normative role - my concern lies with the latter and not necessarily 
the former. Whether our agent A is under some psychological pressure to prefer X over Y 
and whether he is under some normative pressure to prefer X over Y are commonly 
supposed distinct matters. And here I do not contest that S-reasons, or our responsiveness 
to S-reasons, figure as crucial components of a complex psychological capacity - to 
reason and plan for the future - that has enabled our species to take over the world. I am 
mildly optimistic about the prospects that a decently plausible psychological story shall 
eventually be forthcoming explaining why we exhibit these kinds of systematic patterns 
in reasoning and acting linking ends and means. For all I know the story will include 
various evolutionary and cultural details. But this concerns questions distinct from those 
we are presently occupied with. My focus here entirely rests on whether agent A has 
distinctively normative reasons to prefer X over Y, instead of merely and fortunately 
being subjected to cognitive habits that have served our species well. Or, to put the 
question slightly differently, whether the sense in which he does have such reasons is a 
distinctively normative sense, as opposed to a purely motivational and psychological 
sense of reasons. 
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Returning to this question, it is safe to observe that is at least not obvious whether 
S-reasons are normative, and this alone spells trouble. Desire-based accounts of reasons 
face great opposition. The important point now is not to take sides in this debate, but 
notice that there are sides to take. And what opponents of desire-based accounts deny is 
certainly not the empirical observations from above: namely that doing X rather than Y 
will better serve A's end E. What they deny is that this, or this alone, determines A's 
normative situation. It appears, then, that in addition to whether we have the sort of 
complex quadruple relationship in front of us there is also the issue of whether that 
relationship captures what reasons are. For if there was no such further question, then 
specifying that relationship would be all there is to say, and the impression that there is a 
further issue one can potentially disagree with would amount to nothing but confusion. 
Yet we should not be that comfortable with passing verdict of confusion on entire 
traditions of philosophy. 
It appears, in short, that there are two coherent hypotheses, neither one ruled out 
on logical or conceptual grounds alone: 
(1) Given S, doing X instead of Y will better serve A's end E and (hence) S is a reason for A to X. 
(2) Given S, doing X instead ofY will better serve A's end E but S is not a reason for A to X. 
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To put some meat on this, take some ax-murderer who wants to indulge in a 
particular brutal act just for the fun of it, and learns he could best achieved this by 
causing a blood-bath in the local kindergarten. Does he have a reason to do so, given that 
this is what he wants? It's controversial, to say the least, and that's all we need to focus 
on for the moment. Now, given that proponents of both hypotheses (1) and (2) 
acknowledge the fact that, given S, doing X instead of Y will better serve A's end E, 
there must be something else they contest, and therein precisely lies the problem for 
proponents of desire-based accounts. It seems they have mentioned everything there is to 
mention. What further fact is there in their desire-based arsenal? Since all parties agree 
on the empirical/relational facts that supposedly carry reasons, the question of which of 
(1) and (2) is true should be closed and settled, but it clearly is not. 
Now, the easiest way to rule in favor of (1) over (2) is to introduce an additional 
principle. A principle of practical reason, rationality, or prudence that dictates that one 
should, given that in situation S, doing X rather than Y better serves ones ends, do X. Or 
perhaps it is as simple as that it is a good thing (bears truly commendatory force) if 
people get what they want. Kant suggested the principle that "Who wills the end, wills 
(so far as reason as decisive influence on his action) also the means which are 
indispensably necessary and in his power." (Groundwork, Paton translation) What 
precisely figures as the best candidate for this auxiliary principle is controversial and 
involves tremendous complications. I shall mention a few momentarily. For now we can 
put all complications aside and stipulate that principle P establishes the requisite 
normative connection between situations, agents and ends on the one side and choices on 
the other. P would explain why e.g. it would be irrational for A to prefer Y instead of X 
given the facts are as they are supposed to be. The controversy, then, would concern 
principle P and its status. Unfortunately, complementing desire-based accounts with one 
further principle P puts enormous strains on them; it threatens to undermine what 
motivates such accounts in the first place. 
3.5. Desire Cum Principle P 
Principle P, we now suppose, has the power of settling the dispute between 
hypotheses (1) and (2) from above; in other words, it establishes that given agent A finds 
himself in situation S where doing X rather than Y better serves his ends, A has a 
normative reason to do X; or, at any rate, something reasonably close to that. As 
mentioned there are tremendous difficulties with finding an adequate formulation of P. 
Among them are how to control other relevant considerations; how to control relevant 
background conditions, such as excluders, enablers, disablers, etc; how to deal with 
issues relating to the scope of the relevant normative operator, in particular whether we 
are entitled to detach parts in instances of the overall principle. Suppose John has some 
end - to clean his car - which he will further by washing his car in his driveway. Do we 
want P to imply that John has a reason to do so? The simple solution would be yes, but 
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this leads to many problems. What if John's neighbor has a professional car wash station, 
and offered to take care of the car free of charge, and what if, in contrast, John's taking 
on the cleaning of his own not only involves considerable costs, but also means that he 
has to miss the famous one and only job interview? In such and other cases it is at least 
not clear whether we want to say John still has a reason to clean his car, even of the tiny-
bitsy pro-tanto sort. The obvious superiority of some easily accessible alternative should 
bear some weight on whether pursuing the inferior option is in fact reason-supported. For 
otherwise reasons will proliferate in uncontainable ways, and to point out a reason to an 
agent potentially will carry little recommendatory force whatsoever. A second difficulty 
strings from excluders and disablers. If John promised not to clean his car himself, this 
may exclude reasons he may otherwise have. If he has not the slightest idea of how to 
clean cars, this may disable the sensibility of such an undertaking. In short, the precise 
contours of P are complicated. 
For present proposes, however, I shall put all these complications to a side. What 
I am concerned about is adding a normative principle to desire-based accounts in the first 
place, regardless of its content. The only point I need to stress, then, is that P is a 
normative principle. It comes with its own provision of oughts and shoulds which claim 
true normative force. Principle P is not a mere rule of thumb, a statement of some 
regularity, or a specification of our cognitive tendencies and expectations. Rather, it 
issues claims about what we should do, are required to do, or have reasons to do and so 
on. It introduces a practical norm the authority of which can be questioned and 
scrutinized. And therein precisely lies the problem. 
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What explains that normative status of P? If P has normative authority - if it is 
capable of establishing the relevant normative connections - this constitutes a most 
interesting normative fact in need of explanation. And now desire-based accounts face an 
uneasy situation. They must choose between two options: to provide an explanation or 
not to provide an explanation for the normative authority of P. And as I shall argue, 
neither choice quite works. The first choice would be certainly preferable, since desire-
based accounts aspire to explain reasons and authority, and if for that purpose they 
invoke a principle with its own normative authority, then we want to know why they are 
entitled to appeal to that principle and suppose it to carry normative force. The second 
choice would be to suppose principle P correct and authoritative, primitively, without 
further explanation. This would turn desire-based accounts into versions of non-reductive 
realism of the sort discussed in the previous chapter. It would propose and leave 
unexplained one normative principle, albeit one that potentially could claim particular 
intuitive support. I shall comment on this second choice first. 
Accepting the normative authority of P as an unexplained primitive obviously 
amounts to giving up on the initial aspiration of naturalism. Because of this the second 
choice seems a non-starter qua naturalistic candidate. Still, some patience may be in 
order. If desire plus principle P is the closest we can get to explaining reasons in 
naturalistic fashion, and if this exception is motivated, it may not be such a terrible thing 
to excuse one single principle from the relentless demands of explanation. After all, the 
principle, together with the usual set of empirical/motivational facts, promises 
considerable explanatory power, as every practical reason henceforth would receive a 
principled explanation. Unsurprisingly, then, a number of proponents of desire-based 
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accounts - Humeans as they usually call themselves - have urged their compatriots to 
accept this single and local exception from explanatory demands. James Dreier in 
particular has argued for this in Humean Doubts about Categorical Imperatives, 2001. He 
proposes the simple reading of principle P - or (MlE) in his idiom - such that "if you 
desire to <p and believe that by ~-ing, you will <p, then you have a reason to ~." (Dreier 
2001 :38) As mentioned before, the simple reading probably needs further amendments. 
For now, however, let us ignore these difficulties and follow Dreier (2001 :35) in that 
According to [this] reading, it is really a normative claim. It says, in effect, that 
you ought to perform the necessary and sufficient means to your desired ends. 
You might not do this. You might, at least on occasion, find yourself lacking the 
motivation to perform the necessary and sufficient means to some end you desire. 
This would be a fault of yours, a failure of rationality. Glossing over some 
distinctions, we might say that your failure would be a failure of instrumental 
reason. 
Dreier then proposes that Humeans accept principle P, or (MJE), in the form of a 
categorical imperative, an imperative that "a person has reason to follow it that is 
independent of what she desires." (2001:37). In other words, Dreier proposes to accept 
the normative authority of principle P irrespective of what people desire (2001 :42): 
(M/E) has a kind of ground-level normative status. I think it also counts as a 
categorical imperative. Of course, the particular reasons that (MJE) generates are 
all hypothetical reasons. But (MJE) itself is not hypothetical. Its demands must be 
met by you, insofar as you are rational, no matter what desires you happen to 
have. That is why ... I think Humeans are mistaken to say there are no categorical 
imperatives at all. 
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These are astonishing words. Humean have always dreaded the notion that there 
are demands that must be met by you, insofar as you are rational, no matter what desires 
you happen to have. There are many conceptions of practical rationality which involve 
robust and substantial demands: that one must promote one's own well-being; that one 
must accord weight not only on present aims but also future aims; that one must strive for 
flourishing or sociability or perfection. And most importantly, of course, that, on pain of 
deep practical inconsistency, one must respect others if one respects oneself, and surely 
one must respect oneself. Humeans have regarded all this with profound skepticism. 
What they quintessentially contest is the attempt of substantiating the authority of 
ambitious norms on the basis of some robust and substantial conception of practical 
rationality. This precisely is the characteristic Kantian move, where a failure to comply 
with morality, for instance, is analyzed as a failure to comply with practical rationality as 
such. Hence, the inception of desire-transcendent forms of practical rationality represents 
all that Humeans have traditionally been against. Dreier is fully aware of this singularity 
(2001 :37): 
I will argue there is something special about exactly the kind of norms of 
rationality Humeans accept. This special status confers a kind of necessity on the 
Humean norms that we may properly doubt can accrue to other sorts of norms. 
The request for justification, I will argue, is intelligible as a demand for reasons 
bearing just that kind of necessity. And we may properly doubt that the demand 
for moral justification can be satisfied. So we may properly doubt that moral 
imperatives are categorical, but we must allow that some imperatives are 
categorical. 
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Unfortunately, granting this exception involves costs for desire-based accounts 
that far exceed the mere admission of a gap in explanation. It amounts to no less than the 
rejection of the most profound rationale for desire-based accounts itself: the 
aforementioned intemalism requirement. If the normativity of principle P is taken to be 
primitive - that is not to be explained in terms of desire - the amended version of desire-
based accounts cum principle P inevitably places itself in stark opposition to the 
intemalism requirement. An agent may now respond to the dictates of P, namely that he 
must choose the means that best promote his ends, in exactly the same manner of 
philosophical puzzlement as he may responds to e.g. the dictates of some moral dictate, 
call it principle M, namely that he must help prevent the death of a starving child. Since 
according to the amended version principle P claims authority over agents regardless of 
whether it has a foothold in those agents, there is exactly the same sort of structural gap 
opening up between what reason-demands are proposed to agents and which in fact are 
guaranteed to engage those agents; between engaging reasons and non-engaging reasons. 
The bottom line, then, is that one cannot consistently use the interalism requirement to 
fend off some other principles on grounds of their potential disconnection to desire while 
at the same time give principle P a free pass. If principle P is structurally exactly alike 
those other principle, including moral principle M, in that it too involves a claim to 
authority not accounted for in terms of desire, it ipso facto must share the same fate when 
it comes to whether it can live up to the intemalism requirement. 
The important point is entirely structural in character. It is also subtle, and we 
must ensure not to get sidetracked by various irrelevancies. This is not an exercise in 
psychology. As a matter of empirical fact, it would be highly unusual if agents were to 
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respond to the recognized ways of furthering their ends with thinking "so what, what is 
that to me?" Few will do so, unless they are trying to score a philosophical point. If 
someone were indeed to respond in that way, we would start to wonder and probably 
would have cause for concern. We might start counting the days he will stay around. It 
would be crazy for him to disregard basic means-ends rationality that secures his further 
existence. But then, few will respond in that way when presented with commonsensical 
moral principles either. If someone were indeed to respond in that way, we similarly 
would start to wonder, and now would have even more cause for concern: now we might 
start counting our own days to stay around. It would be no less crazy to disregard basic 
moral principles that secure our coexistence. Generally speaking, the issue is not what is 
psychologically likely to happen but what is structurally possible to happen. Even if it so 
happened that every creature in the universe accepted principle M, it still would violate 
the internalism requirement, because it lays claim to authority in a manner irrespective of 
desire. Hence, it is entirely beside the point whether principle P or some other principle 
such as principle M comports to a greater extent with common empirical psychological 
patterns. The point, plain and simple, is that by assuming the normativity of principle P to 
be primitive and independent of our desires, this version inherits exactly the same 
structural features that enabled the engaging/non-engaging gap to open up for other more 
ambitions normative domains such as morality. It is because both principles P and M lay 
claim to authority irrespective of desire that it becomes possible that what an agent 
desires and what he must do come apart. On what basis, then, are we entitled to award 
principle P the status of primitive authority that we are not also entitled to award to the 
basic moral principle M? 
It shall prove most instructive if we keep alive the comparison between principle 
P and principle M, which represents the prototype of what the intemalism requirement 
was devised to strike out. Consider an example of Dreier's (2001 :38-39) that can easily 
be adjoined by a second and relevantly similar one. Consider Ann's case first. 
We tell her that she ought to take a prep course for the LSATs. She asks 
why. We point out that she wants to raise her chances of getting into a 
competitive law school, and she can raise her chances by taking the prep 
course. She admits as much, but she still isn't motivated to take the prep 
course. So we cite the rule [of means-ends rationality, or principle P]. 
Now suppose that Ann agrees that this rule does indeed instruct her to take 
the prep course ... , given what she believes and desires, but she shrugs 
and doesn't accept the rule. 
Ann obviously exhibits a severe form of practical irrationality. She would be the 
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kind of person we are likely to get worried about. Don't plan any trips with Ann! Her 
practical reasoning if off, and we should fully concur with Dreier that we must conclude 
that there is something wrong with Ann. Now consider Antoinette's case: 
We tell Antoinette that she ought to give her leftovers to the starving child 
outside. She asks why. We point out that the child will die otherwise, and 
that her donation involves virtually no costs to herself. She admits as 
much, but still isn't motivated to make the donation. So we cite the rule 
that one ought to help prevent a gratuitous death of an innocent child if 
one can do so without anything but marginal costs. Now suppose 
Antoinette agrees this rule indeed instructs her to help, given her situation, 
but she shrugs and doesn't accept the rule. 
Antoinette obviously exhibits a severe form of immorality. She would be the kind 
of person we are certain to get worried about. Don't plan to do anything with Antoinette! 
Her attitudes are repulsive, and so again we clearly must conclude that there is something 
wrong with Antoinette. 
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Ann, then, flouts principle P and Antoinette flouts principle M. What's the 
difference? The content of the two principles, of course, but nothing more. With regards 
to the relevant structural feature, namely the relationship of their presumed authority to 
desire, they are exactly on par. And since we are not presently concerned with the 
contents of normative principles at all, the answer should simply be: nothing, period. For 
sure, it is an open possibility that we conclude on substantial grounds that one principle is 
valid and the other is invalid. After all, they differ in what aspects of reality they enable 
to carry reasons; principle P places considerable weight on the concerns of agents and 
what furthers them while principle M places considerable weight on the capacities of 
agents to prevent gratuitous deaths. But this difference in content is irrelevant for present 
purposes and anyways, thus far we have not encountered any substantial argument for or 
against each principle. It is certainly not the injunction that Antoinette ought to hand over 
her leftovers that any participant in the present debate would want to take issue with. To 
paraphrase Bernard Williams, there are many things we want to say to her: "that [s ]he is 
ungrateful, inconsiderate, hard, ... , nasty, selfish, brutal, and many other disadvantageous 
things .... it would be better if [s ]he were nicer ... " (1995b:39) But neither do I wish to 
take issue with means-ends rationality. Three cheers to means-end rationality! Both 
principles, then, involve norms most would find intuitively compelling and few would 
wish to discard. The question does not concern our de-facto inclinations towards both 
principles, but that they both lay claim to authority in the same desire-independent 
manner, and that consequently, as far as the internalism requirement is concerned, they 
both stand or fall together. 
The amended version of desire based accounts, then, attempts to quarantine what 
has the capacity of giving reasons to agents - exclusively, namely, what has the right 
kind of relation to what they care about - only to invite back in a principle that brings 
with it all the features the quarantine was erected to keep out in the first place. The line 
the amended version seeks to draw demarcating acceptable from inacceptable principles 
is inherently instable: by drawing it where it wishes it to be drawn it must reemploy an 
element plainly falling on the other side and hence censured off hands. Yet desire-based 
accounts cannot have it both ways. They ultimately shall prove incapable of withstanding 
the dual pressure from left and right, which is simultaneously be applied by those, one the 
one side, who seek to acknowledge the authority of additional desire-independent 
principles, and those, on the other side, who even question the authority of the single 
principle P: Philosophers such as Hume, who famously contested the authority of means-
end rationality, such as contained in principle P, when he wrote Tis as little contrary to 
reason to prefer even my own acknowledg'd lesser good to my greater. (Treatise 2.3.3.) 
To respond to the skeptics who insist each principle must be accounted for and who are 
prepared to jettison all wanting an explanation, proponents of the amended version must 
plead to allow one exception, and to accept principle P despite its disconnection to desire. 
Yet thereby they inevitably become vulnerable on their other flank. 
And indeed, those who wish to advance more ambitious principles to carry 
nonnative force are quick to point their finger at precisely this instability. Christine 
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Korsgaard notes that" ... once this kind of irrationality is allowed in the means/end case, 
some of the grounds for skepticism about more ambitious forms of practical reasoning 
will seem less compelling." (1996:321) Here, then, do we find two representative figures 
questioning the soundness of the amended version of desire-based accounts. Korsgaard, 
coming from one end, will press to allow in principle M as well, given that principle P, 
which is already supposed inside, no less violates the intemalism requirement than does 
principle M. And Hume, coming from the other end, will press to disallow principle P as 
well, given that principle M, which is already supposed outside, no less violates the 
requirement than does principle P. Both Hume and Korsgaard appear consistent in a way 
in which the amended version does not. Desires-based accounts, then, cannot consistently 
refuse to accept principles such as principle M on grounds of its independence to desire 
and yet at the same time accept principle P even though it exhibits just the same sort of 
independence of desire. 
Desire-based accounts, I conclude, are not entitled to accept the authority of 
principle P without explanation. This precludes the second option of how they could 
incorporate principle P. The first one, which we initially declared preferable anyway, is to 
provide an explanation for the authority of principle P. Do desire-based accounts, then, 
have the resources to offer an account of the authority of principle P? Unfortunately, they 
have not. 
The only element desire-based accounts can draw on to explain the authority of 
some principle is desire. When, and in virtue of what, we like to know, does an agent 
have a reason to comply with a principle? The answer, desire-based accounts must say, is 
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when, and in virtue of the fact that, the agent has accepted the principle; when, in other 
words, honoring the principle features as one of his concerns. Suppose an agent accepts 
some principle and now faces a choice where he can either do something that honors the 
principle or alternatively do something which dishonors it. He must have a reason to do 
what honors the principle, we hear the imaginary proponent of desire-based accounts 
saying, because it furthers something he cares about, namely to honor that principle. 
But now we squarely find ourselves in a circle. We introduced principle P 
precisely because we recognized that the mere empirical correlation between what 
someone desires and what furthers his desires cannot carry distinctively normative 
reasons. A gap remains, and principle P was called upon for the sole purpose of closing 
that gap. Hence in the attempt of explaining principle P's own authority one cannot 
presuppose what principle P was employed to explain in the first place, namely that with 
the appropriate provision of desire comes reason. In other words, if what is at stake is the 
reasons-related capacity of desire, it doesn't help to add yet another desire. If the 
transition from what furthers desires to what we have normative reasons to do requires an 
extra step, we make no strides by co-opting an extra desire for taking the relevant step. 
Return, then, to Ann's case from above. Ann wants to get into law school and 
recognizes that she will more likely be able to do so if she takes a prep course for the 
LSATs, but then refuses to do so all the same. We propose principle P to Ann, and she 
acknowledges that principle P directs her to take the course under those circumstances. 
She still has no inclination to take the prep course. Now, we concluded there is something 
wrong with Ann, but wondered what exactly is missing. "What Ann is missing can't be 
any desire" Dreier keenly notes. We cannot get Ann to take the course by just adding yet 
another desire (2001:39): 
The desire that is supposed to bridge the gap between believing that a rule 
requires her to ¢ and being motivated to ¢ is the desire to comply with the 
rule. But suppose that Ann's mental inventory were supplemented with a 
desire to comply with the rule, in this case to comply with (MJE). Could 
this complete the picture? Were she to desire to comply with (MJE), would 
she then be motivated to take the LSAT prep course? By hypothesis Ann 
. .. fails to be motivated by the acknowledged means to her desired ends. 
So adding a desire (complying with (MJE)) does not in her bring about the 
motivation to perform an acknowledged means to her end of doing well in 
the LSA T. ... This futile attempt is exactly what we would be engaged in 
if we were to try to bring Ann to take the LSAT prep course by giving her 
a desire (complying with (MJE)) that would motivate her to take the prep 
course. So what Ann is missing cannot be a desire. 
159 
Dreier frames the argument in terms of motivational force, but it works just as 
well in terms of normative force. If Ann generally doubts she has reasons to do what 
furthers her ends, she will not regard her newly instilled desire to comply with (MJE) to 
conclude in a reason either. Supplying her with the goal of honoring principle P only 
entails that she now has a reason to comply with the principle if we are entitled to 
suppose that she has reasons to do what best satisfies her goals, which, of course, is 
nothing but a restatement of principle P, the very principle at issue. This addition in 
desire thus cannot change the situation. Previously we dealt with a single desire of Ann's, 
and we were flabbergasted by her unwillingness to proceed to means she knows will 
implement that single desire. Now we are dealing with two desires of Ann's, one about 
getting into law school and one about honoring principle P, and Ann again exhibits the 
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same degree of unwillingness to proceed to means she knows will implement these two 
desires. The number of desires, however, is not the problem; rather, the problem entirely 
lies in the transition from desire to reason, be it one or many, and thus we are simply 
moving in circles here. 
Dreier calls this line of reasoning the Tortoise argument given its resemblance to 
the famous story by Lewis Carroll. There we encounter a clever tortoise unwilling to 
draw an inference of the modus ponens sort and who is adjoined by a rather dull Achilles 
attempting to entice her to do the same by offering one after another inference of the 
modus ponens sort. If the Tortoise stubbornly remains disinclined to accept modus 
ponens - or doubts she has reasons to do so - then presenting yet another modus ponens 
argument for accepting modus ponens will not make the slightest difference, neither for 
her inclinations nor her conception of what she has reasons to do. Likewise, if we already 
question that desire-based reasons contain distinctively normative force, then providing a 
desire-based reason on behalf of the authority of desire-based reasons cannot do the trick 
either. If we don't get from desire to reason, we don't get from desire to reason, period, 
regardless of whether the case at hand is of the concrete sort on a first-order level or 
involves principles on a higher-order level. 
The fundamental problem, then, is not (1) that by accounting for the normative 
authority of principle P by way of desire we inevitably would limit the scope of its 
application; that only those agents who harbor the relevant class of higher-order and 
principle-related desires could truly be said to have reasons to implement what they 
acknowledge are means to their desired ends. We could come to accept that only Ann in 
the second case but not in the first case has reasons to take the prep course, even though 
both are fully aware that taking the course increases their chances of getting what they 
want. Nor is it (2) that the authority of principle P would become escapable in a rather 
blunt manner, for all one needed to do in order to relinquish its burden is to abandon the 
requisite higher-order and principle-related desire. Perhaps we cannot just discard desires 
directly, but a good recipe for achieving this indirectly would be to violate the principle 
with great regularity such that its psychological hold eventually wears off. Nor is the 
problem (3) that it becomes hard to see how principle P could retain much independent 
force and point; that one would either have the requisite motivations to honor principle P, 
in which case one would also have reasons to do what one is inclined to do anyway; or 
one would not have the requisite motivations to honor principle P, in which case one 
would not act contrary to any reasons. The absence of the corresponding inclinations 
would conveniently excuse one from being held answerable to the principle. It is not 
immediately evident, to say the least, how anyone could ever come to dishonor principle 
P in the first place. Put together, what (1) and (2) and (3) cause are rather marginal 
worries by comparison. The fundamental problem is that even with respect to someone 
who does have the requisite principle-related desires and who does renounce all plans to 
escape it and who is motivated to honor it - the perfectly practically rational agent - we 
still have no account of why he should have any reasons to choose those means he 
acknowledges further his ends. 
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The amended version of desire-based accounts thus collapses. Accepting the 
authority of principle P without further explanation undermines the very rationale for 
desire-based accounts in the first place. And the attempt of providing an explanation of 
the authority of principle P has proven futile. The principle-adjoined version of desire-
based accounts does not represent progress over the principle-free version. 
3.6. Value 
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Turn briefly to value. What I have to say about value recasts much of what I have 
said about reason before. Moreover, desire-based accounts of value are somewhat less 
complicated than their sister accounts of reasons, and their incapacity to capture the 
distinctively normative import of value is also more immediate. 
According to desire-based accounts, value enters the world through our concerns: 
What is valuable is what figures as the object of our concerns. To be valuable is to stand 
in the appropriate relationship to those concerns; namely to matter to us, to be something 
we have a stake in, to be something we are involved with and are not indifferent about, 
and so on. Just as in the case of reasons we best understand this desire-based relative as 
theories of what value is, not of what provides or confers or generates value, and identify 
what is valuable as things out there, as something being the case, rather than as concerns 
getting what they want. I value professional exchange within my department. It is the sort 
of profitable interaction between likeminded philosophers I value, not that I shall be able 
to cross out one of my concerns from some list of things to worry about. Value structures 
our plans and projects. It directs us to do something, to make something happen. Desire-
based accounts must, and I believe are able to, capture the world-directedness of value 
just as much as they did so with regards to the world-directness of reasons. The question, 
however, is whether they also are able to capture the normative status of value. 
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Many find it rather evident that they are not. In his book Value Judgment, Griffin 
writes (1996:23): "What is clear is that tastes and sentiments, as such, have none of the 
authority that we attach to values. That is, the mere fact that my feelings prompt me to 
approval or disapproval would, in fact, cut no ice, even with me, unless I could sort my 
feelings into better and worse, sound and unsound." I believe Griffin is on target here, 
though his metaphor of cutting no ice does not yet bring it into clear focus. What he 
writes later on is more helpful. Introducing what he calls a perfectly general requirement 
of value, he says "For anyone to see anything as valuable, from any point of view, 
requires being able to see it as worth wanting." (1996:28) The notion of worth wanting of 
course is itself normative; it brings us directly to the core of what is at stake. If value is 
normative, its normativity must be reflected in the value-desire relationship itself. 
Value solely based on desire, however, is stripped of all distinctively normative 
features. Desire-based accounts lack resources to capture the normative significance of 
value. Value is supposed normative precisely in the sense that it is said to merit choice, to 
render certain responses towards it appropriate and inappropriate. Value is that which is 
desirable. But the meaning able adds to desire in desirable is importantly different from 
that of audible and tangible, which denotes only that which de facto can be heard or 
touched under normal circumstances. Yet to speak of something as desirable is not to 
speak of it as something that can be desired, or even as that which is commonly desired, 
but as something that should be desired, or justifiably is desired. Not to desire something 
that is desirable IS in fact to commit some sort of mistake. Indifference towards 
recognized value IS not just unusual but inappropriate; it diagnoses a fault that can 
justifiably be criticized. Not to hear what is audible, in contrast, is just to miss something. 
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At most it diagnoses only some regrettable decline in auditory capacities. A doctor may 
suggest measures to slow down that decline in response, but this is not to level any sort of 
warranted criticism. I believe it is rather apparent that the sense of desirable that desire-
based accounts are capable of capturing is only the one akin to the audible sense and not 
that of the normative sense; of what is de facto and commonly desired as opposed to what 
is appropriately desired. All desire-based accounts can capture is some version or other of 
being desired. Being desirable, in contrast, must appear forever beyond their scope. 
This is not to contest that there is a sense of value that neatly corresponds to 
objects of desire, a non-normative sense as it were. When we speak of the cash-value of a 
car, what we are after is what people are prepared to pay instead of what they ought to be 
prepared to pay. I believe economic theory is in fact best understood as talking solely 
about that non-normative kind of value and utility, that is about that which people de 
facto cherish, regardless of what if anything they ought to cherish. Economic utility is 
merely an operational notion as they say. In that respect, the scenario of monetary-value-
without-desire is quite unlike that of value-without-desire. High prices usually prompt 
interest, but in no way mandate or warrant it. Someone's choice not to value what is 
economically valuable does not express any deficit on his part but merely a divergence 
from common patterns. And often it may even be the thing to do. 
The reason why value solely based on desire lacks normativity is not that desire 
may not have the appropriate depth or complexity - we have seen it very likely has that. 
Our responses are usually motivated in terms of others. Rather, desire seems to be the 
wrong kind of foundation for value altogether; nothing in the relationship between desires 
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and their object points towards anything that could warrant or justify being so related. 
Desire may be constitutive of value; but even then would value fail to merit desire. It 
couldn't do so anymore than being a triangle merits being three-sided or being water 
merits being H20. In fact, as these examples suggest, the problem may even be 
aggravated if desire was constitutive for value. It is hard to see how desire could take 
credit from that which it cannot help but bring about. 
Moreover, if value is normative, it seems fair to suppose that there must be cases 
where either desire is warranted but lacking or unwarranted but present. Yet on the 
constitutive model underlying our present version of desire-based accounts, neither 
option appears even possible. A value that would unsuccessfully call upon a 
corresponding desire could not even exist; value, in turn, would come all too easily to 
desire; desire never could be completely unwarranted. If desire does not respond to but 
rather create the property of value itself, the normative potential of that property vis-a.-vis 
desire simply evaporates. How can that which fully originates in desire lend credentials to 
its originator? The incapability of desire-based accounts to imbue value with normative 
power seems thus to be a direct consequence of the ontological response dependency it 
postulates; it seems to make value completely epiphenomenal; desires cannot invest their 
objects with the sort of critical power or significance that is essential for the normativity 
of value. Only if values are capable of providing a substantive evaluative standpoint for 
the corresponding attitudes can value be said to be normative. If, in contrast, it is 
impossible that in light of one's values ones attitudes are ever inadequate, those values 
lose any normative point. Value would follow desire like shadow follows body, and 
thereby provide value with no more critical power or meriting force than shadows tell 
walkers where to go. 
3.7. Desire, Ideal and Informed 
Let me briefly address the most popular response to the difficulties just presented, 
namely to move away from actual desires and focus instead on informed and ideal desires 
as the foundation for value. I shall focus mostly on value instead of reasons in this final 
section; partly for easy of exposition, but more importantly because the progress the ideal 
presumably affords is most immediately seen when it comes to value. Suppose, then, that 
value does not emerge on the basis of what is in fact or actually desired, but on the basis 
of what would be desired under ideal or more informed conditions. My claim is that 
moving from actual to informed desires does not solve the problem of authority. It 
aggravates it. 
Now, to begin with, the kind of argument presented above against actual desire-
based accounts of reason and value can easily be extended to ideal desire-based accounts 
as well. The problem there was to identify any distinctively normative character in the 
relation between, as in the case of reasons, what's desired and what furthers it; or 
between, as in the case of values, what's desired and, well, what's desired. Recall the 
argument vis-a.-vis reasons. As before in the case of actual desires, we are still facing two 
competing hypotheses in the case of ideal desires. The only difference is that now we are 
dealing with ideal ends instead of actual ends: 
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(1') Given S, doing X instead of Y will better serve A's ideal end E and (hence) S is a reason for 
AtoX. 
(2') Given S, doing X instead ofY will better serve A's ideal end E but S is not a reason for A to 
X. 
And again, given that neither (1 ') nor (2') is ruled out on logical or conceptual 
grounds, we can ask what determines the truth or falsity of (1') and (2'), respectively, 
where it cannot be the mere presence of the quadruple relation involving situations and 
agents and ideal ends and choices, which is countenanced by both hypotheses. The source 
of the problem lies in the relation, not in their parts or relata, and hence replacing one 
item for another does not solve that problem. I shall not further pursue this line of 
argument, however. Instead, what I shall focus on in the remainder is what allegedly 
presents itself as a clear instance of progress in the ideal version, and argue why this 
perceived advantage is in fact a disadvantage. 
What is the supposed advantage? Now turn to value. In the actual version, we 
found a perfect match between what is valuable and what is desired, and consequently 
found no basis on which desire could ever become merited or justified. What is supposed 
to supply that basis, value, turned out the mere slave of desire, with no say and 
independent critical force. What we missed, in other words, was any sort of guidance for 
what ends to adopt: what ends are truly choice-worthy and not just chosen; what is apt for 
admiration and not just admired; what is fitting for reproach and not just reproached; and 
so on. It is at this juncture where the informed version promises the looked-for remedy. 
What we actually desire and what we ideally desire represent separate domains. As a 
consequence, it becomes possible that the former finds guidance in the latter. What we do 
desire can fail to match what we would desire under ideal circumstances. 
The crucial question, however, is whether that mismatch itself has normative 
potency. When we not desire what we would ideally desire, does that constitute a failure 
that warrants criticism, or does it merely constitute a divergence between two competing 
desire-perspectives? Consider the following case. You and I have different desires about 
what I should desire; you would like me to care more about your financial hardships, 
having an urge to turn over half my salary, while I do not want myself to have such 
generous attitudes. That I depart from what you want that I desire is no failure, but 
merely a divergence. In order to retain any normative force, our attitudes towards our 
ideal desires must not be like that. Unfortunately, as we shall see, that's exactly what they 
must be like. Once we know what ideal desires are we must loose all interest in them 
altogether. 
What are informed desires, then? The informed version just as the actual version 
represents a classic response dependent account of value. It explains the value of states of 
affairs in terms of desire. Moreover, the explanation it offers aspires to be a complete 
explanation. Having the appropriate informed desires in place entails there being value; 
there being value entails the appropriate informed desires being in place. The informed 
version must consequently refuse to explain or motivate any desire ultimately in terms of 
the value of certain states of affairs. The qualification "ultimately" is important, since just 
as other response dependent accounts it may explain and motivate certain responses in 
terms of others. An agent's desire to have an X may be motivated by some of its valuable 
168 
properties P, so long as the value of these properties in turn is explained by some other 
responses towards P. Saying that X is desired may thus not be the end to the story about 
its value. Yet somewhere the story needs to end, and according to ideal desire-based 
accounts, it has to end with some informed desire rather than some value. 
There is a choice we face between two alternative models of informed desires. 
Using some handy terminology introduced by Michael Smith, I will call one the 'example 
model' and the other the 'advice model.' (Internal Reasons, in: Ethics and the A Priori, 
Cambridge 2004). Since the second is clearly preferable, I only mention the example 
model to motivate the advice model. According to the example model, the desires that 
confer value are those an agent would converge on if he underwent a process called 
'cognitive psychotherapy,' which proceeds as follows. Start with what the agent in fact 
desires; update and revise what the agent believes; change in beliefs will causally bring 
about change in desires. Continue the process until a stable and suitably enlightened state 
is reached where no further update in belief would result in any additional change in 
desire. The desires resulting from such a hypothetical process would set the example for 
what is valuable for the actual agent. (Cf. Brandt 1979). 
The reason why the example model is unsatisfactory is simple. What is valuable 
to agents must adequately reflect their actual situation, including its limitations, and not 
supplant their actual environment by some ideal utopia. Consider knowledge. Naturally, 
the fully informed counterpart of the actual agent would harbor no desires for taking 
measures to acquire further knowledge. She already has it in buckets. For example, she 
would not want to finish that book since she already knows the ending. Yet coming to 
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know more might be supremely valuable for the actual agent. Finishing the book may be 
the most valuable way to spend her time. Since what is valuable for the actual agent must 
be sensitive to the actual situation in which she finds herself - including her 
epistemological condition - we need another model. Such is provided by the advice 
model. According to this model, the desires that confer value are those the ideal version 
would want her actual version to have. (Cf. Railton 2003) Even if the ideal version knows 
the books ending, she may still advise her actual version to finish it. Taking full account 
of her actual situation, the ideal version would fix her actual version's values in terms of 
the advice she has to offer. 
What remains to be settled, then, is how to specify the advice in the advice model. 
What exactly is it that my ideal version wants my actual version to want; how does his 
superior epistemological position determine the contents of his desires about what I shall 
desire? This is no easy question; at least not for non-instrumental desires, of which there 
must be plenty; instrumental desires are partially conditioned by factual information, and 
so there are no principal obstacles for understanding how belief revision may result in 
revision of instrumental desires; yet for non-instrumental desires the problem becomes 
rather intriguing, mostly for purely formal reasons. Belief purports to represent how 
things are, while desire only how things should be; in familiar parlance, belief and desire 
differ in their direction of fit, which right there undermines any hope for formally valid 
inference rules relating belief and desire. Inferential relationships are usually understood 
in terms of truth, such that the truth or likelihood thereof of one proposition is affected by 
the truth of other proposition(s); yet because desires aren't amenable to truth or falsity, 
desires consequently aren't amenable to being objects of inferences either. Thus, if an 
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update in belief is to settle what to desire, it must do so in other than formal or inferential 
ways. 
It is most important to emphasize, then, that we must not think of the relevant 
advice in terms of instrumental advice. This we already have, for what provides reasons 
according to actual accounts is what in fact best furthers our ends; what is valuable is 
what in fact stands in the relevant relation to our concerns. The solution to the problem of 
instrumental misinformation is already contained in the very way in which the actual 
desire-based versions are set up: the relevant relationship is specified not in terms of what 
agents mayor may not know and be mistaken about but plainly in terms of what is the 
case. We already have on board the advisor who honors our actual concerns and merely 
helps us finding better ways of implementing them. Hence, the advice the informed 
version offers better not be what we already have, only at far less a cost, namely the 
cleaning up of instrumentally misinformed desires. What furthers mistaken instrumental 
desires never was empowered with reasons and value related capacities, for it does not 
deliver and sometimes does even compromise the non-instrumental desires on which the 
former are contingent. Cases where an agent wants to drink some glass of liquid that he 
mistakenly. thinks is gin rather than gasoline or where he wants to quench his thirst by 
drinking a glass of milk that in fact would aggravate his dehydration present no serious 
challenge to actual versions. What those agents want is to have a glass of gin and to 
quench their thirst; and plainly enough, drinking gasoline or milk will not get them what 
they want. 
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Besides instrumental advice what other ways of offering advice are there, then? In 
our discussion of the example model, we already saw one possible answer: update in 
belief may settle what to desire in a purely causal manner; there we find one solution for 
how belief may determine what to desire, if only in principle, which is all we are looking 
for anyway. The causal account thus presents a workable solution we may always fall 
back on, which is indeed what I propose to do momentarily. Still, I cannot wish to 
embrace a causal account simply as an unmotivated background assumption, for I know 
many defenders of informed versions will not be entirely comfortable with it. So I'd need 
to motivate it, and here is how: if we are unable to find alternative solutions for how 
update in belief may determine what to desire, we have no choice but to (partially) resort 
to the causal account as the only account we know to work. This is not to deny that those 
alternative solutions may make some contribution; they may very well limit the range of 
desires to be adopted in light of greater knowledge. Still, if after applying all available 
non-causal procedures the question of what to desire remains open, the causal story 
inevitably must emerge as at least part of the mix. By considering the most plausible non-
causal accounts and finding them insufficient, I wish to put back the ball into the camp of 
defenders of informed desire-based accounts. If they think update in belief can 
completely determine what to desire in other than causal ways, please say how. Until 
then, I have to do with what I know to work. 
One popular yet minimal constraint on how my better informed version may 
select which desires of mine to sanctify is this: only those, namely, which have a realistic 
chance of being satisfied. The underlying rationale would be this: desires aim at the 
attainable, and unattainable desires are thus disqualified. If, unlike me, my better 
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informed version knows certain desires of mine to be unattainable, he may discard them. 
This constraint is a minimal one, for it certainly applies only to a tiny subset of what I 
mayor may not desire; it certainly cannot be the only criterion. Still, many seem to find 
this rationale plausible beyond question; even Hume, who thought that no desire could be 
contrary to reason, conceded that desires may be deemed unreasonable in case their 
objects do not exist, desires that is which are in principle unsatisfiable. I wish to object, 
however. Many desires make perfect sense even though they aim at what we know 
cannot be realized, or what we know to be unattainable. I may desire to live longer than I 
possibly can as the biological creature I am; or, to take another example, Nomy Arpaly 
may at times desire to be Bertrand Russell- an admittedly unlikely superhero she wants 
to be. (Nomy Arpaly 2006) Once one sees the pattern, one can easily generate additional 
examples; fathers who want to be at their son's football game here and at the job 
interview there at the same time, spouses that want to ask their deceased loved ones for 
advice, or sport fans that would like to have been around for a famous game to watch in 
person before they were alive. Now the interesting twist in all these examples is that we 
do know already that those desires are unattainable; and yet, we do not see anything 
wrong with retaining those desires because of that. Yes, I know I can't live a thousand 
years, but I really and strongly would like it so. My response to the acknowledged 
unattainability is not to relinquish that desire - even if I could - but rather to regret its 
unattainability; that unattainability is "what I'm taking issue with," not the desire itself. 
The same is true for Nomy Arpaly. She of course knows that what she desires cannot be, 
given minimally controversial principles of modal logic and personal identity; that's why 
she chose those examples in the first place! Yet all the same, Nomy Arpaly feels no 
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inclination to discharge or wish to discharge that desire for this reason. In what sense are 
we mistaken or irrational? After all, desires are not "chosen" in response to what we think 
can or cannot be, but in response to what we'd like to be: that I live longer than I 
biologically can, and Nomy Arpaly be Bertrand Russell. Now, given that both of us do 
not seem to lack any crucial information and still hold on to our desires, what would the 
basis be for my even better informed version to jettison that desire? What is it that he 
knows but I do not that would warrant the removal? I cannot see what. 
Next, consider coherence; my ideal version may choose what desires to sanctify 
in response to what would make for a maximally coherent desire set. Now, to put an 
initial worry upfront, many authors have forcefully questioned the soundness of the very 
notion of coherent desires. (Cf. Sayre-McCord 1997) It remains unclear how to apply a 
notion developed for representational states to non-representational states in such a way 
that would preserve the disqualifying nature of incoherence. We know why incoherent 
beliefs are tainted; taken together, incoherent beliefs depict the world in ways it cannot 
be, and beliefs aim at truthful depiction. Yet what is the analogue case against incoherent 
desires? If desires are said incoherent if they cannot be jointly satisfied, it is hard to see 
what's wrong with incoherent desires. What is wrong, for instance, with our father's dual 
desire to be at his son's game and at the interview at the same time? Granted, incoherent 
plans and intentions may be bad, for what they specify to be done cannot be done in the 
world as we know it; plans that cannot be carried out plainly enough are bad plans. 
Desires, however, have no such immediate impact on what is to be done, as they enter 
plans and intentions only indirectly and in conjunction with other states, some of them 
presumably representational in character. 
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Now, though I find this line of argument convincing, let me argue a somewhat 
weaker claim which should suffice for my overall motivation of the causal account. Even 
if the notion of coherent desires was sound, considerations of coherence cannot fully 
settle how updated beliefs settle what to desire, and hence need to be supplemented. 
Supposing that my actual desire set is less than fully coherent, there are a billion different 
ways of making it so. Imagine different developmental paths representing each way in 
which my ideal version may want to revise my desires such as to make them more 
coherent; since each path equally leads to a perfectly coherent desire set, he cannot 
determine which one to choose solely based on considerations of coherence. In the face 
of such vast possibilities for how he may make my desire set more coherent, 
considerations of coherence thus seem to offer little guidance. This is not surprising; just 
consider the analogous case of belie, If I was told that only those beliefs of mine are 
rational that I would still uphold if I made my beliefs as a whole more coherent, I would 
have little clue as to which those are; small sets of beliefs already generate vast numbers 
of different ways in which I may make those sets more coherent; suppose I have only two 
incoherent beliefs, I may restore coherence by discharging either one of them, or both, or 
adopt additional beliefs that would clean up the incoherence, etc. In light of any realistic 
estimate of how many beliefs or desires we have, the problem at hand truly becomes 
intractable if the only consideration in play was coherence. 
So we need additional considerations. Perhaps my ideal version could decide 
which desires of mine to sanctify on the basis of their (indirect) contribution to my well-
being or happiness; most probably, my ideal version will have concerns for my well-fare, 
and so perhaps he might determine what he wants me to desire on the basis of those 
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concerns. I'm skeptical this could go very far. First of all, we need to make sure that this 
proposal doesn't smuggle in what we are seeking to explain, namely value and well-
being. The suggestion is non-circular only if we understand the relevant notions of 
happiness and well-being employed here not already in value-laden terms. It simply 
won't do to say that my ideal version would select those desires which would increase 
my well-being. 
Now, trying now to interpret the proposal charitably and non-circularly, it still 
faces considerable difficulties. While I think that it is true in some cases - particularly 
drastic ones such as the devastating craving a rejected lovers harbors for his love - that 
considerations of how certain desires might (indirectly) impact my happiness may be 
helpful, I doubt that such considerations get us very far in general. For one thing, in the 
face of the vast number of different ways in which desires can be chosen with an eye to 
happiness, the proposal generates more indeterminacy than it resolves. Also, it 
encapsulates a rather trivial and unhelpful element. If the idea is to select desires on the 
basis that if I had those desires I would take pleasure in them or their objects, this would 
give my ideal version little guidance indeed. It is true for virtually all desires that if I had 
them I would take some pleasure in their satisfaction. Personally, I'm not a big sports 
person; and though I'm aware that I would take great pleasure in sports if I was more 
passionate about sports, this leaves me utterly cold; realizing this comes on the cheap. 
The fact that if I desired X, X would bring me some pleasure simply doesn't tell in favor 
of any particular X, for one may substitute X for whatever one pleases. 
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But more importantly, I think the suggestion at hand plainly is confused about the 
nature of desire itself. It betrays the notion of desire by giving it an overly and 
implausible hedonistic rendering; in fact, desires need not be and often are not connected 
to ones well-being or happiness at all; construing them so often misses their very point. 
What we desire is simply that certain states of affairs obtain; not necessarily that we 
receive happiness from seeing those states of affairs to obtain, though of course we may 
desire this as well - we do desire happiness, after all. Desire-satisfaction accounts of 
value are commonly thought superior over hedonism exactly because they make it 
intelligible how things could be of value to people even if those things have no 
immediate psychological impact on them. Recall Griffin's example of the caring father: 
" ... if a father wants his children to be happy, what he wants, what is valuable to him, is a 
state of the world, not a state of his mind; merely deluding him into thinking that his 
children flourish, therefore, does not give him what he values." (Griffin 1986:13) 
Examples such as Griffin's are quite common; suppose I desire - or would want me to 
desire if fully informed - that the next world chess champion be Swiss. What would be 
valuable in this case is that the next world chess champion be Swiss and not that I take 
pleasure or satisfaction in the next world chess champion being Swiss. The nationality of 
the next world chess champion would or would not have value independently of whether 
I will come to know the results or whether I would take pleasure in the results. Again, the 
object of the relevant desire is simply that certain states of affairs obtain; if they do 
obtain, value will be realized, regardless of how or even whether it will affect me 
psychologically. What matters according to all desire-based accounts of value is de re 
satisfaction and not felt satisfaction. Hence, questions of what to desire cannot 
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straightforwardly be settled in terms of what would make one happy or what would 
contribute to ones feZt satisfaction, lest we fundamentally misunderstand the nature of 
desire. 
Now let me put all this together and generalize the points from above. Take two 
states of affairs - Fa and Gb, and suppose my ideal version needs to decide whether he 
wants me to desire Fa or Gb; suppose further that this is a mandatory yet exclusionary 
choice, and everything else is truly equal: each desire would make the same contribution 
to how well off I will be, or how much pleasure I would receive in Fa in case I desired Fa 
or in Gb in case I desired Gb; each desire would (indirectly) give my life equal point and 
worth; and each desire would equally well fit in with what else I happen to desire; both 
would have equal effects on my deliberative efficiency and instrumental rationality; using 
a locution of Michael Smith's, the addition of each desire would equally well preserve a 
"maximally coherent desiderative profile." Now, as we have seen from above, my 
stipulation of everything else being truly equal should not present principal problems, 
given the vast number of different pathways for how conative profiles may be developed. 
Yet because everything is truly equal, considerations of coherence, instrumental 
rationality and contribution to felt satisfaction cannot settle what desire to adopt. In what 
way then can we assume that the superior epistemological position of my ideal version 
settles this question? We certainly do not want to say that my ideal version simply affords 
greater insight into matters of value; this would clearly defy the response-dependency the 
ideal version is still committed to - to explain value, not to presuppose it. But if it is not 
greater insight into value, what else will decide whether my ideal me wants my actual me 
to desire Fa or Gb instead? 
The only informative answer I'm aware of again proceeds in broadly causal-
procedural terms. It starts out with the idea that my ideal version is still a version of me, 
albeit ideal. The advice I receive does not come from strangers, ideal observers, or even 
God; it is importantly still my own advice. In order to make good of this idea, we again 
start out with what I in fact desire. We then update and revise my beliefs; change in 
beliefs will causally bring about change in desires. We continue the process until a stable 
and suitably enlightened state is reached where no further update in belief would result in 
any additional change in desire. The outcome will be an ideal version of myself with 
second-order desires regarding what I in my actual situation shall desire. 
I thus take the advice model and the example model to converge on the process 
that generates informed desires. It is certainly true that the two models differ profoundly 
in the structures and contents of the desires they generate; the advice model places all 
emphasis on indirect and second order desires, whereas the example model is first order 
and direct; only in the example model but not in the advice model need the relevant ideal 
desires reflect what the ideal version wants for himself or cares about; but with respect to 
the way in which the relevant informed desires are "generated" or specified I take both 
models to be roughly the same. They depart from actual desires and causally modify 
them in light of greater factual knowledge. If an advocate of the advice model finds this 
an uneasy concession to make, she owns us a substantial alternative explanation. To this 
day I know none. 
But now it should be evident why the desires we would want ourselves to have 
under those conditions cannot offer any guidance for our concerns after all. With regards 
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to our actual concerns we know why the goals it accords value should engage us: They 
concern what we actually care about! Yet this is not so when it comes to our ideal 
concerns which are but causally altered concerns. The desires of our idealized version are 
not ours, and consequently de re satisfaction of informed desires is not the same as de re 
satisfaction of what we actually care about. The greater the divergence between what we 
actually desire and what we would want us to desire under idealized conditions, the more 
pressing the question becomes why it matters for us that our idealized rather than our 
actual desires are satisfied. It would certainly matter if we had such idealized desires, but 
given that we don't, why should we care about them? 
To give it more bite, I'd like to present this thought experiment. Suppose your 
idealized version of yourself manages to write you a letter across possible worlds. In this 
letter he or she recommends you to pursue a list of goals. The letter starts: "I'm a 
completely different person now. The way I see things now has no resemblance to how I 
saw them before, which is as you see them now. What I previously found important 
appears now to be vain. What previously appeared to be vain I find now important. I 
know you won't understand. I am very sorry to be unable to explain my reasons to you, 
which go beyond what you can grasp. None of my explanations would make any sense to 
you. P.S.: Attached is a list of what you should desire from now on." As you quickly 
come to realize, the listed goals are diametrically opposed to what you care about most. 
While you aspire to become an academic, the letter recommends becoming a farmer. 
While you desire to have a family, it recommends a purely solitary life. While you seek a 
career in a middle sized western city, it recommends that you settle to some unknown 
village far away. Now you start to wonder what reason you could possibly have to revise 




Against Agency-Based Accounts 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines the hypothesis that authority is grounded in what is 
constitutive of agency and action. Agency-based accounts of normativity have recently 
received a great deal of attention, and are characterized by Luca Ferrero's as follows 
(2009:304): 
[T]heir basic claim is that the norms and requirements of practical 
rationality and morality can be derived from the constitutive features of 
agency. Hence, a systematic failure to be guided by these requirements 
amounts to a loss of agency. But there is a sense in which we cannot but 
be agents. It follows that we are necessarily bound by the oughts of 
rationality and morality, we are bound by them sans phrase. 
The locution sans phrase is used to contrast the manner in which agency-
constitutive norms are supposed to bind from norms that only bind according and in 
relation to yet some other norms. Agency-constitutive norms are supposed authoritative 
not just according-to-agency-constitutive-norms themselves or according-to-yet-some-
other-set-of-norms, but simpliciter, sans phrase. 
Agency-based accounts represent a Kantian alternative to the previously 
discussed non-reductive and naturalistic forms of normative realism. Bernard Williams 
writes (1995:174-5): 
Consider another picture of what it would be for a demand to be 
'objectively valid'. It is Kant's own picture. According to this, a demand 
will be inescapable in the required sense if it is one that a rational agent 
must accept if he is to be a rational agent. It is, to use one of Kant's 
favorite metaphors, self-addressed by any rational agent. 
The Kantian notion of norms self-addressed by and to agents, respecting their 
deliberative autonomy, looms large in agency based accounts. Kantians reject as 
incompatible with autonomy the supposition that demands can be legitimately imposed 
on us from the outside, demands legislated for us instead of by us. The complaint is that 
this would circumvent our agency in a way that would betray the very normative question 
in the first place. Proponents of the agency-based accounts regard the normative question 
as essentially an agential question: why shall I take seriously what demands are posed to 
me? It is essential for the question that it is addressed to agents on whom it is to answer 
it. The force of the question flows from the potential disconnect between what may be 
asked of someone and what he shall be able to reflectively stand by. That is the problem. 
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The hope is "[t]hat a clear statement of the problem is also a statement of the solution." 
Contemplating the authority of morality, but intending the point to apply more generally, 
Korsgaard continues: "If the problem is that morality might not survive reflection, then 
the solution is that it might." (1996:49) Agency-based accounts have a clear conception 
of what the normative question is, a mark that distinguishes them from many competitors, 
a conception that also is supposed to contain the answer. Once an agent has determined to 
wholeheartedly stand behind some principle, its normative standing is established. 
Furthermore, if the agent has no choice but to stand behind the principle - because it 
enables his very agency which generates the question in the first place - the gap between 
a principle and its reflective endorsement motivating the normative question has been 
closed. The normative question is answered once and for all. 
Connie Rosati develops the idea further. In a remarkable essay, Rosati juxtaposes 
the normative question to Moore's open question argument. Rosati focuses on the 
normative dimension of personal value, but what she says can easily be generalized to 
other dimensions as well. The reason why she believes many traditional analyses of what 
is good for us retain an open feel is that they do not yet take seriously enough our 
autonomous agency. She writes, quoted here at length (2003:496-7): 
I shall try to show that Moore's argument directs us to a genuine, and little 
appreciated, problem for naturalism ... I hope thereby to explain, at least 
in part, the evident and, to many, perhaps mystifying vitality of Moore's 
argument. In making out my claims, I will urge an understanding of the 
argument that is different from Moore's. As Moore presents his challenge, 
the open question argument poses a theoretical question to be asked and 
answered from the standpoint of the ethicist who tests proposed analyses 
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of good in an effort to arrive at a scientific ethics. In contrast, on my 
understanding, the argument reveals something of genuine theoretical 
importance about value while also exposing a practical question that most 
naturally arises from the standpoint of the agent who is inquiring about 
what to value. As Moore concludes his challenge, the argument has 
supposedly provided a vehicle for undermining all forms of naturalism. In 
contrast, on my understanding, the argument may not defeat naturalism so 
much as set it a task. If my suggestions are on the right track, what the 
argument really undermines is neither naturalistic accounts of good nor 
analyses of good, as Moore originally thought but, rather, accounts that do 
not fit with our agency. 
Continuing a few pages later (2003:505-7): 
I believe that for the argument to have force, we would have to be agents, 
creatures with the capacity to engage in autonomous evaluation and 
action. The force of the open question argument has deep roots in our 
agency; it is not merely a function of the expressive and recommending 
functions of our evaluative notions. And so ... a successful account of 
personal good will have to fit us as agents .... We seek to explain why we 
have not yet reflectively converged in our theorizing about personal good 
on a particular N. A plausible explanation would point to something about 
the type of creature we are that enables us rationally to question the 
normative authority of any N proposed thus far. It is our capacity to 
evaluate and act accordingly that enables us to be self-goveming-that is, 
to decline to follow the press of some natural desires and impulses while 
endorsing or at least reflectively acceding to the press of others. That 
capacity would seem to be engaged when we question proposed forms of 
naturalism and find them wanting: we question the natural standards they 
give us, much as we question our own desires and impulses, identifying 
considerations that count against treating them as normative. When a 
proposed account fails to pass muster relative to our autonomous 
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evaluation, when we find ourselves wondering whether things with N 
really are good for us, it is as if we were detecting a mismatch. My 
proposal is that the mismatch is with the very features that enable us to 
question whether things with N are good for us: those features that make 
us agents. The kind of account of personal good that would escape such 
questioning would be one that could survive our reflective scrutiny, that 
would fit with our capacity for autonomous evaluation and action. 
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The basic tenets of agency-based accounts are easy to state. The issue of a norm's 
authority is taken to be characterized in relation to the agential question of why take 
seriously what it demands. A privileged few norms at best shall have the capacity of 
answering that question in the positive. Which and why? Agency-based accounts propose 
to award the distinction of authority to norms only in case they are constitutive of the 
very essence of who we are as deliberating and autonomous agents. 
The fusion between descriptive and normative elements, between a 
characterization of who we are and a prescription of what we should do and ought to do, 
is fully intended. Constitutive principles are introduced to elegantly bridge truths about 
who we are with truths about what we are supposed to do, thereby dispelling whatever 
qualms one might have harbored about normativity. Korsgaard puts all this together as 
follows: (2008:7-8): 
I must say what I mean by a constitutive principle. First, what I will here 
call a constitutive standard ... is one that arises from the very nature of the 
object or activity to which it applies. It belongs to the nature of the object 
or activity that it both ought to meet, and in a sense is trying to meet, that 
standard. Constitutive standards apply most obviously to objects that have 
some standard use or function or purpose. ... Constitutive standards are 
opposed to external standards, which mention desiderata for an object that 
are not essential to its being the kind of thing that it is .... Two things are 
important to notice about standards of this kind. First of all, constitutive 
standards are at once normative and descriptive. They are descriptive 
because an object must meet them, or at least aspire to meet them, in order 
to be what it is. And they are normative because an object to which they 
apply can fail to meet them, at least to some extent, and is subject to 
criticism if it does not. This double nature finds expression in the fact that 
we can criticize such objects either by saying that they are poor objects of 
their kind ... or by saying that they are not such objects at all ... Second, 
constitutive standards meet challenges to their normativity with ease: 
someone who asks why a house should have to be waterproof, or an 
encyclopedia should record the truth, shows that he just doesn't 
understand what these objects are for, and therefore, since they are 
functional objects, what they are. 
Constitutive standards are praised capable of maintaining authoritative standing 
without external help, without embroiling us in any dubious normative metaphysics, and 
without the need to recruit forces beyond its own boundaries, and that's why Korsgaard 
believes "constitutive standards meet skeptical challenges to their authority with ease." 
(2009:29) Whether that shall be so easy, however, and whether all in all the picture is as 
rosy as suggested is open to some serious doubt. 
And indeed, even at a first cursory glance agency-based accounts are 
overshadowed by problems. For starters, the marriage between the descriptive and the 
normative is plagued by internal conflict and dissonance. How can a principle constitute a 
phenomenon and yet allow that divergences from the principle count as normatively 
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deficient instances of the phenomenon as opposed to no instances of the phenomenon 
altogether? Korsgaard is well aware ofthe problem (2008:9): 
Sometimes people are puzzled by the idea that you can fail to conform to a 
constitutive principle - if following the principle is constitutive of the 
activity, and you fail to conform to it, then aren't you failing to engage in 
the activity after all? In one sense that is right, but in another it cannot be, 
for if you were not engaging in the activity after all, then your failure to 
conform to its constitutive principle would not be a failure at all. 
Another problem agency-based accounts face is to identify norms as necessary for 
the exercise of agency as such, and necessity claims are hard to establish and easy to 
assault. The chapter examines in detail the two most prominent proposals, advanced by 
the philosophers David Velleman and Christine Korsgaard, and the reasons why neither 
is successful cannot easily be summarized in brief. But there is a general problem 
underwriting both the contours of which can be stated in brief. If norms possess authority 
when their systematic violation undermines a creature's agency-related capacities, it 
follows that each and every creature navigating under the banner of agency must exhibit 
suitable conformity with the norm. All identifiable agents, in other words, real or 
imaginary, must exhibit a suitable degree of respect for the allegedly constitutive norm. 
And there are a lot of agents on whom one can test that claim. The result is not 
encouraging. Virtually all conceivable norms appealing to our humanity and rationality 
consistently meet agents who intransigently disrespect their prerogatives. Whatever 
norms are suggested as candidates for being constitutive of agency immediately invite 
massive assault by counterexample, a game philosophers know how to play, steadily 
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forcing agency-based accounts to retreat to more general and weaker norms in order to 
sustain the necessity claim characteristic of constitution. 
This, however, puts in serious doubt how much normative fertility, using a phrase 
of Lucca Ferrero's, the constitutive programme is able to retain. To withstand the 
pressure into some normative wasteland, where only the minutest set of norms retains a 
claim to authority, proponents of agency-based accounts ultimately have little choice but 
admitting that constitution cannot be the entire story about normative authority, perhaps 
not even the most interesting part thereof. If so, the constitutive approach at best offers 
negligible guidance for the practical quest of figuring out how to live, what standards to 
adopt and abide by, and what person to be, since the range of systems of norms that, 
individually and collectively, is consistent with what is constitutive of agency is virtually 
without limits. Yet apart from this limitation in practical guidance, the modification in 
explanatory ambition also threatens the internal stability of the constitutive programme, 
or so we shall see. 
Worse still, the retreat to the acknowledgment of being only part of the story itself 
does not work. The hope is that the constitutive programme could explore a particularly 
interesting comer of the normative geography, even if not its entirety, for constitutive 
norms are allegedly unique in that they hold authoritative for agents no matter what, since 
they are inescapable. The hope shall be frustrated too. Inescapability and authority 
represent rather distinct phenomena and to equate them is to equate apples and oranges, 
as the final section of the chapter demonstrates. 
189 
Parts of the chapter are reminiscent of the transcendental strategy discussed in 
chapter two, in particular with regard to the connection between the inescapability and 
authority. Since that strategy was dealt with in chapter two, this chapter does not 
elaborate any further. 
4.2. Methodological Preliminaries - What Constitutes What? 
Constitutive norms are a common phenomenon, showing up in countless 
practices, most easily discernible in games. Games incorporate rules that constitute what 
they are. Though not without problems, I shall not expound on any potential 
philosophical difficulties affixing the notion of constitutive principles as such. I am 
content with using John Searle's old-fashioned distinction between regulative and 
constitutive rules (1969:33): "regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently 
existing forms of behavior; ... constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or 
define new forms of behavior." According to Searle, regulative rules have the form "Do 
X" and "Do not do Y if you care about Z," whereas constitutive rules have the form "X 
counts as Y in context C." That's all I'm going to say about the form of constitutive 
principles. 
Constitutive relations hold between some constitutive base and some constituted 
target. The question is in virtue of what do the kinds of constitutive relations hold that 
agency-based accounts are after? Where do we have to look for an explanation of why 
certain principles (the base) supposedly are constitutive of being an agent (the target)? 
Two broad options present themselves. First, the relation might hold in virtue of the 
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structure of certain natural kinds. Second, it might hold in virtue of certain conceptual 
truths. Water is constitutively identical to H20, and bachelors are constitutively 
unmarried. Thus, we can ask: does the constitutive relation agency-based accounts 
postulate between the implementation of certain norms and agency hold as a matter of 
natural constellations or conceptual truth? As we shall see, neither choice is without 
problems, yet under scrutiny the first holds up worse than the second. 
Consider first constitution in virtue of the structural compositions of natural kinds. 
Water molecules are constituted by H20 and watery stuff is made up of lots of water 
molecules. Chemistry is the exemplary science that studies constitutive relations in 
structural compositions. If you want to know what some natural kind is made out of, you 
need to take it apart and expose its structural organization. Unfortunately, this approach 
fares poorly as a schema along which to unpack the constitutive claim of the agency-
based programme. One reason why is that agency is a very unlikely candidate of a natural 
kind with clear-cut boundaries susceptible to structural decomposition and chemical 
analysis. The methodological upshot of this is that we have no independent criterion 
allowing us to antecedently identify agency as a natural kind that we could subsequently 
examine under the microscope. We cannot just pick it out by pointing at it. In order to 
identify agency we already face all the substantive difficulties that a natural-kind 
approach could ever hope to answer. How much rationality is required for agency? How 
much control and what kind of control? How much coss-temporal continuation and 
internal integration? Do agents have to wholeheartedly self-identify, and if yes what does 
that mean? In other words, the methodological approach to agency as a natural kind 
would presuppose a solution to the problem it is supposed to solve in the first place. 
There are no independent boundaries out there delineating agency that could be consulted 
to answer our questions. For that reason alone the natural kind approach appears 
hopeless. 
Yet even if there was a solution to these methodological problems, there is a more 
fundamental and immediate reason why the natural kind approach is ill suited for the 
constitutive programme. The natural kind approach is of no normative and meta-
normative consequence whatsoever. Suppose there was a natural kind of agency which 
was constitutively underwritten by the implementation of certain norms. What normative 
and meta-normative relevance could that possibly have? The relevant question would be 
why be an agent, a member of that particular natural kind? Yet there is no more 
normative pull for almost-yet-not-quite-agents to become agents as there is for almost-
yet-not-quite-water-molecules to become water-molecules. In case science uncovered the 
nature of agency - still supposing, contrary to fact, that there is a natural kind of agency -
one could, out of curiosity, query whether oneself happens to be an agent, an inquiry not 
entirely unlike some recent research into the human genome trying to figure out whether, 
for instance, it contains Neanderthalean traces, which it apparently does, indicating some 
degree of prehistoric cross-species mating. And should the result concerning one's own 
agency come out negative, one would have no cause to be troubled whatsoever. One 
would simply not be an agent, who cares? It is hard to detect even a hint of a normative 
implication contained in the natural-kind approach that could possibly explain why one 
should strive to become, and why one should ensure to stay in case one already is, a 
member of this peculiar natural kind. As far as I am aware of, no proponent of agency-
based accounts has ever adopted this approach. 
192 
Consider, then, constitution in virtue of conceptual truths. We know many 
constitutive relations are established conceptually. Libraries are constituted by collections 
of books, universities by buildings, students and teachers, museums by collections of art 
and a constant flow of visitors. This is simply what we mean by libraries, universities, 
and museums. Or consider an example from the realm of classical music, namely 
different orchestra constitutions. Why does a philharmonic orchestra have a larger 
constitutive body than a chamber orchestra? The answer lies in the ways the categories 
philharmonic orchestra and chamber orchestra are used by professional musicians. They 
conceptualize different compositions of musicians found apt for performing different 
styles of music. The tradition of classical music and its corresponding classificatory 
schemes explain why philharmonic orchestras require a constitutive body of around a 
hundred musicians while chamber orchestras require a smaller body of only around fifty 
musicians. End of story. If an apprentice were to search for some deeper metaphysical 
truths explaining why the New York Philharmonic was constitutively composed of 
around a hundred players, we would have to redirect his focus away from metaphysics to 
the prevalent classificatory practices within the tradition of classical music. 
All this is pretty straightforward and it hardly surprises that most proponents of 
agency-based accounts have explicitly interpreted the relevant constitutive relationship in 
conceptual terms. Thus understood, we would say that the implementation of certain 
norms is constitutive of agency and we would explain this constitutive relationship by 
appealing to the ways we have come to use the concept agency. Perhaps the concept was 
introduced in order to draw distinctions that matter to our larger interpretative endeavors. 
Since, according to this second conceptual approach, we are not supposing that the 
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category agency tracks a natural kind, a certain stipulative character in the conceptual 
approach shall be unavoidable, with conceptual analysis ultimately revealing how certain 
communities tend to classify. The basic idea in the conceptual approach is, then, that it is 
in virtue of conceptual truths - our classificatory practices - that agency bears a 
constitutive relationship to certain norms, just as it was the case in the example of 
philharmonic and chamber orchestras. 
4.3. Agency, Shmagency 
Unfortunately the conceptual approach is overshadowed by problems as well, and 
major parts of the chapter are dedicated to exposing them more thoroughly and in 
connection with the various concrete constitutive proposals. The devil famously is in the 
details, which is nowhere truer than in the case of agency-based accounts. Still, the 
problem has a general structure which I'd like to lay bare before I turn to my piecemeal 
critique of the problem as it surfaces in the particular proposals. The problem is the 
Agency-Shmagency problem, and David Enoch has led the charge in a remarkable piece 
of the same name in the Philosophical Review. 
Here's a rough outline of the problem. Suppose that as a conceptual matter, 
abiding by norm-complex N turns out to be constitutive of agency. And, suppose further, 
this is so because the concept of agency has been set up to categorize systems that abide 
by N. We are supposing, then, that this is simply what agency means, just as what 
philharmonic orchestra means is an ensemble constituted by a body of at least a hundred 
musicians. Now if you are abiding by N you are an agent and if not then you are not. But 
how could that piece of information provide you with any guidance as to whether to 
abide by N? Why is it relevant for the normative and meta-normative status on N? From 
the deliberative standpoint, what the conceptual findings about agency furnish is but an 
alternative way of putting the very same deliberative question: whether you should strive 
to be an agent, which is but another way of asking whether to be a system that abides by 
norm-complex N. 
Enoch puts the charge beautifully and I'm going to quote him at length. He 
illustrates the problem in connection with the constitutive account of Christine 
Korsgaard's, forecasting many of the crucial details and their difficulties occupying us 
later. Still, I believe the passage and the argument it articulates are fully intelligible in 
their own right (2006: 178-9): 
[C]onsider Korsgaard's hope of grounding a reply to the skeptic in what is 
constitutive of action. We are to imagine, then, someone who remains 
indifferent when we tell him that his actions are immoral or irrational. He 
then reads Korsgaard and is convinced that self-constitution is a 
constitutive aim of action, so that you cannot even count as an agent and 
your bodily movements cannot even count as actions unless you aim at 
self-constitution of the kind Korsgaard has in mind. And assume that our 
skeptic is even convinced that - miraculously - morality and indeed the 
whole of practical rationality can be extracted from the aim of self-
constitution. Do we have any reason to believe that now he will care about 
the immorality or irrationality of his actions? Why isn't he entitled to 
respond along the following lines: "Classify my bodily movements and 
indeed me as you like. Perhaps I cannot be classified as an agent without 
aiming to constitute myself. But why should I be an agent? Perhaps I can't 
act without aiming at self-constitution, but why should I act? If your 
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reasoning works, this just shows that I don't care about agency and action. 
I am perfectly happy being a shmagent - a nonagent who is very similar to 
agents but who lacks the aim (constitutive of agency but not of 
shmagency) of self-constitution. I am perfectly happy performing 
shmactions - nonaction events that are very similar to actions but that lack 
the aim (constitutive of actions but not of shmactions) of self-constitution . 
. .. So what is it to me how you classify my project?" 
The challenge Enoch poses to proponents of conceptual agency-based accounts is 
this: Define agency as you like, and stipulate whatever host of norms you wish to be 
constitutive of agency. Why should that give you any title to recommend these norms to 
your audience as authoritative on the mere basis of the relevant definition of agency? 
Why should your audience not suppose that all this conceptual maneuver achieves is to 
equip them with an additional way of asking the normative question, namely why to be 
an agent, as opposed to be a shmagent or to be no XX-gent at all? David Lewis ridiculed 
the approach in similar ways, quoted at the beginning of Enoch's essay (2006:169): 
Why care about objective value or ethical reality? The sanction is that if 
you do not, your inner states will fail to deserve folk-theoretical names. 
Not a threat that will strike terror into the hearts of the wicket! 
And of course, the crucial point is not that folk-theoretic names are unable to 
strike terror because their corresponding sanctions are minute or because of the case-
hardened nature of those to whom they deny their application. Instead they lack critical 
normative force altogether. What lies at the heart of practical normative criticism is not a 
charge of misclassification. Moral condemnation does not express a linguistic misstep, 
and moral competency does not consist in being literate in a particular language game. 
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For sure, conceptual stipulations frequently carry instrumental significance. They 
are embedded in larger practices set up so as to differentially respond to them. Thereby 
they can come to be associated with substantial social and emotional pressures. If 
everyone is to collect a reward for meeting the socially defined standards of agency, we 
may want to take some notice of the corresponding stipulations after all. Or those 
conditioned to feel distress when denied the label may incur an incentive to earn the label 
for the sake of their emotional health. Yet these ways clearly are nothing but distractions 
to our meta-normative quest. Everything can be associated with anything and thereby 
import all sorts of connotations. What remains true is that how we chose to label and 
classify ourselves and our actions are not relevant factors by themselves that could settle 
what to do and accept. Classificatory schemes can only possess significance derivatively, 
as a proxy for what they classify and its significance to us. They trace what matters but 
cannot matter themselves. Representational schemes and stipulations offer no substitute 
for facing up to the substantive questions about normative significance. 
The general conclusion I'd like to draw from this is that the conceptual alone 
cannot carry the normative significance we are after and which is sought to be explained 
by the constitutive programme. Conceptual truths are not of the right kind to speak to the 
normative question. As a consequence, if constitutive relations were sustained by 
conceptual routes alone their normative contribution would be undercut as well. It would 
all come down to whether or not someone deserves certain labels, which in tum would 
depend on whether he meets the required conditions classifying along whether or not one 
honors certain norms. And yet labeling issues are not what we are concerned about in our 
normative and meta-normative investigations. 
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I said I'd like to draw this conclusion by way of qualification, since I harbor little 
confidence that the rather quick remarks of this section could establish so grand a 
conclusion. Being cognizant of this, the best I can do is to document the force of this 
general charge in detail and in connection with the concrete agency-based accounts that 
have been proposed. Doing so shall occupy the better parts of the remaining chapter, only 
afterwards turning to the most prominent reply to Agency-Shmagency, namely that 
agency is inescapable, and that derivatively the norms constitutive of it are inescapable as 
well, on the basis of which we supposedly are entitled to infer their authority. This way of 
organizing the chapter permits a more thorough motivation of the inescapability reply 
itself, identifying it as a move the success of which is crucial for the constitutive 
program, thereby setting the scene to bury the reply with greater effect. But first, turn to 
constitution and belief, the example proponents of agency-based accounts love to use in 
order to illustrate their approach, and see how this best case scenario holds up under 
scrutiny. 
4.4. The Aim of Belief 
If there is one application fitting for the constitutive programme it is the case of 
belief. According to a prominent proposal belief is said to aim at truth or to track the 
truth. And aiming and tracking quintessentially are norm-involving phenomena. 
Moreover, if aiming and tracking together with their underwriting norms represent the 
constitutive feature of belief, the question of why those norms hold authority for belief 
may be answered. The promise is that we may derive the norms governing belief from 
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nothing more than a clear-eyed recognition of what belief essentially is. With aims come 
conditions for success and failure, and that is precisely what norms are all about. The 
question of what norms legitimately apply to belief could be settled by an appreciation of 
what it is those norms are applied to in the first place. The answer to the question why 
believe only what's true would reside in the very same question containing the concept 
belief. David Owens states the promise after raising the following question: "Why should 
believers be held to these norms? Where does their authority over us come from? Call 
this the problem of authority. If believing involves having an aim and these norms can be 
seen as instructions about how to achieve that aim, the solution is obvious." (2003:284) 
Not quite so obvious, I shall argue. If an explanation of authority is what the constitutive 
programme is expected to deliver we shall be disappointed. The central argument of this 
section will be that even if the constitutive programme does work for belief, what it 
explains is not authority but something else, something a position such as mine has no 
troubles countenancing. In fact, as later chapters will bring out more fully, it may even 
play into the hands of that position. 
This section will be organized around a fascinating and recent exchange between 
David Velleman and Nishih Shah, which commenced in various essays by Velleman 
which were subsequently critiqued by Shah and which ultimately cumulated in a co-
authored reconciliatory piece. The discussion lead to the most developed constitutive 
theory of belief I am aware of, and I would like to retrace parts of that development first 
before I turn to my critical analysis. In particular, I'd like to bring out why a purely 
regulatory account does not satisfy the normative ambitions of the constitutive account, 
and why as a consequence norms need to be involved more directly. With norms being 
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brought to central stage we can then turn to our meta-normative question of what status 
those norms must have in case the constitutive account turns out correct. 
Begin, then, with our slogan that belief constitutively aims at truth. So familiar 
rings that slogan that its metaphoric character almost goes unnoticed. A more specific 
account is needed. To begin with, it is agents who have aims, not beliefs, and even 
though agents may subject activities to aims and thereby lend them aims derivatively, few 
beliefs are intentionally formed by their believers with any aim in mind. Most beliefs, 
especially perceptual beliefs, approach agents without conscious invitation or purpose. 
"Truth must be the aim of belief," Velleman writes, "but it need not be an aim on the part 
of the believer; it may instead be an aim implicit in some parts of his cognitive 
architecture." (2000:19) To spell out the metaphor while appreciating that a great number 
of beliefs are not formed with agential aims in mind we need to focus on the cognitive 
mechanisms that regulate the formation of beliefs. What we want to know is what 
principles are to govern the mechanisms of belief-formation so as to make good on the 
proverb that belief aims at truth. 2 
What the metaphor expresses is a special regard for truth that is characteristic of 
belief. To appreciate more precisely how belief relates to truth we must distinguish it 
2 Notice that agential-aims and state-aims can come apart in funny ways. Suppose someone wishes to 
momentarily deceive himself. Suppose he needs to form a false belief on some matter (fill in your favorite 
story why). The belief, being a belief, supposedly still aims at truth, even though the aim towards which the 
agent intends to form that belief is falsity. Appreciating this intriguing possibility need not unduly embroil 
us in the intricate matter of doxasitic voluntarism. It is just the recognition that states can have inherent 
aims and yet be subjected to aims contrary to them by their agents. Owens suggests the case of a liar, who 
intentionally issues false assertions; still, assertions supposedly aim at representing only what's true. Only 
under that assumption, or something close enough, is lying in fact possible. (Cf. Owens, 2003:285) 
both from the conative attitudes such as hope and desire, as well as from beliefs 
cognitive brethren such as assuming, supposing and imagining. Velleman reminds us that 
the unique role truth plays for belief is more subtle than suggested by the platitude that to 
believe a proposition is to believe it to be true. Similar things can be said of all 
propositional attitudes, which all bear some relation to truth. To imagine or to assume a 
proposition is to imagine or assume it to be true, and to desire or to hope a proposition is 
to desire or to hope it to be true. We need to push further. In particular, we need to 
appreciate the difference between the various forms of cognitive attitudes which is less 
straightforward yet more instructive for our purposes than the difference between the 
cognitive attitudes and the conative attitudes. The cognitive and conative differ in their 
direction of fit, in that they take their propositional object as true rather than as to be 
made true. To believe, as well as to assume or to imagine, is to regard the relevant 
proposition as true rather than as to be made true. What all cognitive attitudes share, in 
Velleman's phrase, is their acceptance of the proposition involved. What is the 
difference, however, between belief and the other species of the cognitive attitudes, in 
particular what is the difference between acceptance-in-the-belief-way and acceptance-in-
the-imagining-, supposing-, or assuming-way? 
Velleman's proposal points toward the special and immediate authority truth 
holds over belief which it does not also hold for other cognitive attitudes. What 
distinguishes belief from the other attitudes is that whether to believe p is decisively and 
exclusively settled by whether p, whereas whether to imagine, to assume or to suppose p 
is not decisively and exclusively settled by whether p. In fact, whether to imagine, to 
assume or to suppose p may have very little to do with whether p. I will follow common 
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usage and call this feature of belief transparency. Belief is transparent to truth in a way in 
which imagination and assumption is not (2005:499): 
The feature that we call transparency is this: The deliberative question 
whether to believe that p inevitably gives way to the factual question 
whether p, because the answer to the latter question will determine the 
answer to the former. That is, the only way to answer the question whether 
to believe that p is to answer the question whether p. By contrast, the 
answer to the question whether p will not settle either the question whether 
to suppose that p nor the question whether to imagine that p, and so those 
questions do not give way to it---or, as we shall say, are not transparent to 
it. 
The task is to capture transparency,3 and the thesis that "believing involves 
regarding a proposition as true with the aim of so regarding only if it really is" 
(Aim:251)4 is supposed to do precisely that. As already mentioned, however, the 
metaphor of aiming has to be cashed out in terms of certain (partly sub-personal) 
mechanisms that regulate the cognitive attitude of regarding true only what really is true 
or only what is appropriately supported by evidences, rather than what serves particular 
3 There might be more work for characterizing belief. Belief differs not only from suppositions and 
imaginations, but also from guessing (Owens 2003) and from what Tamar Gendler has worked out under 
the description of alief(Gendler 2008). Yet guessing as well seems to be an acceptance aiming at truth. 
And alief too is concerned with truth. 
4 The task of capturing transparency is also related to the intriguing wrong kind of reasons problem. It 
seems to me that a successful account of transparency could also be used as an account of why certain 
considerations are ill suited to favor beliefs even though in some sense they show it to be a good thing to 
have the relevant beliefs. That I've read a claim on some anonymous webpage might not be a good reason 
to believe it, but at least it is of the right kind. That believing the claim would make me feel good is not just 
a bad reason, but of the wrong kind altogether. Cf. Pamela Hieronymi 2005. 
S There are some questions concerning the relation between truth and evidence, and it would mean for the 
role evidence has for belief should belief constitutively aim at truth. I am aware the connection is not as 
straightforward as it may initially appear. Still, in this section I'm going to assume that truth and evidence 
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argumentative or dialectical purposes, as it might be the case with assuming and 
supposing. This brings us to the regulatory account, introduced by Velleman as follows 
(2000:17): 
Belief aims at truth in the normative sense only because it aims at the truth 
descriptively, in the sense that it is constitutively regulated by mechanisms 
designed to ensure that that it is true .... Belief thus aims at the truth is the 
same sense that the circulation aims to supply body tissue with nutrients 
and oxygen. 
The regulatory account posits (some sub-personal) belief-regulating mechanisms 
that are cashed out in terms of certain counterfactuals, broadly akin to Robert Nozick 
famous truth-tracking account of knowledge. Nozick developed his proposal as a 
response to Gettier's counterexamples to the traditional analysis of knowledge, where he 
took belief as a primitive. Nozick argued that to know a proposition is to believe a truth 
which one would not have believed had it been false and yet which one would still have 
believed in some alternative scenarios where much is changed but where the truth of the 
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original proposition is left intact. Still, elements of Nozick's counterfactual analysis of 
knowledge could be applied to the case of belief-regulating mechanisms. If, unlike 
assuming and imagining, believing is to retain a special sensitivity for truth that reveals 
itself in its characteristic regulatory patterns then some changes in truth must be 
systematically correlated to some changes in belief, all of which would have to be 
expressed by some suitable set of counterfactuals. 
are systematically related, and that the implementation of the constitutive goal truth for belief must involve 
a special sensitivity for evidence. 
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Unfortunately the regulative proposal does not work. Or, to be more accurate, it 
does not work as an account that delivers on the idea that belief has an aim with all its 
intended normative implications, including transparency. Now it is important to 
recognize that not all authors writing on the subject share the conviction that belief is 
essentially normative (Papineau, Davidson), and for them a purely regulative account 
may be all in order. Here I cannot engage the extensive literature on whether indeed 
belief is essentially normative, and the criticism I now wish to advance only pertains to 
conceptions of belief that embrace its normative nature. Now, as to why the regulative 
account has no normative upshot, the short answer is simple. It is one thing to think of 
beliefs as states that are constitutively regulated by mechanisms bearing certain 
counterfactual relations to truth. It is a matter entirely different to think of beliefs as states 
that aim at truth in the normatively fecund sense that they would fail to do what they are 
supposed to do in those cases where they diverge from the common regulatory pattern. 
As we shall see momentarily, it may not even be possible for belief to depart from its 
constitutively regulatory patterns, and the problem this generates is quite profound. The 
important observation now concerns the way we would have to conceptualize divergent 
cases were they possible: Divergence from common patterns does not amount to a 
normative shortcoming. The unusual and exceptional is not the same as the deficient and 
degenerate. 
Shah and Velleman acknowledge as much. Once the notion of belief having aims 
is understood in terms of regulatory mechanisms, (2005:499): 
the claim that beliefs standard of correctness can be derived from its 
constitutive aim becomes harder to sustain. That claim would now require 
the assumption that if an attitude is regulated by a truth-tracking 
mechanism, then it is correct if and only if true. And this last assumption, 
though previously defended by one of the authors, has subsequently been 
abandoned in the face of objections from the other, to the effect that how 
an attitude ought to turn out is not necessarily determined by how it is 
regulated. 
Now it is true that if the mechanisms regulating belief were to have the function 
or design to deliver truths, the notion of belief aiming at truth could possibly be regained. 
We could do so in virtue of the uncontroversial and heavy-duty normative component 
that the notions of function and design bring with them. The distinctive mark of functions 
is that they can malfunction, and consequently, if belief is part of some mechanism that 
has the function to regulate its states by an exclusive concern for truth then clearly beliefs 
fail in that regard - they malfunction - should they not be so regulated. Velleman shifts 
between different formulations of the belief-aims-at-truth-thesis, and tellingly in one 
passage he states: "My thesis is that belief is an acceptance regulated in ways designed to 
ensure that its content is true." (Aim:277, emphasis added) But if that's the account then 
what we would like to learn is how the belief-regulating mechanisms come to have 
functions or designs at all, and in particular how they come to have the functions with 
this precise content, an explanation that is not provided solely by their actual regulatory 
patterns. For sure, the workings of our belief-forming mechanisms confer some crucial 
benefits on their possessors and have done so for a long time, a fact that partly accounts 
for their etiology. It is fair to observe, however, that the search for a normative account in 
our evolutionary history has proven rather difficult if not entirely unsuccessful, though I 
cannot further pursue this question here. In any case, nothing Velleman says supports the 
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design assumption, support very much needed if it were to bear the entire normative 
weight. 
The upshot, in rough terms, is that a functionalist analysis of belief - one that 
stipulates characteristic input/output patterns for belief - does not capture the normative 
dimension of belief, should belief indeed have such a dimension. Purely regulatory or 
functionalist accounts resemble the characterization of certain chemical processes, and so 
we might briefly illustrate the present point with an example from chemistry. Consider 
the simple process of polymerization, where, with the help of various catalysts, individual 
monomers hook up with each other to form polymers, through a process where electrons 
are being freed up enabling individual monomers to connect into a chain. Suppose 
principles P constitutively describe the process of polymerization. This example enables 
us to illuminate, very quickly, the two fatal shortcomings of regulatory accounts qua 
normative accounts. The first is this. Should a chemical process deviate from principles P 
it would thereby fail to qualify as polymerization, and consequently, it would thereby fail 
to qualify as bad or deviant polymerization. There never could be deviant polymerization 
in the first place. The second point is this. Even if, per impossibile, there could be deviant 
polymerization, the sense of deviant here would not be normative, but merely statistical. 
The chemical process would be deviant in the sense that it is departing from common 
patterns, not in the sense that it failed to do what it was supposed to do. There is no 
supposed to do whatsoever contained in the purely regulatory. 
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This completes the short answer as to why the purely regulatory account does not 
work, and it is related to the longer one to the same effect that Velleman and Shah 
provide (2005:500): 
An adequate account of belief must explain not only the fact that truth 
occupies the sole focus of attention in doxastic deliberation but also the 
fact that evidentially insensitive processes, such as wishful thinking, 
occasionally influence belief. An account of belief rendered solely in 
terms of truth-regulation may be able to explain one or the other of these 
facts, depending on how the term 'truth-regulation' is interpreted, but no 
single interpretation of 'truth-regulation' can explain both facts at once. 
Hence, an adequate account of belief must include more than the fact of its 
being regulated for truth. 
According to Shah and Velleman regulatory accounts face a dilemma. There is a 
stronger and a weaker version of how to construe truth-regulation, and neither quite 
works. 
Consider the stronger version first. Here the idea is that unless an attitude is 
regulated by a concern for truth and nothing but the truth, the attitude simply doesn't 
qualify as a belief in the first place. This option is austere, and the problem is it is too 
austere. The strong version is incapable of acknowledging that there are any non-truth 
related factors ever to influence the formation of belief. For as soon as we find some 
factor unrelated to truth exerting ever so slightly an influence on some attitude it would 
cease to pass the belief-test. There is a lot of research that seeks to unravel the real 
genesis of many of our 'beliefs,' with frequently disquieting results that seem to 
contradict our confidence that belief-formation is exclusively truth-concerned. The work 
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on the infamous confirmation bias and wishful thinking come to mind. Yet according to 
the strong version this kind of research would be internally incoherent as it is engaged in 
the vain attempt to better understand an impossible phenomenon. Beliefs could not be 
subjected to systematic biases, where what we want to believe or what would mesh with 
our preconceived worldview impacts the genesis of belief. What we would have to say in 
such instances is not that some beliefs were unduly influenced by considerations other 
than truth, but rather that what we are dealing with is another kind of attitude altogether. 
The project of cognitive psychology that seeks to reveal how frequently and thoroughly 
biases and interests influence belief-formation would be a confused endeavor. This is not 
how we conceive of beliefs. 
But apart from a concern for the venerability of cognitive psychology, the strong 
version has unacceptable normative implications for an account that embraces and seeks 
to explain the normative character of belief. It renders impossible that there are bad and 
defective beliefs, beliefs that fail to live up to standards they are supposed to meet. This is 
a devastating result, and somewhat ironic too, since the primary objective is to establish 
normative criteria for belief, to explain why one should believe only what's true and to 
demonstrate how there could be more and less successful ways of managing ones 
epistemic household. What the strong version effectively does is to conceptually disallow 
the possibility of unsuccessful ways of managing belief, for it already burdens the very 
concept belief with those success criteria the very point of which was to chastise 
epistemic outliers that fail to meet them even though they should. The inevitable result is 
that the set of good beliefs coextends with the set of beliefs proper, where no space is left 
for offenders, who ironically would exempt themselves from being held to epistemic 
standards at the precise moment where they chose to disrespect them. No criteria are left 
that beliefs could violate while retaining their status as beliefs, a status that is required to 
make epistemic criticism appropriate in the first place. Out the window go belief-
guidance and belief-criticism. One could never violate norms for belief, a point that is 
made by many authors. GHier, K & Wikforss write, speaking of internal connections 
instead of constitutive regulations, but targeting pretty much the same idea (2009:31-70): 
However, to say that beliefs stand in various internal connections to one 
another is not to say that these connections are normative. On the contrary, 
precisely because the connections are internal or analytically necessary, 
they are not normative, not optional. If the connection were merely 
normative, it would be possible to violate the norm in question. That is, it 
would be possible to be in the one state without being in the other. This is 
precisely what is impossible if a relation between the states is internal. If 
the relation is internal, there is, so to speak, not enough room for any norm 
to enter between the two states. 
Thus, the stronger version does not work, and thus we need to consider the 
weaker version. Here the idea is that if an attitude is, possibly among other factors, 
regulated by a concern for truth, the attitude qualifies as a belief. The condition, 
presumably both necessary and sufficient, would be that an attitude must exhibit enough 
relation to truth in order to quality as belief, where it is understood that the condition does 
not rule out that other factors are in play as well. This option is permissive, and the 
problem is it is too permissive. The weak version is incapable of explaining transparency. 
What we would have are mechanisms comprising various factors impacting the genesis 
of belief, where no single factor is distinguished as the crucial one. As Shah and 
Velleman explain (2005:500-1): 
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If belief can be influenced by evidentially irrelevant processes such as 
wishful thinking, then its responsiveness to evidence must be weak 
enough to leave room for such additional influences. And if this 
interpretation of truth-regulation is correct (as we believe), then the 
manner in which belief is regulated for truth can't be cited to explain the 
role of truth in doxastic deliberation. For when one deliberates whether to 
believe that p, this question not only gives way to the question whether p 
but does so to the exclusion of any other, competing question, such as 
whether p would be in one's interest Yet if belief were required only to be 
weakly regulated for truth, then the potential outcome of deliberation 
could be envisioned as a belief that p so long as p's truth were treated as 
relevant to that outcome, without necessarily being treated as having 
absolute priority over opposing considerations: the question whether p 
would not have to crowd out competing, nonepistemic questions. 
This completes the negative discussion of why a normative conception of belief 
must go beyond a purely regulative account. The positive solution Shah and Velleman 
offer is this (2005:501): 
When one deliberates whether to have an attitude conceived as a belief 
that p, one deliberates about an attitude to which one already applies the 
standard of being correct if and only if p is true, and so one is already 
committed to consider it with an eye exclusively to whether p. When one 
deliberates whether to have an attitude conceived as an assumption or 
fantasy, one does not yet apply any particular standard to it, and so one 
does not yet have any commitment as to how one will go about 
considering it. This explanation of transparency leaves room for the 
possibility that beliefs can be influenced by non-evidential considerations, 
because it entails that one is forced to apply the standard of correctness 
only in situations in which one exercises the concept of belief. Not all 
belief forming processes require the subject to deploy the concept, and the 
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norm of truth that controls doxastic deliberation needn't control other 
processes. Our explanation of transparency thus allows for the fact that 
passions can influence belief. 
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Shah's and Velleman's central claim is "that conceiving of an attitude as a belief, 
rather than an assumption or an instance of imagining, entails conceiving of it as an 
acceptance that is regulated for truth, while also applying to it the standard of being 
correct if and only if it is true." (2005 :497). The most striking feature in the development 
of this account is this: The constitutive norm for belief, namely that belief is correct if 
and only if true, is not to be derived from some prior aim inherent in belief, as was 
suggested before where it was held that which standards of correctness apply to belief 
somehow flows from what belief constitutively aims at. Rather, the fact that the norm is 
taken to underwrite belief is what (partly) explains why belief constitutively aims at truth. 
Belief is the distinctive attitude it is precisely in virtue of being subjected to that norm. I 
am not intending to point this out in order to set the stage for introducing a major 
problem. Pressing the view to the admission that it must construe belief as constitutively 
norm-governed is precisely where I wanted to end up. The important point is only that the 
teleology of belief is not explanatorily prior to the relevant norms, and in particular 
cannot independently specify which norms must be taken to constitute belief, but is 
entirely on par with it, as two sides of the same coin. The somewhat stipulative nature of 
the claim that truth-regarding norms constitute belief, already implicit in the chosen 
conceptual approach, now lies in the open. 
Velleman's and Shah's final account is hybrid and gives rise to many fascinating 
questions in its own right. In particular, one might want to hear more about how precisely 
the formation of beliefs interacts with the relevant truth-regarding standards; how is it 
that those standards are applied to beliefs or processes of belief-formation. If agents have 
to apply them to states or deliberative engagements, we potentially witness the recurrence 
of a problem Velleman grappled with earlier, namely the recognition that many beliefs 
are not agentially but rather sub-personally managed. If however the relevant application 
of those norms is cast in terms of sup-personal mechanisms, it is hard to see how the 
problems that plagued the purely regulative account are to be avoided. For now let us put 
aside these questions, and finally turn to the ultimate question: What would Velleman's 
and Shah's account show us with regard to the meta-normative status of the norms 
constitutive of belief, should their account be on the right tracks? Have they presented an 
account that would explain why those constitutive norms are authoritative for us? 
The answer is negative, and the reason why is instructive and revealing. Before 
we turn to the argument why, however, two caveats need to be made explicit. First, even 
if, as I'm going to argue, constitutive norms for belief turn out incapable of delivering 
authority, this by itself need not present a problem for constitutive accounts as such. For 
constitutive accounts do not necessarily encompass the objective of explaining authority 
in the first place. I suspect, in fact, that Velleman and Shah never had any intention of 
applying their theory to that purpose. As far as I can tell, based on extensive study of his 
work as well as conversation, Velleman is no less a meta-normative skeptic than I am. 
My argument henceforth is not leveled as a criticism against constitutive account as such, 
but only against the further claim, for now without explicit authorship yet not without 
interest, that constitution explains authority. Second, as I cannot emphasize enough, my 
argument does not deny the presence of norms pertaining to belief, and in particular does 
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not deny that there are standards of correctness applying to belief. Quite the contrary, the 
departing assumption precisely is that not only do certain norms apply to belief but do 
apply constitutively so, and whatever norms and standards of correctness conceptually 
underwrite belief - the working assumption is that they are truth-related, but alternative 
conceptions face the same fate - the argument shall not contest the presence of the 
relevant norms. The argument even grants that we might speak of reasons to believe only 
what's true according-to-the-relevant-norms-that-define-belief, or that belief is correct 
only when true according-to-the-relevant-norms-that-define-belief The question is 
whether the constitutive account can explain why the relevant norms have authoritative 
status in virtue of the fact that they are constitutive of belief. 
My argument that it cannot explain authority has the following schema. Consider 
the question of why respect the norms constituting belief as a rough approximation of the 
meta-normative question concerning the status of those norms. There are roughly two 
ways in which this question about the status of the relevant belief-constituting norms 
might arise. One may think of these two modes as internal and external to the practice of 
believing. The first way of understanding the question is trivial, where the relevant 
question tautologically answers itself, with the consequence that this way of raising the 
question cannot be taken to speak to the issue of normative authority, which always must 
be construed as a substantial matter. This leads us to a second and alternative way of 
raising the meta-normative question. But there we shall see that the constitutive account 
does not even attempt to offer anything that would answer it or explain authority. The 




Take, then, as a given that believing is descriptively and normatively regulated by 
an exclusive concern for truth. Suppose we can sum up the constitutive norms for 
believing in N, where as a matter of conceptual truth believing constitutively consists in 
respecting or being guided by N. Consider then the first version of our question: Why 
should one respect or be guided by N in managing ones beliefs? In light of the just stated 
conceptual assumption where belief bears a constitutive relationship to N our question 
immediately provides its own answer, and consequently appears somewhat ill-stated. 
This is rendered evident once we reformulate the question, replacing the concept of belief 
with our conceptual assumption. Here is what we get in that case: Why, in the formation 
of states that are constitutively N-regulated, should that formation be N-regulated? Or, 
why, in managing N-respecting states, should one respect N? Or, why, in the formation of 
states that are what they are in virtue of their exclusive concern for N should one be 
concerned about N? The point is simple: Once the concept of belief is included in our 
question, where it is agreed that the concept constitutively enjoins respect for N, the 
question of why respect N in forming beliefs contains its own answer. 
The impression this engenders is that one is missing something. But one is not. 
One either is in the business of believing; a business constitutively characterized by the 
special regard for truth, and in that case it is a given that one already exhibits the 
characteristic and exclusive regard for truth. Or one is not in that business, and in that 
case one does not exhibit the characteristic and exclusive regard for truth. Or, one already 
exhibits the characteristic and exclusive regard for truth, and in that case one is a 
believer; or one does not exhibit the characteristic and exclusive regard for truth, and in 
that case one is not a believer. The question of why respect N when being in the business 
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of believing misses the crucial point that believing and respecting N go hand in hand, that 
they consequently cannot come apart, as if one of the options on the table was to believe 
while disrespecting N, and as if some rationale was needed to rule out that option. The 
question is conceptually closed, and no substantive issue lingers in the background. There 
is no open question argument about the status of the norms underwriting belief thus 
understood. It's not so much that a full appreciation of the normative underpinnings of 
the concept of belief provides an answer to the contested issue of why one must believe 
only what's true. Rather, it explains why such a question does not really arise. The very 
question is somewhat deceiving, making it appear as though there is an issue at stake 
where there is in fact none. It's like asking why one should touch all four bases when 
trying to hit a home run, as if there were two things when in fact there is only one for 
which we only happen to have two different labels. 
The point of having offered various alternative reformulations of the same 
question, each leading to the same trivial result, is to make plain that what we find in the 
constitutive proposal is not so much a solution to our meta-normative problematic but 
rather something of a dissolution for the case at hand; thereby displaying the 
inapplicability of the very problematic to the case of believing so described. What 
initially appeared a question in search of some substantive answer now reveals itself, 
upon conceptual clarification, as laying bare a mere tautology. To believe, under that 
description, is to be solely concerned with truth. Why believe only what's true thus 
transforms into the question of why be solely concerned with what's true when being 
solely concerned with what's true (viz. when engaged in belief-formation). There is no 
issue the question thus understood brings out about which one could adopt competing 
meta-normative positions, being a realist or anti-realist or expressivist or cognitivists or 
whatever. No position can be said to have the upper hand on this or to take any credit 
from this, because the meta-normative issue is inapplicable here. 
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Consider the infamous case of faith in divinity sustained despite blatant lack of 
evidence. Many authors have expressed especially high esteem for faith sustained despite 
all available counterevidence to the contrary, where it is considered an especially 
praiseworthy virtue to have overcome the vast sources of doubt and dared to believe. 
Consider a person of faith who takes a divergent and domain-specific attitude towards 
belief, such that he goes about regulating his "beliefs" in light of the evidence when it 
comes to the natural world but not so when it comes to religious matters where he permits 
non-evidential considerations to reign. There he dares to take the famous Kierkegaardean 
leap into faith. We disapprove, and say that what he is doing is misguided, pointing to our 
conceptual findings, and yet he remains unmoved, insisting to keep doing what he was 
doing. You cannot go about believing that way, we say, and add that if you do anyway, 
what you are undertaking is not really believing but rather something else. But this is not 
a particularly powerful response. All we can show him, assuming we are correct in our 
constitutive analysis, is that he is confused about his mental economy, that he must be 
aspiring to a rather different attitude, which he has every right to do, only that presently 
he has misc1assified what he is doing when he conceives of it as an instance of believing. 
He cannot do what he thinks he is doing under that description. He takes himself to be 
laboring under the concept of belief when in fact he is laboring under some slightly 
different concept, celie! say, where celief is an acceptance regulated by truth and 
evidence when it comes to natural affairs but non-evidential factors when it comes to 
religious affairs. Since we have agreed to reserve the label "belief' for a specific norm-
enabled activity, he must either abandon his classification as belief, or he must abandon 
his "beliefs," which ain't really beliefs properly speaking. It's not that he had some items 
in his belief-box that we show he must remove. What we show is that these items never 
really were in his belief-box to begin with. He is simply conceptually confused. 
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What the case of the person of faith is reminiscent of is the problem initially 
noticed with the purely regulative account, namely its hyper-escapability: Should a 
standard be constitutive of some activity, then one abandons the activity by abandoning 
the standard, and we lose our grip on the crucial moment where one could truly still be 
considered to engage in the activity while disrespecting its constitutive standard. Again 
we find ourselves in danger of having no space left for systematically defective ways of 
going about believing, ways that fail to live up to standards they are supposed to meet, 
and we again would find ourselves incapable of explaining how there could be more and 
less (sic!) successful ways of managing ones epistemic household, where no criteria are 
left that believing could violate qua believing. To cite Velleman, "a subject who lacked a 
disposition to follow indications of truth would not be capable of forming beliefs." 
(2009:133) And we could continue: since the subject is incapable of forming beliefs, he is 
also incapable of forming bad beliefs and consequently incapable of attracting epistemic 
criticism. 
I mentioned this problem only in passing, for as sizeable as it is, is not quite the 
one I just was pursuing, which concerned the implicitly tautological nature of the 
question that the constitutive account is being taken to answer in this first version. To this 
I now return. The problem is that what the constitutive account delivers has the wrong 
form to speak to our substantive meta-normative problematic. To bring out this more 
fully, consider another engagement which comes with its own constitutive standards. 
Think of the concept of a criminal master mind. Suppose the concept contains the proviso 
that no one qualifies as a criminal master mind unless he feels obliged to exhibit special 
diligence in executing his schemes. Now consider this question: Why should a criminal 
master mind, qua criminal mater mind, exhibit special diligence in executing his 
schemes? The question seems pointless, especially after it was just stipulated that this 
kind of special diligence is a necessary component of criminal master minds. The 
reformulation again makes this plain. Why should one exhibit special care in executing 
ones schemes when being engaged in an activity characterized by exhibiting special care 
in executing ones schemes? Examples along similar lines are easily multiplied, all 
showing the same result: the observation that some standard is internal to some activity 
does not speak to the substantive question of whether the standard is authoritative. 
And yet, isn't there a substantial question in the neighborhood? Indeed there is, 
which brings us to the second version of understanding our question why respect the 
norms constituting belief As for the precise way of understanding it we can already take 
a clue from our last example. Granted, if one is to be a criminal master mind then one 
must display special care in executing ones schemes. One cannot maintain good standing 
qua criminal mastermind while feeling disinclined to display the degree of sophistication 
in plan and execution constitutive of it. But why be a criminal master mind in the first 
place? Why internalize the set of standards that characterize that mindset as opposed to 
some other mindset or no mindset altogether? Here we finally encounter the kind of 
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question more apt to our overall meta-normative inquiry. And it is exactly this kind of 
question that can be raised with regard to belief as well. The crucial question is not why 
care about truth when believing (which is defined as exclusively caring about truth), but 
why to believe in the first place. Why must one be a believer, as opposed to a celiver or 
shmeliever, or no XX-liever altogether? Truth is the aim of belief alright, but why ought 
it be my aim, one may ask. Yes, if one respects the belief-constitutive norms one qualifies 
as a believer. But why should one then go ahead and respect the norms and thereby 
become a believer? Once the question is cast in those terms, it is immediately evident that 
the constitutive account has little to say in response. The constitutive account does not 
tell us why to respect the norms constitutive of believing, but only that if one does respect 
them then one is a believer. It does not tell us why to form acceptances in the specific 
belief-way, but only what that way is. What we have granted all along is that with 
believing comes a package of norms where one cannot have one without the other. The 
question, however, is why one must take on the whole package in the first place, and to 
that question the belief-internal and constitutive norms turn startlingly silent. Whether 
one should have the kind of special regard for truth that is constitutive of belief is not 
answered by the recognition that believing as such is to have this kind of special regard 
for truth. 
This concludes the argument. Notice two points, though. First, one may complain 
that we do not really have a choice in the matter of whether we want to be guided by 
representations of the world we live in, and that consequently the question of whether we 
want to be believers is largely rhetorical for us. Not quite. Even if we grant the necessity 
of forming representations of the world on our part, the necessity of forming beliefs does 
not immediately follow. To be a believer is more than to be someone who is guided by 
representations of the world. The example of celievers made this plain. To be a believer 
is to be guided by representations of the world of a highly specific kind, and to that there 
are ample alternatives. Many incorporate less stringent standards. Moreover, the equation 
of inescapability and authority is highly problematic, as I will argue in later sections. The 
second point is this. I certainly have no intention of denying that possessing the belief-
characteristic capacity is hugely beneficial to us, that it is a capacity we cherish to have. 
More often than not it is a very good thing indeed to be a believer. But that recognition is 
neither here nor there as far as the constitutive account is concerned in particular and the 
wider issue of authority in general. My contention with authority is not a contention with 
the norms defining our epistemic practices. And whatever explains why we wish to 
exercise, promote or foster that capacity will have to involve factors beyond the 
constitutive analysis. Trying to gain some argumentative leverage with regards to the 
authority of the norms underwriting belief on such an instrumental basis would lead us 
into a different project altogether, one that in large parts was dealt with in the previous 
chapter. 
4.5. Identifying the Constitutive Base for Action and Agency - An 
Initial Dilemma 
Let us return from the theoretical to the practical, from reasons and norms 
pertaining to belief to reasons and norms pertaining to action. The overarching objective, 
we need to remind ourselves, is to explain authoritative practical reasons. It was not 
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entirely implausible to suppose, as the previous section did, that there are norms 
constitutive of believing. The question we must now consider is whether there are 
practical norms to be found which pertain to action and agency and which could claim 
the kind of constitutive status for their respective domains that norms pertaining to belief 
were able to claim with some credibility. "The question, then," Velleman notes, "is what 
serves as the standard of correctness for action, in the same way as truth serves as the 
standard of correctness for belief." (2000: 15) The task is simultaneously more 
challenging and more promising. More challenging, since one major quandary that 
agency-based accounts have always faced is to identify concrete norms that are plausible 
candidates for principles constitutive of agency and action. Rarely do we find concrete 
norms suggested in the literature that meet this job description, where major parts of the 
discussion proceed in entirely abstract terms, only alluding to norms that supposedly are 
constitutive of agency without saying what they are. Yet without this important detail it is 
hard to gain an adequate assessment of the merits of agency-based accounts, and thus at 
some point we need to know precisely what, according to agency-based accounts, one 
must honor in order to be an agent. 
At the same time the task is more promising, in at least one respect, for the 
following reason. While it is hard to deny that many practices come with their internal 
and constitutive standards that characterize the practices as what they are, one question 
always relevant to ask is why engage in these practices so construed in the first place. 
With regards to belief, the question was why be a believer instead of a celiever or 
something else? Since most practices are escapable, their constitutive standards become 
escapable as well. Now we have not examined the exact relationship between authority 
and escapability yet, which we will do in a later section. For now it is worth mentioning 
that there may be one exception to the escapability of practices together with their 
corresponding standards, and this exception is agency and action, or at least so it is 
claimed by many proponents of constitutive accounts. If that is so, this would give 
constitutive accounts of agency an extra card to play. Unlike in the belief case, where it 
was possible to ask Truth is the aim of belief, alright, but why ought it be my aim?, this 
kind of question arguably cannot arise in the agency-case, where it appears nonsensical to 
ask XYZ is the aim of agency, alright, but why ought it be my aim? As I said, that 
additional option will be the subject of a detailed examination later. Return now to the 
task of figuring out which norms could possibly be held constitutive of agency and 
action. 
Even the little we know about the content of the constitutive norms already spells 
trouble. An initial dilemma threatens. Constitutive accounts aspire to explain reasons for 
action or authoritative practical norms by situating them in necessary features pertaining 
to our agency and capability to act. Yet these two components pull in different directions, 
namely the aspiration to explain authoritative reasons for action on the one side and the 
excavation of an explanatorily fertile stock of necessary standards on the other side. The 
candidate norms underwriting agency can be construed in more or less stringent terms, 
and neither option promises to accommodate quite what we want. The first hom of the 
dilemma is this. Suppose the candidate set contains some fairly robust and stringent 
norms. It would then stand a chance of underwriting most of what is usually considered 
legitimate demands on action, explaining the target domain of authoritative practical 
norms and reasons. The difficulty here is to substantiate the strong necessity claim 
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characteristic of constitution. In other words, if the candidate norms involve substantial 
and stringent requirements, it appears more probable that agents may opt out from those 
norms without compromising their status as agents. 
This leads to the second horn. Based on the just presented difficulties we may 
conclude that we have little choice but to construe the candidate set of constitutive norms 
for agency less stringently. Suppose, then, that alternatively the candidate set only 
contains norms that absolutely cannot be opted out from without relinquishing our 
agency. The difficulty here is to substantiate the claim that constitution is what explains 
legitimacy in principles without at the same time forfeiting the capacity to accommodate 
a fair deal of the principles usually considered legitimate vis-a-vis action. In other words, 
if the candidate norms are necessary for all agents to be agents, it appears their content 
must be very weak indeed and in all likelihood can accommodate only very few 
principles widely held legitimate. Perhaps proponents of the constitutive account may 
moderate their ambition at this point, where they seek to sidestep the trend into some 
normative wasteland by claiming that constitution is only part of the story. As we shall 
see, however, that is no easy concession for agency-based accounts to make. The first 
horn threatens the necessity claim behind constitution. The second horn threatens the 
claim to explanatory adequacy behind constitution, allowing, at best, only the minutest 
set of principles the status of authority. Agency-based accounts face the uneasy task of 
capturing authority and necessity at the same time. 
This is a genuine challenge. Ultimately agency-based accounts have no choice but 
to make do with the second option, to resort to a small number of basic constitutive 
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norms. I shall argue momentarily why this option is unattractive. Still, it is less 
detrimental to agency-based accounts than the first option which plainly appears logically 
ruled out. The reason why the first option is indeed ruled out becomes apparent once we 
apply a process of elimination. Upon closer examination virtually the entirety of 
principles considered legitimate must turn out optional when it comes to maintaining our 
agency. The endeavor of finding necessary norms underwriting agency is aggravated by 
the sheer abundance of agents and their tendencies to flout almost all imaginable norms 
and principles. It is easy to find counterexamples for most norms restricting their 
inclusion to the agency-constitutive set for most norms. There are lots of bad agents and 
there are lots of instances of bad behavior. And as a matter of logic alone no norm that is 
systematically disobeyed by some agent can serves as a candidate for underwriting 
agency as such. Henceforth a great number of norms considered valid cannot be 
encompassed within the constitutive set. 
Moral norms are just the most obvious case. Many have pointed out that the 
constitutive programme proves incapable of accommodating moral norms. Ever since the 
publication of Sources of Normativity Christine Korsgaard has been confronted with the 
evil gang of mobsters, murderers incorporated, sociopaths and psychopaths, and so on, 
who are all agents, albeit of the most horrendous sort. Looking at only a relatively small 
number of moral monsters we can already appreciate how small the intersection must 
become of moral norms they all respect. Perhaps one may object that one cannot lead a 
fully satisfactory life while systematically disregarding others. I am genuinely unsure 
about this, given the apparent success of numerous ethical barbarians to 
compartmentalize their social life and to flourish. But the objection is beside the point 
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anyway. The question is not what is required for happy or flourishing agency, but only 
for agency per se. Discontented agents are still agents. Out the window seems to go moral 
reasons for action. 
Christine Korsgaard disagrees. She has recently argued that Kant's categorical 
and hypothetical imperatives figure as the two constitutive principles for agency and 
action. I'll comment on the hypothetical imperative in the section on Korsgaard later, and 
focus on the categorical imperative now. Korsgaard contents that "[t]he categorical 
principle ... is not just the principle of morality. It is also the constitutive principle of 
action." (2008:12) The categorical imperative may seem quite demanding and to thereby 
secure a place for morality within the constitutive set. Yet her constitutive claim strikes 
me as wholly incredible, in particular her equation of moral norms and norms concerning 
self-constitution, as expressed by the astonishing claim that "[t]he unity that is essential 
to agency and moral integrity are one and the same thing." (2008:14) There are many 
questions about the categorical imperative, what it says, how it works, whether it strictly 
speaking can ever be violated, how the requisite practical contradiction is generated, why 
to place it at center stage in morality instead of other principles, consequentialist, or 
contractualist, or whatever. None of this needs to bother us now. What should, instead, 
very much bother us now, is this: How could anyone seriously doubt that whatever the 
categorical imperative commands, and to the extent to which its commands can be 
violated, they are violated left and right by people looking very much like agents? Take 
promissory norms, something Kant, as well as other Kantians following him, including 
Korsgaard, used as one prime examples for norms backed up by, or instantiating, or 
expressing, the categorical imperative. Yet agents break promises all the time, and by 
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extension disrespect the categorical imperative all the time. If the categorical imperative 
is constitutive of agency, denying claimants the status when defying the imperative, none 
of us are agents, which would be a rather dubious result for a theory of agency, as 
Korsgaard acknowledges: "it is much harder for skeptics ... to deny that agency exists." 
[than that free will exists] (2008:11) I shall return to a more detailed assessment of 
Korsgaard's views after I discuss Velleman's, a task to which I now turn. 
4.6. Constitutive Norms for Action: David Velleman's Narrative 
David Velleman has developed a highly original verSIOn of the constitutive 
programme in a series of articles and books published over several decades, from his 
Practical Reflection to his most recent monograph How We get Along. This section is 
dedicated to assessing that version. First I need to preface the ensuing discussion by a 
cautionary note, however, similar to the discussion of the aim of belief. It is not obvious, 
and in fact there is some cause for doubt, that the most charitable interpretation of 
Velleman's work on agency and action incorporates the aspiration to explain authority. 
Recently I've had the opportunity to ask him about a complaint he is confronting with 
great regularity, namely that his account is void of direct normative implications and is 
purely motivational in character, and his response was rather telling. He seemed quite 
happy to fully concede the complaint. Yes, it is all about motivation, he said as far as I 
can recall, but motivation is all there is anyway. The remark confirmed a suspicion 
emerging while studying his work. In light of his response to my question I hesitate to 
construe my critical observations as directed against Velleman's project as such. Still, 
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and as long as we keep in mind this interpretative proviso, what he says about agency is 
certainly capable of bearing a critical assessment within the present context, which is 
organized around the topic of whether the authority of practical norms can be explained 
on the basis of what is constitutive for agency and action. 
Let me begin with an important passage in the Introduction to The Possibility of 
Practical Reason where Velleman highlights a fundamental problem (2000: 15-16): 
There is a temptation to think that the norm of correctness for actions is 
that they should be supported by the strongest reasons. But this thought 
leads into a vicious circle. What counts as a reason for acting depends on 
what justifies action; which depends on what counts as correctness for 
action; which cannot depend, in tum, on what counts as a reason. 
The notion of norms for correctness for action, Velleman contends, is 
conceptually prior to the notion of a reason for action, and therefore is not analyzable in 
terms of practical reasons.6 This claim of his notably contrasts with the proposition, 
defended by several philosophers, assigning priority to reasons, both conceptually and 
explanatorily. Yet what Velleman attempts to do, again in stark contrast to his opponents, 
is to bring some illumination to the notion of a practical reason, instead of just taking it as 
a primitive. And once the nature of this commendable task is appreciated and accepted, 
we can immediately see why Velleman is right in searching for a criterion for correct 
action, and derivatively practical reasons, that must be found somewhere else than in the 
6 Compare this with the case of belief, where Velleman's claim seems even more plausible: The norms for 
correctness for belief cannot just be to form only beliefs that are best supported by reasons for belief. What 
exactly provides reasons for belief and why is exactly what we would like to know. 
mere generic notion of what is supported by reasons. Where to look, then, instead? 
Velleman first gives a broad recipe before specifying the ingredients (2000:16): 
If there were something at which action constitutively aimed, then there 
would be a norm of correctness internal to the nature of action. There 
would be something about behavior that constituted its correctness as an 
action, in the same way as the truth of a propositional attitude constitutes 
its correctness as a belief. This standard would not be open to question: 
actions meeting the standard would be correct on their own terms, so to 
speak, by virtue of their nature as actions, just as true beliefs are correct by 
virtue of their nature as beliefs. And this norm of correctness for action 
would in turn determine what counts as a reason for acting. 
What, in particular, does Velleman propose as the constitutive aim figuring for 
action? The answer is somewhat surprising. The constitutive aim of action, so Velleman, 
is to know what one is doing, or to be intelligible (2000:26): 
[S]elf-knowledge is the constitutive aim of action ... [which] determines 
an internal criterion of success for acting, in relation to which 
considerations qualify as reasons for acting. ... [T]he considerations that 
qualify as reasons for doing something are considerations in light of 
which, in doing it, the subject would know what he was doing. They are, 
more colloquially, considerations in light of which the action would make 
sense to the agent .... When I speak of "making sense," I am borrowing 
the phrase from the domain of theoretical reason, where it is used to 
characterize phenomena as susceptible to explanation and understanding. 
What makes sense to someone, theoretically speaking, is what he can 
explain. This is what I mean when I say that reasons for doing something 
are considerations in light of which it would make sense. I mean that they 
are considerations that would provide the subject with an explanatory 
grasp of the behavior for which they are reasons. 
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A decade later we still find the same central claim: "action consists in behavior 
that follows considerations that make it intelligible to the agent. Action is thus behavior 
aimed at intelligibility, just as belief is acceptance aimed at truth." (2009:133) 
Explanatory grasp and intelligibility must not, of course, be understood in terms of what 
is most supported or explained by reasons, except in the stipulative sense that what 
provides explanatory illumination and intelligibility ipso facto qualifies as reasons. The 
terms in which the relevant explanation must proceed cannot be the terms of practical 
reasons. 
Velleman's proposal is subtle and part of larger philosophical projects, 
particularly within the philosophy of action. He is elaborating on some central themes of 
Elisabeth Anscombe's, above all how we can acquire non-inferential and non-causal 
knowledge of what we are doing, as when one knows that one is going to take a walk just 
by forming the very intention to do so. Doing full justice to his proposal would require an 
adequate treatment of the kinds of problems in philosophy of action to which the proposal 
is responding, justice I must deny him here for reasons of space. The proposal has also 
prompted extensive commentary, mostly negative, where the common reaction, it is fair 
to observe, has been incredulity and the complaint of running against widespread 
intuitions. Two especially common lines of criticism, in Velleman's own diagnosis, are 
that his view is "oddly intellectualist, or as portraying an autonomous agent to be unduly 
self-absorbed." (2000:30) These are valid points of contention, which cannot be fully 
developed here for reasons of space, though I will briefly return to one of them in the 
concluding paragraphs of this section. The question I want to focus on, instead, is this: Is 
it plausible to suppose, with Velleman, that self-knowledge and intelligibility are the 
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constitutive aim of action? And, given that I'm inclined to respond in the negative, why 
not? 
The question is somewhat speculative, as is to be expected given the nature of the 
proposal; still, there are some empirical matters that seem to bear on it. In a remarkable 
passage Velleman is quite frank about this (2000:17): 
[T]he constitutive aim of action would have to be something at which it 
was in fact aimed; and its being aimed, in some direction or other, would 
be a fact about the mechanisms causing and controlling it - in particular, 
the mechanisms whose causing and controlling it were constitutive of its 
being action. 
This is reminiscent of the purely regulatory account with regard to the aim of 
belief, and we already know that the proposal, as it stands and as it is cashed out entirely 
in terms of regulatory mechanisms, faces formidable obstacles in its attempt to capture 
aims-in-action. I shall not seize on that difficulty here, though, but instead focus on 
another that seems to arise even before we start worrying about the capacity of regulatory 
mechanisms to incorporate aims. The question is how plausible is Velleman's universal 
conjecture about the mechanisms governing action, as far as that goes, when confronted 
with the empirical data. We all have some intuitive, though defeasible, familiarity with 
action where we, at least occasionally, clearly know when someone acts, including 
ourselves. It would seem, then, that once we have identified a few uncontroversial 
instances of someone acting we could proceed by taking those instances apart and, by 
looking inside, we could check whether the relevant mechanisms do have the structure 
and functioning Velleman supposes. Now admittedly this is a much harder task than 
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suggested by the metaphors of taking apart and looking inside. Still, especially under the 
chosen mechanical description, Velleman's proposal clearly presents itself as a matter on 
which empirical disciplines such as psychology have something to say, and it is rather 
optimistic to forecast a confirmative verdict. Now Velleman does not shy away from 
facing up to empirical inquiries, and occasionally cites work in psychology in his favor. 
Providing a few cases in point he writes (2007:xvii-iii): 
Strange as this psychological mechanism may sound, it has been copiously 
documented by social psychologists working in the area that is sometimes 
labeled self-consistency. Research in this area has shown that people have 
a broad tendency to behave in ways that cohere with their conception of 
themselves ... . Potential voters are more likely to vote in an election if 
they have antecedently predicted that they are going to. Children are more 
likely to be tidy if told that they are tidy than if told that they ought to be. 
People behave angrily if they are led to believe that they are angry ... Shy 
people don't behave shyly if they are led to attribute the symptoms of their 
social anxiety to other causes. And so on. 
I share Velleman's fascination for this kind of research and would readily grant 
him that there is indeed ample documentation that our self-conception, and thus in some 
way our concern for coming to understand what we are doing on our own terms, does 
often playa crucial role in the etiology of what we are doing. But as instructive as the 
results may be they can only be taken so far. Notice that what Velleman needs 
psychology to bear out is not just that we can find a drive for intelligibility underlying 
some substantial number of our motivations. What he needs psychology to bear out, 
rather, is that this would hold for all of our motivations, or at least for all motivations 
underwriting action as opposed to mere behavior or mere activity. For each and every 
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instance of someone acting we would need to find the corresponding aim in the 
corresponding mechanisms, and that, it is fair to say, would be a remarkable discovery. 
It's the kind of discovery that would warrant a Nobel prize, had only Nobel decided to 
award a prize in psychology. 
Now there's a sense in which Velleman's empirical contention appears almost 
right, but that sense is rather unhelpful. Everything that happens has an explanation. If 
acquiring an understanding of why something happens or why someone acts suffices to 
render it intelligible, then for every action we can find considerations that render it 
intelligible: the considerations, namely, that are implicated in its etiology. Yet this, of 
course, cannot be what Velleman has in mind, since it turns the criterion for intelligibility 
into an unhelpful triviality, and, moreover, profoundly undercuts the appropriateness of 
any aim-lingo to action-guiding mechanisms. First of all, the fact that every action is 
explainable, perhaps even intelligible, cannot establish that every action aims at anything, 
let alone that every action constitutively aims at intelligibility. All of us are sure to have 
to adjust their ambitions in the course of our lives, but when ultimately forced to do so it 
is unlikely that we are thereby setting out to satisfy a goal of ours for self-adjustment. 
Moreover, the universal explicability of everything undermines any meaningful 
counterfactual tracking-account, where the co-variability with explicability for any 
mechanism would be converging on zero. It is clear, then, that Velleman must target at a 




Over the years Velleman has gravitated towards a narrative interpretation of 
intelligibility: "Reasons for acting are the elements of a possible storyline along which to 
make up what we are going to do." (2000:28) Velleman elaborations of the notion of 
narrative intelligibility and its significance are undoubtedly quite exciting and original, 
yet also present a thorny interpretative task, where it is unclear whether we are always 
dealing with one and the same theory in Velleman's disquisitions, confronting labels 
seemingly used interchangeably yet also seemingly denoting somewhat different things, 
such as knowing-what-one-is-doing, doing-what-is-intelligible, doing-what-makes-sense, 
etc. (Dancy 2004b) I shall not elaborate on Velleman's narrative interpretation. What is 
clear, though, is that whatever sense of intelligibility he has in mind must exceed a purely 
explanatory sense. Yet by making the sense more stringent we are also dampening the 
likelihood that empirical studies would bear out that intelligibility in that sense 
underwrites every action-guiding mechanism. The more plausible hypothesis would be 
that sometimes considerations of intelligibility playa crucial role, and sometimes they do 
not, a hypothesis plainly incompatible with the strong necessity claim behind 
constitution. 
Now, apart from such empirically based incredulity, there are reasons closer to 
home to remain somewhat skeptical towards Velleman's constitutive theory, namely its 
notable failure to comport with our common self-understanding of what is involved when 
we act and when we decide how to act. Since Velleman places such a high premium on 
self-understanding, this is not a worry he could take lightly. Narrative Intelligibility, 
whatever its precise nature, seems such an unlikely candidate for a constitutive aim 
underlying all of our actions and in charge of, even if only implicitly, all of our decision-
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making. I added the modification "implicitly," for the manner in which intelligibility 
organizes deliberation certainly need not be conscious and in the open, with intelligibility 
the explicit goal-in-view. According to the most plausible version of intelligibility-based 
deliberation, a point Velleman emphasizes on several occasions, intelligibility figures in 
the background, much in the same way as, from what we learned in the previous chapter, 
desires figure in the background according to the most plausible version of desire-based 
reasons. Still, we can always momentarily push what is in the background into the 
foreground, and we should not expect to be surprised too greatly by that transition, if 
indeed what was supposed to figure in the background was there all along. After all, we 
are not talking here about deceptive ways in which factors exert influence from the 
unconscious id. As deliberators, or as philosophers seeking to better understand 
deliberation, we can always make explicit what was supposed to be the implicit guide, 
and if under such conditions we remain utterly incapable of recognizing the contested 
feature as the organizing factor, the odds are high that it was not really the organizing 
factor after all. All this is defeasible, of course, but the best way, perhaps even the only 
way, to determine what does structure our deliberation is to make deliberation more 
explicit and see whether we can recover the impact of the relevant contested features. I 
see no real alternative to engaging in this kind of deliberative phenomenology. 
Consider two sources of deliberative discontent with Velleman's claim that 
intelligibility is the constitutive aim of action, the first regarding determinacy and the 
second regarding force. My primary complaint with regard to determinacy is not that 
Velleman's account would permit for significant indeterminacy in what reasons or well-
conducted deliberation call for. That's alright in my view. The problem, rather, is that his 
account seems to give way too quickly too often, where we appear to retain the ability to 
keep deliberating even after we have noticed that all options remaining on the table do 
equally well in terms of intelligibility. Choice-situations coming with an array of equally 
intelligible options are not uncommon. Here's one. I might decide to stay home with my 
book, music and wine-and-cheese, or I might decide to meet a friend and go out for 
dinner and a movie. Both ways of spending the evening seem perfectly intelligible, 
neither having the edge intelligibility-wise. Intelligibility seems neutral between the 
options, and yet I am still thinking. In a telling passage Velleman writes (2007 : xxx [p.30 
of Introduction]): "The standard of intelligibility is a standard of coherence. It requires an 
agent to find that action which is explanatorily most coherent with his values, 
commitments, motives, habits, customs, practices, and personality." But, as is well 
known, coherence is a rather permissive criterion. Both practical options of staying-at-
home-reading-and-listening-to-music and going-out-for-dinner-and-a-movie perfectly 
cohere with my values, commitments, motives, habits, customs, practices, and 
personality. Now it is true that after I have made a decision the winner shall edge ahead 
intelligibility-wise. But that generic truth is not very helpful to consider before a decision 
has been reached, as it applies to all options equally. 
Now consider force. Suppose staying at home is in fact the more intelligible 
option. Were I to write an autobiography, I would take great care in emphasizing how 
hoity-toity a person I am, and literature, music and wine-and-cheese better fits that kind 
of life impression I would then wish to give. The dish and movie I am sure to choose are 
rather ordinary in contrast, bloody and unrefined in both instances. Now intuitions turn 
thin here, but I'm inclined to find the stipulated intelligibility-imbalance a rather 
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insignificant detail for my decision-making-process, which could hardly be so if indeed it 
was the constitutive aim. It seems to me it would not take much to overrule it, perhaps a 
mental depiction of a savory burger at my favorite steakhouse would do. It seems a 
perfectly credible self-description to say that I chose what, on balance, was slightly less 
intelligible over that which, on balance, held greater culinary promise. Moreover, the 
voluntary surrender of some degree of intelligibility on my part would not strike me as 
too bothersome. Intelligibility does not appear to have the deliberative significance we 
would expect should it be the constitutive aim of action. 
Now, it may seem fair to reply: wait a moment, would not the prospect of a 
savory burger have implications for what qualifies as the more intelligible course of 
action? Would not, quite generally, that which emerges as the pivotal deliberative factors 
for choice also contribute to that choice's intelligibility? Whatever considerations tip the 
balance in well-conducted decision-making is ipso facto also a consideration in light of 
which the decision reached becomes more intelligible. This potentially seems to undercut 
the provision of any counterexample against Velleman's account, where reasons tilt one 
way and intelligibility the other. I'm not quite convinced by this, given the relative ease 
with which stories can be concocted about sadists who take great pleasure in their cruelty 
or megalomaniacs who ruthlessly strive for power, rendering their reason-contradicting 
behavior intelligible in light of their motives nonetheless. Marquis de Sade, the eponym 
of sadism, was, after all, quite a gifted narrator of his own libertine lifestyle, portraying 
his excesses as no less understandable than any other conduct. However, few would 
conclude on that basis that he usually did what he had most reasons to do. Or, to take 
another literary example, when Meursault shoots a random person in Camus' L 'Etranger 
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because it was so hot, his murder might be considered intelligible to some extent given 
the ample documentation we have concerning how profoundly seemingly irrelevant 
factors, such as heat, can affect behavior, especially when agitated. And yet that heat, 
whatever else it did, hardly provided any reason for Meursault to murder, not even a little 
bit or to some extent. The lesson, in very abstract terms, is that understanding and 
approval are not the same phenomena, often coming apart, even if also frequently going 
together. It is unfortunately not true that tout comprendre c 'est tout pardoner. I am thus 
not convinced that Velleman's account is indeed free of counterexamples. But even if we 
should grant him that such counterexamples are impossible, this would still not 
necessarily count as a victory for Velleman, for intelligibility could be systematically 
correlated with the factors doing the real work without doing the real work itself. 
And this is indeed not implausible to suppose. The rejoinder to the reply, then, is 
that Velleman's intelligibility account gets things backwards, where the manner in which 
intelligibility affixes to reasoned choices does not help his case. Once I have determined 
that certain considerations settle a deliberative case I have also made a choice rendered 
intelligible by the very same considerations. But intelligibility itself seems secondary 
rather than primary here. If I decide to go for the burger and the movie, because of their 
primitive appeal, I have made an intelligible choice. But the intelligibility of that choice 
is not the primary concern, but rather seems entirely derivative and a function of the 
primary concerns that are in fact driving the decision. It's a supervenient feature with 
little or no independent force. My choice had something to do with my appetite for 
burgers and primitive entertainment. Because it had something to do with anything, or 
anything appealing, it also was rendered intelligible by that anything. Now we may ask: 
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which is the more appropriate description of my deliberative situation? That, first, I was 
moved by considerations of intelligibility, if only implicitly, and that it so happened that a 
burger and a movie would make for a particularly intelligible action-sequence? Or, 
alternatively, that I was moved by the burger and the movie and that it so happened, quasi 
as a side-product, that intelligibility was thereby ensured as well? The second seems the 
more apt characterization. 
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Thus, even if intelligibility turns out to be a supervemng feature of well-
conducted deliberation, where intelligibility is always co-present when we reach well-
reasoned decisions, Velleman is still mistaken in claiming intelligibility to be the 
constitutive aim of our choices. "The goal of a more comprehensive knowledge of what 
we are doing therefore militates in favor of doing things that can be understood as 
motivated by our desires, expressive of our emotions, implementing our policies, 
manifesting our characters, and so on," Velleman contends. (2007:xxvi) But no, it's the 
other way around. We are, non-derivatively and not usually in the service of 
comprehensive knowledge, motivated by our desires, striving for ways of expressing our 
emotions, seeking to implement our policies and to manifest our characters, and it so 
happens that thereby we come to be intelligible and known to ourselves as well. Self-
knowledge is a resultant feature of purposeful action instead of its driving force. Of 
course, none of this is to deny that occasionally a drive for comprehensive self-
knowledge might take a more active role, especially within social context where there is 
ample pressure to justify oneself. There is in fact an intriguing conjecture that our 
occasional obsession to justify ourselves to ourselves emerges as an offline rehearsal to 
justify ourselves to others. However this may be, and however wide reaching a concern 
for intelligibility may be, what I emphatically question is that this drive is the organizing 
motive behind action and deliberation as such, without which they would not even be 
what they are. I am willing to grant the existential, but not the universal. 
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There are plenty other potential worries one could raise about Velleman's 
proposal. For reasons of space I had to restrict myself to developing only one line of 
criticism. In closing 1'd like to mention at least one additional worry that seems 
especially pressing, and which incidentally is not unrelated to the argument from above. 
Velleman's proposal is at risk of systematically mischaracterizing the grounds of a great 
number of practical reasons by situating them in our own agency as opposed to situating 
them in aspects external to it. This seems especially pertinent when it comes to moral or 
other-regarding considerations. When one helps another person, and does so for the sake 
of the other person, the reason that would morally justify such behavior appears to have a 
lot to do with the other person and the opportunity to alleviating her plight and very little 
to do with the actor and the opportunity to further his overall intelligibility. Reversely, 
when one fails to help, in a morally culpable fashion, the primary moral complaint is best 
not understood as taking issue with the forgone opportunity of making oneself better 
understood, but rather as targeting at the forgone opportunity of alleviating the plight of 
another person. In the final analysis, the pivotal consideration here seems to have its 
source in the situation of the patient and not in the (intellectual?) situation of the agent, 
and, in particular, does certainly not derive its primary moral force from considerations 
pertaining to what would make for the most sensible storyline of the agent. Of course, 
various philosophers have challenged the notion of radically other-regarding reasons, 
potentially disconnected from the motivational set of the relevant actors. But whatever 
one makes of those challenges, it is hard to believe that one is entitled to disallow the 
very possibility of such reasons on conceptual grounds alone, by citing some alleged 
constitutive aim of action which, per definition, appears rather self-regarding through and 
through. 
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What my argument contests is that intelligibility is the constitutive aim of action 
and agency; it contests that action has that particular teleology. For all that has been said 
intelligibility might still be considered a central and explanatorily fertile component in 
practical deliberation. My sense is that the final picture would be somewhat messy. Some 
people seem more concerned with their overall intelligibility than others. Concern for 
intelligibility comes in varying degrees, where we find different agential styles of 
prioritizing different kinds of considerations for deliberation. Some people worry about 
intelligibility a great deal, explicitly or implicitly, others not so much but instead focus on 
other things. I find it hard to believe that people of the first group are categorically 
deliberatively superior to people of the second group. I find it hard to believe, in other 
words, that intelligibility does have the privileged status of being the constitutive aim of 
action. 
4.7. Constitutive Norms for Agency: The Integrity of Christine 
Korsgaard 
Christine Korsgaard has developed another version of the constitutive 
programme, resembling Velleman's in some respects while departing in others, but in any 
case quite unique. The resemblance between the discussion of both authors in focus and 
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criticism is sufficiently great, however, to warrant greater brevity here. Korsgaard's 
thought on the subject of agency and normativity has evolved from her Sources of 
Normativity in 1996 to her Self-Constitution in 2009, as well as her collection of essays in 
The Constitution of Agency published a year before, even though the basic ingredients 
and the basic problematic as she conceives it - her famous normative question -
remained pretty much the same. I shall mostly focus on her latest work. The titles of her 
two recent books are intentionally programmatic and supply the central concepts of 
Korsgaard's approach to normativity and agency. In her view, the self qua unified agent 
is constituted through action. This is the entry point into matters normative: "the source 
of normativity lies in the human project of self-constitution". (2009:4) The crucial step 
she takes from this is that normative assessment of action itself must proceed in relation 
to action's capacity to constitute unified agency. Action is geared towards agency-
constitution, and to be fully judged in terms of it. "If we want to learn what it is that 
makes action right or wrong, we must start by asking what actions are, what their 
function is." (2009:8) And, in a stunning completion almost 20 pages later, Korgaard 
writes (2009:25): 
Action is self-constitution. And accordingly I am going to argue that what 
makes actions good or bad is how well they constitute you. . .. [T]he 
principles of practical reason are principles by means of which we 
constitute ourselves as unified agents ... that explains their normativity. 
The principles of practical reason bind us because, having to act, we must 
constitute ourselves as unified agents. 
Her central thesis, then, is that the criterion of correctness for action is self-
constitution. To recapitulate her view in familiar language, Korsgaard contends action is 
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constitutively aimed at self-constitution just as Velleman contended action is 
constitutively aimed at self-understanding. We saw why Velleman is mistaken. We now 
need to see why Korsgaard is mistaken as well. 
My strategy against Korsgaard resembles my strategy deployed against Velleman, 
insisting on the phenomenological inadequacy of the picture of practical reasoning that 
emerges from her constitutive program. I believe Korsgaard's own work contains 
important elements to articulate my criticism most forcefully, enabling me to level my 
criticism quasi from within. Reasons of space permit to press only this one single 
complaint. But the problems with her account are myriad, and let me at least mention 
what would have been my second choice. Korsgaard's entire programme is premised on 
the claim that there is a function actions as such have, but actions as such do not have an 
overarching function or purpose or telos or ergon. Each and every single action has a 
purpose, for sure, since actions are teleological or goal-directed in nature. But to conclude 
from this that there must be a single overarching function or purpose underwriting action 
as such is to commit the same sort of quantifier mistake that Anscombe so beautifully 
diagnosed in Aristotle: namely that, supposing that for each action there is a purpose, we 
are entitled to conclude that there is one purpose for each action. We are not entitled to 
take that step, however, as moving from V3 to 3V is a fallacy. Now there are other 
arguments in support of the claim that there is a function-of-action-as-such, and 
Korsgaard defends her single-purpose teleology extensively, heavily borrowing from 
Aristotle. But the project seems doomed from the very start, for we have little choice but 
to consider Aristotelian teleology as discredited. To me it sounds odd even prima facie to 
ask what action as such is there for. I know what this or that action is there for, to quench 
my thirst or to express my gratitude or to live out my passion. But there is no common 
denominator or purpose for all of my actions, except perhaps the generic one to achieve 
whatever particular purpose my actions have, which merely restates that each and every 
action has a purpose. Suppressing that fundamental dissention, I now turn to my more 
pointed criticism of the thesis that action has the particular function of constituting 
ourselves as agents. 
243 
Conceptualizing the normative force of standards in terms of their necessitation, a 
term she borrows from Kant, and a force in our psychic lives she complains is 
underestimated and misplaced by her opponents, Korsgaard writes in a particularly 
dynamic passage (2009:7): 
There is work and effort - a kind of struggle - involved in the moral life, 
and those who struggle successfully are the ones whom we call "rational" 
or "good." But it is not the struggle to be rational or to be good. It is, 
instead, the ongoing struggle for integrity, the struggle for psychic unity, 
the struggle to be, in the face of psychic complexity, a single unified 
agent. Normative standards - as I am about to argue - are the principles by 
which we achieve the psychic unity that makes agency possible. The work 
of achieving psychic unity, the work that we experience as necessitation, 
is what I am going to call self-constitution. 
It is not entirely clear what Korsgaard has in mind when she speaks of 
necessitation and her repeated allusion to psychic unity and the struggle to achieve it 
makes it seem as though she is more concerned about matters psychological than matters 
normative, let alone meta-normative. Korsgaard's famous normative question frequently 
threatens to tum into a psychological question, as if it concerned our capacity for self-
management and impulse control. This is not an uncommon complaint about her work 
(Hussain & Shah 2006, Parfit 2006, FitzPatrick 2005), and not entirely unmerited either, 
but for now let us set it aside and read what she has to say as a contribution to our present 
meta-normative inquiry, an attempt to explain authority. 
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Now I believe there is an important insight in Korsgaard's portrayal of self-
constitution. I share her skepticism about pre-constitutional agency, of little selves that 
stand behind all of our actions and deliberations, of little selves that are standing ready 
for extra attributes to be attached to them, like dust collectors. I thus agree with 
Korsgaard that "there is no you prior to your choices and actions, because your identity is 
in a quite literal way constituted by your choices and actions," (2009:19) where the 
negated priority is understood principally instead of singularly. Of course there is a prior 
you to particular choices of yours, such as eating serials for breakfast this morning, but 
that is not how to understand Korsgaard's contention. Rather, there is no prior self to 
choice and action as such, but rather it is through choice and action that the self is self-
forming. 
On this issue we agree, then, but notice that it really is a side-issue of sorts as our 
present question is concerned. That question is not primarily about agency and its 
formative relation to action, but about action and its normative relation to agency. The 
question is whether action has the particular teleology Korsgaard supposes, namely of 
constitutively aiming at self-constitution, of owing its pertinent standards of assessment 
to what contributes to self-constitution. To see the distinction I am getting at more 
clearly, consider a simple analogy. A community requires people, but that doesn't mean 
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that people are there in order for the community to exist. Likewise, that agency is in some 
way made up of choices and actions does not mean that the point and purpose of choices 
and actions are to make up an agent. It is not true that a concern for agency sets the 
standards for action and dictates what to do. It is true that one acts and thereby becomes 
an agent, but false, in contrast, that one acts in order to become an agent. One can take a 
left tum or a right tum, one can join the Free French or care for his mother, one can stay 
at home with a book or go for a movie; each time our choices will, to a greater or lesser 
extent, determine who we are as agents, literally making us into who we are. But that is 
just the inevitable effect of making choices - disregarding for the moment particularly 
self-destructive choices - and does not supply normative standards for what particular 
choices to make. Action as such no more aims at self-constitution than it aims at self-
understanding, even though it is heavily implicated in both. 
I believe this relates to a noteworthy tension in Korsgaard's own theory. The 
tension is generated by newer and older elements of her theory, first by her new 
contention that normativity has its source in agency-constitutive standards and her older 
contention, which she still endorses (2009:20-26), that practical reasons and standards 
flow from our contingently-chosen identities. She first claims that "the principles of 
practical reason serve to unify and constitute us as agents, and that is why they are 
normative"? (2009:27, emphasis added), but then she also claims that "our conception of 
our practical identity govern our choices of actions" (2009:20), and these two claims are 
7 I read this as a universal claim, all principles of practical reason or principles of practical reason as such 
... , thus the added emphasis on the. 
harder to reconcile than she appears to acknowledge. Identities have a tendency to 
develop a normative life of their own, independent and not easily be brought back to that 
of agency and the pressure towards unification. Her older views strike me as closer on 
target, but in any case, they don't quite fit with her newer views, thereby revealing a 
major difficulty in taking self-constitution to be the standard of correctness for action. 
Let me explain. Korsgaard's final picture appears to be this. Begin with the 
necessity of being unified agents, of coming to value and respect one's own humanity 
and rationality. The relevant principles here are those in virtue of which we are able to 
constitute ourselves as unified agents, enabling us to successfully struggle for unity in 
complexity. That's the ground level. But there are many alternative ways of being unified 
agents, many ways of acquiring identities, as fathers or professors or citizens or whatever, 
and her view she carries over from Sources is that many of our reasons in life flow from 
the contingent identities of ours we choose and endorse. Further up, therefore, we 
encounter choices and principles that are not strictly speaking necessary and dictated by 
our agency as such. The principles we are dealing with there concern what to do as good 
fathers or professors or citizens, but since no one needs to be a father or professor or 
citizen in order to be an agent, the relevant norms apply only contingently. Had one 
chosen another identity other norms would apply. Yet whatever identity one acquires, the 
reasons that as a result flow from it appear to exhibit no particularly strong tie to a 
concern for self-unification, but rather are concerned with what good fathers or 
professors or citizens would do in certain circumstances. They seem to introduce an 
independent source of normativity, and the question is how to make good on her claim 
cited above that the principles of practical reason serve to unifY and constitute us as 
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agents, and that is why they are normative. The only way to answer that question appears 
to be the attempt to relate the normative significance of our identities to the necessity of 
being self-unifying agents, perhaps by grounding that significance in agency in some 
way, such that the normative significance of our identities ultimately is owed to the 
necessity of being a unified agent. Korsgaard in fact anticipates that move in her previous 
writing, as a component she is independently attracted to. 
Unfortunately there are serious complications for how to relate the normative 
significance of higher-level norms to ground-level norms pertaining to agency, even if it 
turned out that living by those higher-order norms is our way of becoming agents. This is 
most dramatically seen in cases of conflict, where the ground-level norms and the higher-
level norms pull in different directions, undermining the hope that the force of the latter 
could be explained on the basis of the former. Return to the example of being a father. A 
father ought to dedicate significant portions of his time and energy towards furthering of 
his child's well-being. This is what the higher-level norms pertaining to fatherhood are 
calling for. However, doing this may very well conflict with the project of becoming 
more of a unified agent. Dedicating the required time may put strains on ones unity, and 
abandoning ones fatherly duties may render it easier to become more of a unified agent. It 
mayor may not, it all depends on the situation, but in any case it would hardy surprise, 
since fatherly norms are tailored towards an object other than the father, telling him to do 
something about his child, while self-constitutive norms are tailored towards his self, 
telling him to do something about his unity and constitution. The crucial point is that 
living up to the higher-order norms that flow from ones identity need not necessarily 
further, and could even compromise, one's self-constitution. Dealing with life's 
complexities while preserving ones unity in a manner that comports with ones identity is 
only one way of doing so. Another is to run away, or to switch identities, or to acquire a 
unified identity as a bad person. If so, how could the necessity of preserving ones unity 
call for honoring ones contingent identity? Reversely, and in particularly extreme cases, 
living up to ones identity and self-embraced standards might even foreseeably result in 
one's total self-disintegration and death, assuming here that self-disintegration is a 
particularly poor way of achieving self-integration. Sacrifices by parents on behalf of 
their children are not unheard of, and neither are people who give their lives to all sorts of 
causes, thereby giving up their own selves on behalf of something else in selfless fashion. 
Henceforth, what our contingent identities call for and what the drive for self-unification 
calls for can easily come apart. Since the necessity of being a unified agent does not 
directly translate into any corresponding necessity to be an agent of a particular identity 
also living up to the relevantly accompanying standards, and since the promotion of 
greater unity might even take a hit by the commitment to ones identity, the normative 
force of the latter cannot be comfortably derived from to that of the former. 
What I conclude, then, is that the standards that seem most pertinent for action 
and deliberation are not first and foremost standards concerned with self-constitution and 
self-unification, and are neither derivative of them. As in my discussion of Velleman, I 
question the phenomenological adequacy of the picture of deliberation emerging from 
Korsgaard's constitutive program, trying here to pitch elements of Korsgaard's own work 
against herself. Though this line of criticism could easily be extend, adding example after 
example, I won't do so here, but instead isolate this problem and tum to another. Suppose 
I am correct that norms pertaining to self-constitution cannot underwrite norms for action 
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in its entirety. What about agency as opposed to action, quasi as an independent practical 
domain freed from the need of having immediate implications for action? Are there 
principles that could possibly be held necessary for the possibility of agency as such? In 
good Kantian fashion, Korsgaard proposes two principles, the categorical and 
hypothetical imperatives. I already had something to say about the capacity of the 
categorical imperative to be recruited to that end, where I found it utterly incredible to 
suppose that the categorical imperative is constitutive of unified agency as such. Why is 
it also implausible to suppose that the hypothetical imperative is constitutive of unified 
agency as such, even if, admittedly, much less implausible than in the categorical case? 
Suppose the hypothetical imperative directs us to adopt necessary means to our 
considered ends. In the final analysis the imperative would have to be infinitely more 
complicated, but for now, this simple version shall suffice. What would a constitutive 
account of the hypothetical imperative look like? It would say something such as this: it 
is constitutive of willing that one seeks out means of accomplishing what one wills, and 
in case something turns out necessary for what one wills, the willer cannot disregard that 
thing altogether while still being said to will what he wills. With Kant one could hold that 
"Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason as decisive influence on his action) also the 
means which are indispensably necessary and in his power." (Groundwork, Paton 
translation), and, momentarily disregarding Kant's own qualification, read this in the 
following way: Who wills the end, wills also the means which are indispensably 
necessary and in his power, or he does not really will the end after all. Korsgaard 
paraphrases the same idea (1997:244, emphasis hers): 
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To will an end just is to will to cause or realize the end, hence to will to 
take the means to the end. This is the sense in which the principle is 
analytic. The instrumental principle is constitutive of an act of the will. If 
you do not follow it, you are not willing the end at all. 
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In another passage, she writes: "If acting is determining yourself to be a cause of 
some state of affairs, then you are just not acting unless you take the means to that state 
of affairs." (2008:15) We might go further, and hold that the hypothetical imperative is 
not just constitutive of willing, or acting, but of being an effective willer or actor as such, 
of someone who is capable of forming and executing his wills. The thesis would be, then, 
that one cannot be an actor, one who executes what he wills, while disrespecting the 
hypothetical imperative. Korsgaard formulates the idea (2008:13): 
The notion of efficacy brings in the other element of Kant's account of 
action, the principle of instrumental reason. For if to act is to engage in 
practical activity that is directed to producing some state of affairs in the 
world, then the agent must also seek to be efficacious, that is, to work with 
the natural causal mechanisms that he can use to make things happen in 
the world. He must use the means. And this means that the maxim or 
principle on which he proposes to act must serve as a universal practical 
law .... To be an agent is to be, at once, autonomous and efficacious - it is 
to have effects on the world that are determined by yourself. By following 
the categorical imperative we render ourselves autonomous and by 
following the principle of instrumental reason, we render ourselves 
efficacious. So by following these principles we constitute ourselves as 
agents: that is, we take control of our movements. 
Unfortunately the constitutive reading of the hypothetical imperative won't do, 
and Korsgaard is keenly aware of the primary reason why. Rendering the hypothetical 
imperative constitutive of willing, or of being an actor, immediately renders instrumental 
inationality impossible. But it is not impossible, since people often do behave 
instrumentally irrationally, and then we cite the principle to ground our criticism. 
Korgaard writes (1997:236, or 2008:48): 
Kant says that imperatives are expressed by an ought because they are 
addressed to wills that are not necessarily determined by the objective 
laws of reason .... In other words, imperatives are addressed to beings 
who may follow them or not. And this is true of the instrumental principle 
as well as of the others. Now if this is right, it must be possible for a 
rational being (one who is subject to the instrumental principle) to 
disobey, resist, or fail to follow that principle. It must be possible for 
someone to will an end, and yet to fail to will the means to that end. 
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In response to the problem, while still attempting to hold on to the constitutive 
reading, Korgaard proposes to weaken the constitutive proposal, where willing does not 
constitutively require the successful execution of the requisite means, but only the 
formation of a first-personal commitment to adopting the requisite means (1997:245): 
[W]illing an end just is committing yourself to realizing the end. Willing 
an end, in other words, is an essentially first-personal and normative act. 
To will an end it to give oneself a law, hence, to govern oneself. The law 
is not the instrumental principle; it is some law of the form: Realize that 
end. That of course is equivalent to 'Take the means to this end.' So 
willing an end is equivalent to committing yourself, first-personally, to 
taking the means to that end. 
The passage raises as many questions as it answers, and I'm not fully confident 
I'm getting the idea. But however we read the weakening of the condition from actually 
adopting the means to merely committing oneself to adopting the means, the proposal is 
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simultaneously too strong and too weak, a result we also get for many alternative ways of 
weakening the condition, for instance merely trying to adopting the means, or merely 
seeking to execute the means. The modified condition is too strong, because the modified 
proposal rules out the possibility of committal instrumental irrationality (and, mutis 
mutandis, irrationality with regards to trying and seeking), which is in fact quite possible, 
even actual. All we need in order to counter this modified version of the constitutive 
reading of instrumental rationality is to modify the criticism, an easy exercise. People can 
and do fail in forming the requisite commitments to their ends. 
The proposal is also too weak, however, for one does not take care of everything 
one needs to take care of in order to meet the hypothetical imperative by forming the 
suitable commitments. It is not enough to say: 'I am willing the end and 1 am also 
committed to executing the means,' and then stopping short of actually executing the 
means. To the extent to which being committed to executing the means is different from 
just executing the means, what one needs to do according to the principle is not just being 
committed to executing the means, but actually executing the means, and one fails with 
regard to the principle if one merely commits instead of executes. Perhaps one is inclined 
to reply that one cannot be committed to executing the means while stopping short of 
executing them, for not stopping short is constitutive of the commitment. Not so, as by 
now we know, and need not repeat why. 
Neither the categorical nor the hypothetical imperatives are plausible candidates 
for principles constitutive of agency, let alone action. Still short of constitutive principles 
for action and agency we might start becoming discouraged. Is there not a single 
candidate that stands a chance of constitutively underwriting agency? I think there might 
be one, and to this I now turn. 
4.8. The Past and the Future, Michael Bratman's Plans and the 
Importance of George Sher's Past 
Agency is a temporally extended phenomenon. Having a past and having a future 
are essential to agency, in a particularly profound sense of the term. It not merely so 
happen that agents traverse through time and thereby inadvertently become part of some 
ongoing history. A lot of things can be said to have a history, buildings and books, for 
instance. They persist through time and thereby come to acquire various temporal 
characteristics. Things happen to them that shape the way they are. Many aspects of us 
have histories that resemble the manner in which buildings and books have histories, our 
joints and bodies for instance. It doesn't even matter whether it was us who caused our 
joints and bodies to undergo certain modifications. The shape our joints and bodies are 
currently in reflects what we have done with them in the recent past. But that sense of 
acquiring a history is still not the interesting agential sense, as it is still exhausted by what 
happened to our joints and bodies. 
The crucial further agential sense of having a history, then, must be going beyond 
the passive sense from above where things merely happen to agents, and where instead 
agents act and are not merely acted upon. The crucial entry point is this. Agents have a 
conception of who they are and under which they do what they do, representing a truly 
active sense of authorship of their own history. Agency cannot be time-sliced but 
253 
temporally extended and must be active. What we must above all avoid, however, is 
trying to capture the present sense of authorship by postulating little authors in our heads 
writing our stories, be it in the form of noumenal selves outside the causal order or be it 
in the form of some privileged subset of our attitudes, possible higher-order attitudes. 
Such a homuncular approach would offer no illumination for anything. 
Active authorship over time must be understood differently, therefore, and the 
only sense I can think of that avoids postulating homunculi while also preserving activity 
instead of passivity is a sense of self-organization across time, underwritten by certain 
principles, instantiating a distinct form of capacity. And what an astonishing capacity that 
is. Squirrels hiding their nuts and bears feasting for hibernation display a first instinctive 
approximation of that capacity. Yet their preparations for wintertime fade by comparison 
when we consider activities such as building a cottage and cultivating the land. For this a 
myriad of sub-activities need to be coordinated, always keeping the final product in mind, 
being prepared to making necessary adjustments without giving up on the overall 
scheme, forgoing temptations arising for the present self on behalf of the later self, and so 
on. This requires enormous intelligence, and the relevant thought is that the principles 
empowering that intelligence are, in a manner of speaking and at some fundamental level, 
not first and foremost principles we employ but principles we are. Extended active agency 
is but a name for the capacity of operating under the relevant principles. Notice that this 
involves no bootstrapping paradox where agents self-create. Instead, to be an agent, in 
this view, is simply to be a system that operates under the requisite self-organizing 




This is reminiscent of much of what Korsgaard and Velleman have to say, and 
indeed, despite all the points of disagreement, the core assumption I share with 
proponents of agency-based accounts is one that rejects as inadequate the notion of 
agency as an antecedent unity awaiting further cross-temporal-integration, and which 
holds instead that integration and the principles constitutive of it are what create that 
unity in the first place. It is not that there are agents who also happen to posses cross 
temporal characteristics in the manner books and bodies do. They exhibit the constitutive 
capacity to identify with future and past stages of that person and thereby establish their 
own agency. Projecting agency over time and creating agency over time seem two sides 
of the same coin. 
We get a very immediate sense of how essential that cross-temporal identification 
is when we envision the terrifying scenario where we lose our memories and our ideas of 
what to do next. Our agency would shrink to an instant point in time and come 
dangerously close to extinction. What might preserve our agency at such an instant may 
be our awareness that we must have had a past even thought we no longer remember it, 
and that we must go on making choices even though we have no clue as to which choices 
to make. But the lost sense of agency is very palpable indeed. 
Michael Bratman's planning theory of intention is of great help for appreciating 
the intriguing nature of the principles underwriting cross-temporal agency. Alluding to a 
trio of core features of human agency - reflectiveness, planfulness, and having a 
conception of one's agency as temporally extended, Michael Bratman writes (2000:35): 
We are reflective about our motivation. We form prior plans and policies 
that organize our activity over time. And we see ourselves as agents who 
persist over time and who begin, develop, and then complete temporally 
extended activities and projects. Any reasonably complete theory of 
human action will need in some way to advert to this trio of features. 
Bratman believes, correctly in my view, that especially the last member of the trio 
- beginning, developing, and then completing temporally extended activities and projects 
- is key to understanding human agency, its cross-temporal identity, and in particular to 
understanding the other two members of the trio, reflectivity and planfulness (2000:57): 
The primary connection between a self-governing policy and the agent's 
identity over time is grounded ... in the policy's characteristic role in 
coordinating and organizing the agent's temporally extended life in ways 
that constitute and support Lockean continuities and connections. In this 
way, on my view, a broadly Lockean approach to personal identity over 
time can help clarify the nature of the agent's reflective endorsement. 
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Lockean continuities and connections, or Partit's overlapping strands of 
psychological connectedness, are established between different stages of a person in 
virtue of, in backward-looking manner, memories, retained commitments and desires, 
and, in forward-looking manner, intentions, plans, and policies. With regard to the details 
of all the memories, commitments, desires, intentions, plans, and policies involved, there 
is ample space for contingencies and differentiation. Incorporating some mix of them is 
required for an identity to form over time, but there is no necessity for any particular mix. 
I believe, however, we can push all this one step further, and focus on one especially 
fundamental capacity involved in forming and executing plans over time as such, namely 
what Bratman has called a conservative bias in diachronic reasoning and planning, in the 
hope of finding something constitutive. 
Forming an intention today to do something tomorrow requires some confidence 
on my part that when tomorrow arrives I shall still feel inclined to do what I intended 
yesterday, simply because I so intended. For one thing, it would make no sense to take 
the first sub-steps today if I could not rest assured that I will follow through tomorrow. 
The even more fundamental point, however, concerns not mere effectiveness, as 
important as it is, but rather the very sensibility of forming intentions in the first place, 
which crucially depends upon my anticipated preparedness to follow through past 
intentions in the future; which depends, in other words, on my anticipated preparedness 
to feel rational pressure in the future towards taking seriously, in a committal fashion, 
intentions and policies formed in the past. Without that assurance I cannot even sensibly 
begin to form intentions in the first place. My present formation of a forward-looking 
intention is possible only under the anticipation of a backward-looking future self, and in 
particular, looking back not in a mere act of curiosity but in an attitude of upheld 
commitment. 
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In a remarkably insightful chapter, Why the Past Matters, belonging to a 
monograph on desert, George Sher offers a more rigorous development and defense of 
the idea. Sher's overall objective is to come to a better understanding of desert and its 
significance, and, given desert's essentially backward-looking nature, the chapter's 
contribution to the monograph is to answer the question of "how what is behind us can 
affect the normative status of what is ahead ... how future occurrences of no intrinsic 
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importance can acquire value from, or be made obligatory by, their relations to events 
that have already faded from the scene." (1987:175-6) Sher proposes to adopt a 
deliberative perspective to answer the question. "To show ... that reasons retain their 
force in retrospect ... , I shall seek this view's rationale in the demands of deliberation and 
practical reasoning." And, outlining the general form of his argument, he continues 
(1987:178-9): 
More specifically, I shall argue that if we denied that reasons retain their 
force in retrospect, we could not coherently form certain very familiar 
sorts of intentions. Since an ability to form these intentions is central to 
deliberation itself, this would mean that we could not coherently 
deliberate. But ... deliberation is unavoidable, so the view that reasons are 
retroactively efficacious must be unavoidable too. 
Sher's emphasis on what an agent must take for granted so that he can sensibly 
form intentions, in other words states planning for what cannot immediately be achieved 
but what instead must be carried out later, repeats the important insight from above. 
"Because an intention fixes one's readiness to perform the chosen act, it is a kind of 
bridge between one's present and future self. In forming it, the agent necessarily 
envisions his current readiness to act as carrying forward until the appropriate future 
moment." (1987:180) The agent cannot endorse, and in fact must reject, what Sher calls 
principle (NA), afeature of an act or event is never a reasonfor anything once the act or 
event is past. (1987:182)8 The beauty of Sher's reasoning is that the significance he 
claims agents must accord to the past is explained on the basis of the fact that agents 
8 I read reason here as a deliberatively relevant/actor. 
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cannot otherwise make deliberative provisions for the future. The agential necessity of 
expanding into the future entails a similar necessity of continuing the past. Because 
tomorrow I must take seriously what I have decided today, and be justifiably expecting as 
much, lest my present decision loses all point and purpose, I cannot be deliberatively 
future-oriented without also being deliberatively past-oriented. The reasoning is 
particularly effective since it is addressed to those who take no qualms with the 
significance of the future for deliberation but who take qualms with the corresponding 
significance of the past, by showing them that they cannot have the one without the other. 
Not surprisingly, this argument involves various complications and invites further 
attempts to clarify it. The larger context would have to be considered, the defeasibility of 
the force of past intentions admitted and balanced with other considerations, and so on, 
all of which could easily embroil us in a lengthy digression. Not now. However 
complicated the final account may be, however many subtleties need to be considered, 
there must be some norm we operate under which demands, in rough terms, that we take 
seriously, in a committal fashion, what we have done and devised in the past, even 
though the past is over, as one recent United States' President has put it. The practical 
question of why take seriously, in committal fashion, what one has done and devised in 
the past cannot be anything but rhetorical for us qua deliberating agents. It is not that we 
are agents, and then wonder about our fundamental attitudes towards our past and future. 
Having the relevant attitudes is what endows us with the amazing capacity called agency 
in the first place. It appears, then, that we have finally found, even if only in rough 
outline, a principle constitutive of agency as such. 
4.9. The Retreat 
It's time to pause and to take stock. The prevIOUS sections surveyed which 
principles could possibly be held constitutive of action and agency. Though we did not 
end up empty-handed, uncovering at least one plausible candidate concerning cross-
temporal agency, the overall result was rather meager, especially with regard to 
constitutive principles for action. It is clear, then, that agency-based accounts do not 
succeed in coming up with a rich enough set of constitutive principles that 
simultaneously captures the kind of agential inescapability distinctive of constitution yet 
also accommodates a reasonable portion of norms widely considered authoritative. 
Logically speaking, agency-based accounts are free to embrace the minimalist result, and 
to refuse to withstand the tendency into a complete normative wasteland where only the 
minutes set of demands retains a claim to validity. There is not a single author, however, 
that I know of who would be willing to take that route, and so we can safely ignore it. 
The conclusion we must draw, then, is that the agency-based programme falls short of 
satisfying both its initial constitutive and explanatory aspiration. 
Perhaps this was to be expected. Perhaps only the most basic set of principles of 
practical reason ever stood a chance of maintaining a claim to be constitutive of agency. 
Agents are known to exhibit the most egregious failures of practical reason by refusing to 
take into account their own immediate future, their own deliberative health, their 
acknowledged necessary means to execute larger plans and projects, and so on. In 
response, proponents of agency-based accounts may acknowledge that their proposal was 
only intended to be part ofthe meta-normative story. Perhaps the emerging picture is this. 
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Some norms acquire authoritative standing due to their centrality in agency, and some 
other norms acquire that same standing due to other factors. The demand to be responsive 
to intentions formed in the past might be an example of the first kind, whereas not to 
torture babies for fun might be an example of the second kind. According to this picture, 
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what is constitutive of agency does not comprise the entirety of all authoritative norms. It 
simply comprises a particularly interesting subset and explains why all the members of 
that subset have that meta-normative status. One may go one step further and argue that 
constitutive norms are particularly interesting because they hold authority for all agents. 
They are categorical, perhaps uniquely so. Other norms can be legitimately applied to 
certain agents only. Role duties come to mind, such as those affixed with fathers and 
professors. In contrast, it may be argued that norms which are constitutive of agency 
retain normative force no matter what, independently of any further particulars of their 
target domain, since no agent could ever escape them. Being concerned about the view 
that "the justification of action must either lead to an infinite regress of justifications or 
stop short at a contingent aim that remains unjustified," Velleman writes in response 
(2009: 126-7): 
The way to avoid it [namely the problem just mentioned] would be to 
show that actions can be justified as such, in the manner of beliefs -
justified independently of any contingent aim at which they might be 
directed. In order for actions to be justifiable as such, however, they would 
need a criterion of aptness of correctness that isn't contingent, a criterion 
that applies to them simply in virtue of their being actions, just as the 
criterion of truth applies to beliefs simply in virtue of their being beliefs. 
So we have to look for a criterion of aptness or correctness embedded in 
the very nature of action. 
What this picture suggests is that constitution accounts not for a necessary 
condition for authority, but for a particularly interesting and powerful sufficient 
condition, since it also explains categoricity. 
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Given where we are in the overall dialectic, this strikes me the most charitable 
interpretation left. Nonetheless, the proposal comes with considerable costs that arise 
from within the agency-based programme. Recall how agency-based accounts were 
introduced and motivated in the first place, where the normative question was interpreted 
as a quintessentially agential question, and recall in particular Connie Rosati's ingenious 
interpretation of the normative problematic that put it in relation with Moore's open 
question argument. Her suggestion was that many accounts of what we must do and what 
is good for us retain an open feel precisely because they circumvent our own agency. 
Rosati complained that in particular many traditionally naturalistic accounts, such as 
naturalistic hedonism, involve principles that appear superimposed from the outside since 
they can be put at a distance from our own agency. What Rosati's line of reasoning 
suggests is that it is a necessary condition for a principle to retain authoritative force that 
it does not circumvent our agency. And according to the initial understanding of agency-
based accounts they nicely captured this condition for it is not even possible that 
constitutive principles circumvent our agency for they enable it in the first place. Yet if 
now proponents of agency-based accounts are forced to amend their accounts by limiting 
their explanatory aspiration, permitting non-constitutive norms to retain normative force 
as well, the inevitable result is that we create a tension for this neat motivation of what 
the constitutive programme was all about. Indeed, once norms are permitted to retain 
authoritative standing vis-a.-vis agents without a central place in agency as such, one 
starts to wonder what the fuss about constitution was all about. If norms can retain 
normative force on agents, even categorical normative force - e.g. the categorical 
imperative - without being constitutive of their agency, then there are alternative ways to 
answer the normative question, and the condition of not circumventing our agency 
becomes rather optional, which is a polite way of saying that it is no real condition at all. 
Thus, the original motivation, hooking up authority with agency-constitutive 
norms, cannot be so easily jettisoned without also jeopardizing the entire programme 
itself. And indeed, with the inclusion of non-agency-based norms we are forced to revisit 
the rationale for that very motivation itself, namely that a norm must connect to what is 
constitutive of agency to retain the right standing vis-a.-vis deliberative agents. Return to 
Rosati who wrote (2003:507): "The kind of account of personal good that would escape 
such questioning [whether something is really good for us] would be one that could 
survive our reflective scrutiny, that would fit with our capacity for autonomous 
evaluation and action." And also recall Korsgaard who wrote (1996:49): "If the problem 
is that morality might not survive reflection, then the solution is that it might." The 
question we now face is this. Why must the process whereby we determine whether a 
norm survives reflection or reflective scrutiny, the process determining the norm's 
standing vis-a.-vis the agent, terminate in what norms we constitutively must accept 
instead of terminate in norms we do accept? Why is it not enough for a norm to fit our 
capacity for autonomous evaluation and action that it does have a grip on the actual 
agent? There is an imminent threat that the entire motivation behind the constitutive 
programme ultimately collapses into nothing but another version of the internalism 
requirement, in the process giving up on what is constitutive of agency and instead 
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retreating to the weaker condition that demands must find resonance in the contingent 
motivational structures and identities of agents in order to validly apply to them, the 
requirement, namely, that what demands must not circumvent is not some mysterious set 
of constitutive norms for agency, but rather that what they must not circumvent is 
whatever norms agents happen to reflectively endorse. A result Velleman in particular is 
at great pains to avoid. 
This creates a problem so severe, I believe, that it warrants great pessimism about 
the internal stability of the agency-based programme after its explanatory ambitions have 
been modified - to which there is no real alternative. I shall not press this problem 
further, though, since there is an even graver one, and that concerns the move from the 
inescapability of certain norms for our agency to the authority of these norms. The move, 
crucial to this final and modified stand of the programme, emerges as fallacious upon 
scrutiny. The argument to this effect concludes the chapter. 
4.10. Inescapability and Authority 
What is the meta-normative significance of inescapability? The key question we 
need to ask is what conclusions we are entitled to draw about the meta-normative status 
of agency-constitutive norms based on the assumption that the sort of agency they enable 
is inescapable. Recall our present dialectical situation. We begin with the question 
whether norms constitutive of agency are authoritative and objectively reason-providing, 
and after being told that their authoritative standing traces back to agency, we are led to 
the question whether agency is authoritative and objectively reason-providing in the first 
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place. The operative principle is that norms can acquire authoritative standing due their 
role for agency only in case agency has the corresponding authoritative standing in the 
first place. For agency to lend authority it must already have it. And thus we ask: what is 
the meta-normative status of agency? In response to our question we are told that agency 
is inescapable. The claim is that agency, and derivatively its constitutive norms, are 
authoritative in virtue of being inescapable. The claim, however, is false. Agency's 
authoritative status cannot be established by showing it to be inescapable. If that 
assessment is correct, the agency-based programme is unsustainable and doomed in its 
very core. 
Let's reconstruct the dialectic step by step, letting the programme's own 
proponents speak, beginning with the claim that agency and action is necessary. "Human 
beings are condemned to choice and action", writes Korsgaard (2009:1), and just as lively 
continues: 
Maybe you think you can avoid it, by resolutely standing still, refusing to 
act, refusing to move. But it's no use, for that will be something you have 
chosen to do, and then you will have acted after all. Choosing not to act 
makes not acting a kind of action, makes it something that you do. This is 
not to say that you cannot fail to act. Of course you can. You can fall 
asleep at the wheel, you can faint away, ... , [a ]nd then you will fail to act. 
But you can't undertake to be in those conditions - if you did, you'd be 
faking, and what's more, you'd be acting, in a wonderfully double sense 
of that word .... [A]ction is necessary. 
Velleman, reasoning similarly, takes this one step further (2004:290-1): 
There may be, in some sense, an open question whether to be an agent, 
whether to get into or stay in the agency game. But of course someone 
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who is not already in the game is in no position to entertain that question, 
because entertaining it entails thinking about what to do, which entails 
trying to bring his behavior under descriptions that would embody 
knowledge of what he was doing. Anyone who asks himself whether to 
get into the agency game is already in the game; and anyone who asks 
himself whether to stay in the game cannot answer in the negative without 
staying in it at least that far. 
Action and agency are supposed to be inescapable in the sense that we cannot get 
out from within. Thrown into the role of agents we are condemned to remain agents. 
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Agency is not inescapable as a metaphysical condition, but rather agency is inescapable 
for agents, where no agential exit strategy is in sight. What does this kind of 
inescapability entail? David Velleman gives this answer (2009:116): 
The view contends that such practical thoughts can be objectively valid 
without having indicative proxies that are made true by swatches of the 
world: practical thoughts can be objectively valid by being inescapable, in 
the sense that any agent must accept them. 
Lucca Ferrero concurs (2009:304): 
[The] basic claim is that the norms and requirements of practical 
rationality and morality can be derived from the constitutive features of 
agency. Hence, a systematic failure to be guided by these requirements 
amounts to a loss of agency. But there is a sense in which we cannot but 
be agents. It follows that we are necessarily bound by the oughts of 
rationality and morality, we are bound by them sans phrase. 
What we have thus arrived at is the central claim behind the programme that 
norms constitutive of agency are authoritative because they are inescapable. We learn 
that such-and-such norms are constitutive of agency, that we cannot be but agents, and 
that consequently we cannot but honor the relevant norms, and so we are invited to move 
from necessity to authority. 
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Yet what kind of necessity is in play here? Korsgaard starts out raising the right 
question. Action is necessary, she writes, and then proceeds to ask: What kind of necessity 
is this? (2009:1) After ruling out logical, causal and rational necessity, she concludes: "It 
is our plight: the simple inexcorable fact of the human condition." (2009:2) Agency, she 
believes, is necessary in the sense that it is the plight of the human condition, and for the 
sake of the argument I shall grant this to be so even though the precise contours of that 
sense are somewhat enigmatic. What is open to question, however, is the normative and 
meta-normative relevance of this kind of necessity. 
Language seems to be coming to Korsgaard's aid, making the transition from 
necessity to authority appear smoother than it actually is, owing to the fact that the meta-
normative status of authority seems easily translatable into a kind of necessity too. After 
all, the normative question of what ought I to do? seems similar to the question of what 
must I do? This is even more salient when we use instead the all-purpose modality of 
having-to-do. Is not what I ought to do that which I have to do? And, reversely, if you 
have no choice but doing something, with no available alternatives in sight, then you 
have to do it, right? But then, is it not also the case that you ought to do it? To my ear, 
this already rings false, causing a first feeling of uneasiness in trusting language as a 
guide. The suspicion is that the modifier have-to-do is susceptible to normative and non-
normative interpretations, and that moving from one to the other is a form of 
equivocation. We need to watch out for seductive yet illicit linguistic maneuvers. 
But there's another intuitive route to Korrsgard's conclusion. Aren't normative 
questions practical questions of what to do? Isn't normative reasoning a process whereby 
we eliminate available options for choice until we have narrowed it down to a single 
choice which we thereby identify as the one we ought to choose? If so, then, in case there 
is only one choice to begin with - the inescapable choice - should not that choice also be 
the one we ought to do? If I wonder whether I should go through that door, and then learn 
it is the only door to go though, the question of what door to go through has been settled, 
hasn't it? It is tempting, then, to regard the step from necessity to authority an innocent 
one to take. 
Yet it is anything but. To see why, start with a toy example, rolling a dice. 
Suppose there is the feature of the good or right number. You don't know which, if any, 
number has that feature. Now you roll the dice, and get a three. Have you rolled the good 
or right number? You don't know, but upon inspection find all sides of the dice are 
threes. You could not have but rolled a three. Does that answer your question? The 
answer is no. It tells you which number you had to roll, but why suppose that any number 
had the feature of being the good or right number in the first place? Now if you knew 
that, first, there was indeed a number that was the good or right number, and that second, 
it must be possible for you to roll that number, then you would be entitled to conclude 
you rolled the good or right number. But you don't know whether there was a number 




Compare this with morality. It is intuitive to suppose that occasionally we 
encounter a range of morally neutral options. Driving home, I might take the short route 
or I might take the scenic route, and there's nothing more to it. There is no moral 
presumption in favor of either, let alone an obligatory presumption. Morality is simply 
silent on my choice of which route to take. Now this won't change if, for some reason or 
other, my choice situation is narrowed down to one option, due to road maintenance 
preventing me from taking the short route, say. If there was no moral presumption in 
favor of either option before, there will be no moral presumption for the single option 
now rendered inevitable. It is true that I have to take the short route. But it is not true that 
I am under any obligation to take the short route. Now we need to hear this right, since 
saying the latter usually involves all sorts of conventional implicatures, suggesting there 
must be other options I may permissibly adopt. But those implicatures are easily 
cancelable. In our example, the notion of moral obligation is not contrastively used, but 
simply presumed inapplicable. The important point is that the notion of obligation does 
not suddenly interject itself once we limit the option-set to a single choice. 
Compare this with norms. Suppose there is the question of whether any norms in 
objectively authoritative. You then learn that there is a norm you cannot but implement. 
Have you thereby learned that this norm is objectively authoritative? Once more, the 
answer is negative. You would if you were entitled to suppose that, first, there indeed was 
a norm that was objectively authoritative, and that, second, it must be possible for you to 
implement that norm. But you don't know whether there is a norm that is objectively 
authoritative, and again you cannot infer this on the basis of what is inevitable. 
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There are various principles in connection with fairness and responsibility, which 
may seem to apply here and which may seem to support the notion that the inevitable 
choice must be the right or good choice. The principle 'ought implies can' comes to 
mind. Now there are many complications with that principle, and in particular, there are 
complications concerning the relationship between evaluations we wish to make of 
choices and evaluations we wish to make of agents performing those choices, and the 
relevant principles seem most pertinent with regard to evaluations of agents performing 
the choices rather than of the choices themselves. But this is a hugely complicated and 
contested matter, and so I better stay out of it here; which I can comfortably do anyway 
since even without drawing the agent-choice distinction, the relevant principles cannot be 
recruited to support the contested inference from the inevitable to the obligatory. 
Consider 'ought implies can.' This principle does not have the desired 
implications of showing the inevitable to be the obligatory. All the principle says is that if 
there is an option someone ought to choose then that option must be one he can choose. 
And, under the assumption that there is an option he ought to choose, and further that 
there only is one option he can choose, this must indeed be the option he ought to choose. 
But the principle is silent on whether there always is, or even ever is, an option we ought 
to choose. The principle kicks in only after an option has been identified as the one he 
ought to choose and the principle cannot establish that there is such an option he ought to 
choose in the first place. The principle says something about all the oughts there are but 
doesn't say anything about whether there are any oughts. The principle 'ought implies 
can' does not even show that there always must be one permissible choice. It shows 
something significantly weaker, namely that not all of the available options can be 
impermissible. Permissible and impermissible are logically related to each other not as 
contradictories, where everything is either one or the other and never both, but as 
contraries, where nothing is both, but where some things might be neither. 'Ought implies 
can' has implications for what is permissible and what is impermissible once permissible 
and impermissible are in play. It cannot introduce them into play itself. 
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The previous examples proceeded on the basis of inevitable yet normatively 
neutral choice-situations. Can we go one step further? I believe we can, and conceive of 
inevitable and normatively deficient choice-situations. Original sin comes to mind, 
possibly a morally suspicious concept, but surely not an incoherent one in its presumption 
that we all are inevitable sinners who cannot help but sin. The inevitability of sin does not 
affect its normative valence, nor does it provide any absolution. Catholics are not alone in 
this assessment. Especially pessimistic Calvinists might go further and consider human 
agency inherently corrupt and evil, a verdict they surely would not be prepared to revoke 
should agency be proven inescapable. More sanguine minded Protestants might conclude 
that we cannot blame and hold responsible those who cannot help but sin, but even they 
would not deny that what these people are doing is sinning nonetheless. From bad turn to 
worse, and consider Satan. Suppose it was him who engineered human agency, and, 
taking no chances in making sure that humans always sin, he resolved to build a drive for 
sinfulness right into the very design of agency, making sinfulness the constitutive aim of 
action and agency. How about that for a condemnation! Obviously no trace of normative 
worth and merit is contained. 
272 
Return from theology to agency, necessity, and constitution. The kind of necessity 
that underwrites constitution, whatever it is, is not the same that underwrites normative 
authority. The question is why we should be agents, what normative significance agency 
has, and the answer that we must be agents is neither here nor there as that question is 
concerned. It is not an answer of the right form to speak to that question. The space of 
modality should and authority are part of is not the same space of modality must and 
inescapability are part of, to which the fallacious nature of the inference I must do X, X is 
inescapable hence I should do X, X is authoritative bears immediate witness. 
Alternatively put, should and authority essentially are normatively commendatory 
whereas must and inescapability are normatively neutral, and no normative distinction 
may be inferred on the basis of what can and cannot happen, including what can and 
cannot be done by us. 
Constitution concerns what we can't help doing more than what we should be 
doing. It belongs more to the purview of the engineer who designs complex norm-
consuming systems than to that of the ethicist and practical philosopher. Suppose 
acceptance of norm N turns out to be constitutive for doing X. In that case you cannot do 
X while disrespecting N. Should you also care about doing X, then you would only 
achieve what you care about so long as you implement N (assuming that you did not have 
reasons to care). You gotta do what you gotta do. Yet nothing more seems to follow. In 
particular, nothing of the kind follows that you normatively must comply with N or that 
you have any reasons to do so. The impossibility of doing-X-while-disregarding-N could 
reflect some basic constraints in design-space akin to that one cannot build stable bridges 
while disrespecting the laws of gravity. Moreover, the inescapability of doing X itself 
would not change the normative situation either, but solely place yet another constraint 
on your practical options. Thus, even if you absolutely had to do X - a choice you simply 
could not evade - and further that doing X required complying with N, this hardly would 
entail any reasons to comply with N on your part. One constraint would lead to another, 
but the fact remains that being constrained is not the same as having reasons. You merely 
would find yourself trapped in a tight comer. Might does not make right, however, as 
normative force evidently differs from brute force. Demands do not gain authoritative 
standing solely in virtue of their possession of absolute powers over us. 
273 
To conclude, inescapability and authority are very distinct properties. Once the 
distinction is appreciated, it should be clear what conclusion to draw about the agency-
based programme in its own best case scenario; that is to say what conclusions to draw 
should all the myriad "smaller" issues and concerns threatening its viability be 
satisfactorily addressed. What we should say is this: there is a set of unique norms, 
special and interesting in many ways, that we agents cannot escape while retaining our 
agency. These norms constitute who we are, and we must, in virtue of some unique form 
of necessity, be who we are, namely agents. This is how we are built. This is how nature 
has shaped up. If you try to shake off your agency you will fail. What about the 
normative and meta-normative question concerning their authority? That question is 
entirely left open. All three propositions are consistent: The agency-constitutive norms 
are (1) inescapable and authoritative and objectively reason-providing or (2) they are 
inescapable and anti-authoritative and objectively reason-denying or (3) they are 
inescapable and a-authoritative and neither objectively reason-providing nor objectively 
reason-denying. My own position sides with (3), denying simultaneously that we have 
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reasons to be agents and that we have reasons not to be agents. The complex argument of 
the chapter does not support (3), of course, as it was never intended to do so. Its only 
purpose was to demonstrate the compatibility of the constitutive programme with radical 
meta-normative anti-realism, thereby showing its unavailability for being recruited to 
support let alone ground meta-normative authority. The alleged inescapability of agency-
constitutive norms would have many implications, in particular with regard to 
motivation. In conjunction with normative premises it would even have normative 
implications, but then, that is true of everything. What is constitutive of agency and what 
is inescapable does not explain, ground, or account for what is authoritative and 
objectively reason-providing. 
Chapter 5 




This chapter takes substantial steps towards developing a positive account of 
practical deliberation consistent with radical meta-normative skepticism, naming the 
resulting view revisionary subjectivism. In his treatment of the arch-subjectivist, 
Protagoras, together with his doctrine of man being the measure of all things, Richard 
Taylor (2000:56) provides an unflattering yet fairly accurate characterization of the view: 
"all moral distinctions are in the last analysis of human origin, such that nothing is in 
truth really right or wrong, just or unjust, but is only such within the framework of this or 
that artificial set of conventions." Generalizing Taylor's term moral to normative and this 
is roughly the position I defend. Notice revisionary subjectivism differs from traditional 
subjectivism, the approach of classical response-dependency, which holds, following 
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Spinoza, that "it is clear ... that we do not endeavor, will, seek after or desire because we 
judge a thing to be good. On the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we 
endeavor, will, seek after and desire it." (Spinoza, Ethics III.9 Scholium) Traditional 
subjectivism offers an affirmative view of what is good, right, or reason-providing, and 
why, intentionally placing the position in competition with alternative (objectivist) 
normative and meta-normative views, offering different answers to what fundamentally 
remain traditional normative questions. Revisionary subjectivism, in contrast, is a 
position of retreat, intentionally changing the subject matter, offering answers to rather 
different questions, and abandoning the normative project altogether. 
Yet despite its retreat and according treatment of practical deliberation as a non-
normative project, revisionary subjectivism aspires to save (enough of) the deliberative 
phenomena. The question is whether the skeptic qua subjectivist can pull this off. A 
major reservation about the global denial of all normative reasons stems from 
implications it is presumed to have for the possibility of individual and collective 
deliberation. The worry is that by abandoning the normative project the skeptic has also 
effectively abandoned the deliberative project, that, in the accusation of one author, the 
subjectivist, by necessity, must "keep[] very quiet about how little he is able to salvage 
from the wreck." (Brandon 1980:98) Yet we are committed to the sensible nature of 
practical thought about how to live and act. Should the denial of normative reasons 
threaten that commitment, greater by comparison than our confidence in meta-normative 
skepticism, this result could handily be recruited to support meta-normative realism. With 
regard to ethical thought David Brink writes (1989: 173): "If ... rejection of moral realism 
would undermine the nature of existing normative practices and beliefs, then the 
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metaphysical queerness of moral realism may seem a small price to pay to preserve these 
normative practices and beliefs." The argument about reasons thus remains incomplete 
until we arrive at an assessment of the skeptic's ability to accommodate enough of 
practical deliberation. 
In response to this worry, hoping to save most of the phenomena and to salvage a 
lot from the wreck, the revisionary subjectivist - subjectivist henceforth - invents the 
internal stance, the idea of deliberation proceeding from within. Thomas Nagel captures 
the essentials of the idea nicely, together with the relevant dividing line between what the 
subjectivist desires to hold onto and what he is prepared to let go (1979:196-197): 
There is a way of considering human pursuits from within life, which 
allows justification of some activities in terms of others, but does not 
permit us to question the significance of the whole thing, unless we are 
asking, from within life, whether the allocation of energy or attention to 
different segments of it makes sense in virtue of their relative importance. 
This view comes under challenge from a position that regards life in 
detachment from specific or general human purposes. People, and oneself 
in particular, are perceived as having no significance, and absurd because 
they seem to accord their lives great importance in action, even though 
they can also appreciate a broader point of view from which they have no 
importance. 
Each of the two points of view claims priority. The internal view asks, 
what is the importance for individual life of insignificance from an 
external point of view? Life is lived from inside, and issues of significance 
are significant only if they can be raised from inside. It therefore does not 
matter that from a point of view outside my life, my life does not matter. 
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Revisionary subjectivism results from the simultaneous adoption of both 
viewpoints. Nagel's passage is characteristically rich, getting right to the crux of the 
matter, and I wish to restrict myself to two comments. First, while the last paragraph 
articulates very forcefully the general subjectivist spirit, the subjectivist should not kid 
himself, as do some non-revisionary subjectivists, to regard the indeed questionable 
internal significance of external insignificance (or external significance for that matter), 
the failure of recovering external significance in terms of internal significance, to carry 
much dialectical force against the objectivist. What the objectivist is concerned about is 
not internal significance, but something else, and its significance is henceforth not 
contingent upon a type of significance which is altogether different (indeed is different by 
definition). The objectivist ought to be entirely unmoved by all this. Neither side gives or 
gains any ground here. 
Second, when Nagel charges life with absurdity "because [people] accord their 
lives great importance in action, even though they can also appreciate a broader point of 
view from which they have no importance," he introduces a problem his statement may 
not express optimally, potentially representing the problem as too escapable, apparently 
invoking an equivocation of two different senses of importance, a first sense which 
people do accord to their lives and which presumably is the internal sense, and a second 
sense which people apply from a broader point of view and which presumably is the 
external sense. One cannot keep both senses constant and yet generate the absurdity: If 
both senses are internal, then even from a broader view our lives have importance, hence 
no absurdity. If both senses are external, then our lives either have or have not 
importance, regardless of a boarder or narrower viewpoint. The non-revisionary 
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subjectivist believes they do not have that kind of importance but contests that people do 
accord their lives with it, while the objectivist affirms that people do, successfully, accord 
their lives with that kind of importance, and again whoever is right we miss the absurdity. 
What is Nagel after, then? The answer must be this: both senses of importance 
have profound resonance for us; we are anything but indifferent towards external 
significance. A concern for external significance can be recovered from within, deeply 
entangled with our internal-significance based concerns. "This dominance [of the 
external viewpoint] is not imposed from outside, but derives from the intrinsic appeal of 
impersonality to individual reflection. Life seems absurd because it seems absurd to 
oneself, taking up a point of view that is both natural and appealing." (1979:197) A 
sensitivity to the external viewpoint together with a recognition that subjectivism cannot 
accommodate it sets apart revisionary subjectivism from traditional subjectivism. 
Revisionary subjectivism is a form of discontented subjectivism, a position of graded 
pessimism. Nagel's diagnosis carves out precisely the kind of position I am advocating in 
conjunction with the challenge it faces: affirming internal significance, denying external 
significance while being cognizant of its profound resonance, recognizing further that the 
second component threatens to destabilize the first component, in consequence defining 
the subjectivist's task as seeking to stabilize internal significance in the absence of 
external significance. 
The revisionary subjectivist should be the first to admit his account won't deliver 
it all. Thus the question: how high should the subjectivist aim? His objective is to develop 
a success theory rather than an error or failure theory of deliberation, but success and 
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failure come in degrees. How much of the phenomena should he attempt to save? How 
much of deliberation should he hope his account will be capable of accommodating? 
What range of practical question should he hope will find deliberative answers, what 
range of common expectations and beliefs about deliberation should he hope will come 
out true, in line with his account? This is no obvious question. As a dialectical matter, his 
account will better be none of total deliberative failure. Deliberation happens, and as 
already mentioned we are quite confident it happens at least occasionally with success. 
Yet at the same time his account will better be none of total deliberative success either. If 
all we ever wanted from deliberation found its place in a comprehensively reason-
denying framework, one would start to wonder what precisely it was the framework 
denied in the first place. Something's gotta give in a skeptical meta-normative account of 
practical deliberation. Generally speaking, the more the skeptic can accommodate, the 
less interesting becomes his meta-normative denial. The less he can accommodate, the 
less attractive becomes his overall package. Perhaps what he should shoot for is roughly 
half? That seems roughly right. The objective of SUbjectivist, then, is to present half-a-
success, half-an-error theory of practical deliberation. 
Can we be more precise? Perhaps the skeptic is entitled to an upper and a lower 
limit of how much we should expect him capable of accommodating? With regard to the 
lower limit, he might reason thus: if meta-normative skepticism is true, and deliberation 
at least occasionally happens with success, then the best SUbjectivist account must be 
capable of accommodating at least that much. This would protect subjectivism from 
falling into total abyss, from salvaging too little from the wreck. Unfortunately, the 
reasoning does not quite go through. It would be simply question-begging in this context 
to assume skepticism is true. To the subjectivist's style of argument, broadly following a 
modus ponens patterns, the realist could retort another style of argument, broadly 
following a modus tollens pattern: deliberation at least occasionally happens with 
success, subjectivism cannot even accommodate that much, and hence subjectivism is 
false. Moreover, most believe skepticism to be false, and consequently even if skepticism 
was true, the success we find in deliberation might hinge on our illusionary belief. Since 
the subjectivist account of deliberation aspires to rely on no deceptions, it may still fail to 
accommodate as much deliberation as we currently observe works; if so, the subjectivist 
account would lose out against the fictionalist - the subject of the first section. 
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With regard to the upper limit, the skeptic might reason thus: deliberation quite 
frequently appears to fall short of what people expect it to achieve. Practical stalemates 
abound, myriad of practical questions remain unresolved, intractable ethical disputes stay 
intractable, etc. The subjectivist should certainly not hope to make deliberation appear 
more of a success story than it actually is; moreover, should subjectivism entail 
limitations of what deliberation can accomplish, limitations roughly matching the 
limitations we find in reality, would subjectivism not win some plausibility points? 
Unfortunately, the reasoning does not quite go through either. Deliberation is hard even if 
realism prevails. That many practical questions remain unsettled need not indicate 
systematic deliberative limitations, but may only indicate that we have not tried hard 
enough, that we are biased, that irrelevant considerations unduly influence the process, 
that we are in the grip of framing effects, nudging effects, swaying effects, or any other 
of the myriad well documented sorts of cognitive shortcomings. Not much greater 
precision can be provided regarding the subjectivist's objective. Roughly half thus stands. 
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1 should also note that his endeavor to revise the deliberative story the subjectivist 
is not venturing out into entirely new territory. His position is rather similar if not 
identical in crucial aspects to various forms e.g. expressivism, quasi-realism, cognitive 
expressivism, and in large measures the subjectivist can adopt what their proponents have 
developed vis-a-vis deliberation (e.g. Gibbard 1990 & 2003, Blackburn 1998, Timmons 
1999), despite all protests of expressivists against such association. For sure, as 
expressivists correctly reiterate, there is a semantic difference between an expression of 
an attitude and a reporting of an attitude, traditionally aligning the semantic agenda of 
expressivism with the former and that of subjectivism with the latter (an alignment 1 
consider rather optional). Yet even if this is so, the question remains whether that 
distinction matters to the larger issues. For each position, all comes ultimately down to 
contingently held attitudes void of objective authority, and as Richard Joyce (2006:58) 
beautifully states, despite all technical differences, both analyses pretty much concur in 
what informational massage is conveyed as well as what significance (or lack thereof) 
they seem to carry: 
Expressing one's feelings and reporting one's feelings are different 
linguistic activities - on a roller coaster, screaming is not the same as 
stating calmly "I feel very excited now" - yet both provide one's audience 
with pretty much the same information about one's inner states. But 
simply to report the presence of a feeling is never, in itself, to provide 
one's audience with a practical consideration. Suppose that Roger is a 
vehement anti-hunting activist. As a group of fox hunters trot by, Roger 
asserts to them: "Your activities arouse a feeling of disapproval in me." 
We could hardly fault the fox hunters if they responded with a perplexed 
"Yes, but so what?" But then much the same response would be 
reasonable if Roger, instead of reporting the presence of disapproval, 
expressed his disapproval by yelling "Boo to fox hunting!" 
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Another companion in developing a subjectivist account of deliberation is 
Michael Bratman together with his extensive planning theory of intentions, which I 
would be happy to co-opt without drastic changes (this is not to suggest Bratman is a 
subjectivist; only that what he says can, in large measures, be incorporated by one). 
David Velleman's intelligibility-based account of practical reasoning, subject of the 
previous chapter, provides another source of inspiration, yet the details of his account 
give me greater pause than Bratman's, as we saw there. I mention this in order not to 
create the false impression that I am setting out to entirely reinvent the wheel, that in fact 
there is a larger research tradition the subjectivist'S revisionary account is part of. That 
said, the existence of a larger research program is far from a guarantee for its success, 
leaving many grave problems unresolved, occasionally even unaddressed and more often 
underestimated by a good number of fellow subjectivists. 
The chapter is sprinkled with first-personal observations, presented in the hope of 
striking a cord with the reader, enticing him to come up with similar observations in 
himself. This approach is prone to cause some puzzlement, however, and hence a word 
on methodology seems in order. My objective is to show the meta-normative skeptic or 
subjectivist capable of accommodating a decent range of the deliberative phenomena. Yet 
what the skeptic or subjectivist is certainly not capable of is to prescribe what 
deliberation, fundamentally, ought to be like. What he is capable is to draw a picture of 
what successful deliberation could be like, pointing towards elements within that picture 
explaining what we seek to explain, in particular, pointing towards elements explaining 
how certain deliberative steps can be said appropriate or inappropriate within certain 
deliberative context. What the subjectivist proposes is a case study - a study of one case 
- of successful deliberation consistent with meta-normative skepticism; to that end the 
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subjectivist best volunteers himself as the case to be studied. Generally speaking, in light 
of the skeptic' affirmation of standards of correctness in conjunction with his denial of 
correct standards, description and prescription ultimately converge at some point in his 
overall approach. Normative inquiry culminates in self-understanding (in a form of 
psychoanalysis, a cynic might add). 
Daniel Dennett formulates a similar idea, and borrowing a term from 
Wertheimer, calls the underlying methodological principle the Factunorm Principle. 
Here is what he says, with regard to norms of rationality (1987:98, emphasis added): 
When one leans on our pre-theoretical concept of rationality, one relies on 
our shared intutitions - when they are shared, of course - about what 
makes sense. What else, in the end, could one rely on? When considering 
what we ought to do, our reflections lead us eventually to a consideration 
of what we in fact do; this is inescapable, for a catalogue of our considered 
intuitive judgments on what we ought to do is both a compendium of what 
we do think, and a shining example (by our lights - what else?) of how we 
ought to think. 
Dennett then proceeds to quote Wertheimer (1974: 11 0-11): 
Thus, what and how we do think is evidence for the principles of 
rationality, what and how we ought to think. This itself is a 
methodological principle of rationality; call it the Factunorm Principle. 
We are (implicitly) accepting the Factunorm Principle whenever we try to 
determine what or how we ought to think. For we must, in that very 
attempt, think. And unless we can think that what and how we do think 
there is correct - and thus is evidence for what and how we ought to think 
- we cannot determine what or how we ought to think 
Let me provide a brief overview of the chapter. It starts, in section 1, with a 
discussion of the contest between fictionalism and revisionism, attempting to show 
revisionism to prevail. The argument mounts an internal critique of fictionalism, seeking 
to entice the fictionalist to cross over to the revisionist side. After this the chapter 
presents, in section 2, a succinct formulation of the challenge subjectivism faces and must 
overcome, namely the above mentioned worry that without a normative account there is 
no adequate deliberative account. This is followed, in section 3, by my proposed solution 
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schema. Next, in section 4, is a discussion of the question So it is all about motivation? 
This sets the stage for introducing, in section 5, the true hero of this chapter, desire, or 
concern. For the subjectivist concerns are what get deliberation going. Attending to 
concerns more closely, in section 6, is going to reveal an astonishing degree of 
complexity and richness. Moreover, we are going to find, in section 7, that concerns 
contain an element of appraisal, which initially appears hard for the subjectivist to 
capture. In section 8 I detail the subjectivist's solution for how to capture appraisal. The 
final section 9 presents a case study of concern - the concern for recognition - designed 
to illustrate how the subjectivist can capture appraisal. 
This discussion has largely crowded out an originally planned detailed discussion 
of norms and commitments, additional building blocks of the subjectivist's deliberative 
account; I do not regret the result. Practical deliberation is complex and untidy, a fact 
missed by many philosophical treatments by impatiently hurrying over its details. There 
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is a lot about concerns not fitting prevalent philosophical conceptions, quite often 
seemingly owed more to a desire for generating neat and simple theories than to a close 
observation of the phenomenon. I wholeheartedly share Velleman complaint that "[t]he 
agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is a square." (2000:99) There obviously are 
many more sides to agency and deliberation than just these plain old four, and it would be 
quite some progress if my account of deliberation was able to represent agency at least as 
an octagon. Ambitions for simple and smooth theories have attempted to mold agency 
into a simple and smooth phenomenon, ignoring the numerous sharp edges, rifts, and 
ruptures; smoothing it out, at worst turning agency even into a circle, betraying a 
common yet astonishing unwillingness to come to terms with who we are. 
5.2. Revisionism, Not Fictionalism 
Fictionalism enjoys increasing attention as a practically beneficial solution 
offered after we have become convinced of the falsity of certain practical domains. Moral 
fictionalism is the practical case most thoroughly discussed in the literature and thus shall 
be the prime subject of this section, facilitating exposition without limiting the general 
applicability of my conclusion. What we learn about moral fictionalism can be extended 
to other forms of practical meta-normative fictionalism. Richard Joyce sets the scene for 
fictionalism's appearance (2005:288): 
Let us just say when morality is removed from the picture, what is 
practically called for is a matter of a cost-benefit analysis, where the costs 
and benefits can be understood liberally as preference satisfaction. By 
asking what we ought to do I am asking how a group of persons, who 
share a variety of broad interests, projects, ends - and who have come to 
the realization that morality is a bankrupt theory - might best carry on. 
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The promise fictionalism offers is that we may retain the benefits of knowingly 
discredited practices by downgrading our epistemic attitudes towards them from 
believing to make-believing. The promise is pragmatic. Fictions cannot be epistemically 
justified, for they are plainly and literally false, and thus the only kind of justification left 
is pragmatic in nature. The central motivation for fictionalism is the claim that the 
fictionalist stance importantly contributes to our ability to retain the benefits of the 
discredited practice, where this is read as a comparative claim: We are better positioned 
to retain the benefits by make-believing rather than by not make-believing in the 
discredited practice. The relevant comparison-class for fictionalism includes revisionism 
and eliminativism. I am not particularly attracted to eliminativism, the abolishment of the 
discredited practice tout court, and thus I am happy to provisionally grant fictionalism to 
win that contest. 
Revisionism fares considerably better, however. Should it be possible to revise 
the discredited practice, by removing what is erroneous while keeping what is beneficial, 
in such a way as to sustain what we want, the twisted allegiance to the original practice 
already recognized as flawed that characterizes fictionalism becomes entirely moot. 
Problems pertaining to the fictionalist attitude are myriad and well documented (Nolan 
2005). I shall not reiterate them here. The comparatively weak assumption I am working 
with is simply that everything being equal, practices proceeding on the basis of truthful 
attitudes are preferable to ones proceeding on the basis of commonly known false 
attitudes. Here, then, is gist of my argument. It seems plausible to suppose that the 
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benefits the fictional attitude is capable of affording is owed to the retainable elements of 
the corresponding practice. If so, there always is a revisionary alternative available which 
"shrinks" the original practice to precisely those retainable elements and which has the 
advantage of clear-headedly dispensing with the barely-stable fictionalist attitude. If so, 
we better stop make-believing in what does not work and start believing in what does 
work. 
Joyce's treatment of fictionalism together with the pragmatic nature of the 
relevant test case is mostly admirably clear. It is very surprising to learn, then, that 
revisionism does not feature as a relevant competitor in his argument, where fictionalism 
supposedly faces only one single competitor, namely eliminativism. Joyce writes 
(2005:299): "Two options remain as contenders in the cost-benefit analysis: abolitionism 
(or we may call it 'eliminativism') and fictionalism. For fictionalism to be viable it must 
win this pragmatic comparison," speaking of a ''two horse race" on the same page, and 
again emphasizing later on that "the only comparison in which we are interested is 
between fictionalism and abolitionism." (2005:302) As I already said, I believe 
fictionalism is well positioned to win that contest. The glaring omission of revisionism is 
rather unexpected, however, especially since it has always formed a prominent part of 
error-theoretic discussions. If morality is bankrupt, instead of electing to maintain 
morality as a fiction, we may alternatively elect to switch our allegiance from morality to 
shmorality, a system much like morality except for omitting its errors, as true believers of 
an adequately revised scheme rather than make-believers of some flawed scheme. 
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To focus the comparison between fictionalism and revisionism, we need to be 
clear on what kind of fictionalism is at issue. Three points bear attention. First, we are not 
talking about deception. All practitioners of the fiction are assumed privy to the character 
of their fictionalist stance. This is not an upper-house version where the folk are kept 
from the truth by some epistemically privileged elite. Joyce calls such a version 
"propagandism" where "some people may be 'in the know' about the moral error theory 
while, for the greater good, keeping it quiet and encouraging the hoi polloi to continue 
with their sincere (false) moral beliefs." (2005:299) I share Joyce' assessment that 
propagandism is generally a bad idea. The most obvious shortcoming of such a strategy 
stems from the destabilizing effects it is sure to have on public discourse and critical 
inquiry for truth. And neither are elitists ever to be trusted, as they are likely to substitute 
their own interests for the interests of those who they are supposed to look after. It 
therefore appears legitimate to place propagandism beyond contention and have it take no 
part in our present comparison. It is true but irrelevant, then, that non-transparent 
deceptions often are capable of conferring all sorts of practical effects, some beneficial 
some not. That there usually are revisionary alternatives to deceptive fictions with 
comparable practical effects is dubious and not what I am arguing for. What I contest 
applies only to perfectly transparent fictions. 
Secondly, fictionalists are convinced that the corresponding practices are flawed. 
This reminds us of two sub-points. Number one, fictionalists are not agnostic harboring at 
most some mild doubts about the success of the corresponding practice. It appears 
reasonable to take a conservative attitude towards what works and has not been proven 
deficient, even if the epistemic case in support is comparable to the case against. 
Fictionalists are not conservative agnostics in this regard, but ardent deniers. 
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Number two, the flawed practical domain is really considered flawed, as falling 
short in its original function or purpose. One is not a fictionalist when one believes the 
point of some practice consists in something other than truth. In fact, one cannot even be 
a fictionalist in such an instance. One cannot be a fictionalist about fictions, for instance, 
since their purpose is not truth, but entertainment or some such, raising some questions 
about the appropriateness of the term fictionalism itself. The pertinent attitude towards 
fictions is not make-believing or pretend-believing, but entertaining and imagining, 
cognitive attitudes that do not constitutively aim at what's true as we learned from the 
previous chapter, and consequently suffer no defect if shown to be literally false. Indeed, 
one might suspect that with an appropriate provision of cognitive attitudes other than 
belief - including the intriguing attitude of Alief as characterized by Tamar Gendler 
(2008) - the case for inevitably shifting to make-believing after believing has been taken 
off the table turns out somewhat muted. This is relevant especially in connection with 
Joyce's important insight that many of our moral attitudes come in the form of pre-
reflective commitments, viscerally anchored resolutions to adopt a moral point of view, 
usually steadily habituated from early childhood on, and which are unlikely affected by 
error-theoretic meta-ethical considerations, since they do not incorporate the kind of 
abstract meta-ethical presuppositions that could be contradicted by the very same 
considerations. The issue of commitment shall occupy us more thoroughly in later 
sections; the suggestion now is that commitment and especially pre-commitment (Jon 
Elster 1985) may involve cognitive attitudes other than belief, in which case no 
downgrading to make-belief is needed. 
Thirdly, fictionalist must take a discriminatory attitude towards flawed practices, 
where they identify some but not all elements as defective. The defective elements must 
be suitably central so that they infect the practice as a whole. But at the same time, there 
must be elements of the practice that are non-defective as well. A practice completely and 
thoroughly bankrupt is an unlikely candidate to feature in any useful fiction. There must 
be many things that are true of the practice. To begin with, it needs to have the desired 
effects, precisely the kind of effects the fictionalist wishes to preserve through the 
fictionalist stance in the first place. 
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Turning finally to my general recipe for eliding fictionalism, I must start with a 
brief cautionary note. The contours of my revisionist strategy tailored towards rendering 
fictionalism superfluous are admittedly programmatic - the same is currently true of the 
fictionalist programme - and I must ask the reader for patience as additional details 
concerning the revisionary scheme I favor shall emerge as we proceed in the chapter. 
Moreover, the question of which competitor has the upper hand pragmatically speaking 
involves thorny empirical issues concerning the nature of human psychology and its 
interaction with make-belief for which we currently lack conclusive data; nor do we have 
cause to expect the kind of large scale social experiment required to gamer them to 
materialize anytime soon. All we can do at this stage is to speculate about it, which of 
course is always fun to do. 
To facilitate exposition, I propose we focus on a simple example, namely the 
moral status of pain. Let's first recap the general situation as both fictionalists and 
revisionists see it: We used to be caught up in the (deceptive) myth that pain is such as to 
render minimizing measures toward it (categorically) appropriate or obligatory, until we 
learned that this is not so, and that instead we only dislike it and seek to minimize it. In 
response the fictionalist proposes that we falsely make-believe that pain has that peculiar 
feature so as to better enable ourselves to minimize it. By doing so the fictionalists adopts 
the kind of discriminatory attitude toward the original practice mentioned above where 
some things are erroneous, motivating the fiction, whereas other things are not erroneous, 
motivating the assessment that the practice is worth preserving in the mode of a fiction 
conferring true benefits. What is erroneous and what needs fictionalist treatment is the 
supposition that pain has the moral status of rendering a minimizing response towards it 
(categorically) appropriate or obligatory. What is not erroneous, in contrast, is that we 
harbor a strongly disvaluing attitude towards pain, and that we are committed to fostering 
schemes that help minimizing it. If we cannot count on some reasonable consensus to 
minimize pain the fictionalist programme collapses before it has truly started. After all, to 
the question why he chooses to retain some flawed scheme as a fiction, the fictionalist 
points out that doing so gives us something we truly value. Now that we value what we 
value is no fiction, and neither is it a fiction that engaging in a certain practice helps 
realizing what we value. The value of the fictionalist stance entirely traces the value of 
what we care about. 
It is precisely at this point that the revisionist enters the scene, asking the 
following question: Why not just understand what we are doing as doing-that-which-
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helps-realizing-what-we-value? Why not make do with the clear-headed appreciation of 
what we are doing which, as we assume, we already muster, and stick with that? What 
the revisionist proposes in contrast is that we dispense with any make-belief altogether, 
and simply agree to minimize pain which we so strongly dislike. The claim I am going to 
support in the ensuing paragraphs is that the revisionist should be in no worse position to 
achieve this goal than the fictionalist his, once we appreciate the complexity of the 
material the fictionalist is already committed to for his fiction to work. 
To better see why, we need to consider how highly disciplined and focused the 
fictionalist discourse must be in order to stand any chances of procuring real benefits. For 
starters, no good comes from make-believing that what matters are suffering, destruction, 
and despair. History contains plenty of moral ideals, previous drafts of the morality script 
as it were, that poorly comport with what we care about. The moral code for medieval 
monks is particularly unbecoming, prohibiting them, in recognizably moral fashion, from 
securing even the most minimally adequate provision of food, sleep, comfort, social 
exchange, means of expression and leisure, maximizing rather than minimizing pain. For 
fictions to be doing us any good, they must exhibit a close tie to what really matters to us. 
In light of this, the practitioners to the fiction are well advised to retain a clear grasp of 
what really matters to them, making sure they understand what is the tool (the fiction) 
and what is the original purpose (facilitating their concerns). It is well documented how 
collective practices, including fictions, are keen to develop a life of their own, possibly 
striving to emancipate themselves from their initial purpose, possibly straying away from 
their original motivation of helping us to get what we want. There always is plenty of 
internal and fiction-specific pressure in the direction of certain modifications and 
narrative enhancements that produce better and more enthralling fictions - just recall the 
common tendency to embellish even the most mundane reports - yet which present a 
considerable risk of diminishing the fiction's capacity to serve our ends. At precisely 
these moments we need to consult what it is that really matters to us, and what is only 
fictitious, and employ that grasp as a corrective device for readjusting the fiction. The 
fiction must always be kept on a short leash, never forgetting who is master and who 
servant. 
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Moreover, the fiction must be highly disciplined. There must be tight standards 
regulating what may and may not be asserted within the adopted fiction, which moves are 
and which are not admissible within the game of fiction in force. Though fictional, it 
cannot be that anything goes. It cannot be admissible, for instance, to assign significance 
to pain on Mondays but not on Tuesdays, or to pain suffered by men but not by women, 
or to pain caused by people as opposed to circumstances. There are in fact myriad 
alternative ways of treating the significance of pain - alternative fictional pain-status-
functions as it were - concerning such contested matters as whether or not it is 
permissible for persons to privilege their own pain, to discount deserved pain, to balance 
pain against other concerns in certain ways, and so on. Some standards of consistency 
and coherence must be paramount, but standards of consistency and coherence alone 
don't even begin to capture all of the regiment required to permit the fiction to function. 
In the moral domain, we would predict the regiment we ultimately settle upon to be as 
complex as the best moral theory has it. Of course, which theory is best is, according to 
the fictionalist, to be pragmatically determined. The question of which fictionalist 
regiment to implement cannot be settled by appealing to which regiment is the correct 
one, since the guiding assumption is that nothing literally possesses the relevant status in 
the first place, but instead must be settled in terms of their capacity to help realizing what 
we care about. 
Now suppose we can sum up all norms governing our fiction in N, and suppose 
we can evaluate N in terms of how well it serves our ends E. N might be formalized, in 
part or as a whole, in terms of various bi-conditionals, such as "in situation S, it is correct 
to assign to complex C the fictional status of rendering response R (categorically) 
appropriate or obligatory." Within the fiction, it might be correct to assign this status to 
undeserved yet not deserved pain, for instance. And what standard of fictional-
correctness to implement would be determined with regard to their capacity to promote E. 
This two-prong approach is familiar enough, as it is employed by some forms of indirect 
consequentialism, or practice-based approaches as articulated by the early Rawls (1955). 
The upshot for our pragmatic comparison between fictionalism and revisionism will be 
this. With N and E in place, the revisionist has almost all he needs to advance his 
alternative revised practice: as a practice in the service of E governed by N. This is not to 
deny, of course, that there will not be elements he needs to modify. In particular, the 
revisionist must propose a replacement status to be assigned instead of the fictionalist 
status. Speaking of pain, the erroneous, yet within-the-fiction tolerated, assumption that 
pain has the status of rendering minimizing measures appropriate must be characterized 
in terms of some different status, possibly one assigning pain the status-function of 
calling upon certain responses according to the norms governing the revised practice. The 
revisionist counterproposal would likewise proceed, in part or as a whole, in terms of 
various bi-conditionals: "in situation S, it is correct to assign to complex C the literal 
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status of rendering response R (categorically) appropriate or obligatory according-to-our-
chosen-practices-in-the-service-of-our-ends." The task of matching fictionalist bi-
conditionals with revised literal bi-conditionals appears quite manageable, especially in 
light of the fact that nothing literally has the fictionalist status, but rather that it was 
entirely up to us to fictionally assign the relevant statuses in the first place, and that all 
this is common knowledge. 
The smoothest way for the revisionist to proceed is probably by retaining the 
original normative vocabulary, only to supply a revisionary definition which preserves 
the literal truth of most of our original judgments. The original linguistic practice of 
calling pain bad, with the intended meaning of thereby assigning pain the status of 
rendering minimizing measures appropriate or obligatory, a falsehood the fictionalist 
proposes to retain in the modus of make-belief, is supplied a modified definition by the 
revisionist. What the revisionist might suggest, for instance, is that we redefine "bad" as 
denoting not what renders minimizing measures appropriate or obligatory, but as that 
which we agree to minimize, or as that which we are supposed to minimize according-to-
our-chosen-practices. Notice how close the revisionist's counterproposal is to what the 
fictionalist must already acknowledge. For the fictionalist, pain is assigned some fictional 
status according to the tight regiment governing the fiction in force. For the revisionist, 
pain is simply to be treated in certain ways according to the norms of the practices he 
recommends we adopt. 
The present point, then, is this: once we appreciate how focused and disciplined 
the fiction must be in order to stand a chance of doing any good, we are already on our 
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way of granting much of what the revisionist needs, namely certain standards of 
assertability-conditions governing the revised practice which are not understood in terms 
of some direct correspondence to some normative reality. The fictionalist regiment, when 
suitably worked out, would offer great inspiration in this regard precisely because it is 
understood that the standards of fictional correctness are not determined by how well 
they track some normative reality. And the more we attend to the highly focused and 
disciplined regiment underwriting the fiction, the greater appears the contribution of it 
and the lesser the contribution of the fiction. The source of the benefits allegedly afforded 
by the fiction now appears to lie in the fact that we engage in a highly focused and 
disciplined discourse governed by some tight regiment. As the fictionalist contribution 
increasingly becomes marginalized, the revisionary alternative is to simply cut the fiction 
and to restrict morality to the regimented discourse in the service of human flourishing. 
What the revisionist proposes is that we focus our attention on what, according to the 
fictionalist, was really motivating the fiction in the first place, namely its capacity to 
serve our ends, and dispense with the fictionalist veneer that cannot fool anybody 
anyway. 
Let me close this section with some further and quite intriguing speculations 
Joyce adduces in support of the prediction that fictions are capable of making a real 
psychological difference for non-believers-yet-make-believers. What distinctive 
psychological contribution does Joyce believe the fictionalist stance holds on offer? His 
answer has to do with temptation. To answer the question more thoroughly, Joyce 
proposes to first examine the value of moral belief, and in particular in distinction to the 
role of other factors. Joyce concedes, quite plausibly, that a good deal of our reciprocal, 
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cooperative and other-regarding attitudes do not depend on moral belief, and hence need 
little aid from fictionalism after the departure of morality. With some fusion between 
Hume and Hobbes, combining elements of enlightened self-interest, modest other-
regarding sympathy and the enforcement of socially beneficial codes of conduct, one 
should probably be capable to cover a considerable range of the desired effects associated 
with morality. Yet however refined this post-moral and prudence-based social system 
may be like, it cannot deliver it all, since there is temptation. Joyce (2005:301) writes: 
[ An] important value of moral beliefs is that they function as ... an 
expedient: supplementing and reinforcing the outputs of prudential 
reasonmg. When a person believes that the valued action is morally 
required - that it must be performed whether he likes it or not - then the 
possibilities of rationalization diminish. If a person believes the action to 
be required by an authority from which he cannot escape, if he imbues it 
with a 'must-be-doneness' ... , ifhe believes that in not performing he will 
not merely frustrate himself, but will become reprehensible and deserving 
of disapprobation - then he is more likely to perform the action. 
Moral belief features as a kind of conversation-stopper, as an element that remove 
certain practical options from further consideration, an idea that has found traction with 
many writers, including Dennett. Joyce (2006:164-165) describes the idea of a 
conversation-stopper nicely as 
[C]onsiderations that can appear in a personal or interpersonal decision 
process in order to bring the procedure to an effective terminus, preventing 
the mechanisms from spiraling endlessly in seeking further justifications, 
infinitely mulling over further considerations. For Dennett, moral values, 
principles, and imperatives function as conversation-stoppers par 
excellence. An interesting feature of the view is that in order for our moral 
judgments to fulfill this role effectively we must not be thinking of them 
as conversation-stoppers at the time of deploying them; we must, rather, 
think of them as expressing genuine, no-questions-asked, end-of-story, 
moral considerations. 
Thus we get an explanation of the practical import of moral beliefs; in particular, 
we get an explanation for why it is not implausible to suppose that moral beliefs qua 
conversation-stoppers have the potential of combating unbecoming temptations by taking 
off the table what would otherwise require considerable effort to resist. Yet what we 
don't yet get is an explanation of the practical import of transparently false make-belief, 
and in particularly an explanation of why false make-belief should have practically 
superior effects than revised and modified belief. The big question, in Joyce's own 
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words, is "how can a fiction have the kind of practical impact - moreover, the kind of 
practical authority - that confers on moral belief its instrumental value?" How is it 
possible that "a mere fiction could or should have such practical influence in important 
real-life decisions"? (2005:301) The suggestion is that moral make-belief inherits some 
of the practical gravity that usually is attached with moral belief. How could that work? 
Joyce considers the example of daily workout (2005:303): 
Suppose I am determined to exercise regularly, after a lifetime of lethargy, 
but find myself succumbing to temptation. An effective strategy will be 
for me to lay down a strong and authoritative rule: I must do fifty sit-ups 
every day, no less. I am attempting to form a habit, and habits are formed 
- and, for the doggedly weak of will, maintained - by strictness and over 
compensation. Perhaps in truth it doesn't much matter that I do fifty sit-
ups every day, so long as I do more-or-Iess fifty on most days. But by 
allowing myself the occasional lapse, by giving myself permission 
sometimes to stray from the routine, I pave the way for akratic sabotage of 
my calculations - I threaten even my doing more-or-Iess fifty sit-ups on 
most days. I do better if I encourage myself to think in terms of fifty daily 
sit-ups as a non-negotiable value, as something I must do if I am ever to 
get fit. 
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And that last piece, namely the proposition maintaining the absolute necessity of 
fifty sit-ups, is transparently false yet supposedly best affirmed in the modus of make-
belief, according to Joyce. What he describes is a real psychological phenomenon most of 
us are struggling with. What I hesitate to grant, however, is that any transparently false 
make-belief is needed or comparatively better positioned than some clear-headed 
alternative belief to ameliorate the present practical quagmire. In fact, it seems to me that 
what Joyce describes is precisely what we should believe, and all that we should believe 
(or make-believe), since it seems to deliver the same practical benefits. It is true that 
Joyce, determined to exercise, needs to lay down a strict law permitting no exceptions. 
But the attitude he has no need for is that of falsely make-believing that only fifty-sit-ups 
could serve his athletic purposes. Instead, when facing temptation, what he needs to 
remind himself of is that breaking the law considerably weakens his habits, 
compromising his future resolve to do any exercise, and that as a psychological matter, he 
must fully abide by his strict workout plan if he is to stand any chances of sticking to it. 
Nothing in that realization is mistaken, supposedly requiring a fiction to maintain it, but 
rather represents a clear-headed awareness of the psychological implications of what we 
do now for what we may do later as well as our general dispositions and habits. Placing 
our current choices in a larger psychological context, appreciating their long-term effects 
among other things, endows them with considerable gravitas, quite possibly outweighing 
the kind of hallucinatory gravitas knowingly absent in reality and present only in our 
fictional fantasies. 
5.3. The Challenge from Deliberative Indispensability 
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Return, then to the challenge that the abandonment of the normative project 
entails the abandonment of the deliberative project, the challenge that no account which 
denies normative reasons is capable of representing practical deliberation as anything 
other than deeply flawed, forfeiting the capacity of making sense of practical deliberation 
at the moment of denunciating normative reasons. The challenge, to put it in yet one 
more way, that the success of the deliberative project entails the existence of normative 
reasons and hence the falsity of meta-normative skepticism. 
David Enoch (2007) has recently developed a powerful version of the challenge 
against meta-normative skepticism and in support of what he calls robust normative 
realism, which he defines as the view that there are response-independent, non-natural, 
irreducibly normative truths, perfectly objective and universal ones, that when successful 
in our normative inquiries we discover rather than create or construct. (2007 :21) The 
core concept in Enoch's argument is deliberative indispensability, which he juxtaposes to 
explanatory indispensability. Consider the latter first. Why believe in electrons? The 
answer is that electrons feature in our best (and decent) scientific theories. Electrons seem 
explanatorily indispensable to science, and with abduction we are entitled to believe that 
there actually are electrons. Moreover, as Enoch observes, science is not an enterprise we 
could easily dispense with. Clearly not all enterprises justify ontological commitments in 
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those features that cannot be eliminated from them without undermining their very point. 
Indispensability in science carries ontological weight because it is part of an explanatory 
project that is itself "indispensable because it is one we cannot - and certainly ought not 
- fail to engage in, it is unavoidable for us; we are essentially explanatory creatures" 
Enoch concludes "With non-optional projects like the explanatory one, there is no real 
option of abandoning them. If something is indispensable for such a project, it seems 
belief is the only rational way to go." (2007:33-34) 
Turn then to deliberative indispensability. Enoch argues that (robustly 
understood) normative truths are indispensable for deliberation, another enterprise we 
have no choice but to take seriously, and that this grounds belief in such truths. He rejects 
the idea that normative truths are explanatorily indispensable for deliberation. The 
progression of thoughts and intentions that constitutes deliberation is part of the natural 
order, and for all we know robustly meta-normative truths are not required for its 
explanation. Yet Enoch believes explanatory indispensability is not the only basis on 
which we incur justified ontological commitments. The indispensability of features that 
provide point and purpose to deliberation can justify belief in them as well. After all, we 
are no less essentially deliberative creatures than we are essentially explanatory 
creatures. "We cannot and should not avoid asking ourselves what to do, what to believe, 
how to reason, what to care about. ... The deliberative project is not one we can opt out 
of, it is not optional for us." (2007:34) Consequently, if deliberation makes sense only if 
there are reasons, and we must deliberate, it seems we are committed to reasons: "by 
deliberating you commit yourself to there being relevant reasons; if you also believe there 
aren't any, you are being inconsistent ... and irrational." (2007:38) 
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Enoch's emphasis on our own deliberative perspective is well placed. How could 
we altogether fail to take seriously our own deliberative engagement together with what it 
entails? We possibly could adopt an uncompromisingly cynical attitude towards the 
deliberative attempts of other people who we could deplore as victims of thoroughgoing 
deception and illusion. But it seems hard to imagine how we could adopt a similar 
attitude towards our own deliberation. Even when we entertain the terrifying possibility 
of being subjected to massive error, we must at least have some confidence in our ability 
to reason towards a sensible response to that possibility: whether to take it seriously, and 
in case we do, what to think and do then. In general, even when we contemplate radical 
challenges to the sensibility of our own deliberation, we must do so qua deliberators who 
cannot but take seriously at least some of their own deliberative inclinations. If Enoch 
could demonstrate that we would be incapable of recovering point and purpose in our 
own deliberative engagement without believing in (robustly) normative truths, we would 
be under considerable pressure to form that belief. Indeed, given the essentially 
deliberative creatures we are what more convincing case can we imagine for such truths? 
Enoch imagines a student contemplating whether to stay in law school or whether 
instead to switch into philosophy. The decision is of some consequence and treated 
accordingly. Questions are coming up concerning his happiness in law versus philosophy, 
the prospects of succeeding as a lawyer versus as a philosopher, as well as the two 
careers' potential impact on political issues, and so on. And then "There remains the 
ultimate question. 'All things considered', you ask yourself, 'what makes best sense for 
me to do? When all is said and done, what should I do? What shall I do?' (2007:36). 
These are fair observations, and here is how Enoch (2007:36) thinks they support realism: 
When engaging in this deliberation, when asking yourself these questions, 
you assume, so it seems to me, that they have answers. These answers may 
be very vague, allow for indeterminacy, and so on. But at the very least 
you assume that some possible answers to these questions are better than 
others. You try to find out what the (better) answers to these questions are, 
and how they interact so as to answer the arch-question, the one about 
what makes most sense for you to do. You are not trying to create these 
answers. '" When trying to make up your mind, it doesn't feel just like 
trying to make an arbitrary choice .... Rather, it feels like trying to make 
the right choice .... Making the decision is up to you. But which decision 
is the one it makes most sense for you to make is not. This is something 
you are trying to discover, not create. 
Enoch contrasts deliberation with mere picking. Consider the situation where we 
have to choose between two equally decent brands of cereal. Enoch continues (2007:37): 
We can just pick in the face of a known (or believed) absence of reasons. 
But we cannot, it seems, deliberate in the face of a believed absence of 
reasons. Knowing that there is no decision such that it makes most sense 
for us to make it, we cannot - not consistently... - try to make the 
decision it makes most sense for us to make. Deliberation - unlike mere 
picking - is an attempt to eliminate arbitrariness by discovering 
(normative) reasons, and it is impossible in a believed absence of such 
reasons to be discovered. 
Various authors have articulated arguments quite similar to Enoch's. Bennett 
Helm, for instance, writes, putting as much emphasis on correctness, reasons, discovery, 
and non-arbitrariness as Enoch does (2001:13): 
[T]here seems to be an element of objectivity in what values a person 
holds in that she can deliberate about them correctly or incorrectly. 
Deliberation is a matter of choosing for reasons, thereby making possible 
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the articulation of why one course of life is better than another, so that it is 
not intellectually arbitrary which values we choose. Hence through 
deliberation we can discover the values things really have and so the kind 
of person it is worth our being, potentially overcoming delusions or 
misunderstandings about ourselves. ... [O]ur choice of personal values 
and so our understanding of the kind of person it is worth each of us being 
is not arbitrary ... For we think it is possible to have better or worse 
reasons for such choices ... The demand for discovery and objectivity is a 
demand to rule out this kind of arbitrariness. 
A good dozen lines later Helm continues (2001 :14, emphasis added): 
[A]n arbitrarily chosen life lacks the kind of grounding that is precisely the 
point of our deliberation about value. 
Call this the argument from correct-answers. It asserts that when we deliberate 
we incur a commitment to normative reasons that are relevant to our deliberation. (Read 
the assertion with all relevant qualifications in place: that not every deliberative occasion 
entails a corresponding commitment, that we need not be consciously aware of those 
commitments, etc.) The argument contains two steps: deliberation requires that there are 
correct and incorrect answers, and correct and incorrect answers require normative 
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reasons. It begins by capturing something important about the phenomenology of 
deliberation. Figuring out whether to eat at home or to go out is not entirely unlike 
figuring out whether the restaurant is still open. There must be something to deliberative 
answers that is not exhausted by the fact that they just happen to be the answers we 
choose. Otherwise deliberation indeed collapses into mere picking where no place is left 
for reasoned decision-making. Step one seems fine. What the subjectivist contests is step 
two. Correctness in deliberative answers does not require (robust) normative reasons and 
306 
in fact represents a phenomenon the subjectivist can accommodate, although he must 
construe correctness as less involving than Enoch makes it out to be. The question is 
whether he can offer an alternative account that still permits point and purpose to what 
we are doing when we are thinking about what to do. 
5.4. The Outline of a Solution 
The contours of the subjectivist's counterproposal are predictable, and in fact 
were already anticipated in the opening sections. Deliberation receives correct answers 
from within the web of our concerns and antecedent norm-commitments we bring to the 
deliberative task, the subjectivist maintains, accounting for deliberative correctness 
conditionally, relative to the norms we employ, while his opponent insists on an 
unconditional reading. We deliberate when, driven by our concerns and norm-
commitments, we actively participate in the resolution of practical problems, including 
the selection and development of which norms to live by, searching for common ground 
for how to coordinate our individual and joint endeavors. The deliberative enterprise is 
not unconstrained and is answerable to standards of correctness as it is carried out within 
a tight web of norms that we do already accept, a web we continuously spin and expand. 
The subjectivist does not have the resources to accommodate deliberative correctness 
outside this web of norms, correctness simpliciter as it were, and thus what Charles 
Taylor (1977) called radical or strong evaluation, an assessment of our most fundamental 
commitments on the basis of some view from nowhere, is not an option the subjectivist 
can countenance; he only has the resources to accommodate deliberative correctness from 
within, his only card to play, which he needs to play well, rendering plausible that what 
he can offer is indeed enough of what we expect from deliberation. 
Consider the deliberative task of figuring out how to organize the order in which 
students present in class. Suppose we conclude that it is best done by lottery. How did we 
arrive at that deliberative solution? We found it to be comparatively fair, since it does not 
flow from the mere swiftness and vigor with which students voice their preference, and 
we also prize the mutual harmony this decision procedure engenders. We know students 
will be more comfortable with their slot if they can rest assured that no one was unduly 
favored. We have, in other words, worked out a solution to a practical problem against a 
backdrop of shared standards. What precise content the standards have is hard to pin 
down. It probably includes a commitment that everyone has an equal shot in choosing his 
favorite slot. The point is that in light of those standards, whatever their content, the 
decision we made is recognizably better than many alternatives, and thus can be 
considered correct in a more profound sense than merely being the lucky one we chose. 
The subjectivist applies the same account to deliberation about norms and 
principles itself. Norms are addressed to us and we must determine whether to take 
seriously what is so addressed, and thus we, the unique consumers of norms, inevitably 
face the task of deciding which norms to empower with action-guiding potential and 
which not, resulting in a division structurally resembling the realists' division between 
norms with and without authority. There are no objectively correct norms and principles 
that hold unconditionally, the subjectivist maintains, but standards of correctness are built 
right into norms, and thus granting him some he may commence deliberation about 
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others. In the context of deliberation about principles we shall no less rely on a horizon of 
norm-commitments within which to navigate further norm-selection. Standing upon more 
fundamental norms we may judge less fundamental norms, and judge in a manner that 
permits for correct results - intending the fundamental/non-fundamental distinction to be 
drawn contextually, vis-a.-vis concrete norm-choice situations, with no norm principally 
enjoying a more fundamental status than others. The norms employed to judge others are 
taken for granted in the same deliberative context, momentarily suspending the request 
for justification in terms of yet further norms, with the possibility of reopening the case at 
any time. 
Should we, in the progression to further and further norms, reach rock bottom at 
some point, then we would also have reached the end of our deliberative story, where 
little is left than to mention that this is simply how we are, that this is our deliberative 
way of life. Norms underwriting our planning capacities may be such an instance, in their 
pressure towards means-end coordination, meshing of sub-plans, diachronic stability, etc. 
(Bratman 1999) It seems irrational to refuse to take the obvious means to an end of major 
importance (assuming further conditions are met), and the norm driving that judgment 
may simply be built right into our cognitive design, with no further deliberative because 
involved, characterizing (most of) us as (mostly) instrumental reasoners, and that's that. 
Such ultimate norms, should they exist, would probably bear out themselves, unless they 
are extremely poorly designed, representing a case of some rather trivial self-
certification, for sure, but not a case of bootstrapping to authority, since authority is no 
posit of the subjectivist's approach. It is true, then, that the skeptical account entails some 
limitations concerning the scope of non-trivial deliberation, but this should be fine so 
long as enough space is left for the familiar kinds of non-trivial deliberation. Enoch's 
challenge is to explain how there can be deliberation at all if the skeptic is right, and that 
we can explain, namely how there could be point and purpose to deliberation about where 
to go given where we are. The skeptic and the realist may disagree about the scope of 
non-trivial deliberation, but that's an issue for another occasion. 
Commitment looms large in this deliberative approach, and I need to say more 
about it, especially how it interacts with norms. Start with a challenge the skeptic faces. 
The skeptic qua subjectivist intends to stay committed to all sorts of norms, yet realists 
may wonder whether the skeptic is not forced to mischaracterize the nature of 
commitment. Without any confidence in the authority of the relevant norms, realists may 
complain, the skeptic's intention to say committed to them anyway must emerge as an 
unsustainable fetish, a sort of rule-worship in its worst form. The skeptic's response to 
the challenge depends crucially upon emphasizing a gap between the purportedly 
practical question of what norms to commit to and the purportedly theoretical question of 
what properties norms have, yet what is commitment if not acceptance in virtue of 
recognized authority, the realist asks. To this the skeptic responds by contesting the 
underlying assumption wedding commitment and authority by suggesting an alternative 
interpretation where commitments are divorced from judgments on normative authority. 
Skeptics say, rather, that commitments are stable psychological dispositions endorsed by 
reflection, to follow some norm's dictates, incorporating a readiness and willingness to be 
guided by it without regret; perhaps also accompanied by a further disposition to find 
certain features salient, or to exclude certain options from consideration. Commitments 
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further involve some preparedness to see to it that one's intention to engage [in the 
relevant norm-practices] persists. (Calhoun 2009:615-622, Frankfurt 1988) 
Turn, then, to what commitment adds to norms. When we commit to a norm, we 
endow it with a special kind of motivational force, the only force left after normative 
force has been removed from the picture, with the consequence that we empower the 
norm to assume an action-guiding capacity, as a map we steer by. Vis-a.-vis norms met by 
no commitment we can still work out what they entail is to be done, as a purely 
intellectual exercise, as when we say: "Yes, this is what I am supposed to do according to 
etiquette," but hasten to add: "but I couldn't care less about etiquette." What we then 
experience quite immediately is the relativity of the relevant supposed-to-do claim to a 
standard wanting of all motivational impetus, failing to resonate with us entirely. In 
committing to a norm, in contrast, we allow it to take a more active role in our 
deliberative economy. The relativity of the demands it issues is still there, of course, but 
becomes seemingly motivationally discharged. In conjunction to our cognitive capacity 
enabling us to represent norms, supplying conditions of correctness to deliberation, we 
also possess the motivational capacity enabling us to commit, supplying practical force to 
deliberation. Neither capacity can help perform the job of the other, and commitment, in 
particular, cannot add further correctness-conditions, given its purely 
motivational/dispositional character, and thus whatever correctness-conditions are 




My approach echoes what Mark Timmons (1999) has developed with regards to 
moral knowledge: "Things get interesting when we judge from within a moral outlook, a 
position from which genuine moral assertions and truth ascriptions to moral statements 
have a home, as it were. And it is from this morally engaged perspective that talk of 
moral knowledge becomes interesting and useful." Timmons contrasts this engaged 
perspective with a detached perspective where "the proper thing to say about moral truth 
is that there is none. That is, from a strictly metaphysical perspective from which we are 
asking about what there really is, since there are no moral facts or properties, there is no 
moral truth." (1999:244; cf. also Wright 1992:200-1, Blackburn 1998) This nicely sums it 
up. I too wish to maintain that from without our commitments - the metaphorical view 
from nowhere (Nagel 1986) - deliberation cannot get off the ground. If we ever could 
adopt such a non-perspective perspective, we would have no choice but to notice the 
thoroughgoing nihilism it engenders. Fortunately, there is no deliberative view from 
nowhere, and even if, per impossibile, there were such a view, there would be no reasons 
to privilege its results rather than those generated by our own viewpoint. 
Return, finally, to Enoch's student. He cares about happiness, success, and the 
prospects of making a difference in the political world, among other things. Should he 
stay in law or switch into philosophy? His deliberation will be anchored in his norm-
commitments, concerns, and his factual estimates: what promises do the two careers hold 
for his life, and which of the two so projected life-paths should he choose? Perhaps 
success leans towards law, happiness towards philosophy? The question then is what is 
more important to him. Initially this may be hard to tell. But after some thought he might 
reason that without happiness success is unlikely to arise; and that success in law appears 
attractive only due to features that are incompatible with his commitment to political 
equality: dominance and showing off riches. Moreover, he may fear the many 
compromises of an increasingly troubling nature that success in law would require. 
Would he not in the end find himself defending big oil and vindictive divorcees? In 
contrast, the hardships of finding a job in philosophy when he is young are easier to bear 
than the frustrations as a lawyer when he is old. All in all, he may conclude success loses 
and happiness and philosophy wins. A variety of practical norms will condition the 
deliberative process and explain why the deciding factors support his ultimate decision. 
Such as the principle that if, everything being equal, out of two comparable goals only 
one comports with a significant third, one should choose that one. 
5.5. So It Is All About Motivation? 
This question, presumably asked in a critical voice, raises a host of issues it is 
crucial for the subjectivist to get clear on. Coming to a full appreciation of the distinction 
between the normative and the motivational is perhaps the greatest achievement in late 
meta-ethics. Major parts of the literature dedicated to illuminating the normative have 
emerged, upon close examination, to be treatments of another subject altogether, the 
motivational, calling into doubt their capacity to contribute to their intended subject-
matter. The distinction was essential to my skeptical and negative case before, and will be 
essential for my subjectivist and positive case that follows. It focused my critical 
arguments. When I denied normative reasons, I did not deny motives, or motivational 
reasons, considerations that prompt people to act as they do, considerations that do 
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deliberatively guide people in their choices and which, in retrospect, explain and render 
intelligible what they did. The assassin in the service of the mob has an entirely 
intelligible motive for his kill, namely to collect his recompense, in light of which we 
understand what we did; given his motives, targeting at the overzealous investigator 
made sense whereas targeting at the random bystander would not have. Making sense and 
intelligibility are here understood as notions referencing familiar and expected 
motivational patters, thereby providing answers to various why-questions, such as why 
the assassin intentionally killed the investigator rather than the bystander. Motives, and 
purely motivational reasons, are entirely kosher in my view. 
Yet motives aren't reasons. It is a different matter altogether whether the assassin 
should have formed and acted upon the motive, whether he had any reasons of doing so, 
reading should and reasons in the characteristically normative way, as referencing not 
just some contingent standard he or we collectively happen to bring to the situation -
some mobster-etiquette, say, according to which he was required to murder as promised -
but as describing his normative situation as it obtains independently of any such 
standards except standards that are truly authoritative. The difference is clear. That the 
consideration to collect recompense by carrying out the assassination prompts, in 
accordance with familiar motivational patterns, the assassin to kill is what renders it a 
motive. That the consideration makes it appropriate for him to kill, not merely according-
to-some-non-authoritative-mobster-standard, is what would render it a reason. That there 
are reasons and normative situation thus characterized is precisely what I deny, hastening 
to reaffirm my readiness, of course, to join and support the call for the implementation of 
social standards prohibiting and disincentivizing assassination. 
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The normative/motivational distinction should also give us pause of speaking too 
confidently of The Normative Question, as if there was only one single and well defined 
question going under that name, one specific kind of question we raise when we ask 
"why be moral?" or "why be rational?" or "why be an agent?" or "why do what is smart 
and wise and conducive to happiness?" It is unclear whether there is one single subject 
matter all those instances of the question ask about. The question "Why do or be such-
and-such" is in fact ambiguous, allowing for a normative as well as for a motivational 
reading. The question "why be moral," for instance, is normative when it asks about 
reasons to be moral; it is motivational when raised so as to prompt a decision about 
whether to be moral. When raised in the normative mode, the question queries about what 
normative status doing the morally right thing enjoys. When raised in the motivational 
mode, it presents its subject with a decision-problem, where the subject pondering the 
question is plausibly tom, having not yet made up his mind as to whether to be moral; a 
decision to form a motivationally efficacious state or intention is pending yet not 
concluded. 
The two questions possibly bear all sorts of interesting relations to each other. 
According to one common picture, the motivational question is answered by answering 
the normative question. The motivational question asks for a decision, and a decision is 
selected on the basis of its merit. There are various complications about this neat picture. 
The present point is that the two questions are logically distinct, even if variously related, 
that they ask not about the same thing. Many authors ought to be more careful not to run 
them together, as for instance Korsgaard has made a habit of, so often speaking of the 
normative question when she plainly asks the motivational question. She writes, for 
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instance: " ... if these arguments cannot motivate the reader to become a utilitarian then 
how can it show that utilitarianism is normative?" (1996:85, emphasis added) 
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The motivational/normative divide renders ambiguous most of our practical 
vocabulary. One particularly interesting instance concerns the notion of being action-
guiding. Something may be said to be action-guiding in a normative sense in virtue of 
providing reasons for how one should act. Alternatively, something may be said to be 
action-guiding in a motivational sense in virtue of actually guiding how one does act. 
Most importantly, something may be said to be action-guiding in one sense without also 
being action-guiding in the other sense. There's also a third sense I should mention only 
to set it aside. Norms and practical standards can be said to be action guiding in the 
purely formal sense of having the right sort of content fit for speaking to practical 
questions of what to do. The standard one is never permitted to tell a lie is action-guiding 
in this formal sense whereas the proposition people often do tell a lie is not. Yet we know 
standards cannot acquire the kind of normative distinction associated with reasons-
providingness solely in virtue of their form; they are action-guiding normatively speaking 
only to the extent to which what they specify that should be done must be done according 
to authoritative standards, not just according to some standard or other. Furthermore, 
standards need not have any motivational force in virtue of their form. Disregarding the 
formal mode of action-guidingness, we can thus distinguish between a normative mode 
where a standard is action-guiding just in case it provides reasons for what to do, and a 
motivational mode where a standard is action-guiding just in case is motivationally 
involved in how people actually decide to act. 
To make the difference graphic, consider two maps of different sorts. Suppose a 
group of people is trying to get from point A to point B. There are two maps, and two 
routes. One map specifies the perfect route, the route they should take, whereas the other 
specifies the imperfect route, the route they should not take. Unfortunately, the first route 
is invisible, rendering it unusable by our traveling party. What they use instead is the 
second map. Now both maps clearly are action-guiding, but in a rather different way. The 
first guides by telling where they should go, albeit to no avail, the second guides by 
telling where they do go, albeit to no good. The perfect map, of course, would 
incorporate both aspects, telling where they should go and then also making them go 
there. 
The example was intended to make the contrast between normative and 
motivational guides for action as stark as possible, speaking of an invisible map as 
opposed to a map merely currently unavailable, thereby undermining the very possibility 
that the invisible map, being action-guiding in the normative sense, could even be action-
guiding in the motivational sense. This supposition is plainly incompatible with a 
prominent principle, namely that something can be normatively action-guiding only if it 
also retains the potential of being motivationally action-guiding. Expressed in terms of 
reasons, the principle holds that normative reasons must be considerations of the kind that 
people could possibly grasp and act upon, considerations, in other words, with 
motivational potential. The principle is false, however, and my suspicion is that only 
when reasons and motives are conflated with each other does the principle seem more 
plausible than it actually is. Whether certain considerations have the potential of 
motivating creatures of a certain kind depends first and foremost on the psychological 
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makeup of these creatures. Whether certain considerations favor certain responses 
presents another matter altogether. Once reasons and motives are set apart, it becomes 
hard to see why the kind of reasons that may apply to some creatures must yield to what 
the sorts of contingent psychological capacities they display permit them to grasp and act 
upon. 
Notice the principle under consideration is distinct from another issue, namely 
whether creatures who grasp what their reasons are must, on pain of irrationality, be 
moved by them, representing a matter either trivial or false, depending on how the 
underlying notion of rationality is construed. Rather, what I contest is that reasons must 
be such that they can be grasped by those to whom they apply, and the force of my 
discontentment can be demonstrated quickly and with the help of a simple example. It is 
not implausible to suppose that, should there be reasons, dogs have reasons to ingest a 
sufficient supply of vitamins. There is something to be said in favor of that, namely that 
by ingesting a sufficient supply of vitamins dogs lend to have healthier and longer lives. 
Yet dogs cannot process thoughts about vitamins, due to their cognitive incapability to 
grasp and process the concept of vitamins, and consequently cannot act on these reasons 
- without the astonishing effect of thereby making them go away. The point generalizes. 
If there are reasons, it is not incoherent to suppose that some of them may be opaque to 
those to whom they apply due to cognitive limitations, specifying what they should do 
even though they cannot act on them. Applied to us, the way to describe the situation 
would be to say that there are some reasons for what we should do which we can 
understand and act upon and some which we cannot understand and hence cannot act 
upon. This is not entirely different from saying that there might be mathematical truths 
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we cannot understand, and the principle placing restriction of understanding and 
motivation on what reasons (onto logically) there might be appears just as absurd as the 
corresponding principle placing restrictions of understanding on what mathematical 
truths (ontologically) there might be. 
To build on the example of invisible maps one last time, and expanding it by 
speaking of maps concerning how to act more broadly, suppose God laid out for us how 
to lead the perfect life and only forgot to use the right sort of print, or suppose 
alternatively he used a language we cannot deceiver. His map is no less normatively 
action-guiding for that; unfortunately we simply are limited in our cognitive capacities to 
read it and consequently to be actually guided by it. Satan, in contrast, has perfectly 
mastered to deceiver God's maps, with the inevitable effect of doing the exact opposite. 
His motivational guide for how to act perfectly matches his normative guide for how to 
act, only in reverse. It is essential for Satan to strictly keep normative and motivational 
guides for action apart in order to carry out his twisted and evil scheme. This completes 
my emphasis of the motivation/normative divide, and now I'd like to tum to what it 
means for my project as it is going to unfold in this chapter. 
Returning to my own dialectical situation, I happily acknowledge that it was only 
due my insistence on the distinction between the normative and the motivational that I 
was able to permit my meta-normative denial focus and point, saving it from denying the 
obvious, namely that there are motives. Now I am stuck with it, including the 
implications this has for what I may say henceforth. Consider the following argument: 
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(1) The practical domain partitions, without remainder, into the normative 
and the motivational. 
(2) The normative does not, and cannot, exist. 
(3) One cannot truthfully talk about what does not exist. 
(4) The motivational is all that remains to truthfully talk about in matters 
practical. 
I accept the argument, as indeed I have but little choice. Having set the task of 
speaking of practical deliberation, aspiring to say many true things of it, all I can 
henceforth speak of is motivational in nature. If my meta-normative skepticism is 
correct, there is simply nothing else to talk about - nothing distinctively practical, 
anyway, for we shall certainly remain capable of truthfully talking about our world even 
after reasons have been removed from the picture. One thing in particular I wish to talk 
about are norms, what they demand, what they imply, and so on. The subject matter for 
the skeptic narrows to motivational matters as they interact with the world and norms. 
The only force I may countenance norms to have, besides the trivial formal force, is 
motivational force, after normative force, authority, has been dropped from the picture. 
The complaint all this must immediately arouse is this: aren't you thus changing the 
subject? Yes, I confess, guilty as charged, and in response plead that my hands are tied. 
Changing the subject from the normative to the motivational when setting out to 
developing a positive theory is inevitable for a meta-normative skeptic, the only way of 
avoiding massive falsehood given his assumptions. I fully understand the complaint of 
changing the subject, and I appreciate the force it retains for those who believe in the 
normative, and especially understand how it might serve as a remainder for those who, 
aspiring to illuminate the normative, have steered off target, as a call to refocus. Against 
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the meta-normative skeptic qua subjectivist the complaint is dialectically toothless, as 
pointless as criticizing the atheist for disengaging from theology. 
I also grasp the low esteem of the motivational usually embodied in normative 
treatises. If one believes to have a choice of talking about the normative versus the 
motivational, the normative appears more exciting. And yet, the motivational is more 
exciting than often credited, especially the enormously sophisticated subspecies which 
we may call rational motivation, which we employ when we engage in complex long-
term deliberation. The common depreciation of the motivational I seek to counter with an 
appreciation of the motivational, presenting it as a powerful capacity, particularly when 
employed for complex long-term planning purposes by ourselves. Once we acquire a 
better sense of what rational motivation involves, especially in its active mode, we shall 
become more sanguine about its prospects of accommodating most of what we take 
ourselves doing when deliberating. The force of this promise has to be assessed vis-a.-vis 
the details of the ensuing account. There are various general obstacles that can and must 
be removed before we tum to that, though. 
A first source of depreciating the motivational lies in the supposition that 
motivation is third-personal and concerns matters of explanation only whereas normative 
reason is first-personal and concerns matters of deliberation. This represents such an 
egregious misconception which must be addressed even before my motivation-based 
deliberative account is introduced. One author leading the charge is Jay Wallace who 
writes (2006: 66) 
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When we address the question of motivation, we typically focus on an 
action that has already been performed, and we think about the action 
from a distinctively third-person perspective. The aim is to arrive at a 
certain kind of explanation, taking the explanandum as a given. ... [I]n 
posing this question I am viewing my action from a point of view that is 
disconnected from my present capacities for agency... By contrast, the 
perspective within which normative reasons have their place is 
characteristically prospective, first-personal, and deliberative. It is the 
point of view from which I weigh the considerations for and against the 
various courses of action that are open to me, with the aim not of 
explaining something that has already occurred, but of resolving for 
myself the question of what is to be done and acting accordingly. 
As a statement about reasons and motives most of what Wallace says in this 
passage is mistaken - a verdict that would be different had he attempted to describe the 
deliberative perspective more broadly. For instance, his tripartite claim that "the 
perspective within which normative reasons have their place is characteristically 
prospective, first-personal, and deliberative" is false on each count. We can query about 
normative situations of the past, concerning other people, and in a purely evaluative as 
opposed to deliberative context. The assessment that Caesar had plenty of reasons to 
secure better protection on his way to the Senate at the Ides of March plainly involves a 
perspective in which normative reasons have their place, yet is neither prospective, nor 
first-personal, nor deliberative. 
My real source of disagreement, however, concerns Wallace contentions about 
motivation being third-personal and characteristically retrospective. Sometimes it is, 
sometimes it is not - the same is true of the normative. To see why Wallace is mistaken, I 
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suggest we momentarily redraw the normative/motivational distinction in terms of 
attraction, namely in terms of the contrast between what one should be attracted by (the 
normative) as opposed to what one happens to be attracted by (the motivational). First-
personal and forward-looking deliberation can proceed in either terms. When deliberation 
is carried out in terms of normative reasons, we deliberate in terms of what we should be 
attracted by; when forward-looking deliberation is carried out in terms of motivation, we 
deliberate in terms of what we are attracted by. Think of a simple deliberative situation, 
the forward-looking question of where to have dinner tonight. The question - Indian or 
Chinese tonight? - prompts a decision-process which might very well unfold without 
making any reference to normative reasons, or to what one should be attracted by, but 
unfolds rather by considering merely what one is attracted by. Various attractions are 
brought to one's mind - initiating a mental search for suggestive culinary imagery, 
eventually conjuring up a savory thought of chicken-tikka-marsalla - which triggers ones 
little motivational whistles and wheels, ultimately culminating in the placement of the 
order at one local Indian restaurant. 
A second source of deprecation of motivation stems from construing it too 
narrOWly. We need to appreciate its richness and complexity. This plea for inclusiveness 
on my part is admittedly strategically motivated, since accepting limitations on the 
motivational will immediately limit its capacity to explain the rich range of deliberative 
phenomena I am setting out to explain. As a theoretic developer I am well advised not to 
restrict the territory to operate upon, except in so far as it concerns intrusions into 
normative lands. Still, the pea for inclusiveness is not merely a strategic matter but seems 
to be called for in its own right. Williams was keenly aware of the dangers of an unduly 
narrow construal of motivation when, speaking of his famous motivational set S, he 
urged us (1981 :105) 
. .. to be more liberal than some theorists have been about the possible 
elements in S. I have discussed S primarily in terms of desires, and this 
term can be used, formally, for all elements in S. But this terminology may 
make one forget that S can contain such things as dispositions of 
evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various 
projects, as they may abstractly be called, embodying commitments of the 
agent. 
I believe Williams offers good advice. In particular, what we must guard against 
is a behaviorist theory of motivation, as we may call it, according to which motivation is 
exhausted by what directly issues, or by what is disposed to issue under certain 
conditions, in observable behavior. Now since everything can be causally connected to 
anything under certain conditions, it may be hard if not impossible to find 
counterexamples the behaviorist approach cannot handle. I shall still try momentarily. 
Yet even if we could place every motivational state in relation to some behavioral 
disposition, a major complaint remains, concerning how well we would be positioned to 
understand motivation, exclusively viewing it in relation to cause observable behavior 
under certain conditions. What is most troubling is the tendency of the behaviorist 
approach to disregard the inner life of motivation altogether, leaving out entirely the 
distinctive perspective characteristic of the agent thus motivated. When we are motivated 
to do something, we usually don't experience that motivation as a simple drive to behave 
in a certain way, quasi as an internal pull in some direction, but rather experience it as a 
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rich phenomenon that involves a certain perspective of appraisal on the world and 
ourselves. 
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I will return to appraisal and the distinctive perspective inherent in motivational 
states later when I discuss concern and appeal. For now I would like to challenge the 
behaviorist approach more directly and tum our attention to a couple of examples of 
motivational states that appear to bear no immediate or dispositional connection to 
observant behavior at all, attempting to mount some counterexamples after all. The 
examples all involve various forms of desire, the quintessentially motivational state, 
firmly placed on the non-representational and world-to-mind-direction-of-fit side. The 
scenarios are inspired by Timothy Schroeder's excellent discussion on desire and 
motivation Three Faces of Desire, even though Schroeder adduces the very same 
examples to support a seemingly opposite conclusion, namely that a purely motivational 
account of desire is inadequate. The discrepancy does not run very deep, though, since 
the account of motivation Schroeder is working with is the very same behaviorist 
account. Applied to desire, his critique takes aim at what he calls the Standard Theory 
according to which "To desire that P is to be disposed to bring it about that P." (2004:11) 
His complaint that desires need not be motivational in that sense thus aligns quite 
congenially with my case for a broader construal of motivation, an account transcending 
the restriction to dispositions to arouse observable behavior under certain conditions. 
Anyway, here are the examples. 
Schroeder imagines the case of "an ancient Greek mathematician who is uncertain 
about the value of 1t but who desires that it not be expressible as a fraction of two natural 
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numbers." He notes that "there is nothing our mathematician can do, and nothing he 
believes he can do, to affect the value of 7t." Addressing the artificiality of the case, 
Schroeder continues: "Desires regarding the necessary facts of the world, such as facts of 
mathematics, are admittedly rare, but not as scare as might be imagined. . .. I might desire 
that I had never been born, or that my parents had never met, or that, right now, life exists 
elsewhere in the universe (or, to be more prosaic still, I might desire that my girlfriend, 
away at a conference, not be having an affair at this very moment). Because of the 
necessary facts about causation, these are also desires for ends I can do nothing to bring 
about." (2004:16) There simply exists no situation or set of circumstances to place our 
mathematician in where he, pulling off the knowingly impossible, could actually be doing 
something about the value of 7t - the example was chosen precisely for this impossibility 
of effect, documenting an instance of desire that cannot be accommodated in virtue of its 
disposition to do something under certain circumstances. 
This inspires the imagination. I would bet most of us have plenty of desires of that 
kind. Desires about the past come to mind, that the holocaust did not happen, that the 
Roman Empire did not collapse, that dinosaurs did not die out, at least not the cuter and 
more cuddly ones. Yet we know we cannot change the past. Another rich repertoire of 
knowingly unattainable desires consists in self-regarding desires. I most definitely desire 
to live longer than I possibly can as the biological creature I am, and also desire to differ 
biologically, even with regard to features that cannot feasibly be co-designed, to have 
wings, more powerful organs, additional legs and arms, and most importantly, a larger 
brain with hitherto unimaginable cognitive powers, and yet to be light and flexible. And 
then Nomy Arpaly at times desire to be Bertrand Russell. (2006:XXX) Putting together 
desires about the past and oneself brings us to another rich domain of desires known to be 
wanting of all measures to bring about their object: regret. Often what we desire most is 
that we had not acted as we did. When we regret what we did, it is not just that we 
believe we acted wrongly or inappropriately, or that we firmly resolve not to do the same 
in the future. The unmistaken content of our desire that we had not done what we did 
together with our certain knowledge that we cannot change our past, distinguishes regret 
as precisely the tragic experience it is. 
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Taking this one step further, it may be questioned, despite widespread acceptance, 
whether desire, and by extension motivation, bears any essential connection to action, 
unless the concept of action itself is construed so broadly as to include the entirety of 
mental activity, including pure motivational mental activity, such as feeling bad about 
certain things about which one evidently cannot do anything, taking pleasure in 
imagining oneself to do the impossible, wishing what cannot happen nonetheless would 
happen, etc. Galen Strawson has produced an intriguing thought experiment designed to 
fuel the suspicion that there could be desires with no link to action whatsoever. Setting 
the stage for it, Schroeder writes: "The claim that desires are, necessarily, things that 
dispose us to action gives rise to other problems as well. Why could there not exist beings 
quite incapable of action who nonetheless had desires?" (2004:20) Galen Strawson then 
invites us to imagine creatures of precisely that kind, the Weather Watchers. Endowed 
with cognitive capacities, enabling them to reliably track the weather, the Weather 
Watchers remain quite incapable of doing anything about it and yet harbor strong desires 
that the weather be one way rather than another. Their lot is one of mere spectators, or, to 
use Galen Strawson's term (1994:254), one of "motionless meteorologists," which does 
nothing to detain them from taking an active interest as what the weather is like. Here is 
Galen Strawson's introduction (1994:251): 
The Weather Watchers are a race of sentient, intelligent creatures. They 
are distributed about the surface of their planet, rooted in the ground, 
profoundly interested in the local weather. They have sensations, thoughts, 
emotions, beliefs, desires. They possess a conception of an objective, 
spatial world. But they are constitutively incapable of any sort of behavior, 
as this is ordinarily understood. They lack the necessary physiology. Their 
mental lives have no other-observable effects. They are not even disposed 
to behave in any way. 
After raising the question "Are the Weather Watchers impossible?" Strawson 
proceeds at great length to make plausible that the answer is no. His case strikes me as 
intuitively compelling, and his reply to objections of various kinds convincing. Strawson 
dedicates an entire chapter on the case, aptly titled The Weather Watchers, to be 
consulted in the event doubts remain. Besides his intriguing scenario, there are many 
more examples that could be provided to challenge the questionable necessity of 
immediate or dispositional connections between wanting something and doing something 
to bring it about, and reasons of space permit to consider only one final group. Often it is 
a core component of our desire for something to happen that we did not have any part in 
it. We want our children to succeed on their own, a friend to get his deserved recognition 
without our intervention, our spouse to love us without us prompting that love, dear 
people to notice when they offended us without us reminding them, receive an invitation 
to the birthday party without our initiative, etc. Often the nature of what we want is such 
that the deed would be spoiled if it was us who brought it about, however indirectly. 
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None of this is to deny the important connection to action many, perhaps most, of our 
desires exemplify. The examples cited in the last few paragraphs may strike us as 
unusual, and yet they serve as a cautionary note, reminding us that not everything on the 
non-representational divide of our psychic life is in the business of making us do 
something. 
5.6. Concern and AppeaJers 
We engage in practical deliberation because we care about things, because we 
harbor concerns. Concerns represent a major element driving practical deliberation, and 
the remainder of the chapter is dedicated to describe their nature in greater detail. What I 
am going to say about concerns may appear stipulative on occasion. That's fine. This is 
not primarily an exercise in conceptual analysis, but an attempt to delineate and draw 
attention to a phenomenon of first deliberative importance. I also prefer speaking of 
concerns, and alternatively of caring, instead of desires, the more customary choice in 
many practical treatises, not because I deny that concerns are desires, which they 
obviously are, but because 1'd like to single out concerns as a subspecies of desires 
playing a particularly prominent part in the kind of deliberation I am interested in. As we 
shall see, concerns present a particularly rich, integrated and temporally extended species 
of desire, displaying also an interesting combination of specificity, diversity, and 
particularity. What is it to be concerned, then? First and foremost, being concerned stands 
opposed to being indifferent; an indifferent creature would find little point in pondering 
what to do, since nothing it could do would make any difference to the creature. It would 
328 
be neat if the English language allowed for a direct antonym for the condition called 
being indifferent; the obvious choice would be being different, unfortunately it already 
has quite a different usage. To be concerned is to be different, then, in precisely this 
sought after sense. Frankfurt offers the same idea (1982:269). 
It is necessarily the case, of course, that a person who cares about a certain 
thing is not cold-bloodedly indifferent to it. In other words, what happens 
to the thing must make a difference to a person who cares about it, and the 
difference it makes must itself be important to him. 
When something makes a difference to a person, it really can make a difference to 
the person, in that how well his life goes becomes tied up with how well his concerns pan 
out. Here is Frankfurt again (1982:260). 
A person who cares about something is, as it were, invested in it. He 
identifies himself with what he cares about in the sense that he makes 
himself vulnerable to losses and susceptible to benefits depending upon 
whether what he cares about is diminished or enhanced. 
The corresponding worldly counterpart to concerns - the possible or actual state 
of affairs realizing the content of the concerns - I propose to call appealers, an 
intentionally idiosyncratic terminological choice, primarily designed to underline the 
contrast with value, or at least with value normatively understood. There is another sense 
of value appeal aligns with rather nicely, a non-normative sense, namely the sense we 
have in mind when we speak of the market-value of some asset. The market-value of 
some asset is a direct function of what people are inclined to pay for it, as opposed to 
exemplifying the normative condition of rendering appropriate or inappropriate what 
people are inclined to pay. Appeal is like market-value in this regard, pertaining to the 
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domain of what is actually desired and how much, unlike normative value, pertaining to 
the domain of the desirable, of what is fit to be desired (incidentally, the notion of appeal 
thus comports well with the notion of utility as economists are prone to using it). We are 
concerned about what appeals to us, and what appeals to us is that which we are 
concerned about, and thus I explicitly refuse to imbue the notion of appeal with the 
normative connotations characteristic of value, bearing the altogether different relation to 
concern, precisely the kind of normative relation I deny, namely that of meriting or 
warranting or rendering appropriate concern. What appeals to us is not what renders 
concern appropriate, as value would, but simply what renders concern, to excuse this 
instance of bad English in the service of providing the contrast with greater poignancy. 
People who care about philosophy are people to whom philosophy appeals. 
Eventually we might wish to broaden the category of appeal, by loosening its 
restriction to actual concern and by permitting it to include what we would care about 
under certain conditions, turning it into a dispositional notion. The reason is that the 
notion of something we would have cared about had it only come to our attention serves 
an important deliberative purpose, and the term of appeal is in part introduced to serve 
that purpose. It rings true to say that philosophy was an appealing career choice to me 
even before I was able to acquire the kind of familiarity with it required for fostering the 
concerns I harbor for it now. But even under this more extensive and dispositional usage, 
appeal still lacks the normative connotation of rendering anything appropriate. An 
appealer is simply what would prompt a concern under certain conditions. 
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Concern and appeal are two sides of the same coin, relating to each other as 
motivational push and motivational pull, directing attraction and drawing attraction 
simultaneously. Neither should claim priority. Perhaps one is inclined to think concern 
comes first and appeal second, with concern having explanatory priority over appeal? 
This is what several subjectivist treatises suggest, quite shortsightedly, rendering a huge 
disservice to their own position by making it appear incompatible with some rather 
evident truth, encouraged perhaps by the ill begotten language of desires and concerns 
conferring significance, value or appeal onto their objects, making the former's priority 
over the latter almost seem inevitable. When we come to understand a concern, however, 
we usually must also mention something about its object, something that makes it 
appealing. More often than not do we find a lot to be said about why we are concerned 
about what we are concerned about, and in particular, find things to say pertaining to the 
object of our concern rather than our own mere sentimentality. The most seductive 
caricature of subjectivism - fostered by a few subjectivists themselves - is that the only 
thing subjectivists can point out is that we happen to be attracted to certain things and 
that's that, with no further fact belonging to the object-side that could render the 
attraction intelligible. 
Fortunately, subjectivism is quite capable of withstanding the caricature, 
becoming apparent as we tum our attention to the prime case of the subjectivist attitude-
object relation: taste. Philosophers usually do not shy away from taking a subjectivist 
approach on taste, or major portions of it, concurring with Don Loeb (2003) in finding 
comprehensive Gastronomic Realism rather distasteful: De gustibus non disputandum est. 
Indeed, discontentment with subjectivism in the moral, practical, and aesthetic domain is 
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commonly articulated in terms of taste, the complaint being that the good, rational, or 
beautiful cannot just be a matter of taste as sUbjectivism allegedly would have it, 
presupposing in this very critique that subjectivism must be correct vis-a-vis taste. Center 
in on taste, then, and in particular on the taste of chocolate, a source of delight the Swiss 
author enjoys great familiarity with, and suppose there really is no objective realm of 
chocolaty evaluative facts floating around. Still, when asked as to why one is attracted to 
one specimen rather than another, the gourmet is capable of responding at great length 
and in great detail, insisting that his gustatory approach, at least in part, is one of 
discernment instead of projection. The nutty taste, its richness, its complexity, its ... 
There is a world of difference between a fine Swiss piece of a Lind truffle and an 
American piece of Hershey "chocolate," manifest even in the raw bite alone, of soft 
smoothness versus a sandy feel of unabsorbed sugar (to be fair, America has Bissinger). 
In sum, I propose to think of concern and appeal more of a unified phenomenon, 
the concern-appeal complex, involving two sides we may isolate in analysis, where 
neither side is best seen as dominating the other. The term 'concern' can actually be used 
to stand for either side, as when we can speak of a concern as an attitude or alternatively 
as an object of our attitude, for instance when we say of something that it is a major 
concern of ours, the mounting debts of most nation-states, for instance, the concern here 
being a state of affairs causing us to be concerned. My emphasis of the object-side was 
not intended to downplay the subject-side. What is appealing is so always relative to 
specific subjects with specific sentimentalities and specific concerns. My emphasis was 
driven by the worry that frequently the object-side drops out of the picture entirely, 
overlooking that only in virtue of specific features can anything be appealing in the first 
place. Aspects of the attraction and aspects of the object of attraction both matter 
explanatorily. The complete picture will be interactive, such that to explain concern and 
appeal alike we must mention features pertaining to the subject-related and object-related 
side alike, where variations in the features associated with the object might just as well 
result in the withdrawal of its appealing character as variations in the features associated 
with the subjects. 
The concern-appeal relation is in this regard similar to a whole host of other 
familiar relations. That a positively charged field of magnetism dispels a negatively 
charged field must be explained both in terms of the negative and positive charge of the 
fields respectively. That we are incapable of digesting little iron balls has just as much to 
do with the chemical composition and solidity of the iron balls as the structure of our 
digestive system. That we occasionally experience the unfortunate condition of influenza 
has as much to do with the structure of the virus as with the structure of the host. Another 
case in point might be the color/perception pair, or more generally the complex of 
secondary qualities on the one side and the corresponding receptive capacities on the 
other, a model famously introduced by John McDowell for thinking about the 
relationship of value and our sentiments. McDowell's introduces the model to challenge 
the notion that one or the other must have priority, and in this I wish to follow him. He 
also takes this one step further, however, speaking of values meriting our sentiments, and 
here things become more problematic, as we shall see later on. 
With appealers, the object-side of concerns, duly noticed, we are in a much better 
position to capture practical deliberation within my overall account. We can now reap the 
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profits with regard to two important and interrelated points, one more positive and one 
more critical, both concerning the reflexive deliberative perspective. The first speaks to 
the phenomenology of deliberation, reminding us of some crucial observations from the 
third chapter, namely the fact that when we deliberate, we rarely pay attention to our 
concerns themselves, which are featuring in the deliberative background as opposed to 
the deliberative foreground. Since the crucial lesson, I believe, was rather nicely 
expressed in that chapter, I will rehearse it once more. 
Phenomenologically speaking, deliberation engages the world, being outward-
directed rather than inward-directed, and in order to accommodate that fact we need to 
understand how precisely concerns contribute to the deliberative enterprise, and in 
particular, where and how they enter the deliberative theater. Deliberation engages the 
world and rarely amounts to a mere exercise in navel-gazing. To be concerned is to have 
a stake in things, but what we have a stake in are things and not concerns. What we 
should say is that concerns constitute our deliberative background, and that they only 
rarely, only under especially peculiar circumstances, occupy our deliberative foreground. 
(Enoch forthcoming c, Schroeder 2008a & 2008b, Dancy 2000, Blackburn 1998, Pettit 
and Smith 1990) What recommends certain choices instead of others first and foremost 
has to do with how things are. This is not to diminish the important role of our concerns, 
for without them no situation by itself does ever recommend anything. Yet as important 
the role they play, the role is better seen as that of a background enabler, which is that of 
a spotlight operator rather than that of a frontal stage actor. We look at our options 
through our concerns instead of paying them more direct attention. It is in light of our 
concerns that certain practical options become more attractive than others, where 
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importantly the light springs from our concerns instead of shining on them, and where 
what is illuminated in particularly favorable colors are choices rather than concerns. 
What we have in sight when we deliberate are states of affairs and their appeal on us, not 
stats of our minds. 
This leads to the second point which is directed against a core doctrine in the 
philosophy of Harry Frankfurt's, namely the alleged centrality of higher-order desires and 
volitions for enabling reflexivity in concern-related deliberation. In large parts, my 
discussion on concerns could be regarded as an ongoing friendly conversation with 
Frankfurt, whose work has taught me to appreciate many of the underlying problems and 
to whom many of my central observations are owed. The centrality of higher-order 
desires within his philosophy, however, that is of desires whose object are lower-level 
desires, has always profoundly puzzled me. For Frankfurt, our ability to form higher-
order desires is critical for our ability to engage in reflexive deliberation, our capacity to 
be deliberators instead of mere wantons, and henceforth desires and concerns without 
endorsement from higher-order desires don't fully matter. (It is worth mentioning that 
Frankfurt is not the only proponent of the hierarchical model, emphasizing higher-order 
desires; another is David Lewis, especially in his essay Dispositional Theories of Value, 
in Lewis 2000:68-94) The reason why I bring this up now is that with appealers in sight, 
we can appreciate how the reflexive stance characteristic of concern-related deliberation 
can more handily be accommodated with regard to what appeals to us than with regard to 
higher-order desires. But first, here is Frankfurt (1988:163-164): 
There is also another sort of reflexivity or self-consciousness, which 
seems similarly intelligible as being fundamentally a response to conflict 
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and risk. It is a salient characteristic of human beings, one which affects 
our lives in deep and innumerable ways, that we care about what we are. 
. .. We are particularly concerned with our own motives. It matters greatly 
to us whether the desires by which we are moved to act as we do motivate 
us because we want them to be effective in moving us or whether they 
move us regardless of ourselves or even despite ourselves. In the latter 
cases we are moved to act as we do without wanting wholeheartedly to be 
motivated as we are. Our hearts are at best divided, and they may even not 
be in what we are doing at all. ... This means, moreover, that we are to 
some degree passive with regard to the actions we perform. For in virtue 
of the fact that we do not unequivocally endorse or support our own 
motive, it can appropriately be said that what we want - namely, the 
object of our motivating desire, and the desire itself - is in a certain sense 
not something we really want. ... It is possible for a human being to be at 
times, and perhaps even always, indifferent to his own motives - to take 
no evaluative attitude toward the desires that incline him to act. If there is 
a conflict between those desires, he does not care which of them proves to 
be the more effective. In other words, the individual does not participate in 
the conflict. ... Since he exercises no authority, by the endorsement or 
concurrence of which certain of his desires might acquire particular 
legitimacy, or might come to be specially constitutive of himself, the 
actions engendered by the flow and clash of his feelings and desires are 
quite wanton. 
The passage contains a number of points and moves I find troubling, for instance 
the artificial and awkward split in personality it suggests between our regular desires and 
motives on the one side and some overseeing second-order part on the other side, which 
strikes me as an altogether unhelpful and homuncular model, facing ''the problem ... 
whether we can make sense of these ideas ... of ownership and rejection of a desire, 
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without appeal to a little person in the head who is looking on at the workings of her 
desires and giving the nod to some but not others." (Bratman 2003:221) Related to this is 
the poignant criticism mounted by Gary Watson (1975) as well as others, regarding the 
questionable authority and privileged status higher-order volitions allegedly enjoy simply 
in virtue of their formal position within the overall desire-architecture. Yet all this does 
not quite get to the much simpler point I wish to stress now, stemming from a puzzlement 
emerging at an earlier stage still, flowing from my inability to recover within my own 
deliberation-oriented observations the phenomenon of higher-order desires in the first 
place, except as a rare and artificial appearance, and quite not as the pervasive 
phenomenon Frankfurt suggests. Moreover, it seems to be altogether unnecessary, since 
there is a rather straightforward solution for how to accommodate reflexivity without the 
recourse to higher-order desires. This would be a welcome result, since, as what is now a 
philosophical commonplace, appealing to higher-order desires just reintroduces the 
problem of reflexivity with regard to them, immediately giving rise a question Frankfurt 
himself recognizes, namely "in what way an individual with second-order desires or 
volitions may be less wanton with respect to them than a wholly unreflective creature is 
with respect to its first-order desires." (Frankfurt 1988:165) The regress his model 
threatens to get us into, to yet higher and higher order desires, is best avoided right away 
and not when it has already been set in motion. 
Let me begin by trying to make my puzzlement more transparent before turning to 
the solution. I believe I have a pretty decent grasp of what I want from life, but virtually 
no grasp of what I want to want from life. Here's an example. I love skiing, there is no 
doubt about that in my mind; I do not, however, love camping, to add an explicit contrast 
337 
case. Yet when asked whether I also I want to love skiing, rather than want to love 
camping, I have little clue as what to say. To the question whether I want to spend time 
skiing I am able to answer with an emphatic yes; to the question whether I also want to 
want spend time skiing I am unable to provide an answer one way or the other. 
Rephrasing the question in terms of what kind of person to be - whether to want to be 
that person over here full of fondness of skiing and devoid of fondness of camping or 
whether to want to be that person over there with the reverse fondness-distribution -
doesn't help much either. In one interpretation, the question is clear and so is the answer, 
but that interpretation is rather trivial and quite unlikely what Frankfurt is after: Here I 
am, with my fondness of skiing, calling to my mind the two scenarios and find that in the 
second one, where I am the person who does not want to spend time skiing, I actually 
don't spend much time skiing, which is definitely not something I want (i.e. I want to 
spend a lot of time skiing). Assessing this second scenario through the perspective of my 
extant desires I unsurprisingly chose to reject it. In the end, what I'm inclined to say to all 
this is that I am just very fond of skiing, that there's a lot I find going for it - the speed, 
the freedom, the ease and elegance of movement, everything, really - and that's that. I 
might add that I harbor no regrets having spent time skiing (except from a financial 
perspective), that I find the activity deeply rewarding, that my high expectations about it 
are usually met, etc. In short, there is a lot I can say in the way of reflecting upon my 
relationship to skiing without locating any second-order desires towards my skiing-
fondness. 
This leads to what seems to me a rather straightforward solution for how to 
accommodate reflexivity in caring-related deliberation. We are reflexive caring-creatures 
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(carers?) because we have the capacity, having actual and potential appealers in view, to 
ask what to care about. We let our concerns engage the world with often stunning results. 
Common language offers a clue: when unsure about whether we want what we think we 
want, we usually phrase the question thus: Is this really what I want? You think this is 
what I want and then, having thought more about the this-part, you change your mind: no, 
this is not what I want. Perhaps you noticed some further details that change the overall 
attractiveness of this situation, perhaps you have worked out what this involves, perhaps 
you came to notice expectations raised by this not met by reality. Or you think this is 
what I want and then, calling this situation to your mind, other concerns of yours speak 
up, protesting loudly and clearly, repelling you from your initial attraction to this 
(although, as we shall see later, this idea must be treated with great care). To reiterate, 
deliberation engages the world, and to be concerned is to have a stake in things, but what 
we have a stake in are things and not concerns. Baring especially unusual circumstances, 
deliberating about concerns is first and foremost deliberation about the relevant object of 
the concerns, and thus deliberation again and again ends up at the same spot: as a special 
form of thinking about the world (as it is or could be). Contrary to Frankfurt, not only is 
this form of object-orientation in deliberation compatible with reflexivity, it actually 
makes better sense of it. It serves to underline how important appeal is for understanding 
practical deliberation. 
5.7. The Resilience of Concerns 
Concerns are governed by a host of norms specifying when and under what 
conditions specific concerns may be said appropriate, norms crucial for explaining 
important elements of the phenomenology of concerns. The subjectivist should not 
gainsay the infusion of norms into the domain of concerns, for without them, as the 
following section shall document, he would stay incapable of accommodating crucial 
features of our concern-structure. At the same time, in thinking about what norms are 
governing concerns, sufficient attention must be paid to the resilience of concerns making 
a mockery of overly simplistic treatments. For the purpose of specifying the content of 
the relevant norms, we can isolate a couple of elements of resilience that ought to be 
respected, elements providing relevant data-points for future theorizing about concem-
governing norms and also serving as cautionary notes against overly simplistic treatments 
of the norms pertinent to concerns, allowing us to make some reasonable conjectures as 
where further inquiry into concerns may lead. What our target theory has to 
accommodate is the specificity, diversity, particularity, and reflective and cross-temporal 
stability concerns display. These five elements of resilience concerns display are 
instantaneously recognizable once we attend specific examples, and are all interrelated, 
especially the first three. I shall discuss the elements of diversity, particularity and 
reflective and cross-temporal stability first, and tum to the element of specificity later in 
the context of the discussion on appraisal. 
Begin with diversity, or a certain kind of disunity within the plurality of our 
concerns. In a very broad sense, the relevant concern-governing norms could all be 
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classified as nonns calling for mutual coherence, but this notion needs to be treated with 
great care. A minimal mark for concern-coherence, let us suppose, is joint satisfiability, 
the possibility of integrating all relevant concerns into a single life plan, where this 
principle of agglomeration presumably specifies at most a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for concern-coherence. Without further engaging in fonnal theorizing about 
what criteria define concern-coherence, we need to turn our attention to the important 
point that there are going to be limits on the scope of coherence, in any plausible 
construal, and the following paragraphs are partly intended as a cautionary note against 
the familiar subjectivist knee-jerk response to cite coherence as the criterion for 
managmg concerns. 
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What we need to come to tenns with is that we are susceptible to a wide and 
diverse range of good things, harboring many concerns pulling in quite different 
directions, rendering their harmonious agglomeration impossible, yet without this kind of 
joint non-satisfiability discrediting or undennining the assembly of disjoint concerns, 
rendering it illegitimate in some sense to maintain them all. English gardens provide a 
better picture for our overall concern-structure than French gardens. There simply are 
many good things in life we can be fully appreciative of while also being cognizant of the 
fundamental impossibility of having them all, and that organizing a life around some 
concerns may systematically place others beyond that very life's reach. It would be a 
dubious ideal directing us to force our entire network of concerns into some coherent 
superstructure, for this would inevitably blind us to aspects we deem important even 
though we recognize are jointly unattainable. If we were to suppose practical rationality 
dictates complete coherence in concerns, calling us to move towards maximally coherent 
desiderative profiles, considerations of practical rationality would as a result have 
diminishing capacities to bother us. To excuse a perhaps overly dramatic tone, I worry 
about totalitarian ideals calling for some sort of concern-cleansing in the name of overall 
homogeneity. 
Examples help to render the phenomenon of concern-diversity instantaneously 
recognizable. There is something to be said for a life of surprise and spontaneity, and 
there is something to be said for a life of steadiness and stability, diverging lifestyles 
expressive of two different temperaments, one resembling more the New England climate 
and one resembling more the Southern Californian climate (this is a popular example; see 
Velleman 2009). Now if one is to guide one's life by one ideal or the other, in such a way 
as to actually enjoy its benefits, one must be prepared to take steps which systematically 
put out of reach the benefits of the other life. A career promising stability will permit 
only so much spontaneity. Leaving one's options open for switching occupations at any 
moment is going to be incompatible with carrying out those occupations that require 
many years of training and discipline. A social life of constant change is going to be at 
odds with fostering the kinds of personal loyalties and attachments characteristic of a 
social life cherishing stability. The ability to relocate and explore new corners of the 
planet, just like that, places an upper limit on how much at each station one can 
accumulate which one would, in the transition to the next station, inevitably have to leave 
behind. It does not require unusual imagination to fill out further details on how deep the 
divergence in direction runs between a life of stability and a life of spontaneity. The 
crucial point is this: one can fully embrace one life and forsake the other, assigning 
greater significance to the benefits the first affords while being prepared to accept the 
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surrender of the benefits the second affords, without becoming less appreciative of the 
fact that the chosen life has to leave out some of the things one cares about as well. 
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The impossibility of agglomerating all of the concerns underlying these two ways 
of life only illustrates in particularly grand terms what is common from mundane 
experience as well. One may really want that delicious appetizer and that delicious 
desert, knowing together they will exceed the available space, want to spend the 
upcoming holidays with the extended family and go skiing in a cozy resort, want to write 
a dissertation on normative reasons and on creativity (or what not), want to live in the 
warm but boring south and in the cold but beautiful north, or to want a thousand of the 
other mutually incompatible good things in life. In fact, so familiar is this phenomenon 
that we are equipped with various psychological mechanisms helping us to cope, most 
prominently the sour-grape-syndrome: can't have it thus don't really want it. Recent 
empirical research has validated this phenomenon up to some point, the inclination for 
the sake of preserving sanity to cease caring for things we just cannot have (Daniel 
Gilbert 2007). But it is also true that this supplies a healthy remedy only up to a point, 
and only simpletons would be willing to adjust their appreciative capacities to precisely 
the circumscribed sphere of what little they can actually get. In reverse, I think there is 
also a case to be made for maintaining lots of opposing concerns, again in the name of 
preserving our sanity, by equipping us with a certain degree of concern-flexibility in the 
face of life's tendency to frustrate our plans, enabling us to devise alternative yet 
similarly gratifying life-plans. Similarly, maintaining a rich set of concerns brings with it 
an important side benefit, empowering our capacity of understanding, especially with 
regard to people who have chosen very different life-paths in very different contexts, 
enabling us to recover the point behind their aspirations and pursuits within our own 
(dormant) concerns. 
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Notice what is true of incoherent concern-sets is not true of incoherent sets of 
intentions and plans. With regard to intentions and plans it is plausible to suppose that 
internal disorder is characteristically problematic, that something inherent to the nature of 
intention explains why incoherent sets of intentions are ipso facto bad sets of intentions 
just as something inherent to the nature of belief explains why inconsistent sets of beliefs 
are ipso facto bad sets of beliefs. Various authors apparently have failed to fully 
comprehend that there is a relevant difference between beliefs and intentions on the one 
side and concerns and desires on the other side. Michael Smith (1994:159) writes: 
[W]e may properly regard the unity of a set of desires as a virtue; a virtue 
that in tum makes for the rationality of the set as a whole. For exhibiting 
unity is partially constitutive of having a systematically justified, and so 
rationally preferable, set of desires, just as exhibiting unity is partially 
constitutive of having a systematically justified, and so rationally 
preferable, set of beliefs. 
Granted, disunity, or inconsistency, in sets of beliefs is a sure sign faulty elements 
have crept in, as in such a case not the entirety of its members can be true; likewise, 
disunity, or internal mismatch, in sets of plans and intentions is a sure sign that something 
went wrong, since plans and intentions are in the execution-business, which in tum 
explains why incoherent and hence non-executable plans and intentions are flawed. In 
sharp contrast, however, disunity in sets of concerns indicates no such internal flaw, since 
caring is not in the execution business, or for that matter any business, in the first place. 
We simply care about what we care about, even if it is impossible to always find 
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expression of the entirety of our concerns within a single life-plan. Moreover, planning is 
recognizably secondary to caring, relating to caring more as a servant than as a master, a 
process somehow informed by our concerns, without, however, this to involve any 
automatism or immediate translation - or need thereof - from concerns to plans (another 
indicator of the inadequacies of the simple behavioral story). Planners have to figure out 
what to do in light of what they care about, a very complicated task indeed, but the 
standards that apply to that task need not also apply to caring itself. It is entirely 
reasonable, for instance, to abandon an intention one realizes is unattainable, but not 
reasonable - or at least not unreasonable not - to abandon a concern one realizes is 
unattainable; recall Schroeder's mathematician desiring that 1t not be expressible as a 
fraction of two natural numbers, or Nomy Arpaly desiring to be Bertrand Russell. 
Thus, my inclination to find attractive to spend the evening at home and to spend 
the same evening at the party can peacefully coexist in a manner in which my intention to 
spend the evening at home and to spend the same evening at the party cannot just as my 
belief that I am going to spend the evening at home and that I am going to spend the same 
evening at the party cannot. It is interesting to note, in this context, that belief and 
intention are closed under conjunction in a manner in which desire is not. That is, if one 
believes p and also believes q, one has grounds to believe p & q (or ought to, or is 
rationally required to, read wide scope, cf. Broome 1999), just as if one intends p and also 
intends q, one has grounds to intend p & q (though I admit I'm less confident about the 
intention case than the belief case). In contrast, if one desires p and also desires q, one 
need not have grounds to desire p & q. For instance, I may want Peter to join the party, 
and also may want Lisa to join the party, but may definitely not want Peter and Lisa to 
join the party, since they always quarrel and would ruin the party. Thus, the contradiction 
between different conflicting beliefs and intention creeps into the content of some 
particular belief, yielding a belief with a contradictory content, while the incoherence 
between different desires does not creep into the content of some particular desire, 
yielding no desire with incoherent content. As we shall see momentarily, there is another 
respect in which it is crucial to pay attention to the plan-concern dichotomy. 
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There's a prominent philosophical stance which at first acknowledges the 
inalterable concern-diversity as part of our lives, but then goes on to deplore that 
diversity as non-ideal, as something we regrettably have to live with but which at the 
same we recognize as suboptimal. I find such idealizations entirely unappealing and 
beside the point, to the extent to which I even understand them. What is the 
corresponding idealization where the conflict between a concern for a life of stability and 
a concern for a life of spontaneity is removed, and why would that scenario be relevant 
for thinking about a situation where the conflict is not removed but very much alive 
indeed? Here I am, I say, with my not fully coherent and diverse concern-sensibilities, 
facing the task of figuring out what to make of such diversity. What are ideal worlds to 
me where harmony is established by silencing some of what I care about? This is a 
sentiment well expressed by Isaiah Berlin (The Pursuit of an Ideal, 2000: 11), speaking of 
values instead of concerns: 
These collisions of value are of the essence of what they are and what we 
are. If we are told that these contradictions will be solved in some perfect 
world in which all good things can be harmonized in principle, then we 
must answer, to those who say this, that the meanings they attach to the 
names which for us denote the conflicting values are not ours. We must 
say that the world in which what we see as incompatible values are not in 
conflict is a world altogether beyond our ken; that principles which are 
harmonized in this other world are not the principles with which, in our 
daily lives, we are acquainted; if they are transformed, it is into 
conceptions not known to us on earth. But it is on earth that we live, and it 
is here that we must believe and act. 
In closing this cautionary note on the scope of coherence as an ideal for concern-
sets, designed to encourage us to embrace the concern-diversity found in our hearts, two 
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points bear mentioning. First, the kinds of reservations I voiced about the high esteem of 
desiderative coherence as a virtue held by Smith and others does not entail esteeming 
desiderative incoherence as a virtue; I merely believe it is a deep fact of human 
psychology reflecting our attraction to the many diverse good things in life. Secondly, I 
expressively do not deny that coherence ever has an important role to play. As we shall 
see, within particular networks of interrelated concerns, concern-clusters, coherence 
becomes quite important. With this, turn to another data-point concern-related theorizing 
ought to respect. 
This second aspect is particularity, or the characteristic context sensitivity 
concerns display. (Dancy 2004a; Kagan 1988) We best appreciate what this second 
aspect amounts to by turning our attention to what it stands opposed to, namely a 
seductive yet also quite simplistic analysis of concerns which breaks them down into 
some assembly of smaller sub-concerns, taking the overall concern to be the sum of its 
parts. Call this the Lego-brick model of concerns. Here's a big concern, the overall 
attraction, and here are its parts, its sub-attractions. We explain the big concern by 
isolating its various sub-attractions, and then by adding up these sub-attractions we 
determine the overall attractiveness-score. Part of the appeal of the Lego-brick model is 
that it promises some neat manageability of concerns, by proposing a certain isolation-
procedure: explain overall attraction by isolating individual attractive parts. This would 
make for a simpler theory, supplying some neat generalizations: wherever one can 
identify feature such-and-such one will find some attraction towards it as well (provided 
certain conditions obtain, such as awareness of the relevant feature). As a theoretical 
ambition, however, simplicity is a virtue only if the target phenomenon is simplistic too 
and is bound to lead to nothing but distortions if not. 
The primary problem with the Lego-brick approach does not necessarily lie in its 
attempt to understand concerns by breaking them down into various components, as 
concerns obviously contain components. Rather, the problem lies in the approach's 
failure to acknowledge the holistic interaction between the various components that are 
part of the relevant concerns, a kind of interaction that does not permit additive functions 
from little attractions to big attractions. To the extent to which we are able to identify 
what particular aspects we are concerned about when we are concerned about something, 
the capacity of that aspect to arouse our concerns must be understood holistically and 
within its specific context. The same feature arousing a concern here need not also arouse 
a concern there, even when we are dealing with the same kind of concern. Concern-
invitation is not a feature that could be neatly pinned down to specific bits and pieces, 
where in turn these bits and pieces could be invariantly paired up with the capacity to 
arouse concerns across all contexts. 
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As before, the point is best illustrated by attending to examples, and also as 
before, gastronomical examples are especially helpful. Consider the enjoyment of a fine 
piece of chocolate, a Bissinger or Lind truffle. The Lego-brick model suggests that our 
enjoyment of the truffle is to be explained by some combination of our enjoyment of its 
various individual features, such as its sweetness and smoothness and so on. It is our 
basic attraction to sweetness which in part explains our overall attraction to the chocolate 
piece, according to this model. Yet as a moment's reflection makes crystal clear, this 
can't be quite right. The delightful Lind experience cannot simply be some felt 
summation of its attractive parts, but at the very least must consist in their very specific 
combination. For one thing, it is simply not true that there are these simple taste-features 
exhibiting some rigid attraction on us, not even sweetness, which would be rather 
disgusting if part of the tortilla chip or fillet mignon experience. Thus, when we seek to 
adequately describe the pleasant experience of devouring a fine piece of chocolate, we 
cannot capture that by merely describing what we like in it, providing some laundry list 
of likable features, while ignoring the way they combine to the totality of the experience. 
As every chef knows, professional or hobby, preparing a tasty dish is not just a process 
whereby a bunch of tasty ingredients are thrown together. The setting or context of the 
individual ingredients matters just as much as the ingredients themselves, affecting each 
other in unpredictable ways, and thus there is no straightforward, let alone additive, 
function from tastiness in ingredients to tastiness in the resulting dish. 
The same lesson can be applied to concerns more generally, which, to use a 
popular philosophical term, form organic unities. To highlight how the presence of a 
feature can be central to a first concern while its absence be central to a second concern, 
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or similarly, how one and the same feature can prompt a concern with positive valence in 
a first context while a concern with negative valence in a second context, consider a few 
more examples. I cherish the quiet and solitude of a hiking experience in the mountains, 
in no minor parts recompensing for the discomfort and strain hiking is bound to involve, 
yet imagining the same sort of experience of quiet and solitude on Times Square in New 
York City would be horrifying, conjuring up images from bad Zombie movies. Quiet is a 
feature arousing a concern in one context (mountains) and repelling a concern in another 
context (New York City). Similarly, it is perfectly intelligible why someone might be 
contemplating to spend a lot of money to travel to the Alps in order to have a white and 
cold Christmas while also contemplating to spend a lot of money to travel to Southern 
Florida in order not to have a white and cold Christmas, both attractions simultaneously 
holding sway in his imagination. To accuse this man of confusion, pressing him to make 
up his mind as to whether or not he likes white and cold Christmases, would precisely 
betray a failure to understand the particularity of concerns. Or consider a literary 
example. I greatly enjoy the subtle and laborious style in the writing of Thomas Mann, 
brimming with self-irony in his refusal to get to the point, but despise the same style in 
newspaper articles. In similar fashion, I admire the long well-crafted sentences in the 
writing of John Stuart Mill and equally admire the absence of long well-crafted sentences 
in the writing of Derek Parfit. Or consider a technical example. One might love a vintage 
Cadillac for all the little rattles and noises it makes and love a brand new Cadillac for all 
the rattles and noises it does not make. In sum, context matters a great deal, and the vigor 
with which context has recently entered the philosophical imagination might be 
considered the philosophical event of the last decade or so. Without the space or ability to 
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document this further, I have a hunch that there are connections between the various 
domains in which context-sensitivity has finally been recognized to reign, suspecting, in 
particular, that the holistic nature of our minds, noted by recent cognitive science, has 
something to do with the holistic nature of our concern-structures, noted here as well as 
by recent moral psychology. 
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This brings us to the two remaining features concerns display in their capacity to 
anchor deliberation, two more respects in which concerns turn out rather stubborn 
creatures, namely their reflective and cross-temporal stability, or, put alternatively, their 
synchronic and diachronic stability. Exhibiting a certain degree of stability is essential to 
the capacity of concerns to instantiate the resting-points for deliberation. Consider first 
synchronic stability, which is the capacity of mental items to resist change in the face of 
revisions occurring at other corners of the overall cognitive-conative system, a form of 
cognitive resilience or even encapsulation. One important respect in which concerns 
display synchronic stability is informational: Concerns need to survive the confrontation 
with a reasonably wide range of factual representations, rather than be founded on 
evidently flawed information, since concerns which immediately falter after their host has 
learned of some obvious factual error would provide a fragile foundation for deliberation 
indeed. Concerns must be compatible with a reasonably clear-eyed perspective on how 
things are. This analysis partly concurs with the insistence of other authors to place only 
well-considered desires, as opposed to just any desires, at the deliberative center, desires 
the individual actually holds and has also reflected upon, desires which have withstood 
the test of reflection and are not experienced as internally flawed or alien or inauthentic. 
Now I agree this kind of reflective element matters sometimes, but disagree it always or 
even usually matters, suggesting that we ought to regard the need for reflection more as 
special case than the rule. What is crucial for synchronic stability is that concerns do not 
waver in the face of representational revisions. At times this may require the further 
condition that they are reflectively endorsed, as a sort of extra safeguard against the threat 
of reflective destabilization, yet at other times, especially when the relevant concern is 
not likely to be challenged or subjected to reflective pressure, no such reflexive 
examination or endorsement is required to secure its stability. 
Moreover, informational resilience is usually secured rather handily, at least for 
our general concerns, which appear to be rather fact-insensitive creatures, immunizing 
them against factual destabilization from the very outset. This is not intended as a 
universal claim, for on occasion general concerns are factually conditioned, and 
furthermore, as we shall see momentarily, particular concern-occasions are usually fact 
sensitive, but I still believe factual information bears little to no relevance for most 
general concerns. The point is best appreciated when we once more pay attention to the 
distinction between concerns and other goal-directed states such as aims, goals and plans 
which in stark contrast to concerns are heavily fact-sensitive and fact-conditioned. Aims, 
goals and plans enter the deliberative scene at a different stage than concerns, namely the 
later stage of planning and decision-making, and which have to be adopted in response to 
our representations of the world and which, consequently, become immediately subjected 
to factual scrutiny. When setting goals, we do so in the belief that by achieving the 
relevant goals, in this world, we are going to realize something of importance to us. 
Whether the goal meets this expectation depends on the world, and the goal is to be 
adjusted in case it fails to meet that expectation. In contrast, what is important to us, what 
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we are concerned about, is not something we set or adopt against a factual background. 
We don't set concerns but just have concerns and have them for their own sake. We 
usually find no difficulties in sorting out what matters to us from what we only aim at in 
order to get something that matters to us. Aims and goals and plans usually bear what is 
called an instrumental relationship (or some other form of dependence-relationship) to 
something else, other goals or eventually other concerns; with regard to aims and goals 
and plans it should always be possible to identify an informative component to complete 
the sentence "I pursue aim X in order to, for the sake of ... ". But concerns are never 
instrumental, but intrinsic, and this usually deprives factual information of relevance 
from the very start. 
General concerns, therefore, are usually fact-insensitive. However, it must be 
acknowledged, even after paying due attention to the concern/aim dichotomy, that factual 
information bears considerable relevance for particular concerns, particular concern-
occasions as I wish to call them. Consider an example. Most people profoundly care for 
enjoying meaningful personal relationships, to spend time together with people they like 
and love, and this general concern of theirs, albeit itself a contingent fact, strikingly is not 
itself contingent upon fact. What is contingent upon fact is whether and with whom and 
in what manner people are going to enjoy personal relationships - how, in other words, 
the concern plays itself out, how the general concern translates itself into particular 
concern-occasions. The specific practical question, whether to foster a relationship with 
Lisa, is fact-laden; the general practical question, whether personal relationships matter to 
us is not. In sum, we have general and fact-insensitive concerns that express themselves 
in concrete scenarios, engendering concrete and fact-sensitive concern-occasions, as in 
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our case we have a general concern for meaningful relationships that expresses itself in 
the concrete concern-occasion of aspiring to foster a relationship with Lisa. Notice 
concern-occasions are clearly not the same as aims, goals and plans; I intend to write Lisa 
a card in order to make her happy, and the writing is an aim, a chore, something I 
certainly would not pursue for its own sake. In contrast, I foster the relationship with Lisa 
as a way of living out (but not in order to fulfill) my concern for enjoying meaningful 
relationships, fostering the relationship with Lisa for its own sake, providing an occasion 
for the general concern, or, to use a term of Henry Richardson's (1994), providing a 
specification of the general concern. 
Yet might not the fact-sensitivity of concern-occasions infect general concerns 
with fact-sensitivity as well? After all, there is no way of satisfying general concerns 
other than satisfying particular concern-occasions. In this vein one my wonder: should 
the rest of mankind turn out to be sense-less automata, or holograms, or complete 
grouches unworthy of fostering relationships with, our general concern for personal 
relationships would remove itself, wanting of even a single concern-occasion. Not quite. 
In such unfortunate circumstance the concern would merely reveal itself unrealizable in 
this world. Or perhaps one might think if we found out that we only cared for 
relationships because genes encoding this concern out-reproduced genes encoding 
opposite concerns, or if we found out the concern was implanted by an evil demon, then 
our concern would remove itself? Not quite again. In such an awkward scenario the 
world would merely have a funny history, including our concerns, but unless our 
concerns have an unusually awkward self-referential content, namely not to be the 
product offunny histories, the concern would still stand. Moreover, it is also not true that 
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there is a something else, say pleasure, personal relationships happen to afford and in 
virtue of which we care for them, even though personal relationships of course do afford 
many other things we also care for, including pleasure. Concerns, then, exhibit 
synchronic stability in virtue of their capacity to withstand informational updates, among 
other things, a capacity coming free of charge for most (general) concerns. 
Tum then to diachronic stability, the characteristic persistence through time 
concerns display. Frankfurt once more provides the key insight (1982: 260-261): 
[C]aring about something is not to be confused with liking it or with 
wanting it; nor is it the same as thinking that what is cared about has value 
of some kind, or that it is desirable. It is especially to be noted that these 
attitudes and beliefs differ significantly from caring in their temporal 
characteristics. The outlook of a person who cares about something is 
inherently prospective; that is, he necessarily considers himself as having 
a future. On the other hand, it is possible for a creature to have desires and 
beliefs without taking any account at all of the fact that he may continue to 
exist. Desires and beliefs can occur in a life which consists merely of a 
succession of separate moments, none of which the subject recognizes -
either when it occurs or in anticipation or in memory - as an element 
integrated with others in his own continuing history .... The moments in 
the life of a person who cares about something, however, are not merely 
linked inherently by formal relations of sequentiality. The person 
necessarily binds them together, and in the nature of the case also 
construes them as being bound together, in richer ways. This both entails 
and is entailed by his own continuing concern with what he does with 
himself and with what goes on in his life. 
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Concerns endure, and thereby provide the glue linking together the moment of 
thinking about what to do and the usually significant later moment of doing it. Enduring 
concerns supply a perspective past planners and future executioners share, rendering their 
cooperation possible and intelligible, and without which planning agency would crumble 
into a heap of disjoint time-slices. To appreciate the centrality of enduring concerns for 
deliberation, I would like to revisit and then build upon an observation from the previous 
chapter, where I discussed the constitutive conservative bias in diachronic reasoning and 
planning, henceforth the bias. The observation I am alluding to is that the very sensibility 
of forming plans crucially depends upon an agent's anticipated preparedness to follow 
through past plans in the future; which depends, in other words, on his anticipated 
preparedness to feel rational pressure in the future towards taking seriously, in a 
committal fashion, intentions, policies and plans formed in the past. Without that 
assurance the agent cannot even sensibly begin to form plans in the first place. His 
present formation of a forward-looking intention is possible only under the anticipation of 
a backward-looking future self, and in particular, looking back not in a mere act of 
curiosity but in an attitude of upheld commitment. 
To this I would like to add the further observation that only with enduring 
concerns do we get the right sort of context within which we can situate the conservative 
bias in diachronic reasoning and planning. To be clear, the further observation I wish to 
support is not that enduring concerns ground or entail the conservative bias, for the 
norms underwriting the bias supply an extra and independent (constitutive) prerequisite 
to the possibility of cross-temporal deliberation, a norm operating, moreover, at the 
planning level and not the caring level. It is thus entirely possible that a want-to-be 
deliberator has enduring concerns without the bias, and consequently, to the extent to 
which the constitutive claim of the previous chapter proves correct, it is entirely possible 
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that he might sti11lack the capacity of long-term deliberation. This could be so because an 
unbiased deliberator, having a number of equally weighty concerns, and having 
previously decided to pursue a project specifically tailored to one concern rather than 
another, still has no assurance that his decision is going to carry over to later moments 
rather than be reversed, just like that, switching to a project tailored to the other concern 
instead. All the same, the observation I wish to add is that the bias is intelligibly 
sustainable only within the context of enduring concerns. 
To see this, let us attempt to construct a concrete example of cross-temporal 
deliberation with bias yet without enduring concerns. Although I cannot establish this 
conclusively, there is a strong case that such an attempt must fail. As a terminological 
matter, let us say of a decision that was reached on the basis of or which is motivated by a 
desire that the decision expresses the desire. In the example I wish to construct we 
encounter an agent who has time-sliced desires but no enduring concerns, enjoying 
reliable knowledge about desires of the agent's other time-slices. Consider Susan, who, at 
the beginning of the week, feels very energetic, taking a positive outlook on work, yet 
who, at the end of the week, feels very lethargic, taking a negative outlook on work. 
These attitudes are reflected in Susan's desires, being very desirous of working until the 
end of the week on Mondays but not at all on Fridays. And that's all, let us suppose, 
explicitly disregarding other desires Susan might have. Now as it happens Susan has to 
decide, today, on Monday, whether to take off work on Friday; her boss offered her that 
options but would like to know now in order to make provisions for the rest of the week. 
It seems clear the only desire-expressing decision she could reach today is to decline the 
offer and to plan to go to work on Friday. Her present desire to work until the end of the 
week is presently the only desire in play her decision could express, and though she 
knows on Friday she is going to desire not to go to work, this future desire of hers is not 
presently had but only foreseen. What decisions express, however, are actual desires and 
not foreseen desires. She knows, of course, that on Friday she is going to regret that 
decision, but that's Susan on Friday, not Susan today, who desires to work until the end 
of the week. 
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When Friday comes along, Susan faces another decision, this time whether to go 
to work, whether to follow through her previous decision from Monday. The only desire-
expressing decision she can reach now is not to go to work; there simply is no desire she 
currently holds that would correspond to her previous decision to work until the end of 
the week. Of course, in a plausible real world scenario we would suspect there to be other 
considerations with relevance, such as not to disappoint her boss who is expecting her at 
work, but for now we are disregarding them. Now the task is to render intelligible how 
Susan could still be under the influence of the bias, demanding her to give some weight 
to her previous decision simply because it was her previous decision. The problem is that 
there seems to be no rationale rendering intelligible why she should be under this bias, 
which would seem like a glitch, a case of rule-worship or decision-fetishism. 
Now there appears to be a rather straightforward solution to all this, namely to 
add a desire, or a principle calling for a desire, that one's future desires be satisfied, a 
future desire-regarding desire. (Alternatively, the solution could consist in adding a 
backward looking desire, or a principle calling for such a desire, that one's past desires be 
satisfied, a past-desire-regarding desire. What I say vis-a.-vis future-desire-regarding 
desires can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to this alternative solution). What Susan 
supposedly needs, on Monday, is a desire that her desire on Friday, foreseen but not yet 
had, be satisfied. The problem with this alleged solution is that it is difficult to sensibly 
situate such an additional future-oriented desire within her present desires, and that the 
principle calling for the inclusion of future-desire-oriented desires is quite implausible. 
Adding the relevant future desire-regarding desire creates a rather perverse tension within 
Susan's desiderative profile. The tension is not merely between competing desires, which 
I argued earlier ought to be accepted, but is of a very specific kind. When there is a direct 
tension between a present and held desire and a foreseen and not-held desire, there is, 
from the present standpoint, nothing to be said in favor of the object of the future desire 
(presently there is no attraction whatsoever towards that object). Since deliberation is 
object-oriented, a positive attitude in connection with a desire must trace, in some sense, 
a positive attitude towards its object. Yet in Susan's case, on Mondays, there is no 
positive attitude whatsoever that could be recovered in her present desiderative profile 
towards the object of the foreseen but not had desire, and henceforth the only rationale 
left for the disposition towards taking steps to satisfy that future desire could be that a 
desire be satisfied, quite independently of some corresponding appreciation of its object, 
and that, I believe, is a perverse attitude. 
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This also explains why we should reject the principle calling for the inclusion of 
future-desire-oriented desires. To bring this out most forcefully, consider some especially 
drastic cases where one has foreknowledge of insane future desires: that one's present 
(later past) projects fail, that one's family and friends be hurt, that the comer of the world 
one is enjoying to life in be destroyed, or a myriad of other self-and other destructive 
desires. The sensible reaction to such foreknowledge of crazy future desires is not to form 
a present desire that they be satisfied, and as consequence, quasi as a form of perverse 
self-directed sabotage, start moderating ones efforts towards the realization of one's 
present projects, or withdrawing from family and friends so as to make harming them in 
the future psychologically easier, or polluting the sites which one presently enjoys 
lingering at as to make them inhabitable later. The sensible reaction is to seek help, to 
safeguard against ones yet unexplained future craziness, doing what it takes to prevent 
such spiral into psychological disaster (perhaps a product of some "disillusioned" rage 
against oneself and the world). 
This is indicative of a larger pattern of counterexamples. Here is another one, 
suggested by Trent Dougherty in conversation: Suppose Trent knows that he is going to 
be corrupted by the security of tenure and will no longer desire to be highly productive 
after he has secured tenure. The future-desire-oriented principle directs Trent to have a 
desire to facilitate his future desire, hence to facilitate future laziness, yet clearly Trent 
ought not to have such a desire. (Parfit's Russian Nobleman is of a similar kind.) The 
diagnosis for why the principle is implausible is clear: When an agent takes an opposite 
view on the attractiveness of things from that incorporated in his future desires, when he 
finds himself in substantial disagreement with his future self (to be of two minds cross-
temporally, as Trent nicely put it), to demand of him to take steps towards furthering his 
future desires simply because they happen to be his future desires represents a quite 
dubious demand. 
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I am aware the case is complicated, and more support would be needed to 
adequately defend the claim that cross-temporal deliberation cannot proceed solely on the 
basis of time-sliced desires. In particular, I cannot here decisively rule out that a more 
sophisticated time-sliced-desire version might not do the trick. What should be apparent 
by now, however, is what could rather naturally remedy the present predicament: a 
common desiderative perspective past and future time-slices are capable of sharing, 
which past decisions and present executions could simultaneously express. Enduring 
concerns supply precisely this common perspective, and thus supply the context within 
which the conservative bias can be intelligibly sustained. A person with concerns 
conceives of them, and thus to some extent of himself, as persisting through time, taking 
a prospective outlook, and when he reaches a decision on the basis of his concerns he can 
take some assurance that his future self is still going to recover in his (future) desiderative 
profile something motivating the original decision in the first place, something setting a 
context which renders intelligible why to stand by that decision. 
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Concerns, in sum, are unruly fellows, in virtue of the features of specificity, 
diversity, particularity, and reflective and cross-temporal stability they display. In order 
to capture appraisal, we need to situate concerns within larger norm-governed patterns of 
concerns, without violating, however, the constraints set by the five features. Specificity 
rules out that concerns be subjected to one-size-fits all norms; diversity adds specification 
to this by ruling out an all-encompassing norm of coherence applying to the entirety of 
our concerns; particularity suggests different norms apply to different cases; stability 
renders the mutual concern-independence even firmer by encapsulating concerns from 
cognitive revisions made elsewhere in the cognitive system. Adequate treatments of 
concerns, as well as of the relevant concern-governing norms, must accommodate all five 
features, placing us in a position to make some reasonable conjectures about what a 
successful concern-related theory would look like: Concerns come organized into larger 
concern-clusters or concern-families, forming interrelated networks and patters, yet at the 
same time the norms applying to these patterns cannot be all-encompassing but must be 
limited in scope, and moreover, allow for considerable independence between different 
clusters. 
5.8. Appraisal - The Problem 
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Let's return to the concern-appeal relationship. Concerns and appealers are, as I 
argued above, intimately tied up with each other, and we need to take both into view to 
fully understand either component. Concerns and appealers are mutually and 
counterfactually connected - changes in one component will usually result in changes in 
the other component. Moreover, it usually should be possible to be more precise in 
explaining particular concern-appeal relationships, and specify what combination of 
features borne by the relevant appealer is causally responsible for arousing the relevant 
corresponding concern. In such instances we can point towards certain features due to 
which we are concerned about what we are concerned about. The question we now face is 
whether this sort of counterfactual relationship is all there is to the concern-appeal 
relationship. There are grounds to suspect that the answer is no, and furthermore, that 
close attention to how concern and appeal relate in this further sense threatens to 
reintroduce precisely the kind of normative element I was previously trying to disown, in 
a manner that is more, which makes it quite hard for me to ignore, since I intend to place 
concern at the center of my anormative story replacing the normative story: namely by 
finding the normative element to reemerge as an incremental part of the very 
phenomenology of concern itself. 
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What is that phenomenology? To answer the question, we must again take as our 
point of departure the concern-appeal relationship, and in particular, the attitude inherent 
in concern towards its worldly counterpart, appeal, only this time we must look more 
closely. Let us speak of the concerned attitude or C-attitude as the inherent attitude of 
concern towards the relevant object, appeal. The difficulty is not how the C-attitude and 
its object could initially become connected. Concerns have representational contents -
one is always concerned about something or cares about something, that such-and-such 
be (or not be) the case, something involving a specific proposition, and thus what state of 
affairs (appealer) relates to what concern is determined by the content of the relevant 
concern. Furthermore, the difficulty is not to understand how the C-attitude could be 
responsive to features borne by the appealers in one important respect, given the 
counterfactual relation between concern and appeal just outlined. Rather, the difficulty 
stems from an additional sense of responsiveness that is in play, incremental to concern 
yet entirely unaddressed thus far. In particular, it appears as though the attitude's 
relationship towards the content IS not merely normatively accidental, even if 
counterfactually stable, but rather exhibits some specific form of evaluative receptivity 
towards its content. Concern as a whole seems to incorporate an evaluative perceptive 
element, a particular evaluative perspective on its objects, a particular construal of it, a 
charged form of seeing-it-as. Borrowing a term used extensively in the literature on 
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emotions, I propose to call this element appraisal. Concerns contain an appraisal of 
certain actual or possible state of affairs, or, to use Bennett Helm's useful term, construes 
the state of affairs as having a certain import. 
To bring out appraisal more vividly, let me for a moment endow concerns with a 
perspective, resorting to some hopefully innocent form of anthropomorphism in the 
service of exposition. Phenomenologically speaking, and from the perspective of the C-
attitude, there often seems to be, in the relevant object, an element of invitation drawing 
in the attitude. The attitude does not present itself as a mere blind reaction aroused by 
certain aspects of its object, which is precisely what we would have to say should the 
concern-appeal relationship be exhausted by some form of counterfactua1ly stabilized 
relationship between the C-attitude its object, rendering the relationship between the C-
attitude and its object fundamentally accidental. It just so happened, we would then have 
to diagnose, that given the way the overall system was set up, certain states of affairs with 
certain characteristics tended to arouse certain concerned attitudes. It would be true to say 
of the concerned attitude that it was responsive to the relevant aspects of its object in a 
triggering sense. The problem with this is not that it is incorrect as far as it goes, but that 
it does not go far enough, in particular the problem is that this triggering-sense fails to do 
justice to the internal viewpoint of the attitude. From that viewpoint, the C-attitude 
presents itself not just as a reaction to the presence of certain aspects in its object, but as a 
receptivity to their attractiveness, which in tum explains why it might be possible to 
construe the attitude as more than a blind reaction and instead as a receptive response, as 
something occasionally called-for by the attractiveness of the relevant feature, as 
something that can be appropriate or inappropriate depending on whether the feature is 
in fact attractive. 
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Or so it seems. Phenomenological observations are prone to meet 
phenomenological counter-observations, and whether an element of receptivity is part of 
the very phenomenology of concern can be questioned. Hume appears to question it when 
he writes, in relation to virtues and vices, yet certainly intending his claim to generalize 
(2000:301): 
Take any action allowed to be vicious ... [e ]xamine it in all lights 
and see if you can find that matter of fact ... which you call vice .... The 
vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You can 
never find it until you tum your reflection into your own breast, and find a 
sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, toward that action. 
These are frequently cited words of Hume's, appearing for instance in an article 
by D' Arms and Jacobson's dealing with the topic of sensibility theories. After providing 
another citation of Hume' s which seems to advance a similar view with regard to beauty 
- roughly the view, in its common expression, that beauty is in the eye of the beholder -
D' Arms and Jacobson also give voice to a strong reaction by a contemporary 
commentator, David McNaughton, who writes: "Hume's confident assertions about the 
unobservability of beauty are breathtakingly counterintuitive. We see the beauty of a 
sunset; we hear the melodiousness of a tune; we taste and smell the delicate nuances of a 
vintage wine. Hume's denial that we can detect beauty by the senses flies in the face of 
common experience" (1988, p. 55). I am inclined to agree, and so are D' Arms and 
Jacobson: "Understood as a phenomenological claim, this seems obviously correct - so 
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obviously that one should doubt whether Hume meant to be denying it. Surely, when we 
find something beautiful, delicious, or even virtuous, we experience this as a matter of 
sensitivity to the observed object: the sunset, the wine, the person." Phenomenological 
observations are difficult to settle; beyond reporting my readiness to concur with 
McNaughton's analysis, I have little to add for the sake of proving the point, and thus one 
may read the ensuing sections to address an audience sharing McNaughton's, D' Arms' 
and Jacobson's and my sentiment. The relevant question we need to turn to, together with 
D' Arms and Jacobson, is this: But what kind of sensitivity is this? (Copp 2006:187) 
The question leads us to the familiar theoretical choice between detection and 
projection, between thinking of the relevant feature towards which concerns display 
evaluative receptivity as being or not being some product of the concerns themselves, or, 
to use the framework from above, the question is: does the C-attitude toward its object 
obtain because it has a characteristic feature, of possibly a second-order sort, 
attractiveness, attracting the attitude, or does the object have the characteristic feature of 
attractiveness simply because there obtains some attraction towards it, a C-attitude? This 
choice motivates the two standard solutions for handling appraisal. According to a first 
standard theory, the attitude is conative in nature, for instance some disposition towards 
furthering (or hindering) the realization of the relevant state of affairs. According to a 
second standard theory, the attitude is cognitive in nature, for instance some evaluative 
belief maintaining that the corresponding state of affairs is good, choiceworthy, or 
supportive of reasons for taking measures to bring it about. Neither theory seems 
satisfactory. My overall approach is quite clearly inhospitable to the cognitive theory, 
resting its allegiance with the conative theory, and I am confident further elaboration of 
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the conative theory promises to bring us reasonably close to capturing appraisal. But first 
consider why both theories are plagued by problems. 
The first account construes the C-attitude as conative in character, some 
disposition towards seeing to it that the content be realized. The section on motivation 
already exposed some cracks in the conative account by presenting cases of desire 
lacking dispositional action-potential altogether. The counterexamples speak for 
themselves, but I take them to be indicative of a deeper problem still. The problem is 
precisely the inability of the conative approach to capture the distinctive element of 
receptivity characterizing appraisal, still construing content and attitude as disjoint 
components, even though they might exhibit various stable counterfactual relationships 
with regard to each other. And thus while the conative account can explain how we could 
come to experience the relevant content in a particularly charged manner, in the familiar 
sense of the attitude projecting its spin onto its object, it becomes very difficult to see 
how it could also explain how the attitude is responsive to the experienced spin of its 
object. In any case, to see how disjoint attitude and content remain in this account, 
consider an example: Harboring a strong concern for exploring the more attractive 
comers of this planet, in particular, caring for traversing the Californian Wine country in 
late summer. Applying the conation approach, here's roughly the analysis of the concern 
we would get: '[Exploring the Californian Wine country in late summer]: [let's go for 
it!]' As is readily apparent, this analysis must construe the relation between attitude and 
content as ultimately accidental, relinquishing all resources to countenance any deeper 
connection between the two, denying the attitude [let's go for it!] to exhibit precisely the 
element of appraisal, the distinctively charged responsiveness towards the invitingness of 
the state of affairs [Exploring the Californian Wine country in late summer]. It just so 
happened, the analysis must suppose, that the subject is so structured as to adopt this 
attitude instead of the opposite attitude towards it, being drawn to beauty instead of being 
drawn to Texas' plentiful oil refineries. That the subject's attitude is counterfactually 
linked to the Californian Wine country instead of Texas' oil refineries quite obviously 
does very little to help the situation - it doesn't render the concern-appeal relationship 
any less accidental in the relevant sense. Thus, "the subjectivist model," writes Charles 
Taylor, "is false to the most salient features of our moral phenomenology. We sense in 
the very experience of being moved by some higher goods that we are moved by what is 
good in it rather than it is valuable because of our reaction." (1989:74) 
The second account construes the C-attitude as cognitive in character, some form 
of evaluative judgment affirming the worth and value of the object of the attitude. Some 
authors have introduced the notion of the "guise of the good" to express this idea. The 
view is that when we are attracted to or concerned about certain features, we experience 
those features under the guise of the good. This account seems superior to the previous 
account at first glance. Caring for [traversing the Californian Wine country in late 
summer] involves seeing something in the activity, and the cognitive account appears 
well positioned to capture that element. Appraisal appears to be a mental state very 
closely related to judgment, and since the cognitive account places judgment at the center 
of concern, it appears well suited to handle appraisal. 
Unfortunately the cognitive approach is plagued by problems no less severe, 
which become apparent when we notice how evaluative judgments are neither sufficient 
368 
nor necessary for concern. First insufficiency: One can believe certain activities to be 
good and worthwhile yet not care for them in the slightest. One can come to truly regard 
haughty aesthetic exposure as valuable, and yet not care at all for sitting through never 
ending operas and for wandering through massive museums. One can believe one would 
be a better person if more sensitive to the needs of distant people but simply not care for 
being a better person. Or, one can judge some first activity to be better than a second 
activity, but care more for the second one than the first one, asserting to the greater worth 
of the discussion group on marital conversation skills compared to the poker round with 
one buddies, for instance, yet find his concerns unambiguously drawn to the round. Or, 
we can conceive, as a very general sort of counterexample, of creatures who are apt value 
judgers but don't care for anything. They, The Value Watchers, detect what is the case 
value wise, similar to Galen Strawson's Weather Watchers watching the weather, but, 
dissimilar to the Weather Watchers, they don't care a bit. The Value Watchers figure as 
reliable but disinterested and emotionally detached accountants of value. Perhaps 
examples like these reflect some rational conflict at some level within their subjects. But 
even if this was so, these examples provide ample documentation that evaluative 
judgment does not equal concern. The cognitive account is not supposed to be just an 
account of the rationality of irrationality of concern, but of concern, period. 
Evaluative judgments are not necessary for concern either. One can care for 
something without holding any evaluative belief about it. This is most obvious with 
regard to taste preferences. I prefer (care more for) white wine over red wine, but do not 
believe it to be better in any sense except serving my preference better. And to the extent 
to which I do hold evaluative beliefs about wine they entirely are an upshots of my 
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preferences (or concerns), and thus cannot represent something my preferences are 
responsive of in the first place. Taking this one step further, one can even care for things 
one believes to be bad. One may care for playing gory computer games while feeling this 
to be an entirely worthless activity. Or, we can conceive, as a very general sort of 
counterexample, of creatures who have a value-judgment deficit, unable, for whatever 
reason, to form value-judgments. Still, they may very well be deeply concerned about 
how their lives go, that their projects succeed, that their favorite sport teams win, etc. 
On a whole, the cognitive account does not appear superior after all. Judgment 
alone cannot capture the kind of appraisal inherent in concern. Moreover, the difficulties 
with the cognitive approach reversely mirror the difficulties with the conative approach. 
There the attitude was construed too hot and too indiscriminate; here the attitude is 
construed too cold and too discriminate. And thus despite all the shortcomings of the 
behavioral approach as a general theory of concern or desire, at least on occasion there 
seems to be a tight connection between concern and dispositions for action, a tighter 
connection than the cognitive approach seems to be able to countenance, suggesting that 
the cognitive approach might be going too far in the opposite direction, seeming too 
representational, too cold. The cognitive account cannot be the account I favor, for 
obvious reasons, but I believe it should be apparent that it is plagued by problems that 
can be appreciated quite independently of any particular meta-normative commitments. 
Both the conative and the cognitive account experience severe difficulties in 
handling appraisal, which has led several authors to question whether these are our only 
options. Indeed, if neither the purely conative nor the purely cognitive account offer a 
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satisfactory way of capturing appraisal, perhaps the culprit is the underlying division 
between the cognitive and conative in the first place, which suggests it must be but one or 
the other. This is precisely the diagnosis of Bennett Helm's (2001), blaming the 
traditional cognitive-conative divide to undercut all chances of a satisfactory treatment of 
appraisal, or import, to be forthcoming from the very start. His analysis of the problem of 
appraisal or import has been extraordinarily helpful in my own attempts to come to terms 
with the phenomenon, and I mostly share Helm's pessimistic assessment that conative 
and cognitive accounts alone have the resources to explain import in its full extent. I am 
less sure, however, whether we ought to follow Helm's rejection of the 
conative/cognitive divide, as the divide appears virtually logically inevitable, as Michael 
Smith has convincingly argued (1987), a piece of orthodoxy Helm is keenly aware of. 
More to the point, however, I suspect Helm's own positive account does not really 
transcend the distinction itself, but instead only offers a more sophisticated account of the 
broadly conative sort, which possibly combines some cognitive elements, resulting in 
complex mental states often called besires (J. Altham's term from 1986). Whether this 
ultimately fully resolves the predicament is unclear, which quickly resurfaces as we turn 
our attention inside of the relevant complex states, asking how its various pieces are 
related to each other. 
Anyway, and generalizing from the case of emotions that forms his prime target, 
Helm offers a resourceful solution to how concerns could be at the same time responsive 
to and constitutive of import or appraisal. Individual concerns are supposed to be 
embedded within larger patters of concerns displaying interconnected rational 
commitments. Helm's central claim is "that import is constituted by a pattern of 
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evaluative attitudes with the right sort of principle of positive coherence." (2001 :71) His 
idea of transitional commitments provides a neat example of the kind of rational 
interconnectedness he is after. The forward-looking emotion of hope, for instance that 
one will secure some appointment, is rationally related to the backward-looking emotion 
of relief, as, to continue the example, when one has learned that one has indeed secured 
the appointment. Responding to the realization of one's hopes with relief and 
contentment seems fitting, whereas responding to it with grief and discontentment would 
seem unfitting. "The rationality of this pattern means that a failure to feel an emotion one 
is rationally committed to feeling in virtue of the overall pattern is a failure to respond as 
one ought to the focus of the pattern." (2001 :72) Because of this, Helm holds "import is 
perspectivally subjective insofar as something is intelligible as having import only from a 
particular point of view, which is, moreover, relative to the individual. Such a point of 
view and its relativity to the subject are intelligible in terms of these patterns of emotions . 
.. . Nonetheless ... import is objective in the sense that it is a standard in terms of which 
the warrant of particular emotions is to be assessed and so is conceptual prior to 
particular emotions." (2001 :73-74) As I understand it, the essential idea of Helm's 
proposal is that what we get with overall patterns of emotions and concerns are standards 
against which particular emotions and concerns can be assessed as inappropriate. 
5.9. Appraisal - The Outline of a Solution (or something close 
enough) 
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In Helm's proposal we can recognize the familiar subjectivist strategy, which 
accordingly shall be my strategy as well. The strategy takes its point of departure in the 
recognition that the simple conative account does not work, and in particular that single 
conative attitudes won't give us what we want, in response to which subjectivists propose 
raising the number of attitudes, in the hope that many will achieve in concert what one 
alone was unable to achieve in unison, so long as we manage to interconnect them in the 
right way. To think it possible that some attitude displays the pertinent receptivity 
towards certain features of its object is to think it possible that the attitude be appropriate 
or inappropriate in light of these features. Now we know appropriateness simpliciter is 
not a condition the subjectivist approach can countenance, but the account may still 
explain how we can judge the appropriateness of one attitude relative to others, in light of 
some background norms mediating the interconnection. That a bunch of attitudes alone 
won't resolve the problem, and consequently that we really need to throw some 
background norms into the mix is readily apparent once we realize that what we wish to 
explain is not mere conflict between attitudes but potential inappropriateness of some in 
light of others. If I care for tonight's symphony performance as well as the simultaneous 
boxing match, I have two concerns that cannot be jointly satisfied, but this does not make 
one inappropriate in light of the other. In contrast, if I care for the boxing match while 
also finding myself in the grip of a norm ruling out the enjoyment of violence when more 
refined sorts of entertainment are available, we now have a norm-concern pair which is at 
374 
least formally capable of conferring the status of inappropriateness onto my original pro-
attitude towards watching boxing matches. Desires pulling in opposite directions are 
simply opposing desires, and something else is required to turn mere opposition into 
normative inappropriateness. 
That, in any case, is the outline of the subjectivist strategy, and before I detail it 
further, let me provide a frank assessment of what I take it to achieve and especially what 
I don't take it to achieve. Norm-concern complexes or patterns generate the possibility 
that particular attitudes or concerns embedded within larger structures can come to be 
judged inappropriate on particular occasions, relative to the overall structure, giving rise 
to an "internal" sense of appropriateness going a considerable way towards capturing the 
idea of appraisal, yet quite possibly not all the way. What lies beyond that reach I must 
declare illusionary, and hence my above stated pessimism that we won't be able to fully 
capture import. The remaining gap can be nicely brought out by momentarily returning to 
McDowell's allusion to secondary qualities as a model for thinking about value 
(McDowell 1988). McDowell's idea is that secondary qualities display an intrinsic 
relativity to perceptual states yet that at the same time particular perceptive states could 
be warranted by the presence of particular secondary qualities, and that the involving 
circularity is non-vicious. To use the standard example, colors can be both perception-
relative and perception-warranting according to McDowell. Now there is one respect in 
which this idea works and another in which it does not, exemplifying the more general 
point of how the subjectivist strategy can capture appraisal/import in one respect but not 
another. 
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There are two different ways in which a response could be said to be warranted by 
the presence of some feature, and in particular there are two different 
correctness/incorrectness contrasts, corresponding to what is often called the 
internal/external divide, going all the way back to Camap's discussion on internal and 
external questions in Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology (in Camap 1947). First, 
within our subjective scheme of experiencing color, there is such a thing as experiencing 
particular colors correctly, where something really is red or blue, and where we may 
come to have mistaken experience about it. My particular red-sensation could be correct 
in the sense that it, and not a blue-experience, was called for given my overall color 
scheme (which others fortunately share). And thus McDowell is correct when he writes 
(In Sayre-McCord 1988:168) "an object's being such as to look red is independent of its 
actually looking red to anyone on any particular occasion." But there's another sense in 
which my particular red-sensation could be said to be called for, namely that there was 
something in the object meriting the distinctive colorly response in the first place, where 
the focus now is on the contrast of colorly versus non-colorly response, or alternatively, 
the focus is on the contrast between the traditional colorly response versus some inverted 
colorly response, a feature, namely REDNESS, which the distinctive colorly response 
"correctly" responds to and the non-colorly or inverted colorly response miss. And this 
second sense, I conjecture, is not captured by McDowell's ingenious account, precisely in 
virtue of his insistence on the specific sensation-relativity of colors. The naIve suspicion 
about colors is that we might not have evolved colorly-responses to surface-features in 
the first place, in which case there simply wouldn't have been colors, and that there's 
really nothing out there we would have missed in that alternative scenario, some feature 
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calling for or warranting our present colorly scheme as a whole as opposed to some 
alternative non-colorly scheme or some alternative colorly scheme. Nothing McDowell 
says can ultimately remove the suspicion that the world as such is not colorful, that color 
is nothing but a projection, and all McDowell is capable showing is that there are internal 
rules to the practice of color-perception. Once we are in the color-perceiving business, we 
encounter internal, quasi built-in correctness-conditions giving rise to the possibility of 
mistaken particular color sensations. But there is nothing that would explain how being in 
that business as opposed to being in some different or inverted business is "correct" or 
"warranted" by how things are, nothing warranting being a color-perceiver in the first 
place. 
Returning to concerns and appraisal, something analogous is the case, as we again 
encounter two different ways in which concerns could be said to be called for given some 
situation, and in particular where we encounter two different correctness/incorrectness 
contrasts vis-Ii-vis appraisal. First, within our particular concern-pattern, there is such a 
thing as appraising particular objects correctly. My particular appraisal that something is 
concern-inviting could be correct in the sense that this particular concern, rather than 
some contrary concern, was called for given the overall concern pattern encompassing 
the particular concern. But there's another sense in which my particular concern could be 
said to be called for, and the relevant contrast again is best brought out by considering an 
alternative and inverted concern-pattern, incorporating an altogether different concern-
perspective by systematically altering the original's pro-and con-attitudes. Thus, given 
some situation, whereas within the first pattern a concerned response is called for, within 
the second pattern a concern-inverted response is called for. That the subjectivist 
377 
approach cannot accommodate appraisal in this more demanding sense, where the 
original concern correctly appraises while the inverted concern incorrectly appraises what 
is truly concern-inviting should be clear, prompting a rather straightforward diagnosis of 
what happens in the subjectivist move. What happens is that by shifting the focus from 
individual concerns to concern-patterns the subjectivist also shifts the problem from 
individual concerns to concern-patterns - from how individual concerns may be called 
for to how entire concern-patterns may be called for, at which stage the subjectivist better 
proposes ways of coping with the absence of a complete solution than to pretend, as in 
some old conjuring trick, that his reorientation in focus could suddenly make the problem 
disappear. 
With this important disclaimer, return to the subjectivist strategy for handling 
appraisal, which is built upon a suitable provision of norms governing the interaction of 
particular concerns embedded within larger concern patterns. This is a good moment to 
highlight the remaining element of concern-resilience left out in my previous discussion, 
namely the element of specificity. The goal is to capture the specific appraisal of some 
given concern, and for this purpose not every sort of norm grounding conditions for the 
appropriateness or inappropriateness of the concern will do. The relevant norms must be 
tailored to the specific way in which the relevant concern appraises its object. The reason 
why this is such a hard nut to crack is that there are so many different standards of 
inappropriateness applying to any given concern, many of which appear entirely beside 
the point with regard to the goal of capturing the specific perspective of appraisal, 
standards that are not necessarily illegitimate, but too external to offer any help with the 
present task. 
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An example will illustrate the problem best, namely the attitude of amusement 
containing an appraisal of funniness, an attitude at first appearing ill-fit for the format of 
concern until we think of amusement as a particular way of not being indifferent at 
funniness, as a concern to be amused by funny things. In any case, there are many norms 
governing what to be amused by and what not to be amused by that offer no help 
whatsoever for capturing the specific appraisal of funniness, some of these norms 
recognizably moral in tone, such as the norm not to find highly offensive jokes amusing. 
Yet as anyone knows, there are plenty of funny jokes which are morally outrageous, and 
no civilized person would dare to respond to them with amusement in public. All the 
same, some of these evil jokes are quite funny, and amusement is the internally fitting 
response, displaying exactly the right sort of appreciation of funniness characterizing the 
specific sort of appraisal inherent in amusement. The moralist exhibiting not the slightest 
hint of amusement at the evil joke is probably a very good person indeed, but also quite 
probably not of the particularly humorous sort, suffering from some sort of funniness-
blindness as it were. Thus, amusement can be justifiably judged inappropriate and off-
target in ways that have nothing to do with the specific appraisal we are trying to capture. 
And with that example I believe the general point becomes apparent at an instance. What 
we need are not just norms explaining how some concern could be inappropriate, but how 
it could be inappropriate in the right sort of way. 
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5.10. The Concern for Recognition 
Let me try to put all this together, by addressing one particular instance: The 
concern for recognition, meaning by recognition the notion which is part of the 
conceptual ballpark containing notions such as approval, praise, esteem, appreciation, and 
so on, rather than part of the different conceptual ballpark containing notions such as 
knowledge, belief, representation, awareness, and so on. Recognition resembles a form of 
honest yet muted praise. The difference between a representational and esteeming sense 
of recognition, as we may call it, can often be paraphrased in terms of recognition-to-be 
versus recognition-as: I recognize Josef Mengele - Doctor Death - to be a ruthless 
medical practitioner, but I do not recognize Mengele as a ruthless medical practitioner, 
since this represents no distinction in virtue of which I could come to hold him in any 
esteem. It is interesting to note that this ambiguity appears to be a problem of English; the 
German equivalent for esteeming recognition, Annerkennung, displays no such 
ambiguity, clearly separated from the term Erkenntnis denoting representational 
recognition. 
Before outlining standards underwriting the concern for (esteeming) recognition, I 
need to mention an important disclaimer. What follows is not intended to uncover the 
nature of recognition as it necessarily is of concern to every rational creature, but pursues 
instead the more modest goal of lying bare a particularly interesting kind of it, perhaps 
even a prototypical kind, that is of great concern to (most of) us. This point is even more 
important to stress since recognition is complex, and no single instance of recognition is 
an instance of a single kind of recognition; recognition arises on different levels and in 
different shapes: for instance, recognition for a deed and recognition for a person are, 
though conceptually distinct, intimately tied up with each other. My hope in what follows 
is that the reader will recognize, in a representational manner, a sufficient number of the 
kinds of observations I unearthed from my own autobiography in his as well, or at least 
find them helpful in directing his attention to some similar patterns. What matters to my 
argument is that individual by individual, some similar kinds of norm-concern patterns 
are discernible in order to support my claim that such patterns can accommodate 
appraisal to the desired degree, and this end does not require that the same pattern is 
discernible in each individual, though I rather doubt that we are altogether different in our 
regard for recognition together with its underwriting principles. 
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A concern for recognition is one of the most fundamental concerns many of us 
have, inextricably bound up with our social nature. It's centrality to our identity and 
dignity has been noted by many authors, many inspired by the writing of Hegel 
(1988:127-156). I am here simply going to take for granted the profound importance 
recognition has for (most of) us. The question I wish to focus on is what larger (yet not 
too large) package of norms and concerns we can identify to ground the right kind of 
appropriateness conditions for particular recognition-related concern-occasions, patterns 
explaining how concrete concerns to be recognized on particular occasions may contain 
an appraisal of the relevant situation as recognition-inviting, patterns explaining, in other 
words, how concrete concerns may exhibit the sense of responsiveness subjectivists 
aspire to accommodate too. Part of the answer can be extracted from attending the 
recognition-complex more closely. Recognition is necessarily discriminatory; not 
everything can mandate recognition just as not everyone can win. Moreover, when we 
care for recognition on particular occasions, it is from concrete persons for concrete 
accomplishments we wish to be recognized, and consequently, there is a who and a what, 
or a source and an object, with regard to which specific appropriateness conditions can be 
identified. Turn first to the question who we can sensibly wish to be recognized by. 
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"Significant others," Charles Taylor suggests (1992:32), and clearly seems correct 
in insisting that not just everyone can feature as a proper supplier of recognition, as a 
source of recognition as I chose to call it (add another terminological stipulation: call the 
recipient of recognition, the person who wishes to be recognized, the recipient). In this 
regard recognition differs from respect, which is owed to everyone, irrespective of 
familiarity, virtue and accomplishment, and which, unlike recognition, is 
characteristically non-discriminatory in this regard (respect may be discriminatory in 
other regards). To be more specific, there are various source-related restrictions, three of 
which I shall discuss here, beginning with a first class which stems from the rich 
interaction between our concern for recognition and our concern for the enjoyment of 
meaningful relationships, a subject broached earlier. People we are completely indifferent 
towards, with whom we neither enjoy nor seek reciprocal relationships, usually form 
improper sources of recognition. The explanation why is complex. There seems to be a 
reciprocal element in recognition, a give and take, and without bestowing concern onto 
someone expectations for returns in terms of recognition are out of balance. There is also 
the famous Master-Slave dialectic: the worth the recipient awards to recognition appears 
bound up with the worth he awards to the source, and indifference towards the latter 
infects the former with indifference as well - more on this momentarily. In any case, 
should one nonetheless be accosted by a forceful concern for being recognized by a total 
stranger, for instance getting worked up by whether ones distant neighbors recognize one 
as the great stamp collector one is, then, absent some plausible story, the concern appears 
internally unfitting, perhaps even pathological, lacking the sufficient tie with a 
corresponding relationship-related concern. One would wonder: Why does that matter to 
you, for neither do you care much about them nor do they care much about you and your 
stamps? Notice the required presence of some relationship between source and recipient 
needs not go very deep. The professional athlete cares for recognition by his anonymous 
fans; the athlete cannot be totally indifferent towards his fans, however, and still expect 
his concern for recognition to remain intelligible. 
This source-related restriction is further highlighted when we view things from 
the supplier standpoint whose recognition is sought after. I often find myself in situations 
(e.g. plane-travel conversations) where I wish my interlocutor would not try so hard to 
gain my recognition for some pet-project of his. What is called for is tolerance, polite 
interest, refusal to pass judgment, or some such, but the further request for recognition 
appears to be going too far. Perhaps it must be admitted that every person at least 
potentially provides an intelligible and proper source of recognition; but if so, the reply 
would be that it is also true that every person is at least potentially a participant of a 
reciprocal relationship. The emphasis on potential really matters, since the famous strain 
of involvement (Strawson 1962) which renders pathological the desire to get personally 
involved with everyone also renders pathological the desire for recognition from 
everyone. 
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It is interesting to note, in this context, that the interaction between the two types 
of concern, pertaining to recognition and relationship, goes in both directions, where we 
wish to be recognized by those we care about, but also where our insipient concern for 
fostering a reciprocal relationship with someone is somewhat tied up with the reasonable 
expectation to be recognized by them. Again the reciprocal element in recognition neatly 
explains this. When a lover offers an "anonymous" favor for her beloved subject, sending 
a poem without return address, for instance, it is usually hoped by the sender that the 
initial aura of anonymity is dispelled at some point, ideally in an accidental manner 
unprompted by the lover herself, and it is hoped that the beloved appreciates the favor-
done-by-the-lover. Should the addressee find the poem mediocre at best, an 
embarrassment in style and composition, it would be safe to predict some (possibly 
diminishing) effects on the infatuation of the sender. Contrary to the stereotype, love, or 
at least romantic love, is usually anything but selfless, and one important respect in which 
this is so has to do with the need to be recognized by those one loves. 
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Another source-related restriction has to do with expertise and the kind of 
reverence that is usually associated with it. When a naturalist discovers some peculiarities 
in the mating behavior of a rare species of birds, recognition by his fellow birders is 
going to matter incomparably more to him than by people unable of telling apart a 
sparrow from a finch. Seeking recognition by his peers displaying the appropriate 
expertise represents an intelligible concern; seeking the same recognition by some know-
nothings birdwise does not. A yet further source-related restriction, a hybrid between 
recognition-related norms pertaining to the who and norms pertaining to the what, the 
object, has to do with the source's attitude toward the object of concern. The concern to 
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be recognized by someone is intelligible only to the extent to which the source does also 
care for, or could intelligibly be brought to care for, what one wishes to be recognized 
for. Suppose a family-member of an ardent videogame player despises violent computer 
games. Desiring of his relative to recognize his acquired skill to kill a great number of 
virtual aliens within short periods of time would seem unfitting; not just would it be 
unwise and offensive for the player to brag about that skill in the presence of his relative 
(bragging is an action, an altogether different affair), but it would be unreasonable for the 
player to want his relative to recognize the skill; a verdict that would have been quite 
different had the concern for recognition been directed towards one of the player's own 
video-gaming-buddies. 
Tum then to the object-side of recognition, the what for which we care to be 
recognized. Recognition-based norms pertaining to the object are no harder to find than 
those pertaining to the source. First, and rather boringly, the object must exist, or better, 
the particular states of affairs one desires recognition for must be a fact. One cannot 
intelligible care to be recognized for what one is not or for what one has not done. A 
second and more interesting object-related restriction has to do with the recipients' own 
attitudes towards the object of recognition: the object must matter to them, must be 
something they care about and are not indifferent towards. Consider a recipient who, 
regarding some matter as entirely trivial and unnoteworthy, such as his capacity acquired 
by watching too much TV to detect patterns in which commercials follow which, a 
capacity he himself considers indicative of bad habits, nothing to be proud of, 
nonetheless finds in himself a firm concern to be recognized for that capacity. This 
would be completely out of place. Not minding about something and yet minding to be 
recognized for it is, if not straightforwardly contradictory, quite out of order. As a 
consequence, changes in our regard for certain objects must properly be matched by 
changes in our recognition-related desires as well. It makes no sense for a sprinter to 
uphold his desire for recognition of his victory after he has learned that his opponents did 
not try very hard, conspiring perhaps to let him win the race to lift up his spirits after a 
series of losses; or for a doctor for curing a famous patient after she has learned that by 
doing so she only gave the dictator more days of practicing cruelly; or for the researcher 
for synthesizing a virus after she has learned that thereby she caused a pandemic. 
The interaction between ones regard for some object and ones desire to be 
recognized for it is usually subtle and evolves gradually over time. Consider a filmmaker 
who desires to be recognized as an artist, and not merely as an entertainer. Then, driven 
by that desire into the arts scene, and gaining greater exposition to it, he comes to find it 
difficult to place his work in any conversation with what he finds there. Moreover, 
coming to regard their preoccupations as overblown and out of touch, his initial grand 
esteem for the higher arts slowly fades. Finally he (mostly) contents himself with being 
an entertainer and to be recognized only as such. And yet the development of his desire 
might not yet have caught up, where there remains a small residue of a desire for 
recognition as an artist which he cannot fully expunge, which, given his new views about 
the arts are really sincere and wholehearted, he himself must regard as a glitch, a 
regrettable failure to escape the shadow of a discredited evaluative framework. 
Somewhat harder to document, thought quite plausible, is a third and cultural 
element guiding our concern for recognition, a natural extension of the fact that both 
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source and recipient must hold a positive outlook on the object of recognition. Usually, 
though not always, appreciation of the object of recognition must be more widely shared, 
by one's peers, by one's social group, or even by one's society at large. This could be so 
in part because the source comprises a multitude of people; but often the social dimension 
seems to go beyond that, providing a background against which particular concerns for 
recognition become intelligible. Consider recognition for being a great scholar. Being a 
scholar designates a recognition-apt social type in terms of which even people with little 
sense for scholarship can find the desire for recognition intelligible. Their applause in a 
ceremony awarding an academic distinction to a scholar for her excellent work on late 
Roman poetry makes sense even though late Roman poetry means absolutely nothing to 
them. It is part of a larger cultural context distinguishing some but not other activities and 
pursuits as worthy of recognition. 
The example of recognition can also serve to highlight norm-irrelevancy in 
addition to norm-relevancy with regard to capturing appraisal, documenting the force of 
the cautionary notes from above pertaining to the diversity and particularity of concerns. 
Suppose a stoic, striving to gain maximal independence from the opinion of others, seeks 
to expunge or disown all desire for recognition. In the struggle between a desire for social 
independence and for social dependence and involvement, seeing no easy reconciliation, 
the stoic resolves to firmly come down on the side of independence at the total expense of 
social involvement. Still, his general contempt of recognition need not diagnose a 
recognition-specific fault in his particular desires for recognition on particular occasions, 
which I doubt even a stoic can fully silence. The stoic, too, should admit that there are 
proper and improper cases of recognition qua recognition, cases that correctly and 
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incorrectly appraise their object as fit for recognition, but only decries recognition as a 
discredited phenomenon (nice try!). Emperor Nero was internally mistaken to sing his 
own praise while burning down much of Rome, a deed calling forth no praise, while 
Mark Aurelius' victories in Germania were fit for recognition. Or suppose, to take a 
second example, a Christian despising pride as the most serious of the seven deadly sins, 
considering, moreover, the desire for recognition to be nothing but a dressed up form of 
pride. Still, such general condemnation of recognition does not necessarily invalidate any 
particular case of recognition as a proper case of recognition, but only invalidates 
recognition for external and quite recognition-unrelated reasons. The Christian too should 
admit that though sinful, Michelangelo's desire for recognition for his extraordinary 
decorations of the Sistine Chapel is internally fitting; in stark contrast to had 
Michelangelo sought recognition for his abrasive character. In this latter case 
Michelangelo would have been guilty on two counts, not just one: harboring a desire both 
sinful and unfitting. Thus, while the stoic and the Christian consider their reservations 
about recognition legitimate, they must also acknowledge that there is a sense in which 
those reservations do not really speak to recognition as such. 
I have thus outlined three source-related and three object-related norms governing 
the concern for recognition, none of which provide necessary conditions, all of which are 
negotiable with regard to their details, and yet when they apply in concert, they seem to 
give us something of a paradigmatic case of a proper concern for recognition. Suppose I 
have achieved something truly astonishing which profoundly matters to me, my peers, 
and my friends. I am fully invested in the relevant project and people. With all the right 
sort of connections in place between my concern for recognition, my other concerns, as 
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well as other people and their concerns, the concern presents itself as responsive to an 
invitation for recognition, containing an appraisal of its object as fit for recognition. This 
hopefully adds plausibility to my claim that the complex norm-concern cluster 
underwriting recognition has the capacity of accommodating the appraisal internal to my 
concrete concern of recognition, providing an instance for the more general claim that 
complex norm-concern clusters can accommodate appraisal. 
This concludes my discussion of concerns, and my discussion of practical 
deliberation consistent with meta-normative skepticism. I presented a revisionary account 
of deliberation as a very sophisticated form of norm-guided motivation with the aim of 
accommodating core features of practical deliberation. I first rejected the fictionalist 
proposal for how to respond to skepticism as inferior to the revisionist alternative, 
arguing that fictionalism, once fully worked out, is going to lead us right to the very 
doorsteps of revisionism, in the process rendering superfluous the twisted fictionalist 
attitude of make-believing in a reality truly disbelieved. I then presented the challenge 
that without a normative account· there cannot be an adequate deliberative account, the 
challenge, in particular, that revisionary subjectivism cannot accommodate the notion of 
correct deliberation essential to any deliberation worth the name. To this I responded by 
aiming to show how the subjectivist can accommodate correctness-permitting 
deliberation from within, by helping himself to norms underwriting the deliberative 
process, norms void of normative authority for sure yet nonetheless generating formal 
correctness conditions which, in conjunction with motivational force acquired through 
our commitments, enable a form of practical deliberation incorporating internal 
correctness and incorrectness conditions. Thereby I presented deliberation as a very 
sophisticated form of motivational capacity, a move prone to ralse some eyebrows, 
calling for the section trying to justify the subjectivist's turn to the motivational. 
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The second half of the chapter was dedicated to a close discussion of concerns, 
one core component engendering deliberation. Attending to concerns more closely 
revealed an astonishing degree of complexity and richness, which, despite the long 
noticed importance of desires and concerns for practical deliberation, has not always 
received adequate treatment in the literature. Concerns are unruly fellows, displaying an 
intriguing set of properties including diversity, specificity, particularity, and synchronic 
and diachronic stability. Moreover, concerns appeared to contain an element of appraisal, 
where there often seems, in the relevant object, an element of invitation drawing in the 
concern, such that concern do not present themselves as a mere blind reaction aroused by 
certain aspects of their objects, but as a receptivity to their attractiveness, which in turn 
explains why it might be possible to construe the concern as something occasionally 
called-for by the attractiveness of the relevant feature, as something that can be 
appropriate or inappropriate depending on whether the feature is in fact attractive. In 
light of this, my goal was to accommodate the element of appraisal in a manner 
consistent with skepticism. The final section then presented a case study of concern - the 
concern for recognition - designed to illustrate how the subjectivist can capture appraisal. 
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